
RESEARCH REPORTS AND NOTES

SCHOLARLY IMAGES OF LATIN AMERICAN POLITICAL DEMOCRACY IN 1975*

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NORMATIVE ISSUES AND THE THEORETIC CONTEXT

As practiced contemporaneously in most of Latin America, political democracy is more accurately elite governance, with many of the thornier authoritarian trappings cloaked behind an often transparent facade of "popular suffrage" and "parliamentary government." Democracy, as a normative basis for the "good life," is difficult to describe and conceptualize, especially when one assumes that the democratic prototype is to be discovered somewhere within that caldron of slippery political variables known as the Anglo-American model. I do not assume in this report that the nations of Latin America *should* be trying to move in the direction of the Anglo-American model (assuming we can describe, more or less generically, the constituent parts of that model). Nevertheless, I would be remiss in not stating the general outlines of what I understand political democracy to mean as related to the quinquennial survey of scholarly images to be reported herein.¹

*The author is grateful to Merle Kling and James Wilkie for their constructive criticism leading to renovation of much of the conceptual and theoretic context of this research, and especially to Kling for his encouragement and guidance in maintaining this longitudinal study or "time-series." Thanks are due also to Kenneth Coleman for his critical suggestions and to Miles Williams for his valued advice and insight. The seminal idea, of course, came from Russell H. Fitzgibbon thirty years ago and he continued his inspired participation in the 1975 survey. This could be done, however, only because some eighty generous colleagues agreed to participate. Their names appear at the end of the text.

Latin America's constitution-makers apparently thought that paper imitations of French, British, and North American governmental systems would assure the growth of political democracy; and along with it, they hoped, would come vigorous economies with equitable wealth distribution mechanisms buttressed by a wide range of human freedoms, the most important of which would be freedom of political speech, organization, and action.² This, as we know from direct empirical inspection of Latin American political life, has simply not been the case. The contemporary example of Argentina during the second Perón era should be an adequate reminder that such formalisms as ostensibly honest elections, working congresses, and independent judiciaries (plus a myriad of social welfare institutions) do not ipso facto mean freedom and prosperity; nor do they necessarily induce political stability.

We have an adequate literature to demonstrate the ease with which elites and oligarchies have subverted processes and institutions that are formally democratic. In contrast, there is a relative paucity of literature going to the point that the Latin American people generally like it that way. Yet one distinguished Latin American senior statesman once observed bitterly that Latin Americans got, by and large, the regimes they deserved and tolerated.³ More recently, a political novelist has observed that (in at least one country) the people have innate psychic needs that help to maintain a political status quo that is dominated by elites, *caudillos*, and their watchwords frequently expressed as "isms."⁴ Let us examine ever so briefly the innate psychic thesis as it relates to the study of political democracy in Latin America.

Stated succinctly, the thesis is that the people have an innate spiritual need to seek refuge in "thaumaturgical words," miracle working amulets, that will give them a comforting sense of political cohesion and identity.⁵ They need a symbol with messianic powers, like a charismatic leader, or a magic "ism" that continually inspires group attachment, patriotic spirit, and loyalty. The symbol, word, leader, or "ism" must be such that the above emotive qualities can at least be feigned. This often requires inherent ability for self deception along with the instinct for paternalism (which has been cited as one of the principal enemies of Latin American political development).⁶ Thus, confidence in the supernatural powers of key men and symbols, it is argued, has helped bring to power such despots as Getulio Vargas, Gustavo Rojas Pinilla, Arnulfo Arias, and Juan Domingo Perón. Carrying the argument further (in applications not taken from the original source), such spiritual needs may be said to have lent support to *velasquismo* in Ecuador, *aprismo* in Peru, as well as Cuban *fidelismo*. The quest to satisfy psychic needs may be hypothesized to underly the Mexican single-party system and its "revolutionary pyramid-mystique."⁷ In the Mexican case, the preoccupation with perpetuation of the mystique has gone to the point of high officials proclaiming to the public that a "threat" exists to the stability of Mexican democracy in the form of a "party of abstentionism" consisting of those who, unpatriotically, do not vote (because the outcome of nearly all elections at all governmental levels is clearly predetermined).⁸

