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Regime Types and Terrorism
- Khusrav Gaibulloev, James A. Piazza, Todd Sandler
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- Journal:
- International Organization / Volume 71 / Issue 3 / Summer 2017
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- 09 June 2017, pp. 491-522
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- Summer 2017
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Regime type has opposing effects on terrorism. If a regime constrains the executive branch, then terrorism may be more prevalent. If, however, a regime allows all viewpoints to be represented, then grievances may be held in check, resulting in less terrorism. Regimes that value constituents’ lives and property will also act to limit attacks. We formulate a game-theoretic model, containing a terrorist group and targeted government, that captures these opposing forces and supports a nonlinear relationship between regime type and terrorism. This model indicates how diverse samples in the literature can result in different relationships between regime type and terrorism. Seldom does it support the positive relationship that is prevalent in the terrorism literature. We apply a large variety of empirical techniques to show that regime type has a robust inverted U-shaped impact on various terrorism measures. Foreign policy variables (e.g., alliance with the United States) are not a robust influence on terrorism.
Dynamic Panel Analysis under Cross-Sectional Dependence
- Khusrav Gaibulloev, Todd Sandler, Donggyu Sul
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- Journal:
- Political Analysis / Volume 22 / Issue 2 / Spring 2014
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- 04 January 2017, pp. 258-273
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This article investigates inconsistency and invalid statistical inference that often characterize dynamic panel analysis in international political economy. These econometric concerns are tied to Nickell bias and cross-sectional dependence. First, we discuss how to avoid Nickell bias in dynamic panels. Second, we put forward factor-augmented dynamic panel regression as a means for addressing cross-sectional dependence. As a specific application, we use our methods for an analysis of the impact of terrorism on economic growth. Different terrorism variables are shown to have no influence on economic growth for five regional samples when Nickell bias and cross-dependence are taken into account. Our finding about terrorism and growth is contrary to the extant literature.
Of Nickell Bias, Cross-Sectional Dependence, and Their Cures: Reply
- Khusrav Gaibulloev, Todd Sandler, Donggyu Sul
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- Political Analysis / Volume 22 / Issue 2 / Spring 2014
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- 04 January 2017, pp. 279-280
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A Bayesian Poisson Vector Autoregression Model
- Patrick T. Brandt, Todd Sandler
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- Political Analysis / Volume 20 / Issue 3 / Summer 2012
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- 04 January 2017, pp. 292-315
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Multivariate count models are rare in political science despite the presence of many count time series. This article develops a new Bayesian Poisson vector autoregression model that can characterize endogenous dynamic counts with no restrictions on the contemporaneous correlations. Impulse responses, decomposition of the forecast errors, and dynamic multiplier methods for the effects of exogenous covariate shocks are illustrated for the model. Two full illustrations of the model, its interpretations, and results are presented. The first example is a dynamic model that reanalyzes the patterns and predictors of superpower rivalry events. The second example applies the model to analyze the dynamics of transnational terrorist targeting decisions between 1968 and 2008. The latter example's results have direct implications for contemporary policy about terrorists' targeting that are both novel and innovative in the study of terrorism.
Three - Statistical Studies and the Dynamics of Terrorist Behavior
- Walter Enders, University of Alabama, Todd Sandler, University of Texas, Dallas
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- The Political Economy of Terrorism
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- 05 June 2012
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- 31 October 2011, pp 61-102
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Summary
Our eyes are wonderful at detecting associations in data because our brains are wired to simplify complicated patterns and relationships. Within a few seconds, you should be able to figure out that 25 is the next number in the sequence 1, 4, 9, 16. A computer program may need to make millions of calculations just to detect a pattern in the chess pieces that is readily visible to an accomplished player. The problem is that the patterns we perceive in the data may not meaningfully characterize its actual behavior. In the same way that our brains are able to “see” elaborate paintings in the clouds, we are sometimes able to “recognize” what are spurious relationships in economic data.
This chapter will present the time plots of various types of terrorist incidents, including bombings, assassinations, kidnappings, and skyjackings. Some features of the data will be clear even to the casual observer; for example, there is no decidedly upward trend in any of the incident series. However, many other features of the data may not be readily apparent, so statistical analysis may be required to draw inferences about the data. Toward this end, the chapter uses the basic tools of spectral analysis and intervention analysis to formally analyze data of terrorist incidents. Spectral analysis enables us to estimate the cyclical patterns in the various terrorist incident series, while intervention analysis allows us to measure the effects of important structural changes on the incident series. For example, using intervention analysis we can examine the effects on skyjackings of the introduction of metal detectors in airports, and the behavior of terrorists since the attacks of 9/11.
