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19 - Social and cultural presuppositions for the use of the concept of human dignity
- from Part III - Systematic conceptualization
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- By Gesa Lindemann, University of Oldenburg
- Edited by Marcus Düwell, Universiteit Utrecht, The Netherlands, Jens Braarvig, Universitetet i Oslo, Roger Brownsword, King's College London, Dietmar Mieth, Eberhard-Karls-Universität Tübingen, Germany
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- Book:
- The Cambridge Handbook of Human Dignity
- Published online:
- 05 March 2015
- Print publication:
- 10 April 2014, pp 191-199
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- Chapter
- Export citation
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Summary
From a sociological point of view, human dignity is to be grasped as a societal phenomenon, the analysis of which is concerned with identifying the historical circumstances for the emergence of the concept of human dignity. The assumption that every living human being is ‘born free and equal in dignity and rights’ is understood as a normative social institution. In other words, from a sociological perspective, human dignity is conceived as a structural feature of modern societies, which are characterized by functional differentiation. The latter is either defined by an advanced division of labour (Durkheim 1930), or by the idea that there are diverse thematic fields of communication such as science, politics, law, economy, family etc., that are all assumed to be structured by different patterns of action/communication (Luhmann 1997). Functional differentiation requires that human beings recognize each other as individuals who are able to follow different patterns of action/communication. As individuals they are expected to be able to act not only as a scientist, but also as a mother, a shareholder or a member of a political party etc. The role of expectations within different realms of action are diverse and even contradictory and it is up to the individual to manage this complexity. Emile Durkheim (1950) argued that such societies first evolved in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in Europe and North America, a thesis that was subsequently developed further by Niklas Luhmann (1965). According to Durkheim and Luhmann, the structure of functional differentiation demands that there be individuals whose dignity is recognized. This idea forms the current basis of sociological reasoning on human dignity (Verschraegen 2002; Joas 2008; Lindemann 2010a).
If each single member of the human family is assumed to be born free and equal in dignity and rights, identifying someone as a member of the human family serves as a generally valid criterion for delimiting the circle of those beings that have to be recognized as beings with dignity. Two questions arise with regard to this premise: (1) Do sociological accounts offer a description of how the subject of human dignity is identified? In other words, how did the idea of one human family consisting of equal members arise? (2) How does sociology understand the meaning of the predicate ‘human dignity’? In other words, what does it mean to say that each member is equally endowed with inalienable human dignity?