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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 04 August 2017
The Carolingians regarded much of Italy as a military frontier following their overthrow of the Lombard kingdom in 776. Although there was little national Lombard resistance to Frankish rule, other factors — which will be noted later — forced the Franks to keep up their military establishment in Italy. In some ways this military establishment followed the pattern of Carolingian arrangements in other conquered territories, in other ways the Italian situation was quite unique. Since the Carolingian failure to solve the problem of Italian unity was in at least a degree due to the Carolingian failure to meet the challenge of the Italian military frontier, the study of this problem throws some interesting light on the turbulent conditions in northern and central Italy before and after its incorporation in the German Holy Roman Empire.
1 For other studies of medieval frontiers, see Bishko, Charles Julian, ‘The Medieval Frontier,’ a paper read at a session of the American Historical Association in December, 1955; Lewis, Archibald R., ‘The Closing of the Medieval Frontier, 1250-1350,’ Speculum 33 (1958) 475–83; Mikesell, M. W., ‘Comparative Studies in Frontier History,’ Annals of the Association of American Geographers (March 1960); and Gerhard, Dietrich, ‘The Frontier in Comparative View,’ Comparative Studies in Society and History, I (March 1959), 205-29.Google Scholar
2 Romano, G., Le Dominazioni Barbariche in Italia (395-888), Storia Politica d'Italia, 4 (Milan 1940) 512–41; Hartmann, Ludo Moritz, Geschichte Italiens im Mittelalter, 3, 1: Italien und die Fränkische Herrschaft (Gotha 1908) 34-40; Salvatorelli, Luigi, L'Italia Mediœvale (Milan 1938) 435-44; Dümmler, E., ‘Über die südostlichen Marken des fränkischen Reichs unter den Karolingern (795-905),’ Archiv für Kunde österreichischer Geschichtsquellen, 10 (1853) 1-85. Additional material on the March of Friuli together with an indication of the additional territory included in the Carolingian march which was not included in the Lombard duchy may be found in Paschini, Pio, Storia del Friuli, 2nd ed., 2 vols. (Udine 1953) 1, 140-142. Ferdinando Gabotto concludes that the chief Carolingian duchies were Tuscany, Emilia, Austria, Neustria, and the Maritime Coast with capitals Lucca, Spoleto, Treviso, Milan and Embrun, respectively. The exact relation between march and duchy is not clear. “‘IDucati” dell'Italia Carolingica,’ Bollettino Storico-Bibliografico Subalpino 14 (1909) 313-20. For dynastic detail see Hofmeister, Adolf, ‘Markgrafen und Markgraftschaften im Italischen Königreich in der Zeit von Karl dem Grossen bis auf Otto den Grossen (774-962)’ Mitteillungen des Instituts für österreichische Geschichtsforschung, 7 (Innsbruck 1907) 215-428.Google Scholar
3 Paul the Deacon, History of the Langobards, tr. Foulke, William Dudley (Philadelphia 1907); Hartmann, , op. cit., 2 1: Römer und Langobarden bis zur Theilung Italiens (Gotha 1900) 34-50.Google Scholar
4 Liutprand 62, Ratchis 10 and 11 (Leges Langobardorum , ed. Bluhme, F., MGH Leges, IV). Drew, K. F., ‘Class Distinctions in Eighth Century Italy,’ Rice Institute Pamphlet 39 (Oct. 1952) 80–89.Google Scholar
5 Almagia, Roberto, L'Italia, 2 vols. (Turin 1959) 2. 1086ff; Mor, Carlo Guido, L'Età Feudale (Milan 1952) 1. 136-157.Google Scholar
6 Ross, James Bruce, ‘Two Neglected Paladins of Charlemagne, Erich of Friuli, and Berold of Bavaria,’ Speculum 20 (1945) 212–35. Some material can be found in Dümmler, Ernst ‘Über die südostlichen Marken des fränkischen Reiches unter den Karolingern (795-907)’; Archiv für österreichischer Geschichtsquellen, Bd. 10 (Vienna 1853) 1-85, although this work is primarily concerned with the Ost-Mark created in the old Roman province of Pannonia after Erich's defeat of the Avars.Google Scholar
7 For reproductions of weapons found in Lombard graves, see Åberg, Nils, Die Goten und Langobarden in Italien (Upsala 1923) 94–103. Mr. Åberg's treatment is that of the cultural anthropologist interested in the most minute description of the ornament type revealed by various grave finds which, although interesting, offers relatively little to the historian interested in weapons in general and not one find in particular.Google Scholar
8 Aistulf 2.Google Scholar
9 Aistulf 3.Google Scholar
10 Evidently the Lombards did not use the stirrup and this may account for their easy defeat by the Franks who were in the process of revolutionizing their military tactics following the adoption of this new technological device in the early eighth century. However, such an explanation remains speculation. See White, Lynn Jr., ‘The Medieval Roots of Modern Technology and Science,’ Perspectives in Medieval History (Chicago 1963).Google Scholar
