12 results
Frontmatter
- Khairulanwar Zaini, ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute
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- Book:
- 'Building a Sailboat in a Storm'
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- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
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- 01 September 2023, pp i-iv
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Foreword
- Khairulanwar Zaini, ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute
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- Book:
- 'Building a Sailboat in a Storm'
- Published by:
- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
- Published online:
- 01 September 2023, pp v-vi
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Summary
The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.
The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
The Trends in Southeast Asia series acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policymakers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.
THE EDITORS
Series Chairman:
Choi Shing Kwok
Series Editor:
Ooi Kee Beng
Editorial Committee:
Daljit Singh
Francis E. Hutchinson
Norshahril Saat
Annexes
- Khairulanwar Zaini, ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute
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- Book:
- 'Building a Sailboat in a Storm'
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- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
- Published online:
- 01 September 2023, pp 40-43
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“Building a Sailboat in a Storm”: The Evolution of COVAX in 2021 and Its Impact on Supplies to Southeast Asia’s Six Lower-Income Economies
- Khairulanwar Zaini, ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute
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- Book:
- 'Building a Sailboat in a Storm'
- Published by:
- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
- Published online:
- 01 September 2023, pp 1-39
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Summary
Introduction
As it became increasingly evident that vaccines would be central to the recovery from the global pandemic, the COVID-19 Vaccines Global Access (COVAX) Facility was created to ensure equitable access to COVID-19 vaccines, especially for poorer countries. However, the erratic and delayed COVAX shipments in the first half of 2021 led to doubts about the Facility’s ability to fulfil its pledge of securing and delivering 2 billion doses by the end of the year. In June, the Malaysian vaccine minister Khairy Jamaluddin derided it as an “abysmal failure”. Remarkably, by September 2021, the Facility was confident enough to forecast the allocation of 1.4 billion doses by the end of the year—with 1.2 billion of those to be disbursed gratis to lower-income countries. COVAX’s improved fortunes in the latter part of 2021 can primarily be attributed to a surge in dose donations from wealthier countries, as they began releasing their excess inventory of vaccines.
This article will examine how the COVAX Facility evolved in 2021 over two distinct phases and the implications for six lower-income Southeast Asian countries. In the first phase, which coincided with the first half of 2021 (1H), the COVAX Facility had to rely on its own ability to purchase vaccines from the manufacturers. In the second phase, from July onwards (2H), the Facility was instead sustained by dose donations from the West.
In the first phase, the supply of COVAX shots was scarce for Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, the Philippines, Timor-Leste and Vietnam—the six Southeast Asian countries which qualified for free COVAX shots (hereafter referred to as the AMC6). In 1H 2021, the AMC6 were promised 25 million COVAX doses, but the Facility only delivered 16 million doses, or 65.3 per cent of the AMC6’s entitlement. The shift to the second phase significantly boosted the frequency and volume of COVAX shipments to the AMC6. In 2H 2021, a total of around 128 million COVAX doses were shipped to the AMC6, with around 104 million (80.9 per cent) of these shots sourced from dose donations from wealthier countries.
However, as this paper will elaborate at the end, the Facility’s evolution into its second phase (COVAX 2.0) does not entirely align with the goal of developing a truly multilateral institution to advance vaccine equity.
