1 - On the concept (and some conceptions) of the basic minimum
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 March 2012
Summary
Stated in the most general way, and leaving aside the nitty-gritty, that political morality should include a commitment to a basic minimum is plausible. Sentiments that point in this direction range from the following, by Ronald Dworkin: “it is important, from an objective point of view, that human lives be successful rather than wasted, and this is equally important, from that objective point of view, for each human life,” to Martha Nussbaum: “moving all citizens above a basic threshold … should be taken as a central social goal,” to Stuart White, who notes that there “is a widespread intuition that in a just society citizens must have access on reasonable terms to the resources necessary to meet their basic needs.” These sentiments are popular, and it is easy to see why. When any particular person fails to maintain a minimally decent life, or fails to obtain their basic needs, it is tempting to say that this fact by itself provides amoral reason for assistance. Political institutions should be concerned, it would appear, not just with equality, overall well-being, or the plight of the worst-off. They should also be concerned to see that people obtain a life that maintains a minimal, basic threshold.
Like all philosophical matters, however, the devil is in the details. How should a basic minimum be understood? What must a person fail to maintain to fail to maintain the basic minimum? What is the relative moral importance of a basic minimum against other social goals?
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- Information
- The Basic MinimumA Welfarist Approach, pp. 1 - 34Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2012