If the Latin American people need to believe in spiritual panaceas (I cannot prove it, only suggest it on the basis of the works cited above), and if this need

conditions their political life, then does this not imply that "democracy" as an analytic concept may be meaningless vis-à-vis Latin America today? If the answer *clearly* is yes, then we probably should not waste time establishing quantitative indexes of political democracy in Latin America. But it is clear that the Latin American nations have formally embraced democracy, in one form or another, as a cherished social goal. Cuba boasts a single-party people's democracy. Brazil claims to have a two-party democracy. Colombia professes to be a multiparty democracy, although only two of its many parties have any real chance of winning major political power. There are, of course, a number of outright dictatorships, but even some of them (like Nicaragua and Paraguay) try to create the facade of participatory democracy via the tactic of manipulated elections and legislatures. Panama and Peru have "democracy through militarism," or so their orators claim. Chile, at the moment of this writing, does not claim to be democratic but its regime does claim that it is "progressive" on socioeconomic terms.

The United States government recognized the need for development of nonviolent political democracy in Latin America by investing over twenty billions of dollars in the ALPRO, the "alliance that lost its way."⁹ And we, as citizens of academia, often instinctively conjecture as to which are the most and least democratic of the Latin American nations. The fact alone of some 300 million human beings living there, whose lives are vitally affected by their political systems, makes this inquiry relevant in normative theoretical and humanistic terms. It is relevant as well to the formation of U.S. foreign policy, especially as related to the images of political democracy that scholars of Latin American politics may transmit to key governmental actors.¹⁰

The survey data reported below are offered with an eye to the definition of political democracy that was stipulated above (see note 1) and also to the following considerations. In this analysis, one must try to differentiate participatory politics from power politics, the former being egalitarian, the latter not.¹¹ There is also a distinction to be made between power and violence, the latter being chronic in Latin American political instability. Power and violence, of course, often go together, but power is something that is inherent in the very existence of a political community and needs no special justification. Violence, on the other hand, is not inherent in the political community and is an aberration within it. Power need not be justified; violence, when used in connection with power, must be justified but it can never be legitimized.¹² In Latin America, power exercised through violence is common. If legitimate power is replaced by violence (as, some will say, in the contemporary political life of Brazil, Chile, and Haiti), then the inevitable result is terror, i. e., "the form of government that comes into being when violence, having destroyed all power, does not abdicate but, on the contrary, remains in full control."¹³ Thus, violence has become a way of political "life" in certain Latin American countries¹⁴ and this cannot help but influence the scholarly image of democracy, depending upon one's degree of familiarity with the given country.

The politics of power and violence that characterize so much of the Latin American political culture do not, of course, allow a prominent role for nonviolent conflict resolution. For the politics of participation to operate effectively, there must exist some level of basic agreement, in the form of enforceable rules, on the

manner in which political ideologues will disagree. Obviously, the prevalence of zero-sum game conditions militates against nonviolent conflict resolution. Latin American politics exhibit chronic turmoil, stemming from the incompatible ideological demands of competing groups. Thus, the question of democracy will be affected in each country by the norms, styles, skills, and arenas that most prominently characterize the nation's share in the overall political culture (e.g., the degree to which criticism of the state is seen as sedition and/or treason, or the degree to which minority rights are violated by majorities, or vice versa).

What are the key criteria for evaluating democratic practices in Latin America? The issue touched on above, i.e., the ease with which criticism of the state may be branded seditious, implies a threshold of criticality that curtails political speech vis-à-vis a given regime. That is why I have found it constructive to establish a special index that is intended to reflect the presence or absence of political democracy (in terms of scholarly images) and to delineate it as much as possible from other environmental factors that may be conditions for, or consequences of, the relative prevalence of democratic political practices. Therefore, the matter of freedom of speech and press, of criticism of the state without fear of reprisal, becomes central to this endeavor. As Christian Bay has argued, "no complex society can do entirely without political authority to supplement institutions, and the exercise of this authority, or of power in its support, is likely to be much more ruthless in a nondemocratic country in which opposition more easily becomes treason or subversion."¹⁵ His words capsulize a key Latin American dilemma. In the nondemocratic state, acts of disparagement toward the regime are harder to take than in the democratic state that, presumably, encourages constructive criticism and debate within established rules of order. In the nondemocratic state it may be seen as a sign of weakness for the government to enter into a dialogue with its challengers, e.g., the Mexican government in 1968 chose to visit repressive violence upon protesting students rather than negotiate with them. In Argentina, during 1973–76, any criticism of the Leader and his principal cohorts was branded in some high circles as seditious. In 1975, governments such as those of Brazil, Chile, and Haiti offered exile, jail, and often death to critics of the regime. Much the same prevailed in Bolivia, Guatemala, and Panama. Other regimes castigated their critics in varying degrees of severity.