Race and Racism in Singapore
- Edited by Daljit Singh, ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute, Thi Ha Hoang, ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute
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- Book:
- Southeast Asian Affairs 2022
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- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
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- 01 September 2023, pp 324-342
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Summary
Singapore’s home affairs and law minister, K. Shanmugam, is generally an unflappable man. Yet, twice in 2021, his composure appeared to be affected by a series of racially inflected incidents that captured the public’s attention. The first was on 6 June when he expressed that he was “not so sure anymore” that Singapore was “moving in the right direction on racial tolerance and harmony”. His remarks were triggered by a viral Facebook video of a Chinese Singaporean man berating a young couple for their interracial relationship. In the clip, the man—later identified as a sixty-year-old local polytechnic lecturer—told them that that it was “racist that an Indian prey on Chinese girl”, while insisting that people should only date within their own race. (Shanmugam sounded more optimistic four days later, however, when he asserted in an interview that Singapore has made “tremendous progress” as a multiracial country.) Just over a month later, the minister conveyed that he was “quite sad” to hear a particular question raised during a forum co-organized by the government’s feedback unit and Lianhe Zaobao, Singapore’s main Chinese language broadsheet. An attendee had asked why the Chinese community—the country’s largest ethnic group—“shouldn’t have the right to decide on Singapore’s direction, such as education, [and] language”, instead of having to defer to ethnic minorities.
These events were not isolated. Accounts circulated in social media through the year about racial incidents. An ethnic Chinese lady was filmed repeatedly hitting a gong in front of her Hindu neighbour’s door while the latter was conducting his “five-minute, twice-a-week” ritual prayers (which involved ringing a small bell). There were two separate racist incidents against ethnic Indians in the first week of May alone: the first involved a man making offensive remarks at an Indian family after confronting one of them for not wearing a mask, while the second involved an assault against a fifty-five-year-old Singaporean Indian lady who had worn her mask below her nose while brisk walking.
These incidents arose despite the country’s heavy emphasis on the ethos of multiculturalism and the numerous laws regulating racial harmony. The Singapore government has certainly not been shy in resorting to legal sanction when necessary to penalize offensive speech, including relying on the colonial-era Sedition Act (originally introduced to safeguard British rule from local anti-imperial resistance) in the 2000s and early 2010s.
Introduction
- Edited by Daljit Singh, ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute, Thi Ha Hoang, ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute
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- Book:
- Southeast Asian Affairs 2022
- Published by:
- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
- Published online:
- 01 September 2023, pp vii-xvi
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Summary
There was some optimism that 2021 would mark a turn in the region’s fortunes and offer some respite after what was arguably the worst start to a new decade in living memory. Those hopes did not last long. As it turned out, 2021 was significantly much more of the same. The challenges of the previous year did not so much abate as intensify, putting the region’s resilience to the test.
Plans for a year of strong post-pandemic recovery were dashed as the region was engulfed by new waves of COVID-19 infections as a result of the more contagious Delta and Omicron variants. The reopening of borders and economies had to be delayed, as many Southeast Asian countries resorted once again to lockdowns and tried to quickly inoculate as much of their populations as possible amidst scarce global vaccine supply, especially in the first part of the year.
Meanwhile, it could have been a triumphant year for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The grouping made significant headway with its Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (RCEP), the world’s largest trade pact. Final ratifications by Australia and New Zealand in November 2021 meant that the RCEP would go live on the first day of 2022. However, any satisfaction over this feat was overshadowed by the coup d’état in Myanmar, which sparked a violent civil conflict and caused strategic and diplomatic ripples beyond Naypyidaw. The military coup put ASEAN at a protracted impasse as the junta resisted the organization’s entreaties to resolve the crisis, including forbidding the ASEAN special envoy to meet with Aung San Suu Kyi. At the same time, ASEAN redeemed a measure of credibility for itself with the bold decision to exclude the Myanmar military leader from its year-end summit, in what Joseph Chinyong Liow views as an indication that “ASEAN was not about to allow the Myanmar crisis to paralyse the organization” (p. 16).
Furthermore, the region was subjected to more strategic headwinds, as the contest between the United States and China for influence in Southeast Asia and the broader Indo-Pacific region showed little sign of letting up.
