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Contributors
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- By Douglas L. Arnold, Laura J. Balcer, Amit Bar-Or, Sergio E. Baranzini, Frederik Barkhof, Robert A. Bermel, Francois A. Bethoux, Dennis N. Bourdette, Richard K. Burt, Peter A. Calabresi, Zografos Caramanos, Tanuja Chitnis, Stacey S. Cofield, Jeffrey A. Cohen, Nadine Cohen, Alasdair J. Coles, Devon Conway, Stuart D. Cook, Gary R. Cutter, Peter J. Darlington, Ann Dodds-Frerichs, Ranjan Dutta, Gilles Edan, Michelle Fabian, Franz Fazekas, Massimo Filippi, Elizabeth Fisher, Paulo Fontoura, Corey C. Ford, Robert J. Fox, Natasha Frost, Alex Z. Fu, Siegrid Fuchs, Kazuo Fujihara, Kristin M. Galetta, Jeroen J.G. Geurts, Gavin Giovannoni, Nada Gligorov, Ralf Gold, Andrew D. Goodman, Myla D. Goldman, Jenny Guerre, Stephen L. Hauser, Peter B. Imrey, Douglas R. Jeffery, Stephen E. Jones, Adam I. Kaplin, Michael W. Kattan, B. Mark Keegan, Kyle C. Kern, Zhaleh Khaleeli, Samia J. Khoury, Joep Killestein, Soo Hyun Kim, R. Philip Kinkel, Stephen C. Krieger, Lauren B. Krupp, Emmanuelle Le Page, David Leppert, Scott Litwiller, Fred D. Lublin, Henry F. McFarland, Joseph C. McGowan, Don Mahad, Jahangir Maleki, Ruth Ann Marrie, Paul M. Matthews, Francesca Milanetti, Aaron E. Miller, Deborah M. Miller, Xavier Montalban, Charity J. Morgan, Ichiro Nakashima, Sridar Narayanan, Avindra Nath, Paul W. O’Connor, Jorge R. Oksenberg, A. John Petkau, Michael D. Phillips, J. Theodore Phillips, Tammy Phinney, Sean J. Pittock, Sarah M. Planchon, Chris H. Polman, Alexander Rae-Grant, Stephen M. Rao, Stephen C. Reingold, Maria A. Rocca, Richard A. Rudick, Amber R. Salter, Paula Sandler, Jaume Sastre-Garriga, John R. Scagnelli, Dana J. Serafin, Lynne Shinto, Nancy L. Sicotte, Jack H. Simon, Per Soelberg Sørensen, Ryan E. Stagg, James M. Stankiewicz, Lael A. Stone, Amy Sullivan, Matthew Sutliff, Jessica Szpak, Alan J. Thompson, Bruce D. Trapp, Helen Tremlett, Maria Trojano, Orla Tuohy, Rhonda R. Voskuhl, Marc K. Walton, Mike P. Wattjes, Emmanuelle Waubant, Martin S. Weber, Howard L Weiner, Brian G. Weinshenker, Bianca Weinstock-Guttman, Jeffrey L. Winters, Jerry S. Wolinsky, Vijayshree Yadav, E. Ann Yeh, Scott S. Zamvil
- Edited by Jeffrey A. Cohen, Richard A. Rudick
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- Book:
- Multiple Sclerosis Therapeutics
- Published online:
- 05 December 2011
- Print publication:
- 20 October 2011, pp viii-xii
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13 - The neurophysiology of empathy
- from Part II - Empathy and related concepts in health
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- By Nancy Aaron Jones, Department of Psychology, Florida Atlantic University, Chantal M. Gagnon, Department of Psychology, Florida Atlantic University
- Edited by Tom F. D. Farrow, University of Sheffield, Peter W. R. Woodruff, University of Sheffield
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- Book:
- Empathy in Mental Illness
- Published online:
- 17 August 2009
- Print publication:
- 29 March 2007, pp 217-238
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Summary
Theories of empathy
Evolutionary theories of empathy
Darwin (1872) contended that emotions are primary regulators of social interaction and that interspecies communication of emotion is innate and has adaptive value. Within this framework, empathy, which involves recognizing emotions and adjusting social interactions accordingly, would provide individuals and groups who possess this ability with an evolutionary advantage.