If freedom from coercion is the supreme political good (as Christian Bay argues), and freedom of political speech is its collateral second, then loyalty to constitutions and governments should be considered as *conditional* to the extent that such constitutions and governments foster the cause of human rights.¹⁶ And when they serve only the cause of elite maintenance, then the cycle of rebellion-repression-suppressed alienation-aggression-rebellion is not to be unexpected. Yet, finally, we must keep in mind another dictum that helps to place in relief the dilemma of trying to measure or reflect the status of political democracy in Latin America: "If one or two elections do not create a democracy, neither do one or two coups confirm the opposite. What should always be remembered is that every people has to win its own democracy for itself."¹⁷ This, of course, assumes that political democracy is really what the people desire, and earlier I cited culturally well-anchored evidence that might lead some of us to question that assumption.

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Let us look now at some of the quantitative evidence we have from the quinquennium 1970–75.

QUANTIFICATION AND THE IMAGE INDEX

A “democratic weathervane” is the expression Russell Fitzgibbon once used to describe the survey procedure he pioneered thirty years ago.¹⁸ Space here does not permit a full explanation of the methodology, but it is familiar to many social scientists and both Fitzgibbon and I have published resumes of the technique at various times.¹⁹ Essentially, we ask a select group of specialists in Latin America (by and large, limited to political scientists and historians) to rate the twenty Latin American republics in terms of fifteen key criteria for political democracy. Over the years, there was considerable debate about the validity of using environmental criteria such as “educational level” and “standard of living” as indicators of democracy. At the suggestion of Merle Kling and James Wilkie, plus many others, I have *not* eliminated these environmental criteria from the survey in the interest of preserving its longevity as a time-series (of which there are few other, if any, in the social sciences). But, in collaboration with Wilkie, I have established a set of five select criteria that we hope provides more accurate and methodologically “pure” indicators of the relative presence of political democracy. Most of these select criteria (shown below) relate to the earlier-quoted dictums of Christian Bay. In addition, I do not claim to be measuring “democracy as such” but to be measuring or reflecting the changing scholarly image of political democracy in Latin America across the years. This is a reputational procedure—I accept its limitations—and in this first of several reports it is my desire to reflect the basic data (interpreted in a new light) from the original Fitzgibbon instrument along with some preliminary analysis drawn from the most recent survey that took place in November 1975. Data from a Spanish version of the instrument that was administered in Argentina, and those from a supplementary instrument designed to test propositions about political power in Latin America, do not appear here and are reserved for a later report.²⁰

The substantive criteria for evaluation are listed in figure 1 and correspond to the numbers that appear in the left margin of table 1. A total of eighty-four social scientists specializing in Latin America responded to the standard questionnaire.²¹ A core panel of about twenty respondents was selected by this author and they, in turn, recommended the remainder of those who chose to participate. Only a small percentage of those invited chose to decline, and of those who accepted the invitation only about 3 percent failed to respond within the first two weeks of November (after the third week of November 1975 no further responses were accepted). An effort was made to limit the time span of the responses as strictly as possible so that fortuitous events (e.g., coups) would not impede aggregation of the data, and, fortunately, no such events did occur—the attempted coup in Argentina notwithstanding—during the remainder of 1975 that marked the quinquennium’s end. This was the largest, and most randomly chosen, of the entire thirty years of the Fitzgibbon surveys. The last one, directed by me in 1970, had only sixty-three respondents, nearly half and half North

Americans and Latin Americans. The data reported below are for the eighty-four North American (resident) scholars only.

