The essays that appear here are the result of an invitation from the editor to various distinguished authors soliciting original contributions on responsibility. Inevitably the contributions that emerge from such a request will be diverse in their approaches and themes. In spite of this, it can be said that the contributions gravitate toward one of two general themes: (1) responsibility for one's own character and (2) culpability and the role of the moral emotions. In this introduction I discuss these general topics and then relate the themes to the essays presented here.

We consider some, but not all, of our behavior to reflect something about ourselves as moral or rational agents. The fact that we can be related in different ways to behavior that has the same public profile causes us some difficulties. Take sleeping, for example: One can fall asleep despite one's best efforts at staying awake, even when one has every incentive to stay awake; or one can fall asleep as a result of a decision to get plenty of rest. In one case falling asleep is something that overcomes one; it is inevitable and has nothing to do with one' reasons. In the other case, falling asleep is something one does and is the result of rational deliberation. (I leave open the possibility that rational agency is itself the result of evolutionary design.) The way we describe or attribute behavior to people reflects our awareness of these differences in relationship to actions.