STATES-IN-WAITING
A Counternarrative of Global Decolonization
LYDIA WALKER
States-in-Waiting

After the Second World War, national self-determination became a recognized international norm, yet it only extended to former colonies. Groups within postcolonial states that made alternative sovereign claims were disregarded or actively suppressed. Showcasing their contested histories, Lydia Walker offers a powerful counternarrative of global decolonization, highlighting little-known regions, marginalized individuals, and their hidden (or lost) archives. She depicts the personal connections that linked disparate nationalist struggles across the globe through advocacy networks, demonstrating that these advocates had their own agendas and allegiances, which, she argues, could undermine the autonomy of the claimants they supported. By foregrounding particular nationalist movements in South Asia and Southern Africa and their transnational advocacy networks, States-in-Waiting illuminates the un-endings of decolonization – the unfinished and improvised ways that the state-centric international system replaced empire, which left certain claims of sovereignty perpetually awaiting recognition. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.

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States-in-Waiting

A Counternarrative of Global Decolonization

LYDIA WALKER
The Ohio State University

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS
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Naming Conventions

ACRONYMS

AMAX, American Metal Climax mining company, a US-based mining multinational ran by Harold K. and Walter Hochschild in the late 1950s to early 1960s, with holdings and operations across Southern Africa.

NEFA, North East Frontier Agency, a political division within British India and independent India, renamed the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh in 1972.

SWAPO, the South West African People’s Organization, founded as the Ovambo People’s Organization (or Congress) between 1957 and 1959 in Cape Town. Became the dominant force in the Namibian nationalist movement during the early 1960s. As SWAPO, currently the ruling party of independent Namibia since 1990.

SWANU, the South West African National Union, founded while SWAPO was still the Ovambo People’s Organization, a Herero-dominated Namibian nationalist group that came to be identified as ‘communist’ and lost out to SWAPO in their struggle for international recognition.

USAGE

Nagas are usually referred to using their personal names, a practice I follow in States-in-Waiting, so Angami Zapu (AZ) Phizo, is referred to as Phizo, Longri Ao as Longri, etc.
In South Asian History, Vijayalakshmi Pandit is generally referred to as Mrs. Pandit to differentiate her from a title generally associated with her brother, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru. Jayaprakash Narayan is usually referred to as Jayaprakash or JP to avoid confusion because Narayan as a first or last name is shared by many other important Indian political figures.

**Regarding Burma/Myanmar:** Burma (independent since 1948) changed its name to Myanmar in 1989. There are significant controversies and political stances involved in which name is employed. Unless referring directly to the current government of Myanmar, I use “Burma” throughout *States-in-Waiting* because most action takes place before 1989 and because Nagas use the term Burma both historically and in the present day.

**Regarding South West Africa/Namibia:** The UN General Assembly adopted the name “Namibia” in 1966. Mburumba Kerina allegedly coined the name “Namibia” in conversation with Sukharno sometime between 1960 and 1961; by 1962 many Namibian nationalists used it, but it was not agreed upon by all. There are arguments against using the term “South West Africa” because of potentially providing legitimacy to an apartheid state, and against using the term “Namibia” anachronistically, before it was in common use, and also arguments about when common use occurred in the years before 1966. Therefore, I use the terms “Namibia” and “South West Africa” on analytical rather than strictly chronological context.

**Regarding Peking/Beijing:** Following the creation of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, the Chinese government transliterated its capital as Beijing in English. However, Western countries and media continued to use “Peking” until the 1970s and 1980s. “Peking” is the term used by the actors in *States-in-Waiting*. 
MAP 0.1 Postwar global decolonization, 1947–1964. Map by Geoffrey Wallace
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* Singapore was merged with Malaysia from 1963 to 1965
Introduction

Nation-Making

They brought in their dead by night
the brave beloved of the gods
to rest under her troubled skies
their proud and mighty warriors
that some corner of a vanquished field
may stay forever Nagaland.

... There were some in foreign lands
who still spoke of Kelhoukevira
while her fields lay barren and desecrated
her songs sacrificed to the wind
and her warriors to the great spirit.
They trampled her silent hills
and squeezed the life out of her
and washed their hands in her blood.

Easterine Kire, “A Lament for Nagaland,” in Kelhoukevira

In 1951, the Indian prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru allegedly gave a
signed blank check to the leader of the nationalist movement for an
independent Nagaland, Angami Zapu Phizo. Nagaland, a remote state-
in-waiting in the Himalayan foothills, sits at a strategic junction between
India, China, and Burma. After Indian independence from Britain in
1947, Nagas sought their own independence from India. Nehru, eager

1 The opening is by Easterine Kire [Iralu], “A Lament for Nagaland,” in Kelhoukevira: A Volume of Poetry in English (Kolkata: J. B. Lama, 1982). Regarding the terminology of Burma: In 1989 the ruling government of Burma changed its name to “Myanmar.” Since the events of States-in-Waiting mostly occur before that date and its actors use the name “Burma,” I have followed their practice.
to quell agitation for a separate state within his own state, attempted to bribe Nagas into acquiescence to Indian rule by asking their leader to name his price. But Phizo refused to sell the Naga claim of independence. Instead, he turned to insurgency and eventual exile, first in Pakistan and then in London, where he arrived in 1960 seeking international support for his people’s struggle. Phizo’s family preserved the blank uncashed check as an emblem of perceived Indian perfidy and their own resistance to it. Following Phizo’s death in 1990, his family feared losing their home in London due to foreclosure. Therefore, they enlisted the aid of David Ward, a Western advocate for Naga nationalist claims-making, who stepped in to save the house’s contents, including family papers and the blank check.²

David Ward was born in Assam (a neighboring territory to Nagaland), the son of a Scottish tea planter. Sent to a British jail for robbery, and with time on his hands, Ward discovered the poetry of Easterine Kire.³ Ward was so inspired by Kire’s poetry that, once released from prison, he traveled illicitly to Nagaland. There, he enlisted in the Naga cause. He was eventually captured by the Indian military and deported to Britain.⁴ According to Naga accounts, Ward never returned the Phizo family documents that were transferred to him for temporary safekeeping after Phizo’s death. Repeatedly in the decades since 1990, Naga representatives have asked Ward to return those materials, which they consider their founding documents, their national patrimony; as of this writing, he has not done so.⁵

Regardless of the collection’s status, the story of Nehru’s check remains a powerful symbol to Nagas – of their nationalist claim, of Indian deceit in attempting to compromise them, and of hope placed in

² Author interviews with Kaka Iralu (a nephew of Phizo who was a Naga intellectual and activist) and Kolaso Chase (a public spokesman for the Naga Nationalist Council), December 25, 2018, Medziphema, Nagaland, India. Kaka Iralu passed away on April 7, 2023.
³ Easterine Kire is the first Naga to publish her poetry and literature in English.
⁵ The Phizo family collections in Ward’s possession have been the subject of negotiations between Naga scholars, overseas representatives, and in-country representatives, a process in which the author has been adjacently involved. As of this writing, there is no proof that the collections still exist, or, if they do, in what manner.
a providential Western advocate and then dashed by his abandonment. It is a Naga national embarrassment with imperial overtones that an outsider apparently possesses some of the founding documents of a state-in-waiting in Southern Asia and has not returned them. The absence of this archive raises the question of who owns the historical record of a territory that has claimed independence but has never received international recognition.

This narrative of betrayal and disappearance within Nagaland’s attempt to become independent is an example of the hidden dramas of postwar decolonization. In the decades following the Second World War, and accelerating in the early 1960s, many states across the colonial world shook off imperial rule. The roads to national independence for postcolonial states such as India, Ghana, and Algeria are well known and well told. In contrast, stories that highlight little-known regions, marginalized individuals, hidden or lost archives, and the connections that form the analytical links between them produce the narrative of decolonization presented in *States-in-Waiting.* In this narrative, the international ramifications of the Naga pursuit of independence unfolded not only in Phizo’s original journey from Pakistan to London, or in the coda of the missing papers decades later. Through the activities of international advocates working on behalf of nationalist claimants, the plot also crossed to the African continent, the epicenter of decolonization in the 1960s, where other states-in-waiting sought international recognition for their demands of independent statehood, utilizing similar – or sometimes even the very same – unofficial advocates as did the Nagas.

The relationship between claims-making and its advocacy, which provided representation and political support from those unaffiliated with official spheres of state governments or international institutions was central to the struggle that states-in-waiting waged for national liberation. This relationship was a mutually reinforcing as well as an undermining

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dynamic: nationalist claimants who had not yet achieved international-legal recognition for their territories relied on advocacy in order to access spheres of government and international power. Such reliance also made particular advocates influential, enabling them to, for example, testify before the United Nations. Yet the dependence of states-in-waiting upon such advocates, especially when protracted, underscored the lack of autonomy of particular nationalist claims. Independence required independence from advocacy, a fact to which advocates themselves were not always attuned. *States-in-Waiting* untangles the tensions inherent in the relationship between nationalist claims-making and its international advocacy, as well as the contradiction between decolonization’s promise of national liberation and its practice of limiting whose claims of statehood received international recognition. Those whose claims did not, lost not only statehood—they also lost the chance to build national archives, canons of founding figures, and even the opportunity to become a recognized field of historical inquiry.

December 1960 closed the “Year of Africa” at the United Nations, when seventeen countries received independence. That same year, Phizo arrived in London and Naga nationalist claims-making entered international politics. Since India served as a model and symbol of “peaceful,” “successful” national liberation and postcolonial world leadership, Naga nationalist claims for independence from postcolonial India forced many of the advocates who had supported India’s decolonization to confront the complicated issue of self-determination for minority peoples within new postcolonial states.

The early 1960s was a political moment when the global potential for national liberation seemed strongest, yet the United Nations only recognized nationalist claims that arose from the dissolution of European empire, not those that would alter the borders of newly independent states, such as the Naga claim. Therefore, when Phizo reached London and a Western audience, his demand for Naga independence became a tricky issue for the only people who would listen: a network of advocates—missionaries, anthropologists, journalists, peace and civil rights activists, 

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political economists – who saw themselves as brokers of decolonization and conduits for the politically voiceless. Those advocates also relied on their connections with Indian and other postcolonial state governments to achieve their aims.

This transnational advocacy delivered informal representation for nationalist movements that did not have access to formal political forums in the United Nations’ state-centric system of international order. Advocates were spokesmen and women for nationalist claims, gatekeepers to international politics, and key intermediaries to circles of power and finance. They saw national liberation struggles as linked to the civil rights movement in the United States and as one among many humanitarian issues that merited extra-governmental intervention. In States-In-Waiting, I argue that advocacy, however necessary to the pursuit of sovereignty, was incompatible with sovereignty once it was achieved. Leaders of postcolonial states knew this. When nationalist movements became postcolonial state governments, in part with the aid of advocacy – India (1947), Zambia (1964), Namibia (1990), among many others – they disavowed the process that had helped empower them, ignoring, breaking with, and even deporting their former advocates after their states had achieved independence.

The relationship between nationalist claims-making and its international advocacy illuminates how nationalists themselves, whether successful or otherwise in their state-making, operated within an international context. For Naga nationalists, a sense of connection and belonging to a wider international community grew from notions of a Christian universalism, a result of large-scale conversion instigated by American Baptist missionaries in Nagaland from the 1880s to the 1940s. States confronting nationalist demands within their borders made travel, reporting, and mail delivery as difficult as possible for people residing in these territories. For peoples such as Nagas – living in the periphery’s periphery, in regions only lightly connected to their ruling capital let alone to global centers of power – connections with and through advocacy and religious networks allowed them to see themselves as integrated into an international order, even when that order had established no means of recognizing their claims of autonomy. Petitioning the United Nations was not only a weapon of the weak; it was an appeal to a higher power, toward a universal aspiration of global belonging. Chief Hosea Kutako, who petitioned the United Nations

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for two decades through the use of advocacy on behalf of an independent South West Africa/Namibia, referred to international law as “God’s Law.”

In contrast to its preceding system of international order, the League of Nations – which had included a Mandate System and Minority Protections Regime for the former territories of the German, Ottoman, and Habsburg empires – the United Nations lacked a forum for hearing the political claims of peoples until the 1990s. Unlike the League, the UN did not have institutional mechanisms in place to “see” certain dependent peoples as potential political subjects of international law, a reason why it can be considered a more limited international order than its predecessor. As studies identifying the restrictions of the UN’s Declaration on Human Rights (1948) have shown, the types of rights that the UN institution chose to recognize, while the subject of fraught debate, ended up being considerably circumscribed, though the most contentious rights were socioeconomic rather than political. At the

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9 “Meeting with Hosea Kutako and SWAPO,” Windhoek, May 15, 1962. UN General Assembly Report of the Special Committee for South West Africa, September 20, 1962. BB/1000 National Archives of Namibia (hereafter “NAN”). Regarding the terminology of “South West Africa” versus that of “Namibia,” the UN General Assembly adopted the name “Namibia” in 1966. Mburumba Kerina (a South West African/Namibian nationalist) allegedly coined the name “Namibia” in conversation with Sukharno (the first president of Indonesia, and a leader of its struggle for independence) sometime between 1960 and 1961; by 1962 many Namibian nationalists used it, but it was not agreed upon by all. I use the terms “Namibia” and “South West Africa” in an analytical rather than strictly chronological context.


same moment that the UN General Assembly affirmed the norm of self-determination in its declaration of December 1960, the institution, as it grew with new members, became both inclusively and exclusively state-centric – inclusive in that it encompassed almost all new states, exclusive in that the only political unit it recognized was that of the state.  

**WITHIN THE INTERSTICES OF INTERNATIONAL ORDER**

*States-in-Waiting* is a connective history rather than a comparative set of case studies. The Naga claim provides the narrative frame because it illustrates the limit to international advocacy on behalf of nationalist claims-making. As a claim from a region far from both its ruling capital (New Delhi) as well as from global centers of power and governance (such as New York or London), Naga nationalist claims-making relied on an attenuated advocacy network of only a few key individuals, rendering the intersection of claims-making and its advocacy clearly trackable. The Namibian nationalist claim, which achieved independence only in 1990, serves as both an analogue and a contrast to the Naga claim. The former had a much longer history of international petitioning – one that had inspired Phizo’s efforts on behalf of Naga independence – and it entered a new phase in 1966, when the International Court of Justice failed to rule on its claim to national self-determination. The massive political transformation of Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1960s – centered around the Congo Crisis, the breakup of the Central African Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and the emergence of Dar es Salaam as a hub

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for anticolonial nationalism – made that region the center of gravity and activity for a range of nationalist movements, and therefore ground zero for nationalist claims-making.

