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Never not the best: LoT and the explanation of person-level psychology

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 September 2023

Louise Antony Open the ORCID record for Louise Antony [Opens in a new window]
Louise Antony*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, MA, USA. lantony@umass.edu
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Abstract

As Quilty-Dunn et al. observe, the language-of-thought hypothesis (LoTH) has fallen out of favor in philosophy. I will support the arguments made for its rehabilitation by Quilty-Dunn et al. by reviewing old, but still potent arguments for LoTH, and briefly criticizing recent proposed alternatives to LoT, such as Frances Egan's deflationism and Eric Schwitzgebel's dispositionalism, revealing inadequacies in such antirepresentational, antisyntactic theories.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 46 , 2023 , e262
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press

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References

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