Book contents
- Wittgenstein and Davidson on Language, Thought, and Action
- Wittgenstein and Davidson on Language, Thought, and Action
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Contributors
- Acknowledgements
- Introduction
- 1 Holism in Action
- 2 Davidson’s Wittgensteinian View of Meaning
- 3 Davidson and Wittgenstein
- 4 Rule-Following and Charity
- 5 Davidson’s Treatment of Wittgenstein’s Rule-Following Paradox
- 6 Davidson and Wittgenstein on Meaning and Understanding
- 7 The Search for “The Essence of Human Language” in Wittgenstein and Davidson
- 8 Wittgenstein and Davidson on Animal Minds
- 9 Wittgenstein and Davidson on First-Person Authority and the Univocality of Mental Terms
- 10 The Harmony of Thought and Reality
- 11 Davidson, Russell, and Wittgenstein on the Problem of Predication
- Index
- References
3 - Davidson and Wittgenstein
A Homeric Struggle?
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 October 2017
By
Edited by
Book contents
- Wittgenstein and Davidson on Language, Thought, and Action
- Wittgenstein and Davidson on Language, Thought, and Action
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Contributors
- Acknowledgements
- Introduction
- 1 Holism in Action
- 2 Davidson’s Wittgensteinian View of Meaning
- 3 Davidson and Wittgenstein
- 4 Rule-Following and Charity
- 5 Davidson’s Treatment of Wittgenstein’s Rule-Following Paradox
- 6 Davidson and Wittgenstein on Meaning and Understanding
- 7 The Search for “The Essence of Human Language” in Wittgenstein and Davidson
- 8 Wittgenstein and Davidson on Animal Minds
- 9 Wittgenstein and Davidson on First-Person Authority and the Univocality of Mental Terms
- 10 The Harmony of Thought and Reality
- 11 Davidson, Russell, and Wittgenstein on the Problem of Predication
- Index
- References
Summary
A summary is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2017
References
Davidson, Donald. 1974b. “On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme.” In Davidson, 1984.Google Scholar
Davidson, Donald. 1984. Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Google Scholar
Davidson, Donald. 2001. Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Google Scholar
Glock, Hans-Johann. 2010. “Does Language Require Conventions?” In Wittgenstein, Mind, Meaning and Metaphilosophy, eds. Frascolla, P., Marconi, D., and Voltolini, A.. Palgrave Macmillan, New York.Google Scholar
Glüer, Kathrin. 2000. “Wittgenstein and Davidson on Agreement in Judgment.” In From the Tractatus to the Tractatus (and other Essays), ed. Oliveri, G.. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang.Google Scholar
Glüer, Kathrin. 2012. “Convention and Meaning.” In A Companion to Donald Davidson, eds. Lepore, E. and Ludwig, K.. Oxford: Wiley Blackwell.Google Scholar
Glüer, Kathrin, and Wikforss, Åsa. 2009a. “Against Content-Normativity.” Mind 118: 31–70.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Glüer, Kathrin, and Wikforss, Åsa. 2009b. “The Normativity of Meaning and Content.”, New York. In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.Google Scholar
Glüer, Kathrin, and Wikforss, Åsa. 2010. “Es braucht die Regel nicht. Wittgenstein on Rules and Meaning.” In The Later Wittgenstein on Language, ed. Whiting, D.. Palgrave Macmillan, New York.Google Scholar
Glüer, Kathrin, and Wikforss, Åsa. 2015. “Meaning Normativism: Against the Simple Argument.” Organon F 22: 63–73.Google Scholar
Horwich, Paul. 2012. Wittgenstein’s Metaphilosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kripke, Saul. 1982. Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Stalnaker, Robert. 1997. “Reference and Necessity.” In A Companion to the Philosophy of Language, eds. Hale, B. and Wright, C.. Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar
Strawson, P. F. 1970. “Meaning and Truth.” In Logico-Linguistic Papers. London: Methuen, 1971.Google Scholar
Verheggen, Claudine. 2006. “How Social Must Language Be?” Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 36 (2): 203–219.Google Scholar
Verheggen, Claudine. 2007. “Triangulating with Davidson.” Philosophical Quarterly 57 (226): 96–103.Google Scholar
Williams, Meredith. 1999. Wittgenstein, Mind and Meaning. Towards a Social Conception of Mind. New York: Routledge.Google Scholar
Williams, Meredith. 2000. “Wittgenstein and Davidson on the Sociality of Language.” Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 30 (3): 299–318.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1922. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.Google Scholar
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1956. Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics. Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1980. Wittgenstein‘s Lectures, Cambridge 1930–1932. Oxford: Ed. D. Lee. Blackwell.Google Scholar