“Building a Sailboat in a Storm”: The Evolution of COVAX in 2021 and Its Impact on Supplies to Southeast Asia’s Six Lower-Income Economies
- Khairulanwar Zaini, ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute
-
- Book:
- 'Building a Sailboat in a Storm'
- Published by:
- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
- Published online:
- 01 September 2023, pp vii-viii
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- Chapter
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Summary
Executive Summary
• In the first half of 2021, COVID-19 vaccine doses from the COVAX Facility were in short supply, and the plan to mass produce COVAX vaccines through the Serum Institute of India (SII) faltered as the pandemic surged in India in March 2021.
• Due to COVAX’s shift in approach towards convincing richer nations to redistribute their excess doses, the second half of 2021 saw increases in the frequency and volume of its shipments. Donors were however able to “earmark” their dose donations and identify their intended recipients.
• The six Southeast Asian countries which qualified for free COVAX shots—Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, the Philippines, Timor-Leste and Vietnam (the AMC6)—received 16 million doses in the first half of 2021. In the second half, they received 128 million doses from COVAX, 80.9 per cent of which were earmarked donations.
• Despite making up 7 per cent of the world population, the AMC6 collectively accounted for 24.3 per cent of all earmarked dose donations (and 25 per cent of the United States’ total dose donations) to COVAX in 2021.
• The AMC6 greatly benefitted from COVAX’s pivot to dose donations. This demonstrated the region’s strategic salience to Washington and its allies, but came at the expense of vaccine equity, which the region has prudential reasons to care about.
• The execution of COVAX hammers home the hard truth that multilateral governance is a difficult act to pull off even with the best intentions and is not impervious to the geopolitical interests and agendas of the major powers.
'Building a Sailboat in a Storm'
- The Evolution of COVAX in 2021 and its Impact on Supplies to Southeast Asia's Six Lower-Income Economies
- Khairulanwar Zaini
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- Published by:
- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
- Published online:
- 01 September 2023
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In the first half of 2021, COVID-19 vaccine doses from the COVAX Facility were in short supply, and the plan to mass produce COVAX vaccines through the Serum Institute of India (SII) faltered as the pandemic surged in India in March 2021. Due to COVAX's shift in approach towards convincing richer nations to redistribute their excess doses, the second half of 2021 saw increases in the frequency and volume of its shipments. Donors were however able to 'earmark' their dose donations and identify their intended recipients. The six Southeast Asian countries which qualified for free COVAX shots - Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, the Philippines, Timor-Leste and Vietnam (the AMC6) - received 16 million doses in the first half of 2021. In the second half, they received 128 million doses from COVAX, 80.9 per cent of which were earmarked donations. Despite making up 7 per cent of the world population, the AMC6 collectively accounted for 24.3 per cent of all earmarked dose donations (and 25 per cent of the United States' total dose donations) to COVAX in 2021. The AMC6 greatly benefitted from COVAX's pivot to dose donations. This demonstrated the region's strategic salience to Washington and its allies, but came at the expense of vaccine equity, which the region has prudential reasons to care about. The execution of COVAX hammers home the hard truth that multilateral governance is a difficult act to pull off even with the best intentions and is not impervious to the geopolitical interests and agendas of the major powers.
Introduction
- Edited by Thi Ha Hoang, ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute, Daljit Singh, ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute
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- Book:
- Southeast Asian Affairs 2023
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- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
- Published online:
- 27 February 2024
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- 31 March 2023, pp vii-xx
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Summary
In 2022, the COVID-19 pandemic that had plagued Southeast Asia and the world at large for the previous two years finally receded. But hopes for a strong rebound from the pandemic were soon overshadowed by new uncertainties and upheavals in domestic and international politics as well as structural economic shifts that have been accelerated by the pandemic. There were also significant economic and geopolitical disruptions brought on by Russia's war against Ukraine, while the rising tensions between the United States and China across multiple domains have contributed to a more fraught security environment—testing the region's resilience to avoid being drawn into a conflict between the major powers.