The question of states-in-waiting – of territories with nationalist claims that had not (yet) received international recognition and therefore were termed “minority,” “subnational,” “tribal,” or “indigenous” nationalisms – challenged the United Nations as both an institution (meaning the bureaucracy set up in San Francisco in 1945 with a charter and committee structure) and as a system of international order (meaning the political organization of the postwar world reshuffled by decolonization). The UN institution came to have a vested interest in maintaining the legitimacy and territorial integrity of its new member-states. This legitimacy was granted through the UN order, in which national recognition was confirmed by a seat in the General Assembly, crafting a type of self-referential sovereignty. The claims of states-in-waiting to be nation-states had no place in either the UN institution or the UN order, and therefore had the potential for upsetting both UN arrangements.

States-in-waiting relied on international advocacy to advance their nationalist claims, and international advocates connected many of these nationalist claims to each other. Therefore, States-in-Waiting follows the rise and demise of a particular transnational advocacy network during the height of nationalist possibility in the early 1960s. The advocates in this network – particularly its leaders Abraham Johannes (AJ) Muste of the United States, Jayaprakash (JP) Narayan of India, and Michael Scott of Britain – were individuals who had extensive experience with international peace politics dating from the Indian independence movement. With the advent of 1960s decolonization, they decided to channel their activism into an organization, the World Peace Brigade, whose aim was to make sure that decolonization escaped its “entrapment in violence.” Because this network grew out of the international peace movement and had been involved in the nonviolent activism working for Indian independence and

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US civil rights, *States-in-Waiting* emphasizes the role of peace politics during decolonization. However, it is important to underscore that most nationalist claimants faced degrees of violence – at times extreme – from their ruling authorities and engaged in it themselves.

This violence and the threat of violence drew the attention of the international peace movement. The World Peace Brigade launched a project in Dar es Salaam, Tanganyika, in 1962 in order to channel the forces of national liberation into peaceful postcolonial states. This first endeavor of the Brigade, the Africa Freedom Action Project, advocated on behalf of the neighboring state-in-waiting of Zambia and its leader Kenneth Kaunda. During this period the Brigade also worked to undermine the legitimacy of Katanga, a state-in-waiting in Southeastern Congo, arguing that its nationalist claim was a cover for neocolonialism and “made Western democracy look like a giant runaway circus calliope.”

Katanga also had its own, contrasting network of advocates – one that was stridently anticommunist. The intersection between nationalist claims–making and its international advocacy showcases the conflict and connections between different claims and multiple networks. These networked connections operated through the interstices, the unregulated spaces, of the United Nations: since neither claimant nor advocate officially represented a recognized state government, they lacked access to most official forums, unless brought forward by a UN member state.

Studies of the nationalist struggles of the Kurds, Tibetans, and Palestinians, of Biafra, of Western Sahara, of West Papua, among many others, show the important role that international advocacy (also called “rebel” or “insurgent diplomacy”) played in promoting the aspirations of a range of nationalist movements that did not achieve independence during the postwar era. Nationalist claims moved, mutated, were

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actualized, and dissolved through networks of advocacy. As the operations of the World Peace Brigade make clear, these networks were full of internal disagreements on tactics, focus, and ideology, especially as they confronted the dilemma of how to support liberation movements seeking independence from recently decolonized states. For example, the Brigade community’s efforts on questions involving African decolonization relied on the support of Indians in government and in international civil society.  

Therefore, the Naga claim, as a nationalist claim within India, eventually fractured the Brigade’s network and showed the limits of transnational activism when it confronted state sovereignty.

From the perspective of nationalist claimants, international recognition for national self-determination was essential to their political survival. Writing to his nephew in January 1960 while stuck in East Pakistan, Phizo knew that the Naga people needed to be recognized as sovereign to be recognized at all: “[A]ny organization without a sovereign territory cannot be articulately universal in its human scope. . . . Whether we call it a political aim or national ideology, it makes very little difference.”

Global decolonization made the nation-state the legitimate form of international recognition for a people’s claim of resistance against oppression. Phizo and other nationalists recognized this political reality. Their advocates, who also participated in struggles for political justice within states and across national boundaries, did not. They were interested in how a Nagaland could be a “test case” for how to answer the question that minority peoples within new postcolonial nations posed to the postwar international order.  

Their criticism was directed at how India ruled Nagaland, not that India ruled Nagaland.

As this analytical separation indicates, nationalist movements may have relied on international advocates, but the two groups often did not
share the same end goals. Over the long term, these political divergences increased and hampered advocacy’s effectiveness. Decolonizing empires often had elaborate plans for federation-type structures in which minority interests would have had greater representation. These plans were abandoned by decolonizing states, to a large degree because of the (often correct) suspicion of soon-to-be independent and newly independent elites that such plans could be the thin end of the wedge of neocolonialism, using minority concerns to preserve enclaves of colonial influence – a fear that drove the UN’s intervention against the secessionist Congolese province of Katanga (1960–1962).

The early 1960s was a period of rapid regime change and promise for decolonization’s liberatory potential. After the fact, advocates of states-in-waiting realized that they had actually had an extremely limited temporal window in which to act. Katanga’s secession in July 1960, was “the point where the ‘wind of change’ [of decolonization] began to veer,” according to Katanga’s UN envoy, a friend and colleague of World Peace Brigade members. From some perspectives, the window of political opportunity of the early 1960s was closing at the same time that it opened.

Decolonization and its international-legal recognition of former colonies as postcolonial states solidified the nation-state as the unit of political organization and appropriate container for sovereignty. The United Nations expanded rapidly as it recognized more and more new postcolonial states; in the process, the institution came to have a stake in the importance of international-legal sovereignty as a defining feature of national sovereignty and to control the granting of it. In circumstances

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26 Katanga’s secession was halted in 1962, while the first UN intervention in Congo continued until 1965.

27 Michael Scott letter to the Times (London), August 15, 1970, on Hosea Kutako’s death, Box 5, GMS Papers.


that reinforced the UN’s own authority, the UN could patrol international-legal sovereignty from the outside, and at the decision of the departing colonizer, particular colonies would be passively and peacefully assigned independence. Such was the situation of the British High Commission Territories of Basutoland/Lesotho, Bechuanaland/Botswana, and Swaziland/Eswatini (as of 2018) – all granted independence in 1966. However, what of less ideal circumstances? Naga nationalists wondered, *If Zanzibar could claim statehood,* if Rwanda, Burundi, or Gambia could do so – *why not Nagaland?*

The short answer to “Why not Nagaland?” was India, since that country was not going to voluntarily recognize a new state within its own national borders, especially when Nagaland epitomized India’s many “fissiparous tendencies” – its regional, ethnic, and religious autonomous demands. Naga nationalists grasped the precarity of their claim given Nagaland’s geopolitical position. Therefore, they attempted to internationalize the Naga claim and to place it in the context of the rapidly decolonizing African continent of the early 1960s – a context in which the feasibility of their claim seemed more reasonable – rather than within the regional context of a Southern Asia that had already decolonized.

It was not accidental that Nagas made analogies to nationalist movements on the African continent and not to groups closer to home with similar aims, such as Tibetans, other Hill peoples in the Indian Northeast, Bengalis in East Pakistan, or the multitude of communities (including Nagas) across the border in Burma. The window of nationalist possibility of the early 1960s, with all its constraints, opened on to the African continent, not on to the disputed regions of “upland South East Asia.”

When chronicling the month-to-month political fluctuations in the early 1960s, “decolonization” can seem to be an anachronistic term, carefully denuded of the moral valence of “national liberation” or...
“nationalist revolution” – the words in general use at the time among both supporters and opponents of decolonization. At that moment, decolonization was not referred to as “decolonization” by Anglophone politicians: British prime minister Harold MacMillan rather obliquely referred to the “wind of change.” The Kennedy administration in the United States used the Wilsonian language of “national self-determination,” a word choice that elided issues of violence and the need for external recognition (often from the US government).35 “Self-determination” emphasized that it was the people who determined their own political status; while “international recognition” underscored the role played by the foreign policies of powerful states to determine and affirm the borders of the political unit in question.

Nationalists from the decolonizing world talked about “national liberation,” and their international advocates referred to the “struggle for independence,” “world development under world law,” or “world revolution.”36 In the early 1960s, most people actively involved in or sympathetic to decolonization-the-process did not use the term itself to describe it.37 They preferred terms that signaled their political orientation. During its contemporaneous moment, the word “decolonization” rendered the transformation of empires into states an agentless and bloodless process, deemphasizing the determination and action of the individuals and groups who drove that transformation and thereby, obscuring the accountability of those who fought for and against anticolonial nationalism.

National independence did not simply involve flipping a “sovereignty” switch from colony to state; it entailed a set of negotiations with no predetermined result. Yet such negotiations consistently produced unitary nation-states as the successors to empires, while alternative postcolonial

political forms, whether those of federation or secession (with a few important exceptions), were either unrealized or short-lived. Secession and federation were not necessarily mutually exclusive or incompatible with decolonization. Katanga, which attempted to secede from Congo-Leopoldville during this period of heightened national possibility, proposed several alternative models: a federated Congo along the lines of the US Articles of Confederation, a federated Copperbelt state with Northern Rhodesia, as well as an independent Katangese nation-state. None of these alternative political forms achieved international recognition because the United Nations, at the invitation of newly independent Congo-Leopoldville and with US financial and political backing, launched an armed intervention to prevent their occurrence. The UN as an institution of international order had a stake in empowering and protecting the boundaries of its members.

From the late 1940s to the mid-1970s, the UN General Assembly’s Fourth Committee, on “special political and decolonization matters,” was the institution’s most active committee and housed the Committee on South West Africa, which was the international forum for Namibian nationalist claims-making. The Fourth Committee was so active during the 1960s because it was the venue that both the United States and the


40 George Ivan Smith to David Owen, Report on Nyasaland and Rhodesia, p. 5, June 1, 1962, Box 125, Andrew Wellington Cordier Papers, Columbia University.


Soviet Union chose to handle the process of decolonization. The USSR first proposed and sponsored the UN General Assembly’s December 1960 “Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples”; the Committee on Decolonization was set up under Indian chairmanship to implement that declaration. \(^{43}\) (After John F. Kennedy became president in 1961, US foreign policy played a supportive role regarding the Declaration on the Granting of Independence.) The Fourth Committee and its Committee on Decolonization were the chosen destinations for nationalist claimants and their international advocates. However, these committees were established to address the claims of peoples within empires, not within states.

Who had access to the UN’s Fourth Committee and thus the potential of international recognition was a matter determined by the states who made up the institution. Soviet pressure on China regarding Mongolia led to the UN’s recognition of statehood for Outer Mongolia, while the lack of such explicit, powerful backing for Tibetan independence forced Tibetans to remain a humanitarian concern. There was no universal agreement on which people comprised a nation, or on which nation deserved a state: India assisted in the creation of an independent Bangladesh (though it is striking how long it took New Delhi to actively support East Bengali nationalist insurgents), and Biafra had a few state-government proponents, though much of its backing came from humanitarian-oriented non-state actors.\(^{44}\) Yet these counter-examples still demonstrate the constraints on state sponsorship for nationalist movements that sought to revise existing national boundaries.

Into the seeming political flexibility of decolonization, Cold War polarity appeared to impose a strict division between the free world and

\(^{43}\) A/4501, Request for the inclusion of an additional item in the agenda of the 15th regular session: item proposed by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, September 23, 1960, United Nations Digital Library.

communist totalitarianism, or between capitalist exploitation and fraternal socialism, depending upon one’s political outlook. Yet these binaries generally did not reflect the interests or concerns of most of the nationalists discussed in *States-in-Waiting*, or of those of their advocates in the international peace movement who perceived themselves to be nonaligned. However, Cold War binaries shaped how nationalists made and mobilized their claims, and the political pathways to which advocates had access. In this way, the Cold War became a trap that limited the horizons of nationalist possibility even for those who claimed, and sincerely believed themselves, to be neutral during the Cold War.

During the Cold War era, the Soviet Union’s fears concerning its own nationality questions caused it to generally block minority nationalisms from international forums. This Soviet absence made Washington’s official support for national self-determination, however lukewarm, crucial for how minority nationalists – particularly those whose nationalism had religious components (as for Nagas and Tibetans) – made and framed their claims. The advocacy network that formed the World Peace Brigade and supported particular nationalist claimants in the decolonizing world of the early 1960s was composed of American, British, and Indian members of an international civil society community who worked on issues of political justice within and across national borders.

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47 The national composition of this community presented a challenge to their international aims, an issue that emerged when community members attempted, in an organized project, to walk from India to China, as described in *Chapter 6*. The Brigade was also constrained by linguistic boundaries since it did not have the money (for translation) or
nongovernmental organizations received funding directly and indirectly from the Central Intelligence Agency and Anglo-American multinational corporations. This web of funding did not make them stooges of US power, of which they were sincerely critical; however, their perceived utility to US power projection indicated forms of ideological alliance, whether or not individual advocates considered themselves supportive of US interests or were even aware of the source of their funding. That is how US hegemony operated – not as omnipotent, but as inescapable.

Religion, particularly but not exclusively Christianity, played a role baiting the Cold War trap. Almost all nationalists and their advocates in *States-in-Waiting* were religious, though not of the same faith, creed, or denomination. A shared language of faith and a practice of appealing to members of faith communities pervaded nationalist claims-making and its advocacy, aligning these projects with ideological elements of US hegemony even when the US government ignored the actual claims. Religious infrastructure to operate outside of English (Arlo Tatum, secretary of the Preparatory Committee for the World Peace Brigade to James Lieberman, December 5, 1961, Box 45, Devi Prasad Papers, International Institute of Social History, Amsterdam). The Brigade community was one of many transnational advocacy networks during global decolonization; for example, Salar Mohandesi, *Red Internationalism: Anti-imperialism and Human Rights in the Global Sixties and Seventies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2023), chronicles the shifts in the global antwwar movement in response to the US war in Vietnam.


The absence of Muslims in the Brigade community (predominantly Anglican, Quaker, Hindu, and Buddhist) is striking. Muslims during the Cold War were often coded as “communists”; see Samuel Moyn, “From Communist to Muslim: European Human Rights, the Cold War, and Religious Liberty,” *South Atlantic Quarterly* 113, no. 1 (2014): 63–86.
networks also created forms of belonging, connection, and affinity that did not move through states, creating useful political pathways for claimants who lacked international recognition.

