This chapter considers the ECJ procedure and, in particular, the length of time required for cases to be heard, especially in proceedings pertaining to the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, an area in which the saying ‘justice delayed, justice denied’ has particular force. It examines in particular the new urgent procedure, conceived in order to enable the Court to decide a case falling under the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice within an expedited time-frame. It concludes that, while undue haste should be avoided, lengthy time-frames for court proceedings are more often than not a sign of poor case management. The Area of Freedom, Security and Justice provides a special incentive for the ECJ to be vigilant as regards the length of court proceedings.

This chapter examines the recent decision by the European Court of Justice in Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation. It is a response to criticism that the ECJ’s judgment, in providing for the review of EC measures implementing UN Security Council resolutions, undermines the authority of public international law. Instead of committing itself to international law and institutions at all cost, the ECJ concerns itself with the constitutional repercussions from national constitutional courts (in the case of failure to protect fundamental rights). Important as the relationship between EC law and international law is, there is a clear sense that the ECJ is responsible to, and will ultimately be held to account by, the courts and constitutions of the Member States of the European Union.

The EU’s ‘Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’ is a hugely important area covering criminal law, terrorism, immigration, visa control and civil justice, as well as the massive area of free movement of persons. What is clear, however, is that measures which fall within its scope have the capacity to alienate EU citizens rather than making them feel aware of their European identity in a positive sense. This chapter examines some of the measures taken by the EU in this broad field which cause particular concern, namely a lack of democratic and legal accountability as well as inadequate regard to human rights. It focuses in particular on two areas in which human rights protection in the EU has been undermined. The first is in the field of data protection. The second is in the field of suspects’ rights, particularly in the context of the European arrest warrant. The chapter concludes by considering why so many restrictions on freedom have been allowed to come about and suggests some possible solutions.

This chapter begins by considering the challenges posed to the harmonisation of intellectual property law at the European level by the very different ways in which the law of intellectual property is viewed across Europe. It then goes on to review the various global and historical initiatives in the arena of intellectual property law harmonisation before running through the different areas of intellectual property law—trade marks, designs, copyright and patents—and examining the ways in which each of these has been dealt with at the European level, both by the European Union and by other Europe-wide bodies. In effect, the way in which intellectual property law has been addressed by the European Union represents a microcosm of the various possible approaches to harmonisation. As regards the prospect of future harmonisation of intellectual property law by the European Union, it is hoped that a wide and wise view of the issues will be taken, in order that public confidence in the Community’s intellectual property regime may be both justified and strengthened.

This chapter examines the recent controversial decisions of the ECJ in Viking and Laval, focusing on how they are likely to be applied in practice. Firstly, it considers the rules regarding the applicable forum and the procedures for going to court in the UK, then it looks at when it can be said that an employer’s economic rights under EU law have been engaged and when there has been a ‘restriction’ on those rights. It goes on to address the core issue of the circumstances in which a ‘restriction’ on the relevant EU economic right pursues a ‘legitimate aim’ and then considers the key battleground in future cases falling under Viking and Laval, namely whether the industrial action is ‘proportionate’. Finally, it addresses an important, but unresolved, issue: the extent to which industrial action in breach of Articles 43 or 49 EC could give rise to liability in damages.

There is a distinction between exclusionary and exploitative abuse. An exploitative abuse directly harms customers whilst an exclusionary abuse may indirectly harm consumers. Whilst the EC Commission expresses the objective of Article 82 EC as enhancing consumer welfare, its review of the application of Article 82 EC and its 2008 Guidance on enforcement priorities is limited to exclusionary abuses and excludes consideration of exploitative abuses. This chapter argues that exploitation—direct harm to the customer—is a necessary element of an Article 82 EC infringement. However, mere exploitation does not demonstrate harm to competition and without the latter exploitation should not be prohibited by Article 82 EC. It thus advocates a fusion of the exclusionary and exploitative analysis.

This chapter examines the efforts in Europe and and the UK to deal with the problem of people-trafficking. As readers will see, it is in five Sections. The first sets the scene by explaining what ‘people-trafficking’ is, and outlining the history of international attempts to repress it and to relieve its human consequences. The second describes the recent legislative attempts to deal with it in Europe, and in particular, the EU Framework Decision of 2002. The third examines the UK legislation enacted with the aim—not entirely accurate, as we shall see—of implementing it. The fourth looks at the way the UK legislation is working. And the final section concludes with two general reflections. It is based on a study carried out in 2007 for ECLAN, the European Criminal Law Academic Network. Any reader who reaches the end with a thirst for further knowledge will find further refreshment in the book that resulted from the ECLAN study, which was published earlier this year.

The aim of this chapter is to assess what, if anything, administrative law can demonstrate about multi-level administration in the European Union and the United States. The particular focus of the examination is not on the content of administrative law in each legal order, but rather on the impact of EU and US federal administrative law on the Member States and US States respectively. It will be seen that, while US federal administrative law has primarily only influential effect on US States, EU administrative law is often binding on Member States. This observation challenges presumptions often made, particularly in political science, as to the degrees of inter-penetration in administration in the EU and the US. It will be argued that the cause of divergence is largely derived from differing judicial attitudes as to the fundamental tenets of the co-operation between the different levels of administration, and indeed, more general understandings of federalism in the two jurisdictions. In this way, this study also provides a useful prism through which to consider integration in the EU and US more broadly.