The content of table 1 is simply the total image-index vote per cell in the 15 by 20 matrix. This will be of value to scholars wishing to go beyond the data contained in my study and cited variously herein (and in figure 1). Indeed, one of the principal reasons for the rapid publication of this report in its basic form is to enable my colleague participants to use the data they so kindly helped to generate. This continuing project depends almost exclusively upon the good will and professional generosity of the respondent scholars.²² Table 2 contains the 1975 country rank orderings according to the two indexes and a Spearman's correlation coefficient for comparison. Although the implication of this calculation is that the indexes exhibit similar country rank orderings, a closer inspection reveals significant differences. I will leave interpretation of these differences in terms of the substance of ongoing political life to a future report. Suffice it to point out here that when the environmental factors of the total index are removed, and the

FIGURE 1

<i>Substantive Criteria for Evaluation*</i>	<i>Select Criteria for Democracy**</i>
1. Educational level	
2. Standard of living	
3. Internal unity	
4. Political maturity	
5. Freedom from foreign domination	
6. Freedom of press, speech, etc.	6. Freedom of press, speech, etc.
7. Free elections	7. Free elections
8. Freedom of political organization	8. Freedom of political organization
9. Independent judiciary	9. Independent judiciary
10. Handling of governmental funds	
11. Social legislation	
12. Degree of civilian supremacy	12. Degree of civilian supremacy
13. Freedom from ecclesiastical domination	
14. Governmental administration	
15. Local governmental autonomy	

*Each respondent was given a brief statement of how each criterion should be understood (in more or less terms), so as to give something of a common frame of reference to all the responding scholars. The problems of conceptual and substantive overlap in this index have been acknowledged in the light of published criticisms of the technique, and all of this is dealt with in Kenneth F. Johnson, "Measuring the Scholarly Image of Latin American Democracy: 1945 to 1970," in Wilkie and Ruddle, eds., *Methodology in Quantitative Latin American Studies* (Los Angeles: UCLA Latin American Center, 1976).

**Experiments contained in the publication cited above reveal that across the years a substantial amount of difference occurs when the rank ordering of certain countries is compared according to each of the above indexes. The index of select criteria tends to depress the ranking of countries that may have achieved impressive socioeconomic gains but at the expense of basic political freedoms.

freedom-oriented factors become the principal basis for evaluation, the position of several states deteriorates quite markedly. Note, for instance, the relative positions of Cuba, Peru, Brazil, Chile; several countries improve their rankings when judged by the select criteria, i.e., Honduras, Dominican Republic, and Guatemala. Probably most dramatic are the declines in the status of Chile and Uruguay which, over the past thirty years, have remained at or near the top of the various indexes. The decline of political democracy in Chile and Uruguay is clearly a fact of life today and the aggregate images of the experts bear this out well. Similar position changes for these countries were noted in a Spanish version of the instrument that was administered in Argentina by this author, all of which convinces me that creation of the select index was a constructive methodological advance.

On the matter of declining or "deteriorating" rank order positions, an important caveat should be added. Because we do not have precise interval data, we cannot say *ex cathedra* that the position of such and such a country has absolutely declined or increased. The reader will note from table 2 that Mexico is in third and fourth place, respectively, on the two indexes. This represents a slight increase in ranking for Mexico over previous years, but, on the basis of my ongoing interviews with Mexican political ideologues, I would say that the status of political democracy as judged by the freedom-oriented criteria may actually have deteriorated during the past ten years (other scholars may, of course, disagree). The point, then, is that things have gotten so much worse in Chile and Uruguay that Mexico seems to have improved almost by default. In collaboration with Miles Williams, I am developing a technique (suggested by him) that may give us a more precise basis for evaluating all of the rank positions in the entire thirty years of survey experiments. That report will be forthcoming. For the moment, I will leave it to each reader to decipher for himself/herself what additional significance should be attached to the 1975 data and the theoretical framework within which this project is being carried out. A great deal more data from the supplementary instrument (the power index) and the Argentine survey will be forthcoming. Along with this I hope to publish the comments and criticisms of the respondent experts themselves as a way of enriching the debate over the study of Latin American political democracy, this in the interest of the entire scholarly and policy-making community.

TABLE 1 The Scholarly Image of Political Democracy in Latin America for 1975: Country-Criteria Raw Scores*

	Argen- tina	Boli- via	Brazil	Chile	Colom- bia	Costa Rica	Cuba	Dom. Rep.	Ecu- dor	El Sal.
1.	400	138	267	365	277	379	353	194	182	214
2.	353	130	260	266	258	336	309	193	190	209
3.	235	180	301	269	281	383	387	247	232	272
4.	216	152	258	222	306	385	316	192	208	226
5.	338	196	282	233	302	293	238	180	253	228
6.	282	178	151	115	341	393	116	231	227	233
7.	295	142	147	102	351	404	108	240	175	204
8.	301	166	163	152	361	390	140	233	179	217
9.	290	164	183	167	318	360	154	202	198	214
10.	254	168	269	257	279	329	325	194	213	220
11.	317	227	221	227	268	338	396	208	214	224
12.	196	117	109	107	345	402	283	224	133	172
13.	309	270	307	297	244	335	355	267	236	251
14.	258	168	297	270	278	324	317	201	200	217
15.	233	149	234	187	269	305	220	183	190	194

