8 results
3 - Australia and the Evolving International Order
- from Part 1 - Australia and World Order
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- By Nick Bisley
- Edited by Australian Institute of International Affairs, Mark Beeson, University of Western Australia, Perth, Shahar Hameiri, University of Queensland
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- Book:
- Australia in World Affairs 2011–2015
- Published online:
- 04 May 2024, pp 43-59
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16 - The Indo-Pacific and Security: A New Fault Line
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- By Nick Bisley
- Edited by Aiden Warren, Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology
- Foreword by Cynthia Enloe, Clark University, Massachusetts
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- Book:
- Global Security in an Age of Crisis
- Published by:
- Edinburgh University Press
- Published online:
- 14 July 2023
- Print publication:
- 31 January 2023, pp 353-373
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Summary
Introduction
“The United States is a proud part of the Indo-Pacific. And this region is critically important to our nation's security and prosperity,” declared Vice-President Kamala Harris at a speech in Singapore on August 24, 2021. Intended to lay out US strategic resolve in Asia in the wake of the disastrous withdrawal from Afghanistan, Harris continued the American practice, established in 2017 by President Donald Trump, of describing the region as the “Indo-Pacific.” Since the end of World War II the US has been the dominant military power in what used to be described as East Asia or the Asia-Pacific. The move by the 46th president's administration to adopt this newer and much more expansive concept—referring to the perceived integrated nature of the Pacific and Indian Ocean regions—is notable and not only because any time the world's preeminent military power adopts a new strategic concept it is inherently significant. That the US and many of its allies and partners have chosen to move away from Asia-centered regional conceptions and toward the bigger Indo-Pacific idea reflects a number of important developments that are key to understanding the security dynamics of this vital part of the globe.
This chapter sets out to provide a survey of the key security issues and dynamics in the Indo-Pacific. It will show that security issues have been the driving force in creating the idea of a new megaregion but also that the security dynamics of the region have become one of the principal fault lines in world politics. While the analogy should not be taken too far, the security matters at the heart of the Indo-Pacific are akin to the military division of Europe in the Cold War: a regional strategic divide of immense global consequence. The chapter is organized in two main parts. The first examines the new strategic concept of the Indo-Pacific, charting its emergence and the role played by security concerns in driving the adoption of this way of imagining Asia's strategic landscape. The second section will discuss the central security concerns within the region. While it has a myriad of issues that acutely threaten the lives and interests of states and societies, this section will focus on the three that are most significant: (1) great power competition between the US and China, (2) transnational security threats and the securitization of economic matters, and (3) the region's longstanding flashpoints, such as the Korean Peninsula and the South China Sea.
10 - The Cold War and after
- from Part II - International history
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- By Nick Bisley, Professor in the Politics and International Relations Program at La Trobe University.
- Edited by Richard Devetak, University of Queensland, Jim George, Australian National University, Canberra, Sarah Percy, University of Queensland
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- Book:
- An Introduction to International Relations
- Published online:
- 21 June 2018
- Print publication:
- 11 September 2017, pp 155-167
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Summary
Introduction
The Cold War was the most important feature of the international system in the second half of the twentieth century. The rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States shaped the contours of conflict and cooperation among states and peoples between 1945 and 1991. Although the conflict did not drive all aspects of international relations, its impact could be felt in every corner of the globe. Whether in Helsinki or Hanoi, Santiago or Sydney, the influence of geopolitical and ideological conflict was unmistakable. More importantly, the Cold War created rivalries and political faultlines that continue to shape international relations more than twenty-five years after the conflict ended.
The Cold War was a conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States (see Box 10.1). The two powers that emerged from World War II as pre-eminent in world politics became engaged in a protracted global contest that, although actual combat between them never eventuated, involved the largest and most destructive military arsenals in history. The two camps could potentially destroy the entire planet thousands of times over with their nuclear weapons, and each side's military was on a hair-trigger for the conflict's duration. It was a dispute that was driven both by traditional concerns about security – each felt the other threatening to its survival and its interests – as well as by ideological antagonism. Both embodied universal ideologies that asserted the superiority of their social system over all others. In this respect, the Cold War was as much a contest about how to organise society as it was a competition for strategic influence and nuclear superiority.