11 Inheritance of office, unlike inheritance of personal or family property, was not recognized by the Lombards. On the national level, the kings were chosen by the assembled voice of ‘the people,’ and in effect were usually competent members of the ruling family (but not necessarily eldest sons). The dukes were appointed by the king, and although the tendency toward hereditary tenure of the duchies was strong, especially in Spoleto and Benevento, a strong Lombard ruler had always been able to make his will effective when a duchy fell vacant. The Carolingian rulers of Italy had only to accept Lombard custom in this matter to obtain in time an entirely Frankish official aristocracy.Google Scholar
12 By the time of Charles the Fat in the later part of the ninth century, it was provided that everyone who was rich enough to have one must come to the army mounted on a horse. Edictum Pistense , MGH Capitularia Regum Francorum , II, N°. 273, ch. 26 (a. 864) 321.Google Scholar
13 Capitulare Missorum in Theodonis Villa datum secundum, generale , MGH Capitularia Regum Francorum , I, N°. 44, Ch. 6 (a. 805) 123.Google Scholar
14 Memoratorium de exercitu in Gallia occidentali praeparando, N°. 48, Ch. 2 (a. 807) 134, and Capitulare de exercitu promovendo, N°. 50, Ch. 1 (a. 808) 136. Slightly different arrangements were made for the Saxons and Frisians: Capitula de causis diversis, N°. 49, Chs. 2 and 3 (a. 807?) 136.Google Scholar
15 Capitulare Aquisgranense, N°. 77, Ch. 9 (a. 801-813) 170. For greater detail on Charlemagne's military arrangements and some speculation about the unsuccessful attempt to introduce use of the bow and arrow, see Oman, Charles W., A History of the Art of War in the Middle Ages (Boston and New York 1922) 1. 75-82 and Delbrück, Hans, Geschichte der Kriegskunst, 3 (Berlin 1907) 27-57. Also see Lot, Ferdinand, L'Art Militaire et les Armées au, Moyen Age en Europe et dans le Proche Orient, 1 (Paris 1946) 74-118 (Professor Lot argues that the Frankish army was predominantly cavalry by the end of the eighth century).Google Scholar
16 Capitulare Bononiense, N°. 74, Ch. 8 (a. 811) 166.Google Scholar
17 Capitulare Haristallense, No. 20, Ch. 14 (a. 779) 50.Google Scholar
18 Memoratorium de exercitu in Gallia occidentali praeparando, N°. 48, Ch. 1 (a. 807) 134; Capitulare missorum de exercitu promovendo, N°. 50, Chs. 1 and 4 (a. 808) 136-37; and Capitulare Bononiense, N°. 74, Chs. 7 and 9 (a. 811) 166.Google Scholar
19 The strength of this custom and the ambitions of Lothair's brothers, especially Charles the Bald, are recounted by Nithard, , Histoire des fils de Louis le Pieux, ed. and tr. by Lauer, Ph. (Paris 1926).Google Scholar
20 Drew, K. F., ‘The Immunity in Carolingian Italy,’ Speculum 37 (1962) 182–97.Google Scholar
21 The effects of the Hungarian raids seem to have been temporarily more destructive than those of the Saracens if we can judge from the charters of the period which survive. The range of their depredations took the Hungarians into central Lombardy and south to the Apennines. The following charters were all issued in order to confirm rights which had become uncertain because the charters granting them had been ‘lost’ during the Hungarian invasions: in March, 901, Louis III confirmed its rights and properties to the Church of Vercelli through an inquest of those living around (Schiaparelli, L., I Diplomi Italiani di Lodovico III e di Rodolfo II [Rome 1910]X 30-34); Louis III to the Church of Bergamo in March, 901, XI 34-36; Berengarius I in January 904 to the Church of Reggio (granting a new holding to compensate it for depredations and fires suffered from the Hungarians) (Schiaparelli, L., I Diplomi di Berengario I [Rome 1903] XLII 122-24); Berengarius I in 904(?) confirmed to the Church of Aquileia its privileges lost in a fire or destroyed by the pagans, XLIX 142-43; Berengarius I in June 905 confirmed to the monastery of the Holy Resurrection at Piacenza the possessions and privileges documents for which were lost during the invasion of the Hungarians, LV 155-58; in March 912 Berengarius I confirmed to the Church of Padua all earlier privileges proofs for which were lost during the fire and invasion of the Hungarians, LXXXII 220-22; in September 916 Berengarius I ceded certain fiscal rights to the Church of Cremona to compensate it for losses suffered during the invasion of the Hungarians, CXII 285-89; in October 921 Berengarius I confirmed the possessions and privileges of the Patriarch of Aquileia proofs for which had been lost in fire and from invasion of the Hungarians, CXXXVI 348-51.Google Scholar
