

Balkan history as an aspect of European and world history, but Djordjević attacks it from the inside, as a subject with its own intrinsic importance, related to and part of European history but not requiring it to achieve significance. Djordjević is a skillful and erudite historian. His effort should receive serious attention from everyone interested in this confusing and exciting subject.

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FRANZ JOSEPH I OF AUSTRIA AND HIS EMPIRE. By *Anatol Murad*.
New York: Twayne Publishers, 1968. x, 259 pp. \$6.50.

One can fully agree with Professor Murad's evaluation of Joseph Redlich's *Kaiser Franz Joseph von Österreich* (1928) as the most scholarly critical biography of the emperor. Redlich, a truly great historian, was thus far also the only one who had attempted to give, in a book of about five hundred pages, a combined account of the emperor's personality and of the main problems of his reign. He only partly succeeded in this formidable task. Murad, an economist, fails almost completely in this second attempt at such a biography, a volume half the size of Redlich's work.

Lack of space is only partly responsible for this failure. The problems of the empire are discussed in lively fashion, lacking not in literary skill but in depth. Inaccuracies do occur, and such basic terms as independence, province, minorities, and serfdom are used far too loosely.

Yet that part of the book is still far superior to the discussion of Franz Joseph's personality. Here the author takes a most unfavorable view, and he is, of course, fully within his rights to do so; but he frequently criticizes the emperor for the wrong reasons. One may well say that Franz Joseph's policy during the Crimean War was wrong, but to conclude that he was ungrateful to Tsar Nicholas is a rather simplistic approach. The emperor's highly complex relationship to his consort is reduced to the argument that he wanted to keep up appearances. No wonder: according to the bibliography Murad has not used the two-volume edition of the emperor's letters to his wife. The Mayerling tragedy is discussed on the basis of the flimsiest of evidence, and Franz Joseph's often discussed personal austerity, which conflicted with the splendor of courtly etiquette, is perceived as sheer hypocrisy. These and other oversimplifications defeat the author's objective, sound though it may be. The author states that the research material for his book "was almost entirely" gathered in Austrian libraries and archives. Unfortunately the book has gained little from these opportunities. This may not be the poorest book about Franz Joseph, but it is certainly not better than mediocre.

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DER UNGARISCHE REVISIONISMUS UND DIE ZERSCHLAGUNG DER
TSCHECHOSLOWAKEI. By *Jörg K. Hoensch*. Tübingen Studien zur
Geschichte und Politik, 23. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1967.
xiv, 324 pp. 2 maps. DM 46.

Based on published and unpublished documents from German, British, French, Czechoslovak, Polish, Hungarian, and United States archives, and the pertinent

literature in several languages, this study focuses on the part played by Hungarian revisionism in the breakup of Czechoslovakia. It also sheds interesting light on the diplomacy of the great powers, especially the Axis states, as well as on the Little Entente and Poland in the period between the Anschluss and the liquidation of the *Rest-Tschechei* a year later.

Analyzing the main features of Hungarian revisionism, the author stresses the loss in territory and population imposed by the treaty of Trianon. Frustrated national resentment, as he correctly sees it, could be directed against the newly created or enlarged successor states by a conservative regime unwilling to introduce meaningful social reforms on the domestic scene. Hungarian irredentism found allies among dissatisfied elements of Slovakia and Ruthenia who resented the centralizing policies of Prague. Yet the maneuvering possibility of Hungarian foreign policy was limited, owing to the military superiority of the Little Entente. After the creation of the Rome-Berlin Axis in late 1936, Hitler's aggressive plans against Czechoslovakia began to take shape. By the end of 1937 the Hungarian government was given to understand that in order to obtain partial recognition of its territorial aspirations, it must coordinate its plans with Hitler's timetable, limiting its goals to the neighbor in the north. Fearful of the Little Entente and reluctant to believe that the Western powers would abdicate their responsibilities in Central Europe, Hungary was nevertheless in no position to follow the "independently" aggressive line of Poland during the Munich crisis. However, Munich whetted Hungarian appetite for territorial aggrandizement. Besides the Hungarian-inhabited areas of Czechoslovakia, Hungarians asked for plebiscites in both Slovakia and Ruthenia. But since most autonomist Slovak and Ruthenian politicians preferred a Czecho-Slovak Republic—even though weakened by the loss of the Sudetenland—to "returning to the motherland," they decided to press for a four-power arbitration first and Axis mediation afterwards. The first Vienna award of November 2, 1938, so favorable to Hungary, was due to Italian benevolence. But Hungary's rulers tried to incorporate Ruthenia by force. Blocked by Germany, they concentrated on diplomatic means aimed at establishing a common border with Poland. Conceived originally as a Polish-supported plan of a "third Europe" as a barrier against both communism and further Nazi penetration of East Central Europe, the Polish-Hungarian common frontier materialized in March 1939 when Hitler's troops occupied the remainder of Bohemia. By that time, the Little Entente ceased to exist not only de facto but also de jure, and Slovak pseudo-independence was but a camouflage for German tutelage. Nazi connivance at the occupation of Ruthenia by Hungary in the spring of 1939 led to severe restriction of that country's freedom of action in both the domestic and international fields.

Hoensch's study is not confined to Hungarian revisionism. The evaluation of Nazi policy vis-à-vis Poles, Hungarians, Slovaks, and Ukrainians is highly sophisticated, as is the treatment of Polish relations with Slovakia, Hungary, and Rumania and of the role of Italy.

Included in this informative volume are a bibliography and an index of persons and maps. A subject index would have been useful, too.

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