Four - Counterterrorism
- Walter Enders, University of Alabama, Todd Sandler, University of Texas, Dallas
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- The Political Economy of Terrorism
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- 05 June 2012
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- 31 October 2011, pp 103-137
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Counterterrorism consists of government actions to inhibit terrorist attacks or curtail their consequences. Such policies can limit attacks by confronting terrorists directly. For example, intelligence and police investigations resulted in the capture of the entire leadership of Direct Action (DA) in France between 1982 and 1987 (Alexander and Pluchinsky, 1992, p. 135; Hoffman, 1998). Italian authorities captured most of the Red Brigades after responding to a tip-off in the kidnapping of Brigadier General James Lee Dozier, the senior US officer at NATO’s southern European command, who was abducted from his home on 17 December 1981. He was freed unharmed in a daring police rescue on 28 January 1982. Based on state’s evidence obtained from Antonio Savasta, who was captured during the raid, the police later apprehended 200 Red Brigades suspects, which resulted in further arrests and the eventual demise of the group. Other counterterrorism actions can safeguard potential terrorist targets by reducing an attack’s likelihood of success or expected payoff. The installation of metal detectors in US airports on 5 January 1973 decreased terrorists’ probability of success, as did the fortification of US embassies in the mid-1970s and beyond. After 9/11, the deployment of federal screeners at US airports, the reinforcement of airplane cockpit doors, and the designation of no-fly zones in Washington, D.C., and other American cities were intended to limit terrorists’ success and, thereby, prevent attacks. In the extreme, counterterrorism can take the form of a military campaign against a terrorist organization. For example, the Sri Lankan army scored a decisive military victory over the Tamil Tigers on 16 May 2009, ending the group’s twenty-six-year struggle for an independent state.
The purpose of this chapter is to investigate and evaluate the two primary categories of counterterrorism policies – proactive and defensive. Proactive or offensive measures attack the terrorists, their resource base, or those who support them. By contrast, defensive or passive policies may erect a protective barrier around potential targets – physical or human. Such measures dissuade terrorists by decreasing their anticipated gains from attacks. This can occur if their costs are raised or their anticipated benefits are reduced. Defensive actions may also limit attacks if alternative nonterrorist actions are made more attractive. Defensive measures may involve limiting damage following a terrorist attack – for instance, enhanced first-responder capabilities or stockpiles of antidotes against chemical agents. Stiffer penalties and greater certainty of apprehension can dissuade would-be terrorists.
References
- Walter Enders, University of Alabama, Todd Sandler, University of Texas, Dallas
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- The Political Economy of Terrorism
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- 31 October 2011, pp 363-378
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Preface
- Walter Enders, University of Alabama, Todd Sandler, University of Texas, Dallas
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- The Political Economy of Terrorism
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- 31 October 2011, pp xiii-xvi
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Preface
The first edition of this book was published in 2006. Since its publication, there has been a tremendous amount of research in economics, political science, operations research, and related fields on terrorism. This is due to the continued security threat to society posed by terrorism and to the large quantity of resources allocated to defensive and offensive counterterrorism measures. Another driver of this interest has been the funding made available by the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the US Department of Defense, the European Union, and other institutions for the study of terrorism and the practice of counterterrorism. The Science and Technology agency in the DHS has funded twelve Homeland Security Centers of Excellence to study various terrorism-related issues – for example, protecting critical infrastructure against terrorist attacks and preparing for biological terrorism. Some of these centers have degree programs to teach students about the analysis of terrorism, so the need for an up-to-date version of our book has grown.
This second edition is a substantial revision of the first edition; nevertheless, the new edition maintains the structure, analytical orientation, and accessibility of the first edition. The new edition incorporates a number of key changes. First, it brings topics up to date in terms of current thinking and the recent literature. In particular, there is now a lot more insight and knowledge about the economic impact of terrorism, the prospects for international cooperation to thwart terrorism, and the efficacy of alternative counterterrorism tools. Recent research articles have incorporated more agents – for example, terrorist operatives, the general population, and targeted governments – into the strategic analysis of terrorism. There are more models that address suicide terrorism. Second, the new edition updates the statistical displays to include terrorist-event data through 2008. Unlike the first edition, which focused on transnational terrorism, the second edition also investigates domestic terrorism. Statistics on domestic terrorist incidents come from the Global Terrorism Database, maintained at the University of Maryland. Third, the new edition accounts for changes with respect to DHS, the USA PATRIOT Act, insurance against terrorist incidents, and other institutional concerns. Fourth, the new edition uses recent terrorist incidents – for example, the attempted downing of a Northwest Airlines flight on 25 December 2009, the failed terrorist plot to blow up transatlantic flights with liquid explosives in August 2006, and the Mumbai armed attacks on 26 November 2008 – as relevant illustrative examples.