BOX 10.1: TERMINOLOGY
Cold War: Meanings and temperature
The term ‘Cold War’ is generally used in two ways. First, it refers to the global contest for influence and power between the United States and Soviet Union and their respective allies, normally dated to between 1948 and 1991. Second, it is also used to label a broader period of international history in which the conflict was the pre-eminent feature of international politics. In spite of the many wars that were caused directly or indirectly by Soviet–American rivalry, such as in Korea, Vietnam and Afghanistan, the conflict is referred to as ‘cold’ because, although there were near-misses, such as Cuba in 1962, direct military action between the two protagonists never eventuated.
10 - Power, Prestige, and Order
- from Section IV - Conflict and Order
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- By Nick Bisley, Executive Director of La Trobe Asia and Professor of International Relations at La Trobe University.
- Edited by Nicholas Farrelly, Amy King, Michael Wesley, Hugh White
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- Book:
- Muddy Boots and Smart Suits
- Published by:
- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
- Published online:
- 12 January 2018
- Print publication:
- 24 April 2017, pp 141-155
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Summary
This is a good time to study Asia's international security setting. The biodiversity is astonishing. Scholars and analysts have become accustomed to what were once termed “new” security threats being core business. In the past, considerable energy and effort was spent trying simply to make the case that problems like transnational crime or the spread of infectious diseases warranted the distinctive analytic and policy lens of “security”. Today, the range of issues in the region that present clear, immediate, and significant challenges to the well-being, indeed existence, of states and peoples is huge. Equally, the old fashioned security challenges which many had thought we had left behind — rivalry between states over territory, resources, and influence — have become recharged. Flying in the face of the complacent platitudes of liberally-minded globalization enthusiasts, the growth, wealth, and interdependence of Asia's states and societies has fuelled tensions, not caused a binding of interests or fostering of a sense of common cause.
But it is not just the range of security issues — both conventional and non-traditional — it is the sense of change and the rate with which such changes are occurring which makes the field so engaging and challenging. There is a palpable sense that the current period is experiencing a high level of “plasticity” (Mahbubani 2008). The mix of moderate foreign policies and a stable military balance, that kept the traditional security concerns from centre stage for over forty years, is changing. Moreover, the global financial crisis of 2007–8 and its recessionary aftermath has accelerated the sense of transformation. The structures which gave confidence in the past are eroding, future trajectories are uncertain, and state goals and ambitions similarly unclear. Therefore, it is a good time to study Asia's security landscape.
One of the notable features of the Asian security literature, both scholarly and policy-focused, is the absence of a shared vocabulary about that with which we are trying to grapple. Perhaps more precisely, there is no clear intellectual consensus about the meaning of central concepts and ideas.
65 - How the East Asia Summit Can Achieve its Potential
- from ASEAN Processes
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- By Nick Bisley, La Trobe University, Malcolm Cook, Flinders University
- Edited in consultation with Kee Beng Ooi, Sanchita Basu Das, Terence Chong, Malcolm Cook, Cassey Lee, Michael Chai Ming Yeo
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- Book:
- The 3rd ASEAN Reader
- Published by:
- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
- Published online:
- 22 June 2017
- Print publication:
- 17 August 2015, pp 342-346
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Summary
The Cold War provided a stable and simple bipolar global structure within which East Asian states organized their security and foreign policies. The end of the Cold War removed this adversarial but stable global order while the shift of global economic and strategic power now means that how East Asian states organize their strategic affairs will increasingly shape global security.
Destabilisers
• As anticipated by theorists, the speed and scope of the power transition centred on East Asia is transforming relations between the rising major powers, China and India, and the previously more powerful ones, the United States and Japan. India's growing capacity, its ambition and increasing interest in East Asia have deepened and diversified India's strategic relations with the United States and Japan. The opposite is largely true when it comes to China's strategic relations with the United States and Japan.
The US has been the region's pre-eminent power for decades, and has a wide range of alliance and security partners who depend on it for their security. The US-China strategic relationship is the most important facet of the power transition process. High-level voices in Beijing regularly describe the US alliance system in the region as a Cold War anachronism. Washington in turn is rebalancing its strategic policy toward Asia with a focus on strengthening and expanding this network. This is indicative of the increasingly competitive basis of current US-China strategic relations and their regional ramifications.
• East Asia's long-standing territorial dis-putes are flaring up and becoming a more central part of bilateral and regional relations in the region. This is a symptom of an increasingly competitive region and is fuelling a sense of regional insecurity.
China is the focus of much of the concern. The China-Japan dispute is the most threatening. Both are major powers with advanced war fighting capabilities and Japan's administration of the disputed islands draws the US into the strategic calculus because of the US-Japan security treaty.