Elections in Malaysia, the Philippines and Timor-Leste brought back familiar names and faces into power. Anwar Ibrahim finally laid claim to the Malaysian premiership that had for so long eluded his grasp. In Manila, another Marcos once again occupies the Malacañang Palace—this time it is Ferdinand Marcos Jr., the scion of the eponymous dictator who was deposed by the People Power Revolution almost four decades ago. In Timor-Leste, the one-time president José Ramos-Horta was elected back into the same office with the support of the country's founding father and revolutionary hero José Xanana Gusmão.
Meanwhile, the prospects of impending elections in Thailand and Indonesia have prompted considerable political jostling and tussling. The electoral systems in both countries feature byzantine rules for qualification and complex balloting processes so politicians and parties have to manoeuvre early to ensure they remain ahead of their rivals. Cambodia will also hold legislative polls in 2023, but the political situation appears relatively secure for the ruling Cambodian People's Party (CPP). The CPP intends to use the election as an opportunity for leadership succession, with prime minister Hun Sen grooming his son to eventually take over. There was some flux in Laos and Vietnam, especially towards the end of 2022.
On the last day of the year, Lao prime minister Phankham Viphavanh tendered his surprise resignation—ostensibly for health reasons—though the general view was that his failure to effectively steward the pandemic-battered economy meant that he had to go.
Introduction
- Edited by Daljit Singh, Malcolm Cook
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- Book:
- Southeast Asian Affairs 2021
- Published by:
- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
- Published online:
- 09 October 2021
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- 28 May 2021, pp vii-xiv
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Summary
The year 2020 was not a good one for Southeast Asia. The international trade environment continued to deteriorate as a more inward-looking America sought to protect its domestic industry from foreign competition. Deborah Elms in her chapter in this volume explains how the penchant of the Trump administration for using tariffs (notably against China) as a protectionist policy tool undermined an already “creaking” global trading system. Southeast Asian states, particularly the more export-dependent ones, had already been affected by these trends for more than a year. The arrival of the COVID-19 pandemic in early 2020 was a new shock that severely disrupted public health and economic well-being.
To be sure, the effects of these disruptions were uneven. In terms of public health, Indonesia and the Philippines were the most severely affected by the pandemic, while the mainland Southeast Asian countries, apart from Myanmar, were much less so. The degree of state effectiveness and preparedness to mount decisive early action to contain the spread of the virus largely accounted for the differences. Even so, the lockdowns and closing of borders damaged the economies of all, particularly those most dependent on foreign trade and tourism. Towards the end of the year there were hopes of a better 2021 as vaccines against the virus were developed, but much uncertainty remained about timely vaccine availability, the logistics for and pace of vaccinations, and the prospects for economic recovery.
In the midst of the pandemic, Thailand and Malaysia had to cope with difficult domestic politics that absorbed the energy and attention of their leaders. The revival of large student demonstrations in Thailand against the military-backed government put new pressure on the pillars of the traditional bureaucratic-military ruling elite, generating uncertainty about political stability for the near future. In Malaysia the political flux arising from the defeat of the Barisan Nasional coalition in the 2018 elections continued as no single party commanded sufficient support in Parliament to emerge with a strong mandate. There was little prospect of the early amelioration of political unsteadiness in Thailand or Malaysia. Myanmar and Singapore held elections amidst the pandemic. The incumbent ruling parties won the elections handsomely, though in Myanmar this was against the backdrop of a troubling deterioration in relations between the ruling National League for Democracy and the country's powerful military.