Eight - Terrorist Groups and Their Organization
- Walter Enders, University of Alabama, Todd Sandler, University of Texas, Dallas
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- The Political Economy of Terrorism
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- 31 October 2011, pp 238-268
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Terrorist groups vary greatly in terms of their longevity, structure, and evolution. The longest-lived groups in recent years include Euskadi ta Askatasuna (ETA), established in 1959; Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), established in 1964; National Liberation Army of Colombia (ELN), established in 1964; Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), established in 1964; Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), established in 1967; Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), established in 1969; and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), established in 1970. Most terrorist groups are more ephemeral; the median duration of transnational groups is between 1.7 and 3 years (Blomberg, Engel, and Sawyer, 2010, p. 319). In fact, there is a preponderance of terrorist groups that strike only once, called “one-hit wonders” by Blomberg, Engel, and Sawyer (2010). Terrorist groups are generally driven by one of four orientations: left-wing, nationalist/separatist (henceforth, nationalist), religious, and right-wing. Many single-issue groups – for example, animal rights or environmental protection – can be placed into one of these four categories. Nationalist, left-wing, and religious terrorist groups correspond to the second, third, and fourth waves of modern terrorism, respectively.
Terrorist groups have used many alternative organizational structures. At first, terrorist groups tended to be hierarchical organizations with a clear chain of command and many linkages among members. Terrorists discovered that hierarchical, densely linked structures are vulnerable, because the arrests of one or two terrorists could result in the entire group being compromised. A vivid example of this vulnerability was the Italian Red Brigades. In the aftermath of the General Dozier kidnapping in 1982, Red Brigades member Antonio Savasta turned state’s evidence, which led to the arrests of 200 suspected group members (Mickolus, Sandler, and Murdock, 1989, vol. 1, p. 237). In fact, the bulk of the Red Brigades was captured and tried. Although sporadic terrorist incidents claimed by the Red Brigades occurred in subsequent years, the group ceased to be much of a threat after the massive arrests.
Two - The Dilemma of Liberal Democracies
- Walter Enders, University of Alabama, Todd Sandler, University of Texas, Dallas
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- The Political Economy of Terrorism
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- 31 October 2011, pp 28-60
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A liberal democracy rules by the mandate and wishes of its citizens. Periodic elections place candidates into legislative and executive offices based on some voting rule, such as a simple majority or plurality of votes cast. The political system may be two-party majoritarian, proportional representation, or some similar system. The “liberal” adjective underscores that the system preserves the civil and political rights of citizens and foreign residents (see Doyle, 1997). In a well-functioning liberal democracy, the political and civil rights of the minority are protected by the ruling government. The press is allowed to report the news, and everyone has the right to express his or her views. As a result, people can criticize the government and its policies without fear of reprisals. Suspected criminals have civil rights – for example, to be charged with a crime, to obtain counsel, and to have a fair trial. Election results are tallied in an open and accurate fashion. When a government loses an election, it relinquishes office and allows for a peaceful and orderly transition of power.
An essential requirement of a liberal democracy is the protection of its people’s lives and property. A government that fails to provide this security will lose support and be voted out of office. If, for example, a liberal democracy is unable to control a terrorist campaign that murders innocent individuals on city streets or on public transit, then the government will appear inept and lose popularity. Ironically, a liberal democracy protects not only its citizens and residents but also the terrorists who engage in attacks on its soil. The political and civil freedoms that define a liberal democracy provide a favorable environment in which to wage terrorist campaigns. To date, evidence indicates that liberal democracies are more likely to be plagued by transnational terrorism than their autocratic counterparts, even though grievances may be greater in autocracies (Drakos and Gofas, 2006; Eubank and Weinberg, 1994, 2001; Li, 2005; Li and Schaub, 2004; Savun and Phillips, 2009; Weinberg and Eubank, 1998).