This chapter explores the relationship between tort law and criminal law. In particular it tracks one line of developments in the procedural co-ordination of criminal and civil law: the ability of criminal courts to award compensation for harm. It is a study of legal change or development: how and why law has evolved from the middle of the nineteenth century through to the present day. The chapter is also comparative, looking at the English and Spanish legal systems. The history of powers to compensate has highlighted two fundamentally different ways to resolve claims based on a concurrently tortious and criminal wrong. The English system has slowly moved from disparate and piecemeal provisions to a general if under-theorised system. On the other hand, Spain created a novel and complete system of liability to be administered by the criminal courts. This chapter seeks to trace and explain this development with a view to understanding how much civil and criminal law can perform the same function: compensation.

This chapter reviews the regulatory innovation process in the European Union, with a focus on the environmental sector. It examines the EU documents on regulation and, in particular, the ‘eight pillars of European governance’ listed by the European Commission in its follow-up to the 2001 White Paper on European Governance, as a useful means of categorising the practical consequences which the European Union attaches to the different implications of the governance debate in the EU. It goes on to summarise the initiatives on regulatory innovation as kick-started by the White Paper on Governance, and to map the current state of each of these initiatives. It concludes that no fundamental reform is required, but rather only a slim number of targeted remedies; the only real solution to the regulatory fog is acceptance and deregulation.

For a long time, French constitutional law did not appear to concern itself unduly with the European Communities and the process of European integration: the French Constitution did not contain any reference to the European Communities and the Conseil constitutionnel had little involvement with international treaties and their enforcement as a result of an early decision. However, the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 triggered a process of deep constitutional change in France. Since then, the text of the French Constitution has been repeatedly amended to respond to the quickening pace of European integration. Furthermore, the Conseil constitutionnel has totally transformed its control of the constitutionality of international treaties. An assessment of these constitutional changes seems opportune at this juncture. More specifically, an investigation into the manner in which the French constitution reacted to the changing European Union helps cast some light on the impact of European integration on national constitutions.

The aim of this chapter is to provide an initial attempt at analysis of the place of risk within the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and, where appropriate, the Commission, focusing on the related issues of public concern and perception of risk and how the ECHR dispute bodies have addressed these. It will argue that, for quite some time, the Court has tended to adopt a particular, liberal conception of risk in which it stresses the right of applicants to be provided with information on risk to enable them to make effective choices. Historically, where public concerns in relation to particular risks are greater than those of scientific experts—nuclear radiation being the prime example in the case law—the Court has adopted a particularly restrictive approach, stressing the need for risk to be ‘imminent’ in order to engage the relevant Convention protections. However, more recently, there have been emerging but as yet still rather undeveloped signs of the Court adopting a more sensitive approach to risk. One possible explanation for this lies in the Court’s growing awareness of and reference to the Aarhus Convention. What we have yet to see—because there has not yet been a recent, post-Aarhus example involving such facts—is a case where no imminent risk is evident. Nevertheless, the chapter concludes that the Court’s old-style approach to public concern in such cases, in which it rode roughshod over rights to judicial review, is out of line with the third, access to justice limb of Aarhus.

In important recent cases dealing with labour law issues, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) relied on a combination of international, European and domestic sources to justify their decisions. In Viking and Laval, the ECJ recognised that the right to take collective action as a fundamental right protected by EU law. In Demir and Baykara v Turkey, the ECtHR decided, for the first time, that the right to bargain collectively is an essential elements the right to form and to join trade unions covered by Article 11 of the European Convention for the protection of Human Rights. This chapter considers the reliance on multiple sources of law in this series of cases and questions the ‘combination method’ used by European courts to identify or interpret human right provisions. It argues that globalisation of legal sources in the area of labour law does not necessarily lead to ‘globalisation’ of labour law, allowing common solutions or, at least, harmonised solutions to come to life. The outcome of normative interaction is not universal labour law but instead largely depends on which court decides the case. Therefore, litigation strategies in the field of labour law should make use of the potential of normative interactions without ignoring the opportunities offered by the diversity of courts.

Why is it so difficult to qualify the Court of Justice’s decisions as ‘sources of law?’ Does the Court of Justice only ‘interpret’ law, or does it ‘make’ it? To what extent should its pronouncements be taken into account by others? This chapter shows how a particular theoretical approach to precedent and judicial lawmaking shapes the answers to the queries mentioned above. It examines a set of interrelated questions concerning precedent and judicial lawmaking by the US Supreme Court and the French Cour de cassation and then applies these findings to the Court of Justice. The questions are: first, in what sense is it said that these courts make law; secondly, who is bound by their pronouncements; and, thirdly, how does this binding force actually work? It is suggested that while the US and French systems have found ways in which to reconcile judicial lawmaking with the basic premises of their constitutional and political systems, especially by allowing other actors to respond to judicial lawmaking (in the particular sense of the word ‘lawmaking’ used in these two systems), the EU system is still waiting for a satisfactory answer.