The processes of claims-making and advocacy relied on and reified the individual — whether as nationalist leader or international advocate — as the agent of political change, not the collective, with its socialist undertones. Religion, individualism, and financial connections pulled particular nationalist claimants and their advocates into the realm of US power projection, even as their activities often (but not always) had very little to do with formal US foreign policy. Histories of international relations that deal with US power usually make it their primary point of focus. While understandable because of the superpower status of the United States, this emphasis can obscure the actual workings of US hegemony. For histories of international order and its limits after 1945, US foreign relations (in all their multiplicity) does not have to be its chief subject for a study to demonstrate their pervasive effects. That is how hegemony, as indirect domination, works.

Throughout the 1960s, independence for many new states looked very different as the decade progressed from 1961 (Tanganyika) to 1962 (Algeria) to 1964 (Zambia) to 1966 (Lesotho). The pressure of time, and the increased visibility of the limits of many new postcolonial governments, shrunk optimistic hopes about the possibilities of national liberation. When Lesotho became independent in 1966, the political economist and international advocate Winifred Armstrong sent a series of letters to its new national government. As in the manner of many advocates, she wrote these letters in a personal capacity but while employed by (and using the letterhead of) AMAX, the American Metal Climax mining company, a US multinational corporation with operations and subsidiaries in Katanga, in Zambia, and in South West Africa. One of Armstrong’s letters of “congratulations” read:

51 While Armstrong’s AMAX records do not show that it had mining interests in Katanga, scholars and activists with deep experience on the issue, such as Elizabeth Schmidt and William Minter, believe otherwise. (Author conversation with Schmidt, June 25, 2015). Schmidt, Foreign Intervention in Africa: From the Cold War to the War on Terror (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2013), 60–69, and Minter, King Solomon’s Mines Revisited: Western Interests and the Burdened History of Southern Africa (New York: Basic Books, 1984), 47–50, cover American mining interests in Katanga without naming AMAX specifically (as Minter does in regard to Namibia).
I’m not quite sure what to say at this point, but I feel a definite need to write you at this moment of history. I’d like to share rejoicing, offer congratulations, and extend my deepest hopes for your personal and national fulfillment – certainly this hope unqualifiedly! But I know that feelings are mixed on the occasion of Basutoland’s [Lesotho’s] independence just now, perhaps the best I can hope is that history, with your help, will justify the rejoicing and congratulations.⁵²

Armstrong’s qualifications to her congratulations to Lesotho hinted at the limits of Lesotho’s new sovereignty: congratulations on “independence” while it remained a landlocked labor reserve surrounded by apartheid South Africa. These remarks show how advocates as well as nationalists were well aware of the challenges facing new postcolonial states and the restrictions on national liberation even – or most especially – at the moment of independence. Tragedy, or its potential, hovered behind moments of national success.⁵³ As a mode for understanding geopolitical transformation, tragedy shatters narratives of progress or nostalgia.⁵⁴ At the same time, it can foreclose change or hope – outcomes that would be anathema to the nationalists and their advocates who dedicated their lives and careers in pursuit of independence.

ORGANIZATION OF THE BOOK

Transnational advocacy networks are loosely organized international civil society organizations, networks of individuals working in non-state capacities (though often involved in their own state’s politics and policies) tackling problems that have been deemed outside of state-to-state relations.⁵⁵ Nationalist movements are non-state actors who have a connective non-state archive, located in the papers of the individuals and organizations who participated in, were sympathetic to, or closely tracked their aims. This archive’s placement and composition depict the results of advocacy’s operations, producing a source base that privileges the role of advocates, whose papers often provide the most accessible, documented record of nationalist claims, more so than those of the nationalist

claimants themselves or those of the states that controlled their territory. This asymmetry of sources reflects the imbalanced relationship between nationalist claims-making and its international advocacy, and became a defining feature for a state-in-waiting.⁵⁶

Focus on the state-making attempts of non-state actors can seem to reinforce definitions of “state” and “non-state” in the global history of decolonization. However, that distinction did not neatly map onto the activities of nationalist claimants who sought statehood while remaining outside an international order made up of states that they hoped to belong to if they achieved their aims. Nor did the dividing line between realms of “state” and “non-state” hold for international advocates who moved between spheres of government, civil society, international institutions, and corporations. The advocates who populate this narrative – the American political economist Winifred Armstrong, the wealthy British newspaper editor David Astor, the Indian Gandhian civil-society leader Jayaprakash Narayan, the Indian peace activist Suresh Ram, the US civil rights activist Bayard Rustin, the British anti-apartheid activist Michael Scott, the pan-Africanist and US civil rights activist Bill Sutherland, the American anthropologist Laura Thompson, among others – worked to legitimize nationalist leaders in international politics. Prospective national leaders such as Angami Zapu Phizo (Nagaland), Mburumba Kerina

⁵⁶ For Naga nationalism, the Indian state record remains virtually closed; and although there are extensive Indian Home Ministry files on Nagaland (transported from the Ministry of External Affairs after 1974), these are not currently open to researchers. Personal papers of individual Indian politicians at the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, such as Jawaharlal Nehru, T. N. Kaul, Y. D. Gundevia et al., contain useful correspondence. The Assam State Archives has pre-1963 records from their Tribal Affairs Department that contain reports about the movements and actions of Naga “hostiles.” While the libraries of the Naga Baptist Church and the personal collections of individual Naga nationalist insurgents contain important material, it is the records of their primary advocate, Michael Scott (UK), and to a lesser extent those of an early supporter, Laura Thompson (US), that hold the most complete record. Collections include those of: Nagaland Baptist Church Council, Kohima, Nagaland; Council for Baptist Churches in Northeast India, Guwahati, Assam; Zapuvise Lhousa Papers, Mezoma, Nagaland; VK Nuh Collections, Dimapur, Nagaland; Guthrie Michael Scott Papers, the Weston Library, Bodleian Libraries, Oxford University; Laura Thompson Papers, National Anthropological Archives, the Smithsonian, Washington, DC. For Namibia, independent as of 1990, their national archives are valuable for tracking UN deliberations and commentary, as well as for oral histories of Namibian nationalists, but remain effectively closed regarding the records of their primary nationalist organization, SWAPO, now the country’s ruling party, while collections of their Western advocates, such as the interview collection of the researcher Tony Emmett at the Basler Afrika Bibliographien, tell a more fully documented story.
(Namibia), Moise Tshombe (Katanga), and Kenneth Kaunda (Zambia) made use of the prestige, connections, and expertise of advocates. If or when they became the leaders of actual state governments, as Kaunda did, they broke with their former advocates because the advocacy that had empowered their ascent to power had the potential to undermine their regimes once their governments were ensconced.

Following the networked activities of nationalist claimants and their international advocates, States-in-Waiting charts the rise and fall of an advocacy network that became the World Peace Brigade, framed by the attempted internationalization of the Naga claim from 1960 to 1966. These two histories are set against the broader context of global decolonization – of nationalist possibility and its constraints in the postwar era – playing out simultaneously on the African continent. Chapter 1, “Sovereignty in the Hills,” relates the history of Naga nationalism from the China-Burma-India theater of the Second World War, to the Naga declaration of independence the day before India gained its independence in August 1947, to the subsequent Indian counterinsurgency operations against the Naga nationalists. One group of Nagas sought an accord with India, driving the leader of the nationalists, Angami Zapu Phizo, to seek international support to combat those negotiations.

Stymied by the Indian military and moderate Nagas who sought a settlement with India, Naga nationalists looked for international support. Chapter 2, “Advocates of Not-Quite Independence,” relates Phizo’s journey from Nagaland to London, where he placed the Naga claim within the context of African decolonization and reached out to the advocate Reverend Michael Scott because of Scott’s role as an international spokesperson for Namibian nationalist claims-making. This chapter analyzes the role of missionaries, activists, anthropologists, and journalists as intermediaries between nationalist movements and international politics, as well as the contentious friendships between Indian politicians and Western advocates who worked together on African decolonization questions. Chapter 2 closes with the attempt of Jayaprakash Narayan (JP), an Indian advocate for African nationalist movements, to turn Scott away from work on behalf of the Naga claim and toward their shared advocacy for African decolonization by inviting him to a peace conference in India.

Chapter 3, “The Anti-Algiers,” opens with the peace conference that Scott and JP attended from December 1960 to January 1961. At this conference, organized by the War Resisters International and held at the ashram of Gandhigram, outside Madras, Scott, JP, and their colleagues decided to create a “World Peace Brigade”: a nongovernmental advocacy
organization run by JP (who was also a disciple of Gandhi), Scott, and A. J. Muste. Its first project was in Dar es Salaam, Tanganyika, in 1962. There, at the invitation of Julius Nyerere (then prime minister of Tanganyika and, later, the president of Tanzania, its successor state), Brigade members Suresh Ram, Bayard Rustin, Bill Sutherland, and Scott supported Kenneth Kaunda’s claim for an independent Zambia. This chapter shows how the Brigade tried to make Dar es Salaam the anti-Algiers: its headquarters for channeling decolonization’s “wind of change” into peaceful, anticommunist, postcolonial states. However, anticolonial nationalist guerrilla camps encircled Dar es Salaam, undermining the Brigade’s pacific state-building.

The Brigade’s efforts on behalf of Zambian state-making became enmeshed in the dynamics of the African Copperbelt – a zone of copper deposits and associated mining interests stretching between Zambia and Katanga – particularly in the international and regional dynamics surrounding Katanga’s secession and the UN intervention to prevent it. Chapter 4, “The Spectre of Katanga,” considers how the Congolese province of Katanga served as the ultimate example of illegitimate nationalism and of the potential failure of decolonization when not guided into the “correct” political shape. The Brigade’s advocacy against Katanga and its supporters at the UN and elsewhere precipitated the American Metal Climax mining company’s (AMAX) decision to back Kaunda in neighboring Zambia. This chapter shows how Katanga’s secession led the UN and its Euro-American backers to fear that the “wrong kind” of decolonization would undermine new postcolonial states.

The political climate of Katanga’s secession also influenced AMAX to give forms of private support to the South West African People’s Organization (SWAPO), which became the dominant Namibian nationalist group. Chapter 5, “Capital and Claims-Making,” focuses on Namibia/South West Africa, showing how, due to the presence of multinational mining interests, the advocacy networks that connected Southern Africa to international politics were much thicker and more complex than those that stretched toward Northeast India. This chapter demonstrates how, while they may not have always agreed with each other, activists and nationalists worked with corporations that supported particular nationalist claimants. Capital as well as claims flowed through advocacy networks.

After its work to prevent Katanga’s secession and to support Zambia’s independence, the World Peace Brigade turned its attention toward Asia, particularly the contentious relationship between India and China.
Chapter 6, “Marching into the Great Wall of State,” narrates the Brigade’s second project in the recently decolonized world, a planned Delhi-to-Peking Friendship March, which could not cross the border because the Chinese government would not provide visas. Brigade members disagreed about whether an ostensibly apolitical, pacifist endeavor could – or should – have leaders who supported particular nationalist movements in India (Scott for Nagaland) and China (JP for Tibet), movements whose claimed territory bordered the march’s route. By detailing these disagreements, Chapter 6 describes the contradictions that arose between transnational advocacy and nationalist claims-making on behalf of states-in-waiting: the nationalist movements that worked with advocates in pursuit of independence broke with them if and when they achieved statehood. The transnational activism that had supported their ascent to government now provided alternative sources of political mobilization that could counter state power.

Chapter 7, “Postcolonial Imperialism,” picks up at the point when the World Peace Brigade’s Friendship March was forced to halt (in Ledo, Assam), in January 1964. Three weeks later, the Nagaland Baptist Church Council invited JP and Scott to form a peace mission in order to turn a ceasefire between Naga nationalist insurgents and the Indian government into a lasting peace. This chapter details the mission’s negotiations and disputes over definitions of “national” and “non-national” sovereignty. Eventually, due to a lack of trust on all sides, the mission dissolved after JP resigned and the Indian government deported Scott. This chapter explains how Scott’s deportation in May 1966 marked the end of an era for nationalist claims-making and its international advocacy, an era that began in 1946 (before India was yet independent) when the Indian Mission to the United Nations allowed Scott to speak as part of their delegation.

By foregrounding the issue of nationalist claimants within postcolonial states, States-in-Waiting shows how the norm of national self-determination, declared and accepted by the UN General Assembly in 1960, did not meet the actual practice of international recognition. In political practice, international recognition favored communities that had mobilized earlier under empire, that had already begun to take over the infrastructures of authority under colonial rule, and that had acquired leverage with the colonial power (such as in India); or, alternatively, that had the militarily strength and regional allies to command the primacy of force when colonial powers withdrew (as in Algeria). In either process, successor regimes were able to secure the acquiescence – forced or
grudging – of their departing colonizer and its Great Power allies (usually but not exclusively the US) on their route to international recognition. The contradiction between self-determination and international recognition as a sovereign state arose for communities with national aspirations who mobilized toward the end of empire or were considered by both colonizer and successor states to be incapable of the development and “civilization” necessary for self-rule. Their route to recognition was much more logistically difficult, and opposing them were the interests of the emergent postimperial order, an order that denied recognition to what it considered to be the subunits, or even the vestiges, of the old colonial system.

Postcolonial state leaders denounced the aspirations of “minority” nationalists, as Nehru did, on the grounds of “balkanization” or argued that “backwards” and “tribal” peoples were incapable of their own national development. While unofficial advocates and the informal political representation they provided were these groups’ best – at times seemingly the only – avenue to international recognition, the asymmetries of power and the dependent relationship of advocacy hindered the scope and legitimacy of these intermediary allies. The constraints on nationalist claims-making and its international advocacy show not only the complexity of decolonization but also its limits. Halted journeys, stalled endeavors, refused hearings, deportations, and exiles – these disappointments all express the parameters of what is a legitimate national claim, who can provide recognition, and the process in which recognition may or may not be achieved.