Several contemporary theoretical papers have also emerged in the psychological literature that discuss the evolution of empathy and its neural substrates. For example, Brothers (1989) introduced an evolutionary theory of empathy, defining the concept of empathy across maturational levels. He and others (Hoffman, 2000; Trevarthen & Aitken, 1994) argue that empathy is an innate biologically based process in more evolved species. Empathy's evolution in phylogeny and ontogeny is based on the need for more evolved species to be able to communicate with important others, such as caretakers and attachment figures. While the theoretical models proposed differ in the exact mechanism impelling the development of empathy, they agree that variation between individuals in levels of empathic processing derives from evolved variation in genetic endowments and is modified by environmental experiences. Ultimately these theories recognize that empathy, a key component of social communication during development, is adaptive, promotes survival and has a neurological basis.
9 - Neonatal antecedents for empathy
- from Part II - Empathy and related concepts in health
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- By Miguel A. Diego, Department of Pediatrics, University of Miami School of Medicine, Nancy Aaron Jones, Department of Psychology, Florida Atlantic University
- Edited by Tom F. D. Farrow, University of Sheffield, Peter W. R. Woodruff, University of Sheffield
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- Book:
- Empathy in Mental Illness
- Published online:
- 17 August 2009
- Print publication:
- 29 March 2007, pp 145-167
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Summary
Introduction
To properly address the concept of empathy during infancy, developmental theorists must first define empathy, keeping in mind the resources of infants. Rather most theorists focus on the limitations when referring to empathy during infancy. For example, normal functioning infants have been described as dysregulated, less-than-conscious, egocentric and too immature in their representational and self-other capacities to experience empathy (Eisenberg, 1989; Kiang et al., 2004; Strayer, 1987). It is disheartening to think that newborns must be considered inept, rather than simply developing or evolving. Further these definitions indicate an insufficient understanding of infancy and the way that the brain forms during development.
Intuitively it is assumed that emotions are ubiquitous during infancy (Fox, 1991). While it is obvious that newborns do not have the cognitive and experiential abilities required for fully developed forms of empathy, human beings are equipped to function emotionally from birth and emotionality is a key component of evolving empathy.
Studies have shown that newborns can imitate, discriminate and display many of the primary emotions (Field et al., 1982). Findings from these studies suggest that individuals are born with the dispositional tendency to be alerted by emotion signals and that individual infants differentially respond to these signals (Jones et al., 1997b). Brothers (1989) has even suggested that newborn imitation of emotions is a signal for the capacity for empathy (in some precursor form) in the normal brain, one that is elaborated by cognitive maturation and social experiences.
EEG activation in 1-month-old infants of depressed mothers
- NANCY AARON JONES, TIFFANY FIELD, NATHAN A. FOX, BRENDA LUNDY, MARISABEL DAVALOS
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- Journal:
- Development and Psychopathology / Volume 9 / Issue 3 / September 1997
- Published online by Cambridge University Press:
- 01 September 1997, pp. 491-505
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Previous research has documented differences in the pattern of EEG activation between 3-month-old infants of depressed mothers and infants of nondepressed mothers. In the present study, EEG was recorded in even younger 1-month-old infants of depressed and nondepressed mothers. The infants of depressed mothers exhibited greater relative right frontal EEG asymmetry (due to reduced left frontal activation), and this pattern at 1 month was significantly related to 3-month EEG asymmetry. Right frontal EEG asymmetry was also related to more frequent negative facial expressions (sad and pre-cry faces) during the Brazelton exam. Finally, the infants of depressed mothers showed more indeterminate sleep, were less active, and cried less than infants of nondepressed mothers.