Subject Index
- Walter Enders, University of Alabama, Todd Sandler, University of Texas, Dallas
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- The Political Economy of Terrorism
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- 31 October 2011, pp 383-390
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Author Index
- Walter Enders, University of Alabama, Todd Sandler, University of Texas, Dallas
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- The Political Economy of Terrorism
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- 31 October 2011, pp 379-382
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Frontmatter
- Walter Enders, University of Alabama, Todd Sandler, University of Texas, Dallas
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- The Political Economy of Terrorism
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- 31 October 2011, pp i-v
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Tables and Figures
- Walter Enders, University of Alabama, Todd Sandler, University of Texas, Dallas
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- The Political Economy of Terrorism
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- 31 October 2011, pp viii-xii
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Eleven - Homeland Security
- Walter Enders, University of Alabama, Todd Sandler, University of Texas, Dallas
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- The Political Economy of Terrorism
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- 31 October 2011, pp 317-344
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The unprecedented attacks on 9/11 underscored the importance of an overall strategy for homeland security that not only coordinates agencies’ efforts to prevent terrorist attacks, but also takes decisive actions to promote recovery following an attack. The magnitude of the 9/11 incidents, with approximately 3,000 deaths and over $80 billion in property and earning losses (Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan, 2004a, 2004b), indicates that terrorism poses a significant risk. On 11 March 2004 (henceforth, 3/11), Madrid’s commuter train bombings again emphasized the vulnerability of industrial countries to terrorist events. More recently, this ever-present risk of catastrophic terrorist events was underscored by the failed attempt to bomb Northwest Airlines flight 253 on approach to Detroit on 25 December 2009 and by the suicide bombings on the Moscow subway on 29 March 2010. As terrorists seek in the future to outdo the carnage of 9/11, 3/11, and other catastrophic events, they may eventually resort to the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) (see Chapter 12). Thus, preventive measures by the authorities must address a wide range of possible attack scenarios, including standard terrorist attacks and those involving biological and chemical agents. By the same token, plans must be in place to respond to all possible attack scenarios. The digital age and the complexity of modern-day society provide terrorists with the opportunity to cause mass disruptions in communication, energy supply lines, or transportation. Actions to safeguard against attacks to society’s transportation networks involve a trade-off between safety and the free flow of passengers. Ensuring that almost no attacks will occur may slow passenger transit – say, in subway systems – due to long delays at entry points.
In order to have effective homeland security, component agencies must act in unison not only at the same jurisdictional level but also between different jurisdictional levels. That is, the federal, state, and local agencies must cooperate. Agencies’ collective action failure will lead to wasteful duplication and the inability of agents at one jurisdictional level to inform agents at another level about a pending attack or threat. The creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2002 was, in principle, a move to eliminate waste and foster synergy among component agencies at all jurisdictional levels in the United States. Hearings following 9/11 revealed coordination errors, especially in terms of intelligence (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 2004, or 9/11 Commission Report). In the wake of 9/11, the US government had to take steps to provide Americans with a greater sense of security. Clearly, the ability of the 9/11 hijackers to bring weapons on board four flights demonstrated that the nation’s airports were not secure. The success of the terrorists in obtaining visas and even flight training in the United States also highlighted vulnerabilities. The failure of US law enforcement and customs officials to stop the terrorists at the border, even though some were on a watchlist, also reflected the system’s failure to protect Americans against terrorism prior to 9/11. On Christmas day 2009, Northwest Airlines flight 253 revealed that the “no-fly list” still presented gaps and challenges that allowed a bomb-carrying terrorist to board a flight. As a consequence, no-fly lists have been greatly expanded, and advanced imaging technology (AIT) scanners or “whole body imagers” will be increasingly deployed at US airports – 200 AIT units will be in place by the end of calendar year 2010, and a total of 878 AIT units will be in place by the end of the fiscal year 2014 (US Government Accountability Office, 2010).
Five - Transference
- Walter Enders, University of Alabama, Todd Sandler, University of Texas, Dallas
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- The Political Economy of Terrorism
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- 31 October 2011, pp 138-169
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Contraband such as automatic and semiautomatic machine guns, bazookas, hand grenades, suicide vests, and hand-held rocket launchers can easily fit into a ship’s cargo container. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is understandably worried about these potential terrorist weapons reaching US shores. The Container Security Initiative (CSI) is designed to secure US ports against the importation of these and other dangerous materials (see Chapter 11 on homeland security). With the cooperation of its trading partners, US inspectors in port cities such as Rotterdam, Singapore, and Hong Kong inspect and label cargo before it reaches US shores. The CSI is predicated, in part, on the notion that terrorists make choices by taking costs and benefits into account. If it is more difficult to smuggle weapons aboard a commercial plane or by air freight, terrorists will seek out a “weaker link” or softer target. Thus, unless US ports of entry become more secure, DHS predicts that enhanced airport security will make US ports a weaker link.