In May 1971, against the background of postcolonial secession crises in Biafra and Bangladesh, Michael Scott outlined the type of history he wanted to see written of decolonization:

History is still needed of the widely different forms which the “struggle for independence” took . . . especially the advantages and setbacks in the pursuit of constitutional change and the negotiated “settlements” by other than guerilla

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57 For Namibia, Germany was the colonizer and South Africa, the successor state.
58 Louis Mountbatten (last Viceroy of British India): “It was at Nehru’s own request that I removed the choice of independence in the case of Bengal and other provinces to avoid ‘Balkanization.’” Viceroy’s personal report, no. 8, June 5, 1947, quoted in Elisabeth Leake, The Defiant Border: The Afghan Pakistan Borderlands in the Era of Decolonization (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 94. Jawaharlal Nehru: “Nagas have no such background or sensation [of modernity] and we have to create that sensation among them”: Nehru to Bishnuram Medhi, May 13, 1956, Bishnuram Medhi Correspondence File 1, NMML.
warfare ... All these have to be researched in archives and specialist academic studies ... There is the need for an impartial study of the part played by voluntary non-governmental organizations during the intensely transformative period after the Second World War and the birth and early influence of the United Nations. 59

What follows in these pages is the history Scott thought he wanted written. It is not necessarily a narrative that is particularly kind to him. Nevertheless, it is a story that centers him, the network he belonged to, and the causes to which he dedicated his life. This is not simply a recovery project of a previously unwritten history. It is a counternarrative of decolonization from the vantage of the individuals – nationalists and their advocates – who knew that process most intimately because they navigated through it. Their journeys, exiles, and deportations illuminate the histories of states not made, and states in the making, of States-in-Waiting.

59 Michael Scott, personal notes, May 1971, Box 97, GMS Papers.
PART I

NATIONALIST CLAIMS-MAKING
Most Naga nationalist conceptions do not consider the City of Imphal and its immediate environs to be a part of a Greater Nagaland but do consider its surrounding hills traditional Naga Land.

**Map 1.1** Nationalist conceptions of Nagaland at the junction of China, Burma, and India. Map by Geoffrey Wallace

*Administrative boundaries as of late 1961*

*Free Nagaland As depicted by Angami Zapu Phizo, c.1961*

*Greater Nagaland as represented by the National Socialist Council of Nagaland I-M, c.2018*
I

Sovereignty in the Hills

In the moments before the independence of India and Pakistan in 1947, nationalists in what is now the Indian state of Nagaland declared their own region independent. The Naga claim is key to understanding post-colonial state-making in the decolonizing world because it represented the limits of what could be an independent state in an era of seeming nationalist possibility. Nagaland articulated the boundaries of national self-determination by demonstrating the practical restrictions of an international system in which national self-determination remained an aspiration rather than a right. Postcolonial state-making foreclosed the prospect of international recognition for many nationalist claimants, yet sovereignties that can only be seen outside the lens of their ruling state government persisted, even as they held conflicting claims of statehood.

WHERE IS NAGALAND?

The Naga Hills are located in two different political geographies. The first is that of the Indian Northeast, which, as its modifying adjective makes clear, is an Indian concept, viewed from the perspective of New Delhi.

1 In 1957, India combined the British district of Nagaland and the Tuensang Frontier Division into an administrative unit governed by the state of Assam and called the “Naga Hills–Tuensang Area,” which became the Indian state of Nagaland in 1963.
3 Sanjib Baruah, “Towards a Political Sociology of Durable Disorder,” introduction in Durable Disorder: Understanding the Politics of Northeast India (New Delhi: Oxford
The term lumps together a host of ethno-linguistically defined peoples, territorially delineated by their relationship to “mainland” India. Some of these peoples, such as Nagas, have been categorized as a collection of tribes rather than as a nation. The term “Naga” itself was coined in British anthropologies of the late nineteenth century, while “nation” was a label certain Nagas applied to themselves.\(^4\) In this geography, the Naga Hills were the ultimate frontier and a place of restricted travel under both British and Indian rule.\(^5\) The region’s only national border with the mainland, the Siliguri corridor in North Bengal, is often called the “chicken’s neck,” accentuating its (Indian) national security vulnerability.\(^6\) This political geography claims the Northeast as Indian and then underscores its directional difference from India’s center.

The second political geography, a Naga one, is where Nagaland lies at the junction of China, Burma, and India. The portion of Nagaland that is in Burma is sometimes described as twice the size of Naga territories in India, but the population is the other way around: in 2019, according to Naga accounts, there were approximately three million Nagas in India and approximately half a million in Myanmar.\(^7\) One would not find these

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7 Visier Sanyü, personal communication to author, January 22, 2019. Tezenlo Thong, “‘To Raise the Savage to a Higher Level’: The Westernization of Nagas and Their Culture,” *Modern Asian Studies* 46, no. 4 (2012): 893–918, 896, also approximates the Naga population as three million and likewise points out that this can only be an estimate.
It is impossible to set an accurate number for the Naga population because the Indian census has perennially underreported this population (and Myanmar does not report it at all) and the Nagas’ own figures are vague as they do not have the mechanisms in place for carrying out a comprehensive census. More important than arriving at an accurate figure of the Naga population is understanding that the mechanisms of their ruling states are set up to miscount, and therefore discount, them.

Existing national frames obscure seemingly easy-to-establish facts such as where Nagaland is and how many Nagas there are. This strategic absence challenges notions of counted and categorized postcolonial-state citizenship. Naga territories are spread across five political units. Their villages, even the Naga capital of Kohima, nestled in the Himalayan foothills, seem to inhabit the fold of a map—literally present but rendered invisible by the nationalist, cartographic, bounded conception of postcolonial nation-states of India and Myanmar, and elsewhere across the globe.

Globally, hill regions are often considered ungovernable, “uncivilized” spaces. In 1961, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru of India compared geographically distinct hill spaces when he proposed a “Scottish pattern of administration” for tribal regions in the Indian Northeast.

8 The Indian census counts Nagas as “Scheduled Tribes” in Assam, Nagaland, Arunachal Pradesh, and Manipur, not as Nagas. In areas where the dominant collection of scheduled tribes are Nagas (divided between Ao, Angami, Sema, etc.), this can be a proxy for Nagas, but in other regions with a variety of scheduled tribes, it is not. The Myanmar government does not report the number of Nagas in its state.


10 On the issue of cartographic statehood, see Joshua Keating, Invisible Countries: Journeys to the Edge of Nationhood (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2018). One way to handle the difficulty of determining nationally derived “facts” is to consider Nagas as emblematic residents of “Zomia,” the borderlands region of upland Southeast Asia stretching from Thailand to Tibet. The term “Zomia” was coined by Willem van Schendel, “Geographies of Knowing, Geographies of Ignorance: Jumping Scale in Southeast Asia,” Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 20 (2002): 647–68; and popularized by James C. Scott, The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009).

In scholarship, James C. Scott famously (and ironically) asked, “Why cannot civilizations climb hills?” while Lauren Benton categorized mountainous regions as “primitive with the potential to become increasingly but never fully modern” in her discussion of uneven imperial geographies. Benton actively searches for sovereignty, while Scott looks for its absence, but they arrive at much the same place – with the hills as a non-state space, a geography of resistance.

Worldwide, regions seeking independence from postcolonial states laid strong claim to hallmarks of “modern civilization” such as nationalism, statehood, and, in the case of Nagas, Christianity. At the same time, these claims of modernity, of civilization, of sovereignty were rendered invisible to outsiders. From the outside world, “Where is Nagaland?” is a seemingly impossible question to answer. Therefore, for Nagas, conceptualizing a “national territory” became “an act of narration and imagination” – an act of self-determination.

WORLD WAR AND NATIONALIST CLAIMS-MAKING

As with many peoples seeking to define their sovereignty, a set of geopolitical processes – war, religion, empire, decolonization – produced Naga nationalist claims-making. During the First World War, approximately 2,000 Nagas served in the French and Mesopotamian theaters as military laborers. On their return home, some of them tried to join the British officers club in Kohima and were refused because they were not considered of the appropriate rank or race. In response, they formed the Naga Club in 1918, a proto-nationalist civil society organization. A decade later in 1929, the Naga Club met with the British Simon Scott, The Art of Not Being Governed, 13; Lauren Benton, A Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 225.

Thank you to Kalyani Rammath for helping to articulate this point.


15 Harry Fecitt, Sideshows of the Indian Army in World War I (New Delhi: VJ Books, 2018). John Thomas, Evangelising the Nation: Religion and the Formation of Naga Political Identity (New Delhi: Routledge, 2016), 26, says approximately 4,000 Nagas and Kukis (another tribal people who straddled the Indian and Burmese border) were sent to France. These different figures show how difficult it is to quantify the number of Nagas engaged in particular endeavors. On the wider panorama of Indian support troops in the First World War, see Radhika Singha, The Coolie’s Great War: Indian Labour in a Global Conflict, 1914–1921 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020).

16 Keviyiekielie Linyie, author interview, December 21, 2018.
Commission, a group of seven British Members of Parliament (no Indians) sent out to study constitutional reform for British India.\footnote{17}

Indian nationalists from multiple parties reviled the Simon Commission, which denied that India had a legitimate national claim and therefore that it deserved independence. For them, the commission embodied the dominant logic of empire: that India was a collection of incompatible peoples over which Britain alone could keep the peace.\footnote{18} Both the Indian National Congress and the All-India Muslim League refused to meet with the commission. Instead, they waved black flags at demonstrations, which the colonial police violently suppressed.\footnote{19}

However, Naga nationalists, alongside other disenfranchised communities in British India, rejected the Indian nationalist interpretation of the Simon Commission as a tool of continued British imperialism.\footnote{20} When Naga Club members met with the commission, they submitted a memorandum stating “that the British Government will continue to safeguard our rights against all encroachment from other people,” and that, on British withdrawal, Nagas “should not be thrust to the mercy of other people … but to leave us alone to determine ourselves.”\footnote{21} In Naga nationalist accounts, this meeting with the Simon Commission served as the point of origin for the public articulation of the Naga nationalist claim.\footnote{22} As a result, the Simon Commission became a source of legitimacy for Naga nationalism. While there is debate on how many Naga Club members had served in the First World War, the Naga nationalist narrative drew a causal chain from the Nagas’ return from war, to their racial

\footnote{18} Sugata Bose, His Majesty’s Opponent: Subhas Chandra Bose and India’s Struggle against Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012), 72.
\footnote{20} Dalit activists also saw the Simon Commission as a portal outside the Indian nationalist movement to petition the British colonial state; e.g., B. R. Ambedkar, “Evidence before the Simon Commission,” in \textit{Selected Writings and Speeches}, vol. 2, ed. Vasant Moon (Mumbai: Education Department, Government of Maharashtra, 2005), 315–491.
\footnote{21} Naga Club memo, emphasis added.
exclusion from the British officers’ club, to the formation of the Naga Club, to the Memorandum to the Simon Commission. Like many nationalist narratives, this one wields mythic power rather than strict accuracy. The Naga Club’s 1929 petition to the Simon Commission remains a founding sovereign document.

The overlapping interactions between indigenous claim, colonial encounter, and neighboring (Indian) majoritarian nationalism that conceptualized Nagas as not “appropriately” Indian shaped the critical geopolitics of Naga nationalist claims-making. This call for sovereignty in the hills was a response to and repudiation of the sovereignty of “mainland” India, which had been created by a partition that decoupled the Northeast from what had been a united Bengal in Eastern India. The “chicken’s neck” link to the mainland could always be snapped, making the Northeast both a place of perpetual insecurity from the perspective of New Delhi and of ambiguously belonging to the rest of India. Several years after the Nagas’ 1929 Memorandum to the Simon Commission, in 1936 the British declared the Naga Hills to be an “excluded area,” which meant that it would be administered by the governor of Assam rather than from New Delhi – attenuating the chain of authority that connected the region to its ruling government.

Excluded area or not, Nagaland became central rather than peripheral to international relations when the armies of the Second World War invaded the region. It is not accidental that the political geography of Nagaland as the junction of China, Burma, and India shares a name with the China-Burma-India theater of the Second World War. In 1944, the Allied forces – the British colonial army made up of South Asian, West African, and East African troops, with US air support flying out of Calcutta and engineers running the railways through Assam – halted the Japanese march westward at the Battles of Kohima (the Naga capital) and Imphal (137 kilometers from Kohima, down a rough road in neighboring Manipur). The violent presence of foreign troops, airplanes, and trains

transformed a region that the British Raj had left purposely undeveloped since it was cheaper and easier to govern with a light footprint. Notably, few Nagas officially fought in that war, though many joined partisan units; only one is buried in the Commonwealth War Cemetery in Kohima. And not all Nagas chose the Allied side, since the Japanese actively courted Asian anticolonial nationalists within the British Empire.

After the Japanese captured Rangoon in March 1942, they advanced into Burma, cutting off Allied supply lines to China. The defeated British and American command ordered a retreat into India in May 1942. Indians living in Burma, if they could not afford to leave by boat, walked nearly 1,500 kilometers to Northeast India, through Naga territories. Their slow and unprovisioned passage meant that they often needed aid from Naga villagers. Following the Japanese victory in Burma, the British rebuilt its army in the Northeast, while American forces regrouped and turned their attention to China, using long-range penetration units in Burma to reopen supply routes.

Frustrated by the continued Allied control of supply routes into China, the Japanese decided to brave the difficult jungle and mountainous terrain and invade India. Catching the British off guard, Japanese troops laid siege to Kohima and its surrounding villages in early April 1944; the battle dragged on until June. From a Naga perspective, the battle involved the Japanese capturing villages that the British then relieved; forced and voluntary civilian population removals; and the employment of many as laborers, interpreters, and partisan fighters. Eventually, with superior airpower and fierce fighting, the British colonial army drove the Japanese out of Kohima in late June. During a similar time period (March–early July 1944), the Japanese attacked and laid siege to Imphal in neighboring Manipur – approximately a two-day march south from Kohima – and eventually were defeated and retreated from that city.

A poll conducted by the British National Army Museum named the Battles of Kohima and Imphal as Britain’s greatest victory, more significant than either Waterloo or the Normandy landings – yet the battles do


not loom large in histories of the Second World War because of their location. Mirroring international perceptions of the region in which they fought, the British colonial army, officially the Fourteenth Army, was nicknamed the “Forgotten Army.” The trope of a forgotten army, a forgotten war, and a forgotten region haunts the political geography of Nagaland. Of course, the armies, wars, and territory are never forgotten or unknown to those who live there and those who fought there. However, the formation of that trope was not accidental. It was produced both by a departing empire that strategically forgot its past responsibility and violence and by a new ruling government that had its own ambivalent relationship with the Second World War—a war that split India’s independence movement: some sat it out in prison, while others allied with the Japanese.