Singapore in 2019: In Holding Pattern
- Edited by Malcolm Cook, Daljit Singh
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- Book:
- Southeast Asian Affairs 2020
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- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
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- 24 November 2020
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- 22 April 2020, pp 295-322
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Summary
A Nation Awaits
Frequent travellers flying to Changi Airport may occasionally find their aircraft caught in a holding pattern, as their flight circles the airport while waiting for clearance to land. Singapore in 2019 appears to be in a similar holding pattern as the country awaits an election that is coming sooner rather than later. Although the current parliamentary term only expires in April 2021, the Election Department's announcement on 4 September 2019 about the formation of the Electoral Boundaries Review Committee (EBRC) was the first—and clearest—sign of an impending election. Convened by the prime minister prior to every general election, the EBRC is tasked with determining the number of parliamentary seats and delineating the electoral map of constituencies, taking into account demographic changes and shifts in the residential housing populations. The committee of five senior civil servants was also instructed to increase the number of single-member wards while reducing the average size of Group Representation Constituencies (GRCs). In the past, the committee has taken between three weeks and seven months to issue its report to the prime minister, who would then generally call for an election soon after. This time, however, the committee was reported to be still in the midst of deliberations as of early January 2020, suggesting that the next election will only be likely to be called in the second quarter of 2020 or later, after the conclusion of the Budget and Committee of Supply debates in February 2020.
The PAP Continues Apace with Its Leadership Transition
As part of its preparations for the elections, the ruling People's Action Party (PAP) has taken steps to consolidate its fourth-generation (4G) leadership as Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong moves ahead with his plans to step down after the next election. After being appointed as the PAP's first assistant secretarygeneral in November 2018, Finance Minister Heng Swee Keat was elevated to deputy prime minister in April 2019, in a further affirmation to the public and the international community of his status as heir apparent. In order to facilitate this leadership renewal, the two incumbent deputy prime ministers—Teo Chee Hean and Tharman Shanmugaratnam—relinquished their positions and were appointed as senior ministers, while retaining their roles as coordinating minister for national security and coordinating minister for social policies, respectively.
Introduction
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- By Khairulanwar Zaini, Research Associate at the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, Singapore, Malcolm Cook, Senior Fellow at the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, Singapore.
- Edited by Daljit Singh, Malcolm Cook
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- Book:
- Southeast Asian Affairs 2019
- Published by:
- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
- Published online:
- 07 September 2019
- Print publication:
- 10 April 2019, pp vii-xvi
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Summary
The year 2018 was an eventful one for Southeast Asia, with many of its developments likely to shape those in 2019 and beyond. In 2018, the United States’ policy towards China, and by extension towards the region more broadly, crystallized into one of full-spectrum major power rivalry. The broader Indo-Pacific regional strategic concept is gradually replacing the long-standing Asia-Pacific one. It could well be that 2018 is seen as the year that the post–Cold War Asia- Pacific era ended.
There was better news on the regional economic front. The inelegantly named Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) was signed by eleven states and ratified by seven, while the ASEAN-led Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) negotiations experienced what in diplomatic language is termed “substantial progress”.
A number of domestic developments in the eleven states of Southeast Asia also had wider regional implications. The Rohingya crisis in Myanmar demonstrated the limits of the ASEAN Way, as noted by Leszek Buszynski in his chapter on regional security. Malaysia's surprise election result and first change of government by the ballot box countered the narrative about the decline of democracy in Southeast Asia and brought Dr Mahathir back on to the regional scene. In the Philippines, the passage of the Bangsamoro Organic Law offers the best chance of addressing the long-running Moro insurgency in Muslim Mindanao and the safe haven this conflict has provided for local and regional terrorists.
The twenty-four chapters of Southeast Asia Affairs 2019, written by twentynine authors, reflect the diversity within the eleven countries that make up the region, and they provide timely analysis of the current political, economic and social developments at the regional level and in each country. Four themes in particular connect a large number of these chapters and reflect structural, rather than temporary, factors that will help determine the trajectories of the region as a whole and those of its eleven states for the foreseeable future.
The Indo-Pacific
The regional section of this edition features four shorter pieces looking at the development of the Indo-Pacific regional security concept in the United States, Japan, India and Australia. Brian Harding's contribution on the United States focuses on the role of strategic rivalry with China. Tomohiko Satake for Japan and Rory Medcalf for Australia address directly Southeast Asian and ASEAN's concerns with the Indo-Pacific, particularly the place of ASEAN in the concept.