

absence of available goods. One spending outlet is a "parallel" market of illegal and senile transfers; Dmitri Simes analyzes its expected characteristics; one would expect that the goods would be income elastic and labor intensive, implying a disproportionate share of services in the total. Simes notes that Soviet authorities, while officially deploring this market, are perforce required to rely on it to solve system disequilibria. Everett Jacobs examines the market in private housing (especially cooperatives) and its competitor in the public sector.

The acquisition of income and consumer goods, however, is not necessarily egalitarian. Keith Bush continues his excellent international comparisons of living standards and working conditions. Peter Wiles finds that Soviet equality has increased greatly since 1967 and couples it with observations on the role of chance in wage relativities, our imperfect linking of wages and work effort, and the incidence of Soviet taxes. Mervyn Matthews defines the Soviet elite and estimates its income, a formidable task and well done.

Other papers include household interaction with labor supply (Norton Dodge, Maria E. Ruban, G. Wild) and the role of pension and medical programs (H. Vogel). The volume would be an excellent supplementary text for a course in Soviet contemporary economics or other social science.

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IMPLEMENTATION OF SOVIET ECONOMIC REFORMS: POLITICAL, ORGANIZATIONAL, AND SOCIAL PROCESSES. By *Karl W. Ryavec*. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975. xvi, 360 pp. Figures. Tables. \$21.50.

This study joins a large Western literature on the nature, implementation, and consequences of the economic reforms launched by the Soviet leadership in late 1965—the so-called Kosygin reforms. The author views the reforms as an attempt to change the behavior of enterprise managers in ways that would bring about a more efficient use of scarce economic resources and both raise the rate of growth in output and improve its quality and design. The author seems to believe that the reforms, at least initially, had the potential to effect profound changes in the Soviet political, social, and economic systems. As a framework for ascertaining whether or not significant change has in fact occurred in the process of implementing the reforms, the author examines the evidence for behavioral change in key managerial relationships—enterprise managers and their hierarchical superiors, managers at all levels and the Communist Party, enterprise managers and their workers, and enterprise managers and other managers. The conclusion reached is that real, qualitative change has indeed occurred, particularly in the manager-worker relationship, but that the extent of behavioral change has been much less than the political leadership desired. Granting that the reform has had minimal effect in improving economic performance, the author, nonetheless, argues that it has had significant social and political consequences. "Its implementation has set in motion waves of economic and social change, and perhaps ultimately political change as well, whose magnitude cannot but grow . . . because the Communist Party has itself become part and parcel of the process of reform." And "the reform has set in motion a major current of Soviet political life," which is "the tension between the demands flowing from the attempt to modernize Soviet society and the resistance of ideologues and conservative functionaries."

From the point of view of an economist, this book leaves much to be desired. There are inaccuracies and a great deal of impreciseness in dealing with economic concepts, processes, relationships, and consequences of the reforms. Aside from that, the author seems to believe that the political leadership, in launching the reforms,

had an unambiguous desire, at whatever cost, to change the behavior of enterprise managers toward efficiency by according them greater freedom, so as to permit them to respond "spontaneously" to objective economic "levers." These "levers" were to be: prices, profits, return on capital, a capital charge, incentive funds, and a greater role for bank credits. This clear intent of the leadership was then frustrated by a conservative, self-seeking economic bureaucracy. The bureaucracy did indeed curb the "spontaneity" that developed in the first years of the reform, but it surely did so with the tacit approval of the party, which was not willing to relinquish any of the familiar controls as the price to be paid for greater efficiency.

In interpreting the behavior of both the economic bureaucracy and the political leadership during a decade of reforms, this reviewer believes that account should be taken of the fact that both were engaged in an impossible task from the outset. To boost economic efficiency and growth, the leadership was persuaded to launch a "reform" that in effect attempted to mimic the forms and verbiage of a market system without creating markets; it sought "businesslike" behavior from enterprises without in any way putting them in a business (market) environment. Instead of behaving like businessmen, Soviet enterprise managers continued to behave much as before, because the economic environment was unchanged—that of state-owned producing units administered by government bureaus through a system of taut, directive planning. As Ryavec points out, the leadership is now supporting more of the same "reforms," supplemented with managerial training, modern managerial techniques (for example, systems analysis), and computers. Since none of these innovations alters any essential of the Soviet economic system, the behavior of its participants also will not change in any fundamental way, and the chronic, systemically-based economic malfunctions will persist. The party has "engaged," not in an effort to re-form the present system, but in an effort to make it significantly more productive and efficient without doing so. There is no evidence of "tension" among the political leadership over this fundamental issue of systemic reform, nor is there evidence even of its conscious recognition.

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SIBERIA TODAY AND TOMORROW: A STUDY OF ECONOMIC RESOURCES, PROBLEMS AND ACHIEVEMENTS. By *Violet Conolly*. New York: Taplinger Publishing Company, 1976. 248 pp. Illus. Maps. \$20.00.

Siberia, long a symbol of vastness, hardship, and natural wealth, clearly stands today as one of the world's major reserves of conventional energy and industrial raw material. Indeed, according to Miss Conolly, Siberia is at once "the future base of Soviet economic power" and "the world's largest and richest developing country." Such grand assertions may remain in doubt but readers of this volume will certainly agree with the author that the impact of Siberia's resources will be increasingly felt in the Soviet Union as well as in international commodity markets.

Until recently interest in the development of Siberia has been confined almost entirely to the Soviet Union and to a handful of Soviet specialists, like Miss Conolly, in the West and Japan. During the 1970s, however, a number of factors (including "détente," increased Soviet interest in international trade, rapidly escalating energy costs, and a growing general concern about raw material supplies among the industrial countries) have combined to create widespread interest in the potential impact of Soviet resources on the world economy. Because that potential hinges in large measure on future developments in Siberia, a book reporting on the region's resources and economy is certainly timely.

The author's purpose is to present a balanced account of the Siberian economy with attention to readers interested in the region but unfamiliar with the Russian