Not only did some Indian nationalists, such as Indian National Army leader Subhas Chandra Bose, ally with Japan, but the Nagas’ most prominent nationalist leader, Angami Zapu Phizo, did so as well. Phizo was a member of the Angami tribe from Khonoma village, in the Kohima region. The Angamis of Khonoma had held off the British twice, in 1847 and 1879, so Phizo embodied a nationalist call of historic resistance. Growing up, he held a leadership role within his peer group before he left for school in Kohima. After receiving an English-language education from US missionaries, he became a traveling insurance and Bible salesman, working on commission for US and British firms based in Calcutta. Finding it difficult to make a living in Nagaland, Phizo relocated with most of his immediate family to Rangoon, Burma. There, he made contact with Japanese intelligence, which sought to use

30 Sanjoy Hazarika, Strangers of the Mist: Tales of War and Peace from India’s Northeast (New Delhi: Penguin India, 2003), 95–96.
31 Umatic Film #2, Visier Sanyü Collection. These films feature a collection of interviews made by Sanyü in 1990 surrounding the events of Phizo’s funeral. They were restored and digitized with support from the International Institute of Social History (IISH), Amsterdam, and transcribed by Asanuo Heneise in English and Tenyidie with support from The Ohio State University’s Provost Early Career Scholars Program.
33 Steyn, Zapuphizo, 49–52.
indigenous anti-imperialist sentiment against Western empires to garner local allies on their march into India. In Burma, Phizo “was very active in politics . . . He was with the Japanese army and he was with Netaji, Subhas Chandra Bose.” “Netaji” as well as “many Japanese officers” visited the Phizo family regularly in their Rangoon home during the war. Phizo’s own movements during the Second World War – whether he fought with the Japanese, or with the Indian National Army led by Subhas Chandra Bose, or at all – are not clear. He was ambivalent about Bose’s end game (Indian independence) and worried about how much space an independent India would have for an independent Nagaland: “[Phizo] could not escape entirely the man’s charisma and boundless energy, but he refrained from joining the cries of Jai Hind whenever and wherever Bose appeared.”

The Indian National Army–Japanese alignment affected how the Naga question was understood in India. In 1961, the Department of Tribal Areas for the State of Assam (which administered the Naga Hills) believed “that the Nagas were still worshipping the ideals of Netaji [Bose].” Indeed, “Netaji’s appearance at this critical time would have solved the [Naga] problem” by giving the Indian government a representative who would have been a trusted authority in the Naga Hills. This belief in Subhas Chandra Bose as someone who would “solve the [Naga] problem” is more a symptom of Indian misunderstanding of Naga allegiances than an accurate assessment of Bose’s past influence on Naga politics. Given Phizo’s wariness of Netaji even when they shared the goal of driving the British out, it is unlikely that the latter’s presence would have enabled Nagas to trust the Indian government. Yet the Tribal Areas Department’s revisiting of the Second World War show how the legacies of the “forgotten” war were never themselves forgotten – or, were forgotten only by those who had a vested interest in doing so.

World war globalized the Naga Hills but did not lift the trope of invisibility from the region. There is a concerted effort in Nagaland today

34 Steyn, Zapuphizo, 57–61. 35 Umatic Film #4, Visier Sanyü Collection. 36 Umatic Film #4, Visier Sanyü Collection. 37 Steyn, Zapuphizo, 59. 38 Fortnightly Confidential Report on the political situation in United Khasi and Jaintia Hills, for the fortnight ending January 31, 1961. TAD/Con/1. State Archives, Guwahati Assam. This comment also alludes to the controversy that surrounds Subhas Chandra Bose’s death, and the belief among some in India that he did not really die in August 1945 from injuries occurring in a plane crash. Bose, His Majesty’s Opponent, and Leonard Gordon, Brothers against the Raj: A Biography of Sarat and Subhas Chandra Bose (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), debunk that theorizing.
to memorialize the Second World War and to celebrate the efforts of Nagas who supported the British. The Kohima battlefield cemetery functions as a pilgrimage site for British veterans and, therefore, as an international portal for Naga claims-making. Descendants of veterans, often from rural British villages traveling to a non-Western country for the first time, are met by delegations of Nagas who ask, Why did you abandon us to India? Caught off guard, some of these British visitors respond that the United States made them leave before they were ready. Even this simplification of the tensions between US and British concerns that accelerated Indian independence show the continued presence of postimperial links. Affective ties remained strong between individual Nagas and the Westerners who were intermediaries between them and the Allied forces. These ties, which are explored in depth in Chapter 2, did not necessarily translate into international support for Naga independence, but they provided the foundations of international advocacy on behalf of the Naga nationalist claim.

MISSION AND NATION

Alongside world war, Christian conversion connected the “excluded area” of the Naga Hills to a wider, global community. The Indian state of Nagaland in recent times is nearly 90 percent Christian and 75 percent Baptist. Percentagewise, it is the most Baptist “state” in the world, followed by the US state of Mississippi. From 1868 onward, a small group of American Baptists sparked outsized rates of conversion and

39 The Kohima Education Trust and The Kohima Education Society make up a British-Naga civil society organization under whose aegis British veterans from the Battle of Kohima and their descendants support the construction of war memorials, scholarships for Naga students, and the collection of oral histories with Nagas who participated in the war.
42 Indian Census, 2011. Available at www.census2011.co.in. The next Indian census has been on hold due to the COVID-19 environment, but it is supposed to occur in 2024, and it is likely that these percentages will decrease.
43 Mississippi has been approximately 34 percent Baptist, according to Paul Harvey, Freedom’s Coming: Religious Culture and the Shaping of the South from the Civil War through the Civil Rights Era (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 255.
English-language education in the region. Nagaland is the American Baptist Foreign Mission Society’s great success story, though it is important to note that most Naga conversion occurred in the years after Indian independence, when American missionaries left the region. Being invaded by armies and bombed from the sky may have made many Nagas more receptive to a religious intervention.

In addition, the rise of Naga nationalist claims-making increased the value of a Christian identity that contrasted with stereotypical Hindu Indian-ness.\(^4\) In the years between the Simon Commission (1929) and Indian independence (1947), American missionaries continued to convert Nagas and teach English, particularly those who lived in the Kohima district and sought jobs as translators for the British colonial authorities.\(^5\) George Supplee, a missionary schoolmaster in Kohima, had a printing press at the school on which the Naga Club printed their English-language newsheet, the *Naga Nation*, starting in the mid-1940s. Earlier, in the 1930s, they had printed a newsheet in Tenyidie, the Angami language, on Supplee’s press.\(^6\)

The independent Indian government disliked the activities of American missionaries, which they correctly saw as a source of global connections for Nagas that short-circuited India, but incorrectly viewed as supportive of Naga nationalism. The government selectively refused to renew visas of missionaries departing for home leave, arguing that they undermined Naga loyalty to the Indian Union. Therefore, by 1953, there were no more American missionaries in the Naga Hills, and the American Baptist Convention transferred church leadership to indigenous clergy.\(^7\)

\(^4\) Thomas, *Evangelising the Nation*.

\(^5\) Some Nagas remember the missionaries as joyless taskmasters: George Supplee, the schoolmaster in Kohima, “shouted a lot, [was] bald headed, [and] very arrogant.” As a student, Phizo once “threatened to bite him.” Niketu Iralu, interview with author, February 7, 2016.

\(^6\) Copies of the *Naga Nation* and *Kewhira Kielie* from the collections of Rev. Keviyiekielie Linyie, Kohima, Nagaland.

\(^7\) Many Nagas continue to feel a degree of admiration for the American missionaries, a feeling that embodies a contrast with and critique of Hindu India: “The Hindu swamis did not climb the hills. The American missionaries did and the Nagas were impressed.” Niketu Iralu, interview with author, February 4, 2016. For archival purposes, this means that the American Baptist Foreign Mission Society kept up correspondence with Naga clergy after 1953 under the category of “mission correspondence” in their collections now in Atlanta, GA. This correspondence provides a potentially rich resource for histories of the Naga Baptist Church, which are mostly written by Naga and Indian scholars who are often not able to easily travel to Atlanta.
The most successful Naga Baptist missionary was Longri Ao, born in Mokokchung in northern Nagaland in 1906. Longri’s life and work contrast with the Naga nationalist narrative promulgated by Phizo and his supporters. Back in 1930, Longri pondered how the Lord’s “ministry of reconciliation,” which extended to all men – including “the British” – could align with the Indian independence movement’s call for political separation from imperial rule. This was not necessarily a resolvable question; rather, it was one that demonstrated how Christian beliefs and networks distanced Nagas from the mainstream Indian independence movement. Longri studied and taught at the Baptist Bible School in Jorhat Assam from 1930 to 1950, then spent seventeen years as a Baptist missionary to the Konyak Nagas in Northern Nagaland and the North East Frontier Agency (NEFA), where he converted over 10,000 people; he also traveled extensively in the United States. He eventually headed the Nagaland Baptist Church Council and had credibility as a successful missionary who “sought to make the private and public life of the largely Christian Nagaland state a testimony to the power of Christ.”

Under Longri’s leadership, the Nagaland Baptist Church Council became a powerful institution in the region, though it remained wary about New Delhi’s perception of it as potentially disloyal to the Indian government. In spite of their historic ties, American Baptists were hesitant to bring young Nagas to the United States for education. In the early 1950s, they had helped Vichazelie (Challe) Iralu, a nephew of Phizo, go to Chicago for study, under the assumption that he would become a doctor and return home to serve his people. Instead, he remained in the United States, became an epidemiologist, and provided funding for Phizo’s endeavors. Afterward, American Baptists only brought Nagas, such as

49 Frederick S. Downs, entry for Longri Ao in Biographical Dictionary of Christian Missions, ed. Gerald H. Anderson (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 1999), 25. Downs was born to American Baptist missionary parents in Assam in 1930, and was one of the last Americans to live in the Northeast, as a professor at Eastern Theological College in Jorhat, Assam; he was the vice-president of the Council of Baptist Churches in North East India. Longri was a friend and colleague of Downs.
50 Downs, Longri Ao entry, Biographical Dictionary, 25.
51 Correspondence between George Supplee and Charles Pawsey, 1957–1964, Box 1, Charles Pawsey Papers, Cambridge Centre for South Asian Studies Library, Cambridge, UK. Supplee forwarded his correspondence with Pawley regarding Phizo to the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).
Longri, over to the United States for short-term theological training and were adamant that they return home.52

American Baptist heritage connected Nagas to a wider global community. Christianity provided a powerful modernizing discourse, legible to the Western world, that linked Nagas to wider global networks. However, fearful of New Delhi’s wrath, the Naga Baptist Church did not directly support Naga nationalist claims-making.53

Language and education are important tools of conversion and nation-making.54 Missionary education policies provided many Nagas with the ability to speak, read, and write in English.55 Naga nationalists produced masses of field notes and atrocity lists, typed up in English on a typewriter that the insurgents had with them in the jungle during the first decade of insurgency (1954–1964).56 These lists were written to be circulated to Western audiences, secretly handed to some of the few journalists who were allowed in the region, given to Indian and Western advocates whom Nagas used in their pursuit of independence, and published in Naga histories.

While these documents may include elements of British colonial bureaucratic organization, they also correspond to Naga traditions of reciting detailed family genealogies in the form of oral lists.57 Naga nationalism worked with and adapted the elements at hand – the geography of the Naga Hills as both an excluded area and a strategic junction; the experience of empire, war, Christian conversion, and

53 From at least 1975, the Nagaland Baptist Church Council received funding from the Indian government for its reconciliation efforts. Longri Ao and Kenneth Kerhuo to Nagaland State Government, February 7, 1975; Longri and Kenneth Kerhuo to Nagaland State Government, April 2, 1975. VK Nuh Papers, Dimapur, Nagaland.
55 George Supplee correspondence, 1940–1953, Reel 348, ABFMS.
56 Lists found in Zapuvise Lhousa collections, Mesoma, Nagaland; VK Nuh collections, Dimapur, Nagaland; Guthrie Michael Scott Collections, Weston Library, Oxford, UK. They are also printed as appendices in many Naga nationalist pamphlets, particularly A. Z. Phizo, *The Fate of the Naga People: An Appeal to the World* (London: The Africa Bureau, 1960).
English-language education. These elements formed the critical geopolitics of sovereignty in the hills, posing a critique of the international legal structures of decolonization that recognized some people-territorial matches as sovereign states, but not others.

**TRIBE, CONSTITUTION, AND CATEGORIZATION**

The sovereign document of postcolonial India, its constitution, includes a list or schedule of castes and tribes who have specialized relationships to the Indian state. On their political incorporation into India, Nagas were broken down into a series of tribes – Angami (Phizo’s tribe), Ao, Konyak, Lotha, Rengma, etc. – and were not listed as Nagas. When the Naga Hills became the Indian state of Nagaland in 1963, it did so under Article 371a of the constitution, which gave it special status: non-Naga Indians cannot legally own land in most of Nagaland; when they travel there, they must apply for an Inner Line Permit (a holdover from Nagaland’s colonial past), and foreigners must register with the police.58

The term “Naga Nation” predated Indian independence and contrasted with the notion of Nagas as a premodern “tribal” people.59 Imperial rulers defined Nagas (as well as Pashtuns in Afghanistan or American Indians)60 as a “tribe” rather than a “nation” in order to legitimize their conquest. In North America, as imperial expansion hardened into settler colonialism, American Indian nations also came to

58 For the colonial and postcolonial evolution of an “Inner Line” and the differences between the Fifth and Sixth Scheduled Tribes, see Duncan McDui-Ra, *Northeast Migrants in Delhi: Race, Refuge and Retail* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2012), 36–38. There are a number of other territorial exceptions under the Indian Constitution, such as the eight Union Territories (which include the former Portuguese colony of Goa, the former French colony of Pondicherry, and Kashmir since 2019). The precarity of these exceptional statuses can always be revoked. Article 371a controls Nagaland at the same time that it protects Naga land-ownership.


be termed “tribes,” diminishing their political status. Globally, rendering peoples into tribes subordinated them within the colonial expansionist and postcolonial consolidation projects. In the Indian context, a Naga nation escaped the structures of caste in a Hindu-dominated society and rejected the Indian constitutional category of “tribe,” with its connotations of colonial anthropological classification. The concept of “nation” also linked Nagas to the idea of abiblically chosen people, such as the Hebrew nation of Israel.

In Northeast India, the term “tribe” was a marker of difference that could indicate either subordination or separation, depending on the perspective. Some Nagas as well as other Northeastern ethnic groups embraced aspects of tribal categorization and identity for their own goals. For instance, a slogan for Mizo nationalists in nearby Mizoram, another Northeastern region, declared: “Long live Tribal Unity, We want [a] Hill State, We want [an] Eastern Frontier State, Down with Traitors, Separation is the only Salvation.”