	Guate- mala	Haiti	Hon- duras	Mexico	Nica- ragua	Pa- nama	Para- guay	Peru	Uru- guay	Vene- zuela
1.	168	89	149	302	163	253	152	233	394	321
2.	176	90	146	289	165	244	162	224	324	332
3.	195	197	217	347	232	285	252	261	308	349
4.	188	102	169	343	154	226	160	260	254	353
5.	198	176	187	313	177	188	236	324	276	332
6.	200	106	190	311	147	222	127	199	221	374
7.	185	89	162	271	131	169	110	140	191	395
8.	200	94	177	288	153	177	132	168	227	391
9.	195	105	179	275	152	195	136	204	248	326
10.	198	110	175	258	153	205	160	259	271	312
11.	192	113	191	317	160	247	149	319	321	323
12.	153	169	140	380	162	132	119	107	178	367
13.	242	218	249	338	252	286	237	284	334	319
14.	189	120	169	285	165	212	171	264	274	308
15.	175	115	160	245	155	184	152	204	242	281

*Total raw scores by country appear in table 2

TABLE 2 *Fitzgibbon-Johnson Image-Index for 1975:
Country Rank Orderings by Two Indexes*

<i>All Criteria Rankings</i>	<i>Points</i>	<i>Select Criteria*</i>	<i>Points</i>
1. Costa Rica	5356	1. Costa Rica	1949
2. Venezuela	5083	2. Venezuela	1853
3. Mexico	4562	3. Colombia	1716
4. Colombia	4478	4. Mexico	1525
5. Argentina	4277	5. Argentina	1364
6. Uruguay	4063	6. Dom. Republic	1130
7. Cuba	4017	7. Uruguay	1065
8. Peru	3450	8. El Salvador	1040
9. Brazil	3449	9. Guatemala	933
10. El Salvador	3295	10. Ecuador	912
11. Chile	3236	11. Panama	895
12. Panama	3225	12. Honduras	848
13. Dom. Republic	3189	13. Peru	818
14. Ecuador	3030	14. Cuba	801
15. Guatemala	2854	15. Bolivia	767
16. Honduras	2660	16. Brazil	753
17. Bolivia	2545	17. Nicaragua	745
18. Nicaragua	2521	18. Chile	643
19. Paraguay	2455	19. Paraguay	624
20. Haiti	1893	20. Haiti	563

Rho = .78 and is significant beyond the .01 level.

*See second column of figure 1.

NOTES

1. Drawing upon such works as Leslie Lipson's *The Democratic Civilization* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), and Stanislav Andreski's *Parasitism and Subversion: The Case of Latin America* (New York: Pantheon, 1966), I would argue that a democratic political system should have all of the following characteristics to at least some degree: (1) Popular sovereignty exercised through competing interest groups that vie for power and leadership within a fixed and impartial set of rules that are applied equally to all participants; (2) the state and its personnel exist to serve the public, not to rob them, and there is a recognized norm distinguishing between that which is public and that which is private; (3) some free and honest procedure for selecting leaders of the state that will be competitive and popular; (4) leadership elements so selected will be perpetually (or periodically) subject to public review, challenge, and/or removal from office, again within an impartial and equitably applied set of rules; (5) the stakes in the power struggle are not so high as to make it impossible for one politically relevant group to accept an *adverse* popular judgment vis-à-vis its preferred candidate or policy; and (6) the overall thrust of the political system is conducive to individual self-realization (what Christian Bay has called "potential freedom") as opposed to fascism, in which the individual is sacrificed to the alleged organic unity of the nation-state. A glance over the hemisphere will show that, in substance, Latin American political life

does not measure up well to the above criteria if they are taken in an absolute sense. Therefore, it is necessary to stress that political democracy in Latin America is to be taken as a culture-relative concept. A discussion similar to that given above is to be found in Lyman T. Sargent, *Contemporary Political Ideologies*, 3rd ed. (Homewood, Illinois: Dorsey Press, 1975), and a somewhat contrasting view is found in David E. Ingersoll, *Communism, Fascism, and Democracy* (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill, 1971). Ingersoll argues that individuality is the core idea in democratic theory but the practice of "mass democracy" in the contemporary world seems to be destroying that key element, an observation that is especially relevant to the study of political democracy in certain Latin American states.

