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Causal dispositionalism in behaviour genetics

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 September 2023

María Cerezo Open the ORCID record for María Cerezo [Opens in a new window]
María Cerezo*
Affiliation:
Department of Logic and Theoretical Philosophy, Complutense University of Madrid, Madrid, Spain macere03@ucm.es; https://philpeople.org/profiles/maria-cerezo
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Abstract

Causal dispositionalism developed in metaphysics of science offers a useful tool to conceptualize shallow causes in behaviour genetics, in a way such that (a) it accounts for complex aetiology and heterogeneity of effects, and (b) genetic causal contribution can be considered to be explanatory. Genes are thus causal powers that make a difference.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 46 , 2023 , e188
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press

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