The bombing of the three train stations in Madrid on 11 March 2004 is another instance of terrorists finding a weaker link. The bombs, designed to explode during rush hour, left 191 dead and injured more than 1,200 others. The coverage in the Spanish press and the effects on the Spanish psyche rivaled the influence of 9/11 in the United States. One indirect consequence of the attack was the unanticipated victory of the Socialists over the ruling Partido Popular party. Why did al-Qaida decide to attack rail passengers? One rationale given for the train station bombings was that terrorists found that skyjacking was too difficult and too risky to be successful. The main Atocha train station and the two smaller stations were softer targets.
Six - International Cooperation
- Walter Enders, University of Alabama, Todd Sandler, University of Texas, Dallas
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- The Political Economy of Terrorism
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- 31 October 2011, pp 170-200
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In a globalized world with a high volume of cross-border flows, transnational terrorism is a global public bad, while action to control or eliminate it is the quintessential global public good. As such, antiterrorism efforts yield nonrival benefits – enhanced security – received by all at-risk countries. The formation of far-flung terrorist networks has greatly increased the spatial dispersion of benefits derived from measures taken against these networks. The theory of public good supply teaches that as the dispersion of these measures’ benefits increases, their underprovision worsens as providers fail to take account of the benefits that their efforts confer on others when deciding upon antiterrorism actions (see Chapter 4; Sandler, 1997, 2004).
The sheer volume of cross-border exchanges of all types makes it possible to monitor but a small fraction of them, thereby affording opportunities for terrorists to move personnel and equipment internationally. For example, well over a half-billion people cross US borders annually. In 2003, 130 million motor vehicles, 2.5 million rail cars, and 5.7 million cargo containers transited US borders (White House, 2004, p. 165). These transit numbers have grown annually since then. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has a daunting task, with 5,000 miles of Canadian border, 1,900 miles of Mexican border, and 95,000 miles of coastline to protect against terrorist and other threats (DHS, 2009, p. 70). According to DHS, 625 million airline passengers were screened in US airports in 2009. The combination of globalization and technological advances means that even the most secure borders may be penetrated by determined terrorists who utilize technologies (for example, communication advances) and apply innovative methods to circumvent security upgrades. Terrorists weigh relative risks to identify the least secure venue or weakest link at which to stage their attack against a targeted nation’s assets. Thus, as we have seen in Chapter 2, most attacks against US interests occur outside the United States, where defenses are weaker. The networking of terrorists facilitates their ability to identify vulnerable targets and exploit governments’ failure, except episodically, to act in unison.
One - Terrorism
- Walter Enders, University of Alabama, Todd Sandler, University of Texas, Dallas
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- The Political Economy of Terrorism
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- 31 October 2011, pp 1-27
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The events on 11 September 2001 (henceforth, 9/11) served as a wake-up call to the world that transnational terrorism poses grave risks. The four simultaneous hijackings on 9/11 represent watershed terrorist incidents for a number of reasons. First, the deaths associated with 9/11 were unprecedented: the human toll was equal to the number of deaths from transnational terrorism from the start of 1988 through the end of 2000 (Sandler, 2003). Second, the losses associated with 9/11 topped $80 billion and caused insurance companies to end automatic coverage of terrorist-induced losses. Following 9/11, many companies were unable to afford terrorism insurance. To address the insurance concern, the US government enacted the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA) on 26 November 2002. Third, 9/11 showed that ordinary objects can be turned into deadly weapons with catastrophic consequences. Despite the huge carnage of 9/11, the death toll could have been much higher had the planes struck the towers at a lower floor. Fourth, 9/11 underscored the objectives of today’s fundamentalist terrorists to seek maximum casualties and to cause widespread fear, unlike the predominantly left-wing terrorist campaigns of the 1970s and 1980s that sought to win over a constituency. Fifth, 9/11 mobilized a huge reallocation of resources to homeland security – since 2002, the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) budget has grown by over 60% to $36.2 billion for the fiscal year 2004 (DHS, 2003). In fiscal year 2005, the DHS budget grew another 10% to $40.2 billion (DHS, 2004). The proposed DHS budget for 2010 is $55.1 billion, with approximately 65% of the budget, or $35.7 billion, going to homeland security proper (DHS, 2009, p. 155). In past DHS budgets, between 60 and 65% went to defending against terrorism on US soil. This expenditure is small compared to proactive or military measures taken in fighting the “war on terror,” including the invasion against the Taliban and al-Qaida in Afghanistan on 7 October 2001 and the ongoing operations against these groups in Afghanistan in 2009, 2010, and 2011. Still other proactive spending involves improving intelligence, tracking terrorist assets, and fostering cooperative linkages with other countries. Sixth, protective actions taken by rich developed countries have transferred some attacks against these countries’ interests to poorer countries – for example, the post-9/11 attacks in Indonesia, Morocco, Kenya, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and elsewhere.