2. For instance, the nineteenth-century Argentine writers Esteban Echeverría (*Los ideales de mayo y la tiranía* [1838 approx.]) and Juan Bautista Alberdi metamorphosed French and British political thought and reflected it in the Argentine constitution of 1853. Notwithstanding, many scholars would not distinguish Argentina for its democratic achievements in *relative* terms.
3. Alberto Lleras Camargo, "Los países subdesarrollados tienen la política que merecen," *Visión*, 9 de octubre de 1971, p. 25.
4. See Julio Cortázar, *Libro de Manuel* (Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamericana, 1973), pp. 261–62. V.S. Naipaul observed the tendency among Argentines to believe in thaumaturges as a part of their quest for political faith (which Perón pretended to provide). See his "The Corpse at the Iron Gate," *The New York Review of Books*, 10 August 1972 and, in the same review, his later article "Argentina: Brothels Behind the Graveyard," 19 September 1974.
5. *Ibid.*
6. Paul Gallet, *Freedom To Starve* (London: Penguin Books, 1970), p. 52.
7. See Octavio Paz, *Posdata* (México: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 1970), *passim*.
8. Daniel Cosío Villegas, *El estilo personal de gobernar* (México: Cuadernos de Joaquín Mortiz, 1974) p. 78.
9. From Jerome Levinson and Juan de Onís, *The Alliance That Lost Its Way* (New York: Quadrangle Books, 1970).
10. James Wilkie has written that the key issue in the debate over the Fitzgibbon experiments is not whether democracy as such is being measured but that the project reflects "the scholarly image of democracy, an image that has influenced not only several generations of students (many of whom went on to government) but also opinion in the United States and subsequently elite opinion in Latin America itself." From his *Statistics and National Policy* (Los Angeles: UCLA Latin American Center, 1975), p. 480.
11. See Robert J. Pranger, *The Eclipse of Citizenship* (New York: Holt-Rinehart-Winston, 1968), p. 29.
12. Hannah Arendt, *On Violence* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, & World, 1970), p. 52.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 55. See also E. J. Hobsbawm, *Revolutionaries* (New York: Pantheon, 1973), pp. 210–14.
14. See Kenneth F. Johnson, "On the Guatemalan Political Violence," *Politics and Society*, Fall 1973, for a discussion of the degree to which violence can become an accepted part of political life under extreme circumstances.
15. Christian Bay, *The Structure of Freedom* (New York: Atheneum, 1968), p. 317.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 382.
17. Leslie Lipson, *The Democratic Civilization* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 589.
18. See his "Measuring Democratic Change in Latin America," *Journal of Politics* 29 (1967), for a discussion of the methodology involved in the series of ranking experiments.
19. See my "Measuring the Scholarly Image of Latin American Democracy: 1945 to 1970," in James W. Wilkie and Kenneth Ruddle, eds., *Methodology in Quantitative Latin American Studies* (Los Angeles: UCLA Latin American Center, 1976).
20. The Spanish version was administered by this author to a select group of Argentine scholars with whom rapport had been maintained over the years, and many of whom