While the concept of a Naga (Christian) nation occupies the political geography of a Nagaland as a strategic junction, the categorization of


63 Some Nagas feel an affinity with Israel through evangelical Christian theology and a sense of shared national struggle – they declared independence within a year of each other, and both are small, religiously oriented states/states-in-waiting with antagonistic neighbors of a different religion. In addition, certain Mizos from neighboring Mizoram and Manipur have called themselves a “lost tribe of Israel,” and were recognized as such by the Israeli chief rabbi; some have since emigrated to Israel on that basis. Eetta Prince-Gibson, “Lost’ Indian Jews Come Home,” Tablet Magazine, December 12, 2017. Available at www.tabletmag.com/jewish-news-and-politics/120195/lost-indian-jews-come-home.

64 Report of the Mizo district for the second half of October 1961, TAD/Com/24, Assam State Archives.
Nagas as “a collection of tribes” who inhabit India’s Northeast not only defined them in early-twentieth-century anthropological monographs but also in the Indian constitution. Verrier Elwin, a British anthropologist who took Indian citizenship after independence, became Prime Minister Nehru’s advisor for the North East Frontier Agency and advised on the special provisions for the scheduled tribes’ section of the Indian constitution. He believed that the tribal areas of the Northeast should be kept separate from the rest of India so that tribal peoples could be slowly modernized and Indianized in the “right” way, and lured away from what he perceived as their racial affinity with China and affective sympathy with the British Empire.

Just as the term “tribe” can cut in two different directions, and just as there are two dueling narratives of the Simon Commission as well as two distinct political geographies for Nagaland, there are also two different sets of scholarship on modern Nagaland, “modern,” meaning after the Anglo-American colonial and missionary encounter and its consequent defining, categorizing, ruling, and writing about the region. One body of scholarship is that of empire. The second is that of nationalist claims-making. Interestingly, until relatively recently few “mainland” Indian scholars studied the Naga region. Decades of violence do not produce an accessible research site, and India’s own historiographical nation-building project required writing Nagaland out of India rather than into it.

British colonial officials and anthropologists (who were sometimes also colonial officials) and American Baptist missionaries either wrote about Nagaland or were the central subjects of the imperial works of scholarship. They were also the men and women “on the spot” when the Japanese invaded during the Second World War. As mentioned earlier, missionary George Supplee ran an army hospital, the Kohima school, and the printing press used for Naga newssheets. Anthropologist Ursula


Graham Bower Betts led a Naga reconnaissance unit. Colonial administrator Charles Pawsey liaised with the British colonial army and the Naga population, drafting native translators and laborers. The reporting, correspondence, and monographs of Bower Betts, Pawsey, Supplee, and their colleagues shaped how Westerners understood Nagas in the subsequent decades. Early-twentieth-century anthropology defined Nagas as premodern head-hunters, uncivilized tribal peoples in a forgotten corner of the world – residents of Zomia, the borderlands regions of Upland Southeast Asia, before the term was coined. This imperial scholarship also came to shape elements of Nagas’ own sense of history. On the shelves of nearly all libraries in the region, in many homes, and even at certain Nagaland state government promotion events, one finds copies of these anthropological texts, which have maintained continued relevance, even as they become dated.

The second dominant, documented set of scholarship for understanding Nagaland has been written by Nagas themselves, particularly those who engaged in the nationalist struggle and its concomitant peace negotiations. These writings are based on personal records from the Naga nationalist movement (many of which are included in the source base for *States-in-Waiting*) but do not always conform to Western-discipline modes of history writing – they are not necessarily linear in narrative nor do they have extensive citations. Their primary audience has been an

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internal Naga one, even as they were written in an effort to “get the story out.” What historical narrative gains the largest public and expert acceptance? Frequently, that which produces the easiest-to-read sources. Nagas themselves know this, which is why these books are written in English and include large appendices of historical documents. The same geopolitical and epistemological orders that make “Where is Nagaland?” and “What is the population of Nagas?” seemingly impossible questions to answer are mirrored in the marginalization of these histories. Since they deal with a political geography that centers on Naga sovereignty and Indian “colonialism,” they do not tell stories that a non-Naga audience is easily equipped to comprehend; they are also often self-published and collaboratively written. The results of this marginalization – being strategically forgotten, being rendered invisible – are characteristics shared with its subject, but these books are not notes from Zomia. They articulate an indigenous claim of sovereignty that began in contact with, and in the conquest by, Western empire.

STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE

For all the contestation surrounding their status within India, Naga nationalists are emphatic about what they are not – a secessionist movement – because Phizo’s political party, the Naga National Council, declared independence on August 14, 1947, the day before India gained its independence. The Naga National Council made its declaration to the United Nations (UN), in a telegram that is often reprinted in Naga nationalist document collections. Naga nationalists allege that they received a return telegram from the UN acknowledging that the international institution had received their declaration of independence. In this narrative, the receipt – now lost – provided literal international


69 While this is often not mentioned in the books themselves, some of them are written with friends and family to make the best use of different levels of knowledge of the subject and degrees of formal education within a community. While this sublimated group-authorship does not correspond to certain Western public scholarly norms, it does align with how large academic historical projects may employ a host of researchers who may be mentioned in the acknowledgments but are not on the title page.


recognition. Over time, loss of that receipt became an emblem for the tragic outcome of their struggle, of the United Nations’ deliberate ignorance of their existence, and of Nagas’ own failure to keep their claim safe from internal dissent.

In late June 1947, before both declarations of independence, the governor of Assam, Akbar Hydari, signed a nine-point accord with the Naga National Council. The agreement gave administration of the Naga Hills to the National Council, promoted the aspiration of bringing “all Nagas” in all territories “under one unified administrative” unit, and allowed for both sides to revisit the agreement in ten years. Naga nationalists believed that the opportunity to revisit the Hydari Accord after a decade meant that India would respect Naga independence at that later date. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru did not read the Hydari Accord in that manner and never officially approved the agreement, which occurred before he was prime minister. In Naga nationalist narratives, the Hydari Accord joined the Memorandum to the Simon Commission and the missing UN telegram receipt in their collection of founding documents that provide validation for their claim.

Angami Zapu Phizo (narrowly) won the presidency of the Naga National Council in 1948 because many Nagas were frustrated with the Indian government’s rejection of the Hydari accord. Alongside Phizo, the Council’s secretary was Theyiechüthie Sakhrie, editor of the Naga Nation, who had attended university in Calcutta. Then in his early twenties, Sakhrie played the more moderate (or realistic) intellectual to Phizo’s nationalist firebrand; from different clans, they were both Angami Nagas from Khonoma Village.

Under Phizo’s leadership, the Naga National Council held a plebiscite in May 1951, in which Nagas unanimously rejected the Indian Union. Phizo traveled throughout the Naga Hills, drumming up support for an independent Nagaland. On a 1952 visit to Kütsapomi village in southern

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73 In 1953, the Assam government confiscated Sakhrie’s extensive writings, which are still missing. Thomas, Evangelising the Nation, 103.

74 The plebiscite, for which Phizo and the Naga nationalists went village to village collecting thumbprints representing a 99 percent vote for Naga independence, remains controversial in Indian accounts. For an overview, see Thomas, Evangelising the Nation, 110. For the details of how the Naga National Council (NNC) organized the plebiscite, see A. Sakhrie, The Vision of T. Sakhrie for a Naga Nation (Kohima: Self-Published, 2006), 11.
Nagaland, he emphasized Christianity, sovereignty, and education as the interlocking platform that supported Naga nationalism. He also often discussed economic and material conservation as an important aspect in preserving Naga patrimony. For instance, he argued that bars of soap—an expensive, imported item—should be cut into strips and stored vertically, so that they did not needlessly dissolve in water and become mushy and useless. Here, soap became an emblem for a rare, precious necessity that Nagas needed to preserve and guard, like their sovereignty. Phizo repeatedly preached national unity and resource conservation.

In 1952, due to the success of Phizo’s campaigning, Nagas boycotted the first Indian general election, refusing to be counted as Indian; in many Nagas’ view, their refusal to vote made the application of the election results to the Naga Hills inherently undemocratic. After a joint visit of Nehru and U Nu of Burma to Kohima in 1953 (Nagas were banned from presenting petitions and therefore boycotted the event), Phizo turned to violence, threatening the physical safety of Nagas who worked for the Indian government. As a result, the Indian government suspended rule of law in the Naga Hills and sent in the military, deploying approximately 40,000 troops. In response, Phizo formed a rebel government, declaring the region the “People’s Republic of Nagaland” (later renamed the “Federal Government of Nagaland”). He also established the Naga Home Guard to fight the Indian army, while the Naga National Council remained the nationalist political party.

Neither the war in the Naga Hills nor politics within the National Council went Phizo’s way. Throughout the 1950s, the Indian government forcibly relocated the villages of his (alleged) supporters, with tactics reminiscent both of the British “villagization” processes used during the

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76 Versions of this anecdote were independently told by Zapuvise Lhousa, author interview, February 11, 2016; and by Visier Sanyü, author interview, December 25, 2018. Sanyü was repeating a story told to him by his older brother, Pericha Meyasatsu, who joined Phizo’s movement.

77 Umatic Film #2; regarding tobacco, Phizo “always said, do not waste matchsticks by lighting every so often; instead make a fire and light up your cigarettes.”

78 A fascinating revision of this meeting (on display at a 2014 Rwandan reconciliation exhibit) described Nehru’s 1953 visit to Nagaland as a successful example of peaceful reconciliation. Thank you to Erin Mosely for sharing an image of this exhibit with me.

concurrent Malayan Emergency and Nehru’s forced relocation of communities following the Indian annexation of Hyderabad in South India in 1948. For many Nagas, these violations also called to mind the Japanese army’s invasion of their villages during the Second World War. And within the Naga National Council itself, Sakhrie, who was willing to seek an accommodation with India, and Phizo fell out. In January 1956, Sakhrie was assassinated, allegedly on Phizo’s orders. Subsequently that year, after losing control of his struggle against both the Indian government and Sakhrie’s allies within the nationalist movement, Phizo left the Naga Hills, walking approximately 750 kilometers to East Pakistan, where he remained for four years.

From East Pakistan, Phizo sought external alliances and international attention. A 1958 field report written by Captain Perhicha Meyasetsu of the Naga Home Guard focused on the need to gain international visibility: “We requested [the Pakistanis] to help us to send abroad [lists of] Indian atrocities and [descriptions of] our tribulations to the wide world.” Perhicha wrote that they had asked the Pakistanis to “send out these papers through their Ambassadors.” From Pakistani intelligence, Nagas “received some confidential news … that the UNO had accepted our appeals, [knew about] Indian atrocities and our announcement [of independence]” and was going to consider it. The institution would “also send some Observers” to Nagaland. The United Nations did not respond to Naga nationalist appeals nor send in observers, but this report communicated how Naga nationalists wanted the UN to act; its reference to “Observers” may have been a wishful comparison to Kashmir, where there has been a UN observer mission since 1949. Even given Pakistan’s aid in disseminating the atrocity lists, these lists had remarkable

80 Robert Grainger Ker Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency: Experiences in Malaya and Vietnam (London: Chatto & Windus, 1966). Besides his key advisory role to the British and US forces in Malaya and Vietnam, Thompson had also served in the China-Burma-India theater during the Second World War, where he was a liaison officer for long-range penetration units in Burma. For Hyderabad, see Srinath Raghavan, War and Peace in Modern India: A Strategic History of the Nehru Years (New Delhi: Permanent Black, 2010), 98–100.


82 All of the quotes in this paragraph are from: Captain Perhicha Meyasetsu, Naga Home Guard, to Kedahge, Government of Nagaland, April 18, 1958, Visier Sanyü Collections, Medziphema, Nagaland.
circulation for a nationalist movement that did not control its own mail delivery – though they never generated the recognition of a UN observer mission or committee hearing.

Captain Perhicha’s report continued, noting that the Nagas had “learned that one Britisher named Mr. Graham Green[e] a journalist was arrested at Kuda (Dimapur) when he was coming to explore our country in 1956.” It is unlikely that Greene, who crisscrossed the globe, actually traveled to India, let alone to the Northeast, in 1956, though he was planning an overland journey to China via the Soviet Union in that year. However, he had a global following as a critic of imperial wars against nationalist movements, particularly in Vietnam and Cuba. His novel *The Quiet American* (1955) eviscerated US covert intervention in the then-French war in Indochina, and he supported Fidel Castro during the Cuban revolution (1953–1959). The invocation of Greene linked Naga nationalism to a wider set of anticolonial nationalist liberation movements, particularly in Southeast Asia. This fit how Nagas themselves saw their struggle: as one of many torches in the “ring of fire burning all along the tropics.”

With Phizo in Pakistan, Nehru reached out to Phizo’s Naga opponents. According to Naga nationalist accounts, this was not the first time Nehru had attempted to co-opt Naga leadership. During the dueling declarations of independence in August 1947, Nehru allegedly gave Phizo the signed blank check, asking him to name his price. In Naga nationalist retelling of this encounter, Phizo refused to be bought off. However, other Nagas chose otherwise – not necessarily (or not only) for monetary reasons, but also because they wanted to make the best deal they could with the means they had. In time, the Indian government attempted to cut Phizo out of the political equation completely by negotiating an agreement with his political opponents.

How some degree of Naga autonomy would interact with the Indian constitution and linguistic-nationalist movements throughout India – particularly in contiguous Assam – was New Delhi’s primary concern. These questions had dangerous repercussions for both Naga moderates and the...
Indian government. In July 1960, the Naga People’s Convention, a group of moderates under the leadership of Dr. Imkongliba Ao, negotiated a sixteen-point agreement with Nehru. This group, opponents of Phizo’s, made a trade: instead of independence, Nagas would have a Naga state within the Indian Union. Critics of Nehru argued that the creation of an Indian Naga state emboldened and exacerbated separatist demands throughout India, particularly elsewhere in the Northeast. A year later, in August 1961, militant Naga nationalists assassinated Imkongliba Ao as he returned home from his medical clinic in Mokokchung, northern Nagaland.

While the agreement did establish a Naga state in India, Nehru refused to budge on the constitutional categorization of “tribe” as well as on Naga “integration” – the incorporation of all Naga territories (in Assam, NEFA, Manipur, and Burma) into one political unit, which had been discussed in the Hydari Accord. From Nehru’s perspective, these demands were too destabilizing to Indian domestic and regional security dynamics to even begin to address. However, leaving them out of the July 1960 sixteen-point agreement between the Naga People’s Convention and the Indian government undermined the possibility of a lasting, peaceful settlement.

