The problem of moral obligation

Moral philosophy characteristically sees moral standards as reasons. That an action would be kind or just or in some way morally admirable is supposed to give us a reason for performing it. And surely there is something right about the thought that moral standards imply reasons for conforming to them. For we offer the morality of an action as a relevant consideration in practical argument—a consideration to support that action's performance. You should provide the help, because it would be kind, or just, and so forth. And an argument, surely, is in the business of offering reasons for what the argument supports.

Now reasons and the arguments which convey them apply not only to our actions but to our psychological attitudes as well. We can have reasons for actions; but equally we can have reasons for non-actions such as our general beliefs and desires. And the force of all these reasons and the arguments which provide them seems to be this—it would be sensible or advisable to perform this action, to form this belief or desire. Of course, there may be conflicting reasons—there may be reasons for believing one thing or for doing one thing, but opposing reasons for believing or doing quite another. And here the reasons in favour of one belief or action may defeat the opposing reasons for believing and acting otherwise.