- participated in the 1970 survey. The second instrument (power index) was not administered in Argentina due to my own fears about political sensitivity during a very difficult period in that country's political life. The power index that I am developing in collaboration with Miles Williams was administered to the resident North Americans only. Results from that, correlated with the Fitzgibbon-Johnson data, will be forthcoming.
21. The respondents were asked to rate the twenty Latin American republics according to the fifteen substantive criteria that appear in figure 1. Their votes were in the form of A through E with the former valued at five points and the latter one point. Thus, the higher the score the more favorable, or in cases greater, the evaluation. The technique is designed to generate a kind of political "beauty contest" in terms of scholarly images vis-à-vis political democracy and/or its accompanying conditions and consequences. Creation of the special index of five freedom-oriented criteria was intended to separate variables and eliminate much of what had been substantive and conceptual overlap in previous experiments. Copies of the traditional instruments used are contained in the forthcoming study cited in note 19.
 22. In the interest of space I shall list only the names and institutions of the participating scholar respondents for 1975. We did, however, elicit generational and other professional and attitudinal information about the panel of experts for possible correlation and testing. My sincere thanks go to: Marvin Alisky (Arizona State), Charles D. Ameringer (Pennsylvania State), Barry C. Ames (Washington, St. Louis), Charles W. Anderson (Wisconsin), Gayle Avant (Baylor), John Bailey (Georgetown), Enrique A. Baloyra (North Carolina at Chapel Hill), C. Richard Bath (Texas at El Paso), Marvin D. Bernstein (SUNY at Buffalo), Robert R. Bezdek (Texas at Corpus Christi), Robert E. Biles (Sam Houston State), Morris J. Blachman (South Carolina), George Blanksten (Northwestern), Cole Blasier (Pittsburgh), John A. Booth (Texas at San Antonio), Winfield J. Burggraaff (Missouri, Columbia), David Bushnell (Florida), Leonard Cardenas, Jr. (Louisiana State), Henry A. Christopher (St. Louis University), Kenneth M. Coleman (Kentucky), Charles F. Denton (California State University at Fresno), Edward C. Epstein (Utah), John Farrell (Southern Illinois, Edwardsville), M. Barry Faye (Western Illinois, Macomb), Julio A. Fernandez (State University College at Cortland), Russell H. Fitzgibbon (retired), Charles J. Fleener (St. Louis University), William H. Furlong (Utah State at Logan), Rudolph O. de la Garza (Colorado College), Federico G. Gil (North Carolina at Chapel Hill), R. Kenneth Godwin (Oregon State), Paul E. Hadley (USC), Paul R. Hoopes (Texas at Kingsville), Gary Hoskin (SUNY at Buffalo), Clifford Kaufman (Wayne State), Harvey F. Kline (Massachusetts), Merle Kling (Washington, St. Louis), Lawrence E. Koslow (Arizona State), Sheldon B. Liss (University of Akron), Leo B. Lott (Montana), Donald J. Mabry (Mississippi State), R. Michael Malek (University of South Alabama), John D. Martz (North Carolina at Chapel Hill), Mary Jeanne (Reid) Martz (Clemson), Rev. Kieran McCarty (San Xavier Mission, Tucson), Ronald H. McDonald (The Maxwell School, Syracuse), James W. McKenney (Wichita State), Richard Millett (Southern Illinois, Edwardsville), David J. Myers (Pennsylvania State), Martin Needler (New Mexico), James L. Payne (Texas at College Station), Neale Pearson (Texas Tech, Lubbock), John H. Petersen (Western Kentucky), Robert L. Peterson (Texas at El Paso), Alberto J. Pinelo (Northern Kentucky State), Guy E. Poitras (Trinity University), William Dirk Raat (State University College at Fredonia), Karen L. Remmer (New Mexico), Riordan Roett (Johns Hopkins, SAIS), H. J. Rosenbaum (City University of New York), J. Mark Ruhl (Dickinson College), Steffen W. Schmidt (Iowa State), Carl E. Schwarz (Fullerton College), Martin L. Seeger (Creighton University), Mitchell A. Seligson (Arizona), John W. Sloan (University of Houston), Peter G. Snow (Iowa), Charles L. Stanisfer (Kansas), Andrés Suárez (Florida), Lewis A. Tambs (Arizona State), Philip B. Taylor (University of Houston), Joseph S. Tulchin (North Carolina at Chapel Hill), F. LaMond Tullis (Brigham Young), Frederick C. Turner (Connecticut), Richard J. Walter (Washington, St. Louis), Howard J. Wiarda (Massachusetts), James W. Wilkie (UCLA), Edward J. Williams (Arizona), Miles W. Williams (Central Missouri State), Ralph Lee Woodward (Tulane), Freeman J. Wright (Mon-

tana), plus myself and several respondents who either neglected to sign their responses (a fact *we* neglected to observe when the letters arrived) or asked that their names not be published. As a matter of interest for those colleagues involved in doing survey research in Latin America, the Spanish version of the questionnaire that was administered in Argentina was accompanied by this writer's promise not to divulge the respondents' names publicly in that country for the indefinite future, i.e., the lingering sensitivity over the various U.S. clandestine activities in Latin America and fears over *public* collaboration with North American social scientists.