Interestingly, like his Naga nationalist opponents, Nehru saw the Naga claim through the lens of global decolonization. He wrote to Bimala Prasad Chaliha, the chief minister of Assam, suggesting that the Naga Hills needed the “largest possible autonomy” because any other attitude “will be contrary to what is happening in Africa.” “New States, big and small – and some very small – are appearing on the scene every few weeks as independent States. We support them and encourage them. We cannot

89 The definition of Nagas as a collection of constitutionally listed tribes remains a source of anger in some corners within Nagaland. Interview with Akum Longchar, February 11, 2016.
therefore, oppose full autonomy” for the Naga Hills, he wrote. However, in spite of the need to show the world that India supported self-determination, he said that Nagaland would be part of India – but it would be a “special type of State” within the Indian Union.91

“Naturally,” he said, “[Naga] autonomy will be limited because of law and other conditions.”92 For security reasons, the Armed Forces Special Powers Act of 1958, which placed the territory under martial law, continued to apply (as it does as of this writing); and New Delhi administered Nagaland through the Ministry of External Affairs rather than the Home Ministry until 1972 – even as India categorized the Naga question as a “domestic,” rather than an international, concern.

For the Indian government, the debates surrounding the creation of a Naga state in India were Indian political affairs. The issues of Sikh and Tamil nationalisms, linguistic movements throughout the country, particularly in neighboring Assam, as well as labor unrest in central India framed Nehru’s negotiations with the Naga People’s Convention.93 In Nehru’s declassified correspondence, during the summer of 1960, when he was articulating the prospects and limits of an Indian Naga state, the issue of Goa in Western India was not prominent. In Goa, India supported the nationalists against Portuguese empire and invaded a year later, making Goa an Indian Union territory (rather than a state). For Nehru, Goa was an international issue that needed to be made Indian, while Nagaland was an Indian issue that needed to escape international attention.

Obviously, the Naga question was a decolonization issue for Naga nationalists, who sought independence and international recognition. Less obviously, the context of global decolonization also framed the Naga question for the Indian prime minister, who had the most at stake in labeling the Naga claim a “domestic concern.” Nehru was the person who had to deal with the fallout of creating a Naga “special state” within a country riddled with many other claims of difference or separateness, as

91 Nehru to his Chief Ministers, August 1, 1960, File 705, Part 2, Nehru Papers SG, NNML.
92 Nehru to Chaliha, June 25, 1960.
93 Nehru to Sardar Guram Singh (Sikh nationalist) on the Indian government’s refusal to recognize religion as a defining characteristic of an Indian state, July 8, 1960; Nehru to Chaliha on linguistic and anti-Bengali riots in Assam, July 12, 1960; Nehru to M. C. Chagla (ambassador to Washington, DC) on the Indian general strike, July 12, 1960; all in File 705, Part 1, Nehru Papers SG. Secession was not unconstitutional in India until 1963, when the 16th Amendment banned political parties from standing for elections if they had a secessionist platform – an amendment targeted at Tamil nationalists.
he called India’s “fissiparous tendencies.” Against this background of Indian instability, Nehru decided to create an Indian Naga state in order to undermine the Naga claim to national independence and to pacify the territory. He did so while attempting to demonstrate his ostensible support for national liberation on the decolonizing African continent – being careful to separate the Naga claim from that of anticolonial nationalism.

CONCLUSION

Within postcolonial India, Nagas posed a fundamental challenge to state authority. They were the “mother of all insurgencies” and the first nationalist movement within the country to declare independence. Over time, the “special-ness” of the Indian Naga state and the “exceptionalness” of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act were extended to other regions, particularly Kashmir and elsewhere in the Northeast, making Indian Nagaland a template for how the Indian government could deal with its unruly pieces. Outside of India, Nagas are one of many “tribal” or Fourth World peoples whose existence and political mobilization threaten not only empires but also both settler colonial and postcolonial states. They likewise challenge Cold War ideological and developmentalist orders of so-called First, Second, and Third Worlds. Asking “Where is Nagaland?” in the process of global decolonization is not only asking a question about Nagas themselves. It is asking a question that makes visible the many nested claims within, and obscured by, each and every demand for national liberation.

During global decolonization, the international community – the United Nations, the United States, the Soviet Union, dissolving European empires, and new postcolonial states – came to recognize and therefore legitimize one slice of nationalist claims-making as legitimately “national” and capable of becoming postcolonial nation-states. This process led to difficult queries: “Whose nationalism is legitimate?”

94 India’s fissiparous tendencies were a repeated Nehruvian refrain and a theme expanded in Chapter 6, “Marching into the Great Wall of State.”
95 “Mother of all insurgencies”: This phrase/trope is frequently used (without attribution) to describe Naga nationalism in Indian accounts; e.g., Samir Kumar Das, “Regions Within but Democracy Without: A Study of India’s North-East,” in Rethinking State Politics in India: Regions within Regions, ed. Ashutosh Kumar (London: Routledge, 2011), 250.
“What is the “correct” political unit (i.e., nation) deserving of independence?” The sovereign recognition provided by a postcolonial, state-based international order was built upon national liberation for some and the subsequent exclusion of others, such as Nagas.

Naga nationalist claims-making had a specific history derived from Nagas’ geographic location, imperial confrontation, missionary encounter, and wartime experiences, as well as their anthropological and Indian constitutional categorization. At the same time, the Naga claim is emblematic of the general challenge states-in-waiting posed to the international community as decolonization transformed international order, revising and then entrenching hierarchies of power. Peoples such as Nagas were forgotten and ignored because international attention directed toward them would have upset the balance of decolonization. Recognition of the Naga claim, its critical geopolitics, and that of other similar claims made by “marginal” or “minority” peoples would have redrawn the postcolonial map in ways that the international legal order and emergent postcolonial nation-states desperately and successfully sought to avoid.

Angami Zapu Phizo himself understood the weakness of a sovereign claim when virtually no one outside of a region realizes it exists; he left Nagaland in order to place his case before an international, Western audience. The following chapter features the networks of advocacy that connected Naga nationalist claims-making to international politics, and Phizo’s efforts to mobilize them. Yet these networks – which included some of the same missionaries and anthropologists who had spent their careers in the Naga Hills under empire – were imperial remnants rather than catalysts for subsequent decolonizations.

Phizo left Nagaland so that Naga nationalist claims-making could utilize international advocacy to confront the structural limits of an international system in which national self-determination did not become, in practice, a universal right. This tactic was emblematic of nationalist claims-making throughout the postcolonial world – with the African continent the epicenter of these upheavals in the early 1960s. The United Nations’ 1945 Charter, its 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and its 1960 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and People all focused on the rights of states and the rights of individuals within states. None of these structuring documents addressed “the rights of peoples who did not happen to be in the mainstream of, or [reject the] control of, a state” – such as
Nagas. In the words of David Maybury-Lewis, an indigenous-rights activist who supported Naga claims-making, as well as an anthropologist of Latin America, born to a family of imperial civil servants in British India and therefore intimately familiar with this conundrum through professional advocacy, scholarly expertise, and family heritage: “It is the lack of correspondence between states and peoples ... or between states and nations ... that is the difficulty.” International institutions “have so systematically [yet] unsuccessfully attempted to suppress these units of identity” since they destabilize their member states.


The place of minority peoples in new postcolonial states presented the international community with a quandary: if national liberation presumed that dependent peoples deserve self-rule, what should the world’s response be to peoples within newly independent states who demanded political autonomy? In order to move their claims onto the international stage and win the support they required, nationalist claimants – on the African continent, in India, and elsewhere across the globe – had to find and work with advocates outside their communities.

In 1960, Angami Zapu Phizo, the most prominent nationalist leader of the Naga people who claimed independence from India, journeyed to London in search of such advocacy in order to generate global support for the Naga cause. The history of internationalized Naga nationalist claims-making emerges through the complex of correspondence, journeys, identities, and friendships that made possible Phizo’s journey to London. These advocates were faced with the disquieting question of states-in-waiting within the solidifying borders of newly independent states, peoples who may have, at times, seen little difference between the ambiguous “protection” of empire and the direct control of national government. Because nationalist claimants from these “forgotten” regions of the world were virtually unknown to global publics, advocates used newspapers to disseminate narratives to intended and unintended audiences, at times conflating reporting and advocacy. The attempt to internationalize the Naga claim illuminated the issue of minority peoples within postcolonial states at the height of nationalist possibility in the early 1960s. The tenuous route the Naga claim traveled also revealed the fragile limits of this process.
The advocates who populate Phizo’s journey – in their roles as gatekeepers and with their connections to resources and to the press – were involved in many other political struggles. They made repeated analogies to the Algerian War, to Katanga’s secession from newly independent Congo-Leopoldville, to white settler colonial rule (of apartheid South Africa, South West Africa, and the Rhodesias), painting a picture of connected conflict in the decolonizing world and of the limits of the United Nations institution as the forum for handling such conflict. However, while these advocates celebrated decolonization and national liberation in much of the African continent, the political question of “minority” peoples trapped within newly independent states posed a significant challenge for those who had supported Indian independence and joined the global anti-apartheid movement.

**UPDATING THE “MINORITY QUESTION” FOR THE 1960S**

The situation of the Nagas within postcolonial India, the efforts by their leader Angami Zapu Phizo to gain international advocacy and recognition for their nationalist claims, and the subsequent reporting on the Nagas’ situation by Western newspapers brought global attention to the issue of “minority” peoples within postcolonial states. Inspired by the Naga question, in the fall of 1960 – a year when fourteen African countries became independent and the year that Phizo traveled to London seeking international assistance – the British anti-apartheid activist Reverend Michael Scott wrote the following opinion piece in the *Observer* newspaper:

More than social justice is involved in minority problems: They are as likely as any other single factor to cause war in modern times. What is going on in the Congo at the present time illustrates the danger. Many people look to the UN as our best hope of salvation in this respect. But the tragic truth is that the UN is far less able to deal with minority problems than is generally supposed, and it is becoming less and less so as each year goes by. In the past, some subject peoples have been able to make use of the procedures left over by the old League of Nations mandate system to take petitions to the UN. But as formerly dependent peoples achieve sovereignty and a seat at the UN, they, in turn, acquire the sovereign nation’s ability to discriminate against its minorities with impunity. Like older sovereign states, they are protected from questioning by the doctrine of no interference in internal affairs.

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The piece had a far-flung circulation even among interested peoples without an Observer subscription, as copies independently found their way into archival collections in Dimapur, Nagaland, and in Windhoek, Namibia.² In his op-ed, Scott pinpointed the limits of the United Nations both as an institution and as a system of international order. The UN institution, meant the bureaucracy set up in 1945 in San Francisco, while the UN system of international order, referred to the political organization of the postwar world reshuffled by decolonization and frozen by the Cold War.

There were extensive differences between the place of minority and/or dependent peoples in the League of Nations before the Second World War compared to their place in the United Nations, its successor institution.³ The League of Nations created and administered two international oversight regimes: the minority protections system for Eastern Europe and the mandate system for the former Ottoman and German empires. Petitioning played a central role in both oversight regimes. The minority protections system provided a form of redress short of national recognition for minority populations within fourteen “new” Eastern European states. The mandate system looked outside of Europe. It was the “first effort to begin the radical project of transforming colonial territories into sovereign states,”⁴ though not until the peoples living in those territories were “ready.”⁵ Petitions (and the right to petition) were controversial and restricted in scope and language.⁶ Petitions could be brought forward by individuals or groups, interested third parties, or the peoples themselves.

Since South West Africa had been a League of Nations mandate, the UN Committee on South West Africa was a vestige from the League that made its way into the UN. With this important exception, the post-1945

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² In the collections of Reverend V. K. Nuh outside of Dimapur, Nagaland, and the National Archives of Namibia in Windhoek, Namibia.
United Nations got rid of the League petitioning processes, which is one reason why the UN system can be considered a more restrictive international-legal regime than that of the League. Therefore, circumnavigating these limitations required political savvy and gave well-connected, concerned individuals such as Reverend Scott a role in helping nationalist claimants maneuver through the interstices, the unregulated spaces, of international politics.

Nagas had been seeking United Nations intervention since Indian independence in 1947, sending letters directly to the UN Security Council and to national delegations at the UN. Many of the letters never left India, since the Indian government attempted to control the information flow in and out of the Naga Hills. Those that reached their designated state government or United Nations correspondent were ignored. In 1956, the Naga leader Phizo went into voluntary exile in East Pakistan as a tactical bid to fight international unresponsiveness, to put a face and a voice behind the Naga cause, and to reach a wider Western audience in order to make them know and care about what was happening in Nagaland. In contrast to international ignorance and apathy about that region, Naga nationalists closely followed and distributed international news, listening to the radio and reading press bulletins about the wars of decolonization and new nations receiving independence on the African continent. If the United Nations itself would not listen to the Naga claim, perhaps there were people with access to that institution who would, once they met Nagas in person. In 1960, Phizo made his way to London to find out.

**ENTER THE GATEKEEPERS**

Phizo’s journey to London highlighted the tactics, ideals, and logistics necessary to transport a nationalist insurgent claim into international

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8 For examples, Hongkhin to UN secretary general, November 30, 1954, and January 31, 1955. Bishnuram Medhi Correspondence File 1, Nehru Memorial Museum and Archives; Khukishe to the Israeli chief delegate to the UNO, November 1, 1949, HZ-14/71, Israel State Archive, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Thanks to Rafi Stern for sharing the latter document.

9 This is why the papers of Bishuram Medhi, chief minister of Assam (1950–1957), include Naga petitions to the UN.

politics. National self-determination was a process that the “self” – the people in question – did not get to determine in a vacuum. Instead, peoples relied on the access, and its accompanying forms of external recognition, conferred upon them by advocacy networks made up of gatekeepers – individuals with the prestige, connections, and expertise to move a nationalist claim through the United Nations system of international order. While this process is most easily visible for a small movement like the Nagas, other dependent peoples that felt trapped in independent states (such as India, China, South Africa, and elsewhere) used similar tactics and often the same set of advocates: South West Africa, with its vestigial League of Nations mandate status and UN committee, is the most famous example. With a combination of political connections, moral suasion, and social prestige, advocates moved political claims and claimants across the hardening borders of postimperial and postcolonial states.