Stabilisers
• Non-military threats are a growing focus of regional states’ strategic and defence policy and of defence force deployment nationally and regionally. These non-traditional security issues range are diverse and range across many ministerial portfolios, and tend to require inter-state cooperation to be addressed.
20 - The Cold War
- from 2 - The Traditional Agenda
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- By Nick Bisley
- Edited by Richard Devetak, University of Queensland, Anthony Burke, Jim George, Australian National University, Canberra
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- Book:
- An Introduction to International Relations
- Published online:
- 05 June 2012
- Print publication:
- 17 October 2011, pp 281-294
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Summary
Introduction
The Cold War was the most important feature of the international system in the second half of the twentieth century. The rivalry between the Soviet Union (USSR) and the United States (US) shaped the contours of conflict and cooperation among states and peoples between 1945 and 1991. Although the conflict did not drive all aspects of international relations, its force permeated every corner of the globe. Whether in Santiago, Sydney or Shanghai, the influence of geopolitical and ideological conflict was unmistakable. More importantly, the Cold War created rivalries and political fault lines which continue to shape international relations long after the conflict has passed.
The Cold War was a conflict between the USSR and the US (see Box 20.1). The two powers who emerged from World War II as preeminent in world politics became engaged in a protracted global contest which, although actual combat between them never eventuated, involved the largest and most destructive military arsenals in history. The two camps could destroy the entire planet thousands of times over with their nuclear weapons, and each side’s military was on a hair trigger for the conflict’s duration. It was a dispute that was driven both by traditional concerns about security – each felt the other threatening to their survival and their interests – as well as by ideological antagonism. Both embodied universal ideologies which assumed the superiority of their social system over all others. In this respect the Cold War was as much a contest about how to organise society as it was a competition for strategic influence and nuclear superiority.
19 - The cold war
- from Part 2 - The traditional agenda: states, war and law
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- By Nick Bisley, Senior Lecturer in the Faculty of Business and Economics, Monash University
- Edited by Richard Devetak, University of Queensland, Anthony Burke, University of New South Wales, Sydney, Jim George, Australian National University, Canberra
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- Book:
- An Introduction to International Relations
- Published online:
- 05 June 2012
- Print publication:
- 13 November 2007, pp 223-234
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- Chapter
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Summary
Introduction
The Cold War was the most important feature of the international system in the second half of the twentieth century. The rivalry between the Soviet Union and the US shaped the contours of conflict and cooperation among states and peoples in the period between 1945 and 1991. Although the conflict did not drive all aspects of international relations, its force permeated every corner of the globe. From the Cape to Cairo, Sydney to Shanghai, the influence of geopolitical and ideological conflict was unmistakable. More importantly, the Cold War created rivalries and political fault lines which continue to be a central factor in international relations long after the conflict has passed.
The Cold War was a conflict between the Soviet Union and the US. The two powers who emerged from World War II as preeminent in world politics became engaged in a protracted global conflict which, though actual combat between them never eventuated, involved the largest and most destructive military arsenals in history. The two camps could destroy the entire planet thousands of times over with their nuclear weapons and each side's military was on a hair trigger for the conflict's duration. It was a dispute that was driven both by traditional concerns about security – each felt the other threatening to their survival and their interests – as well as by ideological antagonism. Both embodied universal ideologies which were predicated on the superiority of their own social system.
Counter-revolution, order and international politics
- Nick Bisley
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- Journal:
- Review of International Studies / Volume 30 / Issue 1 / January 2004
- Published online by Cambridge University Press:
- 02 December 2003, pp. 49-69
- Print publication:
- January 2004
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- Article
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Every social revolution has elicited some form of counter-revolutionary response from the international system. The impulse to reverse revolutionary transformation has much to tell us about the dynamics of social revolution as well as the nature of international order. The purpose of this article is to investigate the relationship between counter-revolution and international order. First it establishes a basic conceptual framework of international counter-revolution and argues that counter-revolution should be understood as more than just an active opposition to revolution and also examines the motives of counter-revolutionaries. Second, using two interpretations of the international system – those of Henry Kissinger and Raymond Aron – the article draws several conclusions about the international tendency to attempt to overturn revolution and concludes that there exist international systemic pressures, of a non-neorealist kind, which provide the basis for international order. These pressures not only produce order but, at certain times, impel states to counter radical transformations in parts of the world which seem, at first glance, to have little consequence for the functioning of international order.