

the USSR to preserve its dominant external position there. In general, the book fails to offer major new interpretations and insights into Soviet relations with Pakistan and Bangladesh. It, consequently, does not represent a significant scholarly achievement.

Of much greater interest is Nirmala Joshi's study which purports to examine, as a background to understanding their postindependence policies toward each other, the mutual perceptions of Soviet and Indian political figures in the pre-1947 period. The author succeeds better in elucidating Indian views toward Russia than the Soviet perception of India, not only because of the nature of Soviet published writings (which are an extension of official policy), but also because of her superficial examination of the Soviet materials. By abstracting only those articles that illuminate Soviet policy toward the Indian nationalist movement, a policy which was itself determined by Moscow's changing relations with Great Britain, the author presents a unidimensional image which neither assesses the level of sophistication of Soviet analyses of India nor discusses important Soviet writings on Indian nationality and communal problems during the 1940s. Admittedly, the author was denied access to Soviet archives during her two years of research in the USSR, but it is still disappointing that the book shows scant trace of any benefit from this visit. It is all the more surprising that the author evidently did not contact other Soviet scholars, such as M. A. Persitz, who had begun to publish articles directly pertinent to her subject, which were based on archival sources, during her visit (1969-71).

The main value of the work then lies in the exposition of the generally positive appraisal of Russia by Indian nationalist leaders. The "Russian menace" was never taken very seriously by Indian nationalists who viewed it as a British ploy to preserve hegemony in India. The October Revolution drew considerable interest because Indian leaders saw Russia as a kindred agrarian, underdeveloped country. Revolutionary Russia was seen not only as a bulwark against imperialism but also as a development model with impressive achievements in industrialization, education, health, and so forth, that were worthy of emulation. The Indian image of the Soviet Union was not, however, entirely an uncritical one. The major leaders of the Indian left were democrats who were repelled by the suppression of civil liberties, and they became progressively disillusioned with Soviet foreign policy after the signing of the 1939 Nazi-Soviet pact. It is interesting, however, that Jawaharlal Nehru, the architect of India's foreign policy, in spite of Stalin's postwar policies, continued to believe that the USSR did not pose a threat to India and looked forward to close ties with India's powerful neighbor to the north after independence. That such ties were not established at the inception of Indian statehood must be attributed to Stalin's retrenchment of Soviet policy in the late 1940s.

Overall the author has done well in illuminating the wellsprings of the official Indian approach to the Soviet Union.

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ECONOMIC ESSAYS ON VALUE, COMPETITION AND UTILITY. By V. K. Dmitriev. Edited and with an introduction by D. M. Nuti. Translated by D. Fry. New York and London: Cambridge University Press, 1974. 231 pp. \$18.50.

V. K. Dmitriev (1868-1913) was a Russian economist who worked with sources from Western Europe and extended their concepts by formulating his own. This book collects three major essays in which he attempted "an organic synthesis of the labor theory of value and of the theory of marginal utility." The first essay is an exposition

of Ricardo's theory of value with Dmitriev's restatement in rigorous mathematical terms; it led both to input-output analysis and to contemporary mathematical economics in the Soviet Union. The second essay expounds Cournot's theory of competition and extends that analysis to derive a highly original corollary relying on the absence of forward markets in industrial goods. The final essay is an exposition of the theory of marginal utility, based on the Austrians to be sure, but also on the Italian, F. Galiani, who wrote in 1750.

The essays are breathtaking in their scope of scholarship and brilliance of thought; the editor and translator are commended for making them available in the English language. In contrast to many other treatises in mathematical economics, the publisher is to be commended as well; the text is meticulously edited and handsomely published.

For my taste, the essay on competition presents the newest and most elegant extension of traditional theory. Building on Cournot, Dmitriev criticizes Cournot's assumption that production and sales are instantaneously equal; in fact, he notes, producers willingly would join a tacit monopoly-like collusive pricing policy when the fear that other producers might jump in for quick profits is allayed. Their collusive alliance is enforced by excess stocks of goods or unused capacity; only those devices ensure that an attempt by one producer to increase sales will be countered instantly by increased goods from other producers. Both conditions are nonproductive increments to price. In a brief conclusion, Dmitriev adds advertising to this list. The addition typifies the pungent and undated freshness which Dmitriev brings to the study of competitive markets even today.

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SOVIET POST-WAR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. By *Abram Bergson*. Wicksell Lecture Series, 1974. Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International, 1974. 87 pp. Paper.

The subject of productivity growth in the Soviet economy has been enriched by Professor Abram Bergson for almost two decades. It is extended in these prestigious Wicksell Lectures to an analysis of comparative growth performance during 1955-70 in several Western countries. The lectures are rich in analytical insights, a meticulous handling of a mass of data spanning several countries, and carefully-drawn conclusions.

The task that Bergson sets out to accomplish is formidable. He seeks to determine how the Soviet economy, characterized by public ownership, centralist bureaucratic planning, and the strategy of economic growth under self-sufficiency, performs in relation to the market economies of the United States, Japan, and several Western European countries. He concludes that Soviet economic performance in terms of output per worker and consumption per capita is "impressive but not imposing."

Why should one expect Soviet economic performance to be "imposing"? The Bergsonian analytical framework, stipulated in terms of "advantages of backwardness," indicates that for Western countries the more advanced the economy, the less rapidly it grows, and vice versa. The Soviet Union, therefore, which in terms of output per worker in 1960 was at the same "stage of economic backwardness" as Italy and Japan, should grow at least as rapidly as those countries. By the same token, it should grow faster than the United States, which is economically more advanced and hence grows more slowly.