PREFACE TO MY REPLIES

I wish to express my appreciation to all the contributors to this volume for their contributions. The quality of the chapters and the distinction of the authors calls for more extended comment on what they have to say than the space allotted to me permits, and this may sometimes lead to my stating my reactions with a bluntness that disguises the gratitude, regard, and respect that I have for all of the authors. I am aware that my views are often controversial, and the authors have as a group risen admirably to the occasion by fueling the controversy.

WHAT SORT OF REALIST IS PEIRCE AFTER ALL? REPLY TO MISAK

Cheryl Misak and I share an admiration of Peirce's account of fixing belief – an account whose basic elements remained constant throughout the bulk of Peirce's career. According to that account, changing beliefs requires justification. Current beliefs do not need justification. Indeed, rational inquirers judge all their current beliefs to be true. This shared appreciation is qualified by substantial disagreement concerning how to understand Peirce's elaboration of his ideas – disagreement that is of some philosophical moment.

In “The Fixation of Belief,” Peirce wrote that “the sole object of inquiry is the settlement of opinion.” He explicitly dismissed the thesis that the aim was to settle opinion with true (i.e., error-free) belief. He did so in the context of a comparison of four different methods of relieving doubt.