John Rawls introduced the term “reflective equilibrium” in TJ (18), but he there insisted that the concept derives from earlier discussions of the justification of inductive logic, citing Nelson Goodman (1955, 65–68). We can ask, for instance, whether a particular inductive rule is a justifiable one, but our only basis for answering that question, Goodman argued, is to consider whether our practice of induction, broadly understood, includes that inductive rule. By analogy, we will have to judge whether specific principles of justice are acceptable by seeing if they it well with our most deeply held specific judgments about what is just. Viewed most generally, a “reflective equilibrium” is the end point of a deliberative process in which we reflect on and revise our beliefs about an area of inquiry, moral or nonmoral. The inquiry might be as specific as the moral question, “What is the right thing to do in this case?” or the logical question, “Is this the correct inference to make?” Alternatively, the inquiry might be much more general, asking which theory or account of justice or right action we should accept, or which principles of inductive reasoning we should use. We can also refer to the process or method itself as the “method of reflective equilibrium.”