We highlight one way in which Jones & Love (J&L) misconstrue the Bayesian program: Bayesian models do not represent a rejection of mechanism. This mischaracterization obscures the valid criticisms in their article. We conclude that computational-level Bayesian modeling should not be rejected or discouraged a priori, but should be held to the same empirical standards as other models.

In order to defend her claim that the concept object is biologically determined, Carey must answer Quine's gavagai argument, which purports to show that mastery of any concept with determinate reference presupposes a substantial repertoire of logical concepts. I maintain that the gavagai argument withstands the experimental data that Carey provides, but that it yields to an a priori argument.

Logical consistency demands that Mercier and Sperber's (M&S's) argumentative theory of reasoning apply to their own reasoning in the target article. Although they hint that their argument applies to professional reasoners such as scientists and philosophers, they do not develop this idea. In this commentary, I discuss the applicability of argumentative theory to science and philosophy, emphasizing the perils of moral reasoning.

Normative theories can be useful in developing descriptive theories, as when normative subjective expected utility theory is used to develop descriptive rational choice theory and behavioral game theory. “Ought” questions are also the essence of theories of moral reasoning, a domain of higher mental processing that could not survive without normative considerations.

Arguably, the religious use of hallucinogenic drugs stems from a human search of metaphysical insight rather than from a direct need for cognitive, emotional, social, physical, or sexual improvement. Therefore, the sacramental and spiritual intake of hallucinogenic drugs goes so far beyond other biopsychosocial functions that it deserves its own category in the drug instrumentalization list.

The foundational theme of the target article is that processes of self-deception occur in a functional context: a social one through which self-deceptive processes enhance fitness by affecting an actor's performances. One essential component of this context not addressed explicitly is that audiences should have been selected to resist, where possible, enhancements falsely bolstered by self-deception. Theoretical implications follow.

In this book, Carey gives cognitive science a detailed account of the origins of concepts and an explanation of how origins stories are essential to understanding what concepts are and how we use them. At the same time, this book's details help highlight the challenge of explaining how conceptual change works with real-world concepts that often have heavily degraded internal content.

While impressed by much of what Mercier & Sperber (M&S) offer through their argumentative hypothesis, we question whether the specific competencies entailed in each system are adequate. In particular, whether system 2 might not require independent reasoning capabilities. We explore the adequacy of the explanations offered for confirmation bias and the Wason selection task.

Normative theories provide essential tools for understanding behaviour, not just for reasoning, judgement, and decision-making, but many other areas of cognition as well; and their utility extends to the development of process theories. Furthermore, the way these tools are used has nothing to do with the is-ought fallacy. There therefore seems no basis for the claim that research would be better off without them.

We examine the self-deceptive aspects of religion and nationalism. By embracing various religious or political ideals, regardless of their truth, our ancestors could have enhanced their confidence, solidified their social ties, and manipulated their reproductive rivals. This use of culture as one's extended phenotype may increase the spread of misinformation and create global webs of deception and self-deception.

The claim that non-addictive drug use is instrumental must be distinguished from the claim that its desired ends are evolutionarily adaptive or easy to comprehend. Use can be instrumental without being adaptive or comprehensible. This clarification, together with additional data, suggests that Müller & Schumann's (M&S's) instrumental framework may explain addictive, as well as non-addictive consumption.

Bayesian psychology follows an old instrumentalist tradition most infamously illustrated by Osiander's preface to Copernicus's masterpiece. Jones & Love's (J&L's) criticisms are, if anything, understated, and their proposals overoptimistic.

Were we just the Darwinian adaptive survival/reproduction machines von Hippel & Trivers invoke to explain us, the self-deception problem would not only be simpler, but also nonexistent. Why would unconscious robots bother to misinform themselves so as to misinform others more effectively? But as we are indeed conscious rather than unconscious robots, the problem is explaining the causal role of consciousness itself, not just its supererogatory tendency to misinform itself so as to misinform (or perform) better.

The evolutionary framework suggested by Müller & Schumann (M&S) can be extended further by considering drug-taking in terms of Niche Construction Theory (NCT). It is suggested here that genetic and environmental components of addiction are modified by cultural acceptance of the advantages of non-addicted drug taking and the legitimate supply of performance-enhancing drugs. This may then reduce the prevalence of addiction.

My research program proposes that children have representations and learning mechanisms that can be characterized as causal models of the world – coherent, structured hypotheses with consistent relationships to probabilistic patterns of evidence. We also propose that Bayesian inference is one mechanism by which children learn these models from data. These proposals are straightforward psychological hypotheses and far from “Bayesian Fundamentalism.”

In this commentary I argue that the notion of incommensurability can be extended to the child's developing theories of mind. I use Carey's concept of Quinian bootstrapping and show that this learning process can account for the acquisition of the semantics of mental terms. I suggest a distinction among three stages of acquisition and adopt the theory–theory of conceptual development.

Elqayam & Evans (E&E) argue that evaluative normativism leads to unacceptable research biases, and should be avoided. Though it is stipulated that the particular biases they discuss are cause for concern, this argument should not be generalized. The boundary between evaluative and goal-directed “directive” norms is difficult to define, and normative assumptions are an integral part of academic progress; moreover, the biases that result may have beneficial potential.

It warrants examining how well people can come to argue under supportive conditions, not only what they do under ordinary conditions. Sustained engagement of young people in dialogic argumentation yields more than the temporary “contextual effect” that Mercier & Sperber (M&S) identify in the target article. If such engagement were to become the norm, who can say what the argumentive potential of future generations is?

If the target article represents the summary findings of the field, reasoning research is deeply flawed. The vision is too narrow and seems to fall into biological determinism. Humans use reasoning in effective ways apparently not studied by researchers, such as reasoning for action. Moreover, as the brain develops through adulthood and from experience so do reasoning capabilities.

Tests of a universal theory often find significant variability and individual differences between cultures. We propose that descriptivism research should focus more on cultural and individual differences, especially those based on motivational factors. Explaining human thinking by focusing on individual difference factors across cultures could provide a parsimonious paradigm, by uncovering the true causal mechanisms of psychological processes.