Ten - The Economic Impact of Terrorism
- Walter Enders, University of Alabama, Todd Sandler, University of Texas, Dallas
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- The Political Economy of Terrorism
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- 31 October 2011, pp 288-316
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Summary
On 12 October 2000 in Aden, Yemen, a small motorboat full of explosives rammed the USS Cole while it was in port for a refueling stop. Seventeen sailors died and another thirty-nine were injured by the explosion, which ripped a forty-foot by forty-foot hole in the ship’s side. On 13 December 2000 the USS Cole returned to the United States, carried aboard a transport ship, for repairs that lasted fourteen months. Two years later (6 October 2002), Yemeni terrorists attacked the French tanker Limburg while it was readying to receive its cargo of crude oil from an offshore terminal. Although Yemen is ideally located as a major Middle Eastern port because it borders the Red Sea and the Arabian Sea, the combined attacks on the USS Cole and the Limburg crushed Yemen’s shipping industry. A US Department of State (2002) fact sheet indicates that a 300% increase in insurance premiums led to ships routinely bypassing Yemen for competitive facilities in Djibouti and Oman. As a result of a 50% decrease in port activity, Yemen expects to lose $3.8 million per month as a result of the attacks.
The incidents in Yemen illustrate the direct and indirect costs of terrorism. The direct costs can be calculated by summing the replacement costs of damaged goods, equipment, structures, and inventories. Despite the difficulty of measuring the cost of a human life or the cost of pain and suffering, such calculations are now routine, using either lost earnings or the value of a statistical life. The indirect costs, such as the decline in Yemeni shipping revenues, are more difficult to measure. How much of the actual decline is due to insurance costs rather than to the military activities associated with the Iraq War or to higher oil prices is difficult to gauge. Beyond these lost revenues, Yemen faces increased security costs as it decided to purchase additional patrol boats and helicopters to guard its waters. Calculating the associated costs of any attack is difficult, since, unlike traditional crimes, terrorism is designed to create a general and ongoing atmosphere of intimidation and fear. Terrorists are most successful when they lead the public to expect future attacks. Because the psychological effects of the two Yemeni attacks were mutually reinforcing, they increased the “risk premium” necessary to compensate insurers for the potential damage of future attacks.
Twelve - The Future of Terrorism
- Walter Enders, University of Alabama, Todd Sandler, University of Texas, Dallas
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- The Political Economy of Terrorism
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- 31 October 2011, pp 345-362
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Despite the war on terror and the death of bin Laden, the one certainty is that terrorism will continue as a tactic associated with conflicts. As long as there are grievances, there will be conflict and, thus, terrorism. Terrorism will always be present owing to its cost-effectiveness and its favoring of the weak against the strong. A bomb that costs a mere few hundred dollars may cause hundreds of millions in damage – for example, the 1993 bombing of the north tower of the World Trade Center. Desperation and frustration are key motives for terrorism. Its cruelty can, at times, make it an end in itself.
Since the start of the modern era of terrorism in the late 1960s, terrorist experts have used current experiences and trends to predict the future of terrorism. Predictions are based on two paradigms: (i) an induction derived from recent events, and (ii) forecasts using statistical methods. Both paradigms have their shortcomings. When past experiences (attacks) are used, predictions tend to be reactive coming from an unanticipated driver – for example, the shift from leftist-based to fundamentalist transnational terrorism. Such predictions are useful until the next major unforeseen upheaval. Policy ends are better served if changing grievances, players, and tactics are recognized near their onset so that countervailing actions can be proactively engineered at the outset of change. Forecasts based on statistical techniques are less accurate as they are further projected into the future. As in the case of experienced-based predictions, a statistically fitted trend cannot foresee shocks that throw off forecasts. Trend analysis provides an “average” description that cannot identify an unusual future pattern.