

doctrines concerning the extraterritorial effects of the criminal law in the two Germanies, doctrines which the treaty of 1972 was to redefine. In terms of legal formulation Roggemann sees the evolution of relations between the legal systems of these dual German states as a transition from interprovincial conflicts to international conflicts governed by the principles of international criminal law. Whether this transition will occur is still uncertain. The book does not indicate that the attitudes of the West German and East German courts has changed following the signing of the treaty, but Roggemann does note that West German jurisprudential writers have come out in favor of the new approach in criminal law enforcement, seeing it in terms of relations between two members of the international community (pp. 12-56).

The other two books are collections of documents on the Soviet and East German state order. They add perspective to Roggemann's monograph on *Strafrechtsanwendung* by illustrating features of the Soviet and East German regimes which determine the scope and degree of cooperation in the administration of justice between East and West Germany. Both volumes are divided into sections dealing with the organization of the Communist Party, constitutional order, promulgation of laws, central and local government, elections, and protection of rights. Each section is preceded by an introduction which combines brevity with encyclopedic precision. The introductions are very useful for the reader seeking basic information on the Soviet and East German regimes. Although the material in the two collections is accurate and informative, the author regrettably has not seen the need to point out differences between the Soviet and East German regimes, even though they differ markedly in areas such as administration of justice and labor relations.

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GERMAN AND POLE: NATIONAL CONFLICT AND MODERN MYTH. By Harry Kenneth Rosenthal. Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1976. x, 175 pp. \$10.00.

The title of this book is somewhat misleading for it is not a study of the German-Polish conflict, nor even a presentation of these two peoples' opposing images of each other. It is, rather, only an account, well documented although not especially well written, of the opinions which the Germans have held of the Poles throughout history and particularly since the end of the eighteenth century.

Still, it is an important little book. The German-Polish conflict has been one of the international problems which has profoundly affected the course of events in Europe on several occasions. By systematically reviewing the changing image of the Poles as held by the Germans, Dr. Rosenthal helps us to understand the roots of the conflict. With the detachment of an outside observer (one that is not, however, entirely free from the naïve optimism which often characterizes American writings about European politics), he examines the existing evidence and carefully dissects myth from reality.

The author rejects the stereotype which holds that the Nazi slaughters in Poland during the Second World War represented a culmination of a historically persistent German hatred of the Poles and he successfully supports his contention. Yet, Dr. Rosenthal's overall conclusions are pessimistic. German attitudes toward the Poles have fallen into two categories: the Germans living in the western part of the country were generally indifferent toward the Poles; while the Germans in the east, in close contact with the Poles, despised them and, not necessarily because of a feeling of superiority but often because of fear, tended to adopt a contemptuous view of their eastern neighbors. One searches in vain in this book for evidence of any positive view

that the Germans might have held of the Poles, which could have inspired them to strive consistently for cooperation between the two nations.

Dr. Rosenthal rightly observes that since the Second World War the Germans have abandoned, although still not completely, their negative view of the Poles. Unfortunately, in West Germany this has not been replaced by a positive image but rather by a new indifference. The valiant efforts by a few West German scholars to change this situation have not been particularly successful. In this sense the author's basic pessimism about German-Polish relations still holds true.

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POLAND AND THE COMING OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR: THE DIPLOMATIC PAPERS OF A. J. DREXEL BIDDLE, JR., UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR TO POLAND, 1937-1939. Edited and with an introduction by *Philip V. Cannistraro, Edward D. Wynot, Jr., and Theodore P. Kovaleff*. Foreword by *Charles Morley*. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1976. xvi, 358 pp. Photographs. \$17.50.

Ambassador Anthony Drexel Biddle, Jr., was one of the few foreign diplomats to enjoy the complete confidence of Polish Foreign Minister Józef Beck. Precisely because Beck confided in Biddle on matters of policy and frequently sought his views, the publication of the "Biddle Report" on the fall of Poland in September 1939, and a selection of his diplomatic correspondence provides an interesting source for the study of Polish diplomacy and domestic affairs during the years 1937-39.

In addition to an introductory essay, this work, based on materials found in the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, is composed of the lengthy "Report" and thirty-one documents, only two of which have been previously published. The ably written introduction sketches Biddle's background and diplomatic career, and outlines the course of Polish foreign policy up to the outbreak of war. The "Report" itself, written in Paris in October 1939, traces in a succinct and at times exciting manner the events—from the Munich crisis to the internment of Polish leaders in Rumania on September 21, 1939—leading to the collapse of Poland. The documents are perhaps the most interesting feature of the book. Chronologically spanning Biddle's tenure in Warsaw, they touch upon economics, military matters, minority problems, and politics as well as foreign affairs. Yet, we find no major revelations here; much of what Biddle reported to Washington, as the editorial notes indicate, corroborates positions and policies already made known through the memoirs of Beck, the papers of the Polish ambassadors to Paris and Berlin, Łukasiewicz and Lipski, and the diary of Undersecretary of State Jan Szembek.

The picture of Colonel Beck that emerges from Biddle's correspondence is not the stereotyped version of the elegant and completely cynical foreign minister who was, to use Henry L. Roberts's phrase, "riding two horses at once." Rather, Beck appears as a sympathetic figure, a statesman attempting to maintain a delicate balance between two hostile neighboring states. Yet, while Beck had no illusions as to the ultimate catastrophic consequences of the cession of any part of Polish territory to Germany (pp. 62-63), his assessment of Hitler was partly obscured by a belief that Hitler's "Austrian mentality" would impart to him a "flash of reasoning" or cause him to think twice when faced with a strong opponent (pp. 52-53, 348).

Biddle, politically and financially well-connected, had no formal training in diplomacy, but nonetheless possessed natural analytical powers that enabled him to carry out his assignment effectively. Viewed from the present, his memorandums often emerge as correct in their insights into Polish policy (especially, pp. 17, 220-21).