

charismatic qualities are not readily conveyed by the chronicler's pen. A man of few personal records revelatory of his feelings and inner thoughts, Tsereteli's personal life is almost completely undocumented and unknown. The second difficulty stems from the fact that Tsereteli was an outsider by origin and choice and cannot be squeezed into the mold of traditional political and cultural categories. A Georgian, conscious and proud of his national heritage, he was yet culturally Russified and a true cosmopolitan at heart. Humane, tolerant, and uninterested in ideological questions, he did not readily fit into the dogmatic, narrowly partisan milieu of Russian socialism. Finally, he belongs to the vanquished, and it is notoriously difficult to write about those who did not succeed, especially if there are no dramatic personal aspects to compensate for historical failure. Mr. Roobol has not managed to overcome these limitations in his workmanlike study.

The highlight of Tsereteli's political life—and naturally the *pièce de résistance* of Mr. Roobol's book—came in 1917. The well-known events are related from the perspective of Tsereteli's participation, that is, his efforts to guide the Petrograd soviet and the Provisional Government along the path of cooperation, mutual trust, and democratic, moderate socialist goals. In spite of his tactical talents, his diplomatic skill, and the charisma of his oratory and personality, Tsereteli failed for two main reasons: his "revolutionary defensism" precluded him from advocating Russia's immediate exit from the war, and his fear of a counterrevolution from the right blinded him to the danger of the left. These were errors of vision that Tsereteli shared with all moderate liberals and socialists. Unlike so many of his comrades, Tsereteli did acknowledge this error with characteristic honesty in 1929: "They [leaders of the Soviet majority] were not ready for the extraordinary situation created by the Russian revolution, when for the first time in the history of all the world's revolutions the leading role was given to the socialists, but with the greatest danger to liberty coming from the left" (pp. 148–49). The epilogue of Tsereteli's active political career was equally tragic in its failure. After Lenin's disbanding of the Constitutional Assembly, at whose only meeting Tsereteli pronounced one of his most dramatic and moving speeches, he returned to his native Georgia. There he found himself a "reluctant nationalist" and soon lost contact and influence with his own party as the latter veered to intransigent nationalism as a result of foreign threats and the Soviet takeover.

Mr. Roobol has been very diligent and successful in mining all accessible published and unpublished sources (the latter include Tsereteli's letters and recorded conversations at the Hoover Institution and the International Institute of Social History). He has chronicled Tsereteli's public life fairly and clearly. As always, specialists may quarrel with details and disagree with some judgments. The general reader, however, will be disappointed that the noble and attractive Irakli Tsereteli does not come to life. He remains a shadowy figure flitting on the screen of history.

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THE UNKNOWN CIVIL WAR IN SOVIET RUSSIA: A STUDY OF THE GREEN MOVEMENT IN THE TAMBOV REGION 1920–1921. By *Oliver H. Radkey*. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University, 1976. xiv, 456 pp. \$12.95.

The author proposes in this book an interesting and still unknown topic: the "green" partisans who operated during the civil war, between the "red" and the "white" camps, sometimes against both of them, sometimes switching sides. There was also an additional stage, after the civil war, which lasted from about the end of 1920 till

mid-1922, during which the countryside seethed with unrest and numerous partisan groups emerged and fought against the regime.

The author focuses on one particularly tenacious and well-organized uprising against the Soviets which took place mainly in 1921 in a few *uezdy* of the Tambov region and lasted for about nine months. Material about this "*antonovshchina*," so baptized by the authorities after Antonov who was its leader, is not easily available. Professor Radkey's qualities as patient and competent researcher allowed him to gather every possible scrap of evidence, but the results of his work are nevertheless disappointing.

The author believes ardently that the different bands and groups of those "greens" were actually "a movement"—a term which connotes some degree of unity and community of goals; moreover, he even believes that this "movement" and leaders like Antonov presented a genuine democratic and revolutionary alternative for Russia against which both the "reds" and the "whites" conspired, and which finally the Bolsheviks put down.

This opinion led the author to try to write an epic, when the material at hand would sustain no more than a modest monograph. Even after having read this oversized volume, we still are not clear about the character of the partisans and their leader and we certainly are at a loss as to why Radkey endowed Antonov's and similar uprisings with the quality of a serious "third force" and a potentially viable political alternative. If anything, his own material serves to disprove such a contention. The uprisings were strictly local in scope; Antonov and other leaders were unable to cooperate with each other and had no positive unifying program. Once the regime introduced the NEP, the peasants' discontent subsided and their support for the uprisings dried up. Deprived of such support, the partisans who persisted inevitably degenerated into banditry.

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FORMIROVANIE SOVETSKOI UNIVERSITETSKOI SISTEMY (1917–1938 GG.). By *Sh. Kh. Chanbarisov*. Ufa: Bashkirskoe knizhnoe izdatel'stvo, 1973. 473 pp.

"Is it true that after the Revolution you preserved your universities?" a French intellectual somewhat incredulously asked a visiting Soviet scientist during the 1920s. Unlike the Jacobins, the Bolsheviks did indeed retain the concept of the university, though not without considerable internal dissension and a brief period (1928–32) when most universities were subdivided into autonomous institutes. The present work is an exhaustive study of the fluctuating development of Soviet university policy during its most formative stages.

The author, a historian who is currently the rector of Bashkir State University, stresses Lenin's belief that universities, with their emphasis on broad, general, and theoretical studies, should have pride of place over technical institutes and other more narrowly vocational educational institutions. This idea came under increasing attack during the twenties by "ultra-leftists," who regarded universities as the strongholds of bourgeois culture and impractical knowledge, but was reaffirmed and decisively implemented by the educational reforms of the thirties. Following the footsteps of historians such as S. A. Fediukin, Chanbarisov argues that Lenin assiduously wooed the "old" intelligentsia (in this case the professoriate), the vast majority of which are portrayed as eventually overcoming their initial hostility and wholeheartedly casting their lot with the Soviet government. Overlooked are instances of terror such as the execution of the pro-rector of Petrograd University in 1921 and the fact that it was