There have been two significant obstacles to determining the substance of Kierkegaard's epistemology. The first is the barrier of language. It is relatively easy for scholars in the English-speaking world to learn languages such as German or French. By contrast, most Kierkegaard scholars are able to piece together only a rudimentary knowledge of Danish during short stays in Denmark facilitated by research fellowships. The second obstacle to understanding Kierkegaard's views on knowledge is that his otherwise prodigious authorship includes no straightforward treatise on knowledge. The closest thing to such a treatise is, in fact, his Concluding Unscientific Postscript. A comprehensive account of the epistemological views contained in this work is beyond the scope of a brief essay. Such an account would require an entire book, and a substantial one at that. I argue elsewhere that Kierkegaard appears to subscribe in a very broad sense to the traditional view that knowledge amounts to justified true belief. A great deal of insight into the epistemology of the Postscript can thus be gained by looking closely at how the concept of truth functions in this work.

INTRODUCTION

This chapter will focus on the concept of truth in the Postscript. It will also look in detail at the significance of some of the relevant Danish terminology. The end product, I hope, will help to give the reader greater insight into the substance of the epistemology of the Postscript than it has yet been possible to attain from any secondary work in English.