22 A detailed study of the Hungarian invasions, with some notice of the castle-building stimulated thereby, is to be found in Fasoli, Gina, Le Incursione ungare in Europa nel secolo X (Florence 1945).Google Scholar
23 The best work on Italian castles located by this writer is Cusin, Fabio, ‘Per la Storia del Castello Medioevale,’ Revista Storica Italiana, 4 (1939) 491–542. Professor Cusin is, however, interested in the castle as a constitutional entity, not as a means of military defense. Some inadequate information on Italian castles of this period may be found in d'Auverne, Edmund, Famous Castles and Palaces of Italy (London, n. d.). For the activities of John VIII against the Saracens and ultimate failure of the Italians to prevent establishment of a permanent Saracen camp at Garigliano, see Engreen, Fred E., ‘Pope John the Eighth and the Arabs,’ Speculum 20 (1945) 318-30. For a more detailed treatment of the entire problem of Arabic expansion in Italy and its associated islands down to about 875, see Lokys, Georg, Die Kämpfe der Araber mit den Karolingern bis zum Tode Ludwigs II (Heidelberg 1906). Louis II seems to have been able to accomplish much in rallying the defenses of the entire Italian peninsula against the Saracens in western and southern Italy, succeeding even in driving the Saracens from their fortified port at Bari. Chronic jealousy on the part of the semi-independent southern Italian princes and Louis II's death without a male heir, however, doomed Italy to a period of governmental breakdown during which the Saracens were able to operate unchecked in the west and the Hungarians would soon appear out of the east.Google Scholar
24 E. g., Louis III granted two towers to the Church of Cremona in 902 (Schiaparelli, Luigi, I Diplomi italiani di Lodovico III e di Rodolfo II, Rome 1910) 53–56, and in 900-901 he granted the castle of Ascona to the Church of Como, 3, 88-89; in 903 Berengarius I ceded a castle to the Monastery of S. Salvatore di Tolla (Schiaparelli, Luigo, I Diplomi di Berengario I, XXXVIII 111-114); in 904 Berengarius I confirmed to the Church of Modena a castle near Nova, XLVI 132-33; in 904 Berengarius I confirmed possession of its castles to the Church of Asti, LI 146-49; in 912 the Bishop of Padua was granted the right to build castles in his diocese, LXXXII 220-22; in 911 Berengarius I permitted the Bishop of Reggio-Emilia to build a fortification (castrum) in one of his parishes, LXXV 206-208; about 911-915 Berengarius ceded to the vicedominus of the Church of Novara the right to build castles in the places called Pernate, Terdabbiate, Cameri and Galliate, CII 266-68; all the castles of the Bishopric of Cremona were taken under the royal protection by Berengarius in 916, CXII 285-89; Berengarius in 921 ceded the Castle of Pozzuolo in Cividale to the Patriarch of Aquileia, CXXXVI 348-51; in 924 Rudolph II gave to one of his faithful followers (fidelis) the Castel Vecchio of Asti (I Diplomi italiani di Lodovico II e di Rodolfo II) X 122-25. In 926 King Hugh confirmed to the Church of Asti exemption from taxes for its castles (I Diplomi di Ugo e di Lotario, di Berengario II e di Adalberto [Rome, 1924]) IV 14; in 931 Hugh ceded to the Church of Aquileia the castle of Muggia located on the seashore in the County of Istria, XXVIII 85-87; in 951 Berengarius II and Adalbert ceded the right of justice for a number of castles to the Church of Modena, II, 294-96.Google Scholar
25 I Diplomi di Berengario I, LXV, 176–78.Google Scholar
26 Ibid. LXXXIV, 224–26.Google Scholar
27 Ibid. XCIV, 249–50.Google Scholar
28 Ibid. XC, 281–83. Further examples could be noted: in 904 Berengarius I permitted the city of Bergamo to defend itself by rebuilding its walls, towers, and other defensive works under the leadership of its bishop (I Diplomi di Berengario I, XLVII, 134-40); in 911 Berengarius permitted Leo, vicedominus of the Church of Nova, and other men of the city, to erect a castle (castrum), defensive towers (propugnacula) and platforms (bertiscae) for assault (ad expugnandum) (LXXVI, 208-10); in 922 Berengarius permitted a priest of the Church of Aquileia to fortify his castle with apertures (meruli) and defensive towers (propugnacula), elevated platforms (bertisci) and ditches (fossatta) (CXXXVII, 315-54); in 938 Kings Hugh and Lothair gave the Castelvecchio of Asti with its walls (mura) and ditches (fossata) to the Church of Asti (I Diplomi di Ugo e di Lotario, di Berengario II e di Adalberto, L, 150-52); and in 948 King Lothair granted to his faithful (fidelis) Varemondo the right to construct on his own property towers (turri) and castles (castella) with apertures (meruli) and defensive towers (propugnacula) and with every apparatus of war (omni bellico apparatu) (ibid., X, 274-76).Google Scholar