In June 1960, Phizo arrived in London after a secret journey that took him from Nagaland, to East Pakistan, and then to Switzerland, on a fake El Salvadorian passport. Four years earlier, Phizo had sneaked into East Pakistan, but the Pakistanis looked on the Naga cause with suspicion and kept his activities constrained. Neither Pakistan nor China, however inimical to India, would directly foment separatist sentiment in the region when they had to contend with their own nationalist claimants in nearby East Pakistan and Tibet. Eventually, with money and the fake passport procured – through his nephew Vichazelie (Challe) Iralu, an epidemiology PhD student studying in Chicago – Phizo made his way to Zürich under the name “Prudencio Llach,” though he considered it “a sorry fact for a Christian” to use an “assumed name.”

While Phizo was stranded in Zürich, Challe (in Chicago) read an article in the New York Times about the Herero people of South West Africa petitioning the United Nations for support against South African rule, with the help of Reverend Scott. This was a model for how a people, small in number and politically disenfranchised, could reach the United Nations – through a Western advocate connected to but not representative of state power. Inspired by the article, Challe wrote to Scott. Scott did not reply to Challe’s first letter because he worried that

12 There are also Herero people of Bechuanaland.
13 Niketu Iralu, interview with author, February 4, 2016. Also recounted in an account by David Astor from his interview with Cyril Dunn, May 10, 1975, Box 25, GMS Papers.
the Naga cause would distract him from his advocacy work for African anticolonial nationalist movements. So Challe wrote to Laura Thompson, an American anthropologist based in Brooklyn, who had conducted fieldwork in Melanesia and Micronesia and taught Challe’s wife, Tefta Zogra Iralu, at the University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill. As a result, Thompson then also wrote to Scott, attempting to persuade him to take a closer look at Phizo and the Naga question. Scott remained ambivalent. On the one hand, the Indian delegation at the United Nations had supported his Southern African causes; Scott knew that supporting the Naga cause could upset his important working friendships with Indian prime minister Nehru and with Vijayalakshmi Pandit, Nehru’s sister, who had been the Indian ambassador to the United Nations and was high commissioner to London in 1960. But on the other, he felt that there might be something significant to the Naga claim.

During that spring of 1960, Scott’s colleague E. J. B. (Jim) Rose of the Institute of Race Relations, a British think-tank concerned with the security questions generated by decolonization, was holidaying in Switzerland with his family. At Scott’s urging, Rose visited Phizo in Zürich that May and found him “an odd, troublesome little man” but deserving of attention. As a result of Rose’s recommendation, Scott went down to Zürich in June and brought Phizo to London, bamboozling his way through passport control with his priest’s collar, his over six feet of height, and his name-dropping of the eminent people who were board members of the Africa Bureau, Scott’s nongovernmental advocacy organization for African anticolonial nationalist claims.

Under the label “former imperial citizen,” Phizo was provisionally admitted into the UK. Scott’s patron, David Astor – son of the American heiress and British politician Nancy Astor, as well as the editor and owner of the Observer newspaper – brought in a collection of former colonial officials and anthropologists to confirm Phizo’s identity; he also dispatched a reporter to Nagaland to investigate Phizo’s allegations of Indian atrocities. Scott gave Phizo an office at the Africa Bureau, in Denison House, Pimlico, in which Phizo quickly got to work writing a

15 Challe Iralu letter to Laura Thompson, June 20, 1959, Box 41, Laura Thompson Papers, National Anthropological Archives, the Smithsonian Institution, Washington, DC.
16 Michael Scott, Personal Account, Box 5, GMS Papers.
booklet on the history and politics of Naga nationalism in order to promote his cause to a Western public.  

Phizo’s arrival in London was well timed. The year 1960 was a moment of tremendous optimism in the potential of national liberation. Scott and Astor saw the need for a nongovernmental work-around to the United Nations in order to address nationalist claims within new postcolonial states. They believed that the crucial challenge for new postcolonial nation-states would be how they handled their minority populations; with the “multiplication of sovereignties,” Scott thought, “what redress would minorities have against injustice?” Scott and Astor argued that the Naga question in India’s Northeast could be “a test case for the new countries” in decolonizing Africa.

In response to this perceived need, Astor set up the International Committee for the Study of Group Rights – eventually renamed the Minority Rights Group and funded by the Ford Foundation with some support from the US Congress for Cultural Freedom, an anticommunist advocacy organization that the US Central Intelligence Agency founded and financed. It is crucial to note that the aims of the Minority Rights Group differed from those of the “minority” for whom they advocated: Phizo and other Naga nationalists claimed independence, not minority rights protections. The Minority Rights Group drew up “memoranda and interviewed United Nations people,” but its work was not considered “anybody’s business in the realm of high politics.” Whose business, then, were national claims within new postcolonial nation-states? The question remained unanswered. The business of minority rights and the business of the Minority Rights Group were no one’s priority.

The vacuum of international interest in, and ability to handle, minority rights questions was double-edged – both opportunities and challenges existed in addressing an issue that was “no one’s business.” This attention void gave the Minority Rights Group room and purpose to exist. In addition, the group’s claim to apolitical, unbiased reporting allowed it to address contentious questions. Yet, this power and attention vacuum meant that the question of minority rights within the UN order remained off official agendas; so, while Scott, Astor, and their colleagues had


21 Minority Rights Group Minutes, July 21, 1965, Box 44, GMS Papers.

incredible scope and influence regarding minority rights questions, the role of the Minority Rights Group underscored the weakness of the Nagas’ own claim. The weakness of a nationalist movement and the strength of its advocates were intertwined.

NATIONALIST CLAIMANTS’ PATH TO INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

The primary function of a gatekeeper was to vouch for the legitimacy of a claimant from a place and people little known to the Western Anglophone world, so that the claimant could potentially enter more influential spheres of international politics. Since nationalist claimants could not, on their own, access the United Nations, their best chance to enter the world stage was through networks of advocates—people already accepted internationally for their moral, political, or scholarly prestige in the related region or cause, who could act as gatekeepers to international forums through their personal, political, and at times financial connections. When Phizo arrived in Britain, after Reverend Scott had slipped him past immigration, he needed to establish his identity; for this purpose, David Astor asked a collection of individuals who had known Phizo in the Naga Hills before the Second World War. Anthropologist Ursula Graham Bower Betts from the Isle of Mull, retired colonial official Charles Pawsey from Suffolk, and anthropologist/retired colonial official/Naga-skull collector J. H. Hutton from Powys, in Wales, congregated in London to sign affidavits certifying that Phizo was, indeed, Angami Zapu Phizo born in the Naga Hills in the former British India in 1903.

The presence of Phizo and, later on, other Nagas, in London led to a reunion of sorts for Western experts on Northeast India, some of whom did not approve of Phizo or did not get along with each other, or both. Charles Pawsey and George Supplee, the American Baptist missionary who had worked in the Naga Hills, exchanged letters on Phizo. Supplee expressed concern about the perceived political implications of Phizo’s “Che Guevara mustache,” which he believed might brand him a communist. J. H. Hutton reported to Verrier Elwin, a British anthropologist who took Indian citizenship after 1947 and became Nehru’s advisor on tribal peoples, that Phizo was “a thoroughly bad hat who is

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23 With a few important exceptions that were granted observer status, such as the Palestinian Liberation Organization and the African National Congress.

24 George Supplee–Charles Pawsey correspondence, Box 1, Charles Pawsey Papers, Centre of South Asian Studies, University of Cambridge, UK.
exploiting his people for his own benefit.” Hutton blamed Phizo for killing his rivals in Nagaland and felt that the real reason he had come to London was to escape reprisals at home. Amidst the reminiscence of friends and enemies, all were cognizant of the international – possibly even Cold War – ramifications that Naga nationalism might cause. Elwin copied Hutton’s letter and sent it to the Indian governor of Nagaland, Vishnu Sahay. The letter was leaked to the Indian press, which presented its mention of the Cold War as proof that the Nagas were in collusion with the Chinese.

Elwin himself disliked many of his fellow anthropologists. He thought that Western anthropologists were conspiring with the tribal peoples they studied to keep them from integrating into the Indian Union:

[Ursula Betts and her husband, Tim] were thoroughgoing imperialists and their love of NEFA was closely bound up with their antagonism to non-tribal Indians and especially to the Assamese. Both [Christoph von] Fürer-Haimendorf [anthropologist at the School of Oriental and Asian Studies in London who worked on Nagas] and the Betts were among those most anxious to separate NEFA from the Assamese and indeed if they had their way the POs [political officers] and APOs [assistant political officers] would not only not be Assamese: they would be British!

While Elwin was not quite fair to his colleagues, he had touched on an important feature of some Westerners’ sympathy for the Naga cause: colonial nostalgia. For a “small people” like the Nagas in a “forgotten” corner of the world, the porousness of imperial boundaries and categories had allowed them more freedom than did the postcolonial Indian state. In addition, imperial notions of “the white man’s burden” undergirded the qualified support that some interested Westerners, such as Ursula and Tim Betts, gave to Naga nationalists. In contrast, for critics of empire, such as Astor and Scott, notions of the white man’s burden intensified with decolonization. Their support for anticolonial nationalism in India, Africa, and elsewhere made them feel responsible for peoples who did not feel liberated by the end of colonialism.

The act of vouching for Phizo’s and other Naga nationalists’ identities and claims gave a group of former colonial officials, anthropologists, and

26 Assam Tribune, December 20, 1962, Assam Tribune Office Collections, Guwahati, Assam.
27 Verrier Elwin, personal notes to “AG,” concerning an undated, untitled Assam Tribune article, Subject File 16, Elwin Papers, NNML.
missionaries an opportunity to rehash old alliances and gripes from the time when the Naga Hills were British. The “new” politics of national liberation overlaid older imperial relationships. These older relationships were predicated on notions of protection – of a dependent people who were obliged to rely on Western advocates as gatekeepers to international politics. Paternalist ideas of the white man’s burden may have undergirded significant elements of Western support for the Naga nationalists, as they have for many global humanitarian endeavors. Yet to discount that advocacy because of this critique accepts the Indian statist frame that has worked to undermine the legitimacy of Naga nationalist claims-making. This advocacy was a necessary first step for potential Naga recognition. Having known authorities personally vouch for Phizo – for his identity only, as Pawsey and Hutton did, or for the need to investigate his claims, as Bower Betts, Astor, and Scott did – was crucially important for Naga nationalists. It allowed them to garner global attention for their allegations against India.

In Phizo’s travelogue, many advocates stood at metaphorical and literal gates – Challe Iralu, Laura Thompson, Michael Scott, Jim Rose, David Astor – facilitating his passage. Most of them then dropped out of the story; they had served their purpose and had passed Phizo’s nationalist claim on to the next advocate.

Michael Scott was one of the advocates who did not drop away. He was drawn to seemingly hopeless causes. While he knew that taking up the Naga question could test his relationship with Indian friends and politicians to the breaking point, he could not turn Phizo down. Phizo was the incarnation of Scott’s life project: to speak for those for whom no one else wanted to speak. Certain advocates perceived Phizo as unlikable and rude to the Africa Bureau office staff. Scott’s Indian friends considered Phizo a violent criminal. All Phizo had were detailed, typed-out-

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29 Anne Yates and Lewis Chester, *The Troublemaker* (London: Aurum Press, 2004), a biography of Michael Scott. Scott’s rich collection of papers, now housed at the Weston Library, University of Oxford, include Anne Yates’s notes as well as those of his previous biographer, the former *Observer* journalist Cyril Dunn, who never finished his Scott biography.

30 Bowers Betts letter to Lorna Richmond, January 26, 1963, Box 63, GMS Papers; Bowers Betts letter to George Patterson, January 2, 1963, Box 28, GMS Papers.
in-English allegations of atrocities, with no formal avenue of redress. The difficulty of Phizo’s claim – the small size of the Naga population, the tiny amount of up-to-date information on Nagaland available to outsiders, and the problem of upsetting India – made championing Phizo irresistible for Scott.

Scott had begun his advocacy work in South Africa in 1946. Following the Second World War, he was posted to a congregation in the shantytown of Tobruk, outside of Johannesburg. His protests against racist land-tenure legislation in South Africa caught the attention of Mrs. Pandit, head of the Indian delegation to the UN. Scott first got to the UN in 1946, when Maharaj Singh, the governor of Bombay, took him on as a member of the Indian mission to Lake Success and helped him get a visa to the US.31 At the UN General Assembly, Scott testified in support of Mrs. Pandit’s case against South Africa’s 1946 Asiatic Land Tenure and Representation Act. The Herero people of South West Africa took notice. When Britain would not let Tshekedi Khama of Bechuanaland travel to New York with the petitions of the Herero of South West Africa (there were also Herero in Bechuanaland), those South West African Hereros sent their petitions through Scott. He then testified at the UN on their behalf under the auspices of the Indian UN delegation – something he continued to do for decades.

Scott spoke as the personal representative of Chief Hosea Kutako of the Herero people in South West Africa/Namibia. He asked for international protection and recognition of South West Africa as a mandate to be held in sacred trust by the international community, not as a de facto fifth province of South Africa. He compared the lack of economic development of the South West African mandate held by South Africa unfavorably (and incorrectly) with that of the British Southern African protectorates, where “Africans are grateful that their land is protected for them.”32 His advocacy in the late 1940s and 1950s focused on the

31 Michael Scott, interview with Cyril Dunn, October 1964, Box 77, GMS Papers. Due to US president Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s support for Indian decolonization, India was a member of the United Nations (which was founded in 1945 as a wartime alliance) before the country became independent in 1947.
grievances of the Herero people in South West Africa and their need for international protection, rather than on independence for the territory of South West Africa. This echoed the rhetoric of nineteenth-century missionaries in Southern Africa, who viewed European empire as a source of moral and technological progress while considering settler colonialism a wicked, inequitable system.\(^{33}\)

This type of advocacy was politically practical in the 1950s and more aligned with the interests of the board members of Scott’s advocacy organization, the African Bureau, including captains of industry Ronald Prain of the Rhodesian Selection Trust (mining) and Jock Campbell of Booker Brothers, McConnell, and Co. (sugar), who funded the Africa Bureau.\(^{34}\) However, it also highlighted the paternalist mode of Scott’s advocacy, which often saw white settler governments, not continued empire, as the primary enemy of African liberation. Unsurprisingly, Scott had contentious relationships with younger nationalists, who began to make it out of South West Africa in the mid-1950s and eventually supplanted him at the UN. Scott served as a gatekeeper for Namibian claims-making, the older form of claims-making that asked for international protection rather than the newer form that called for national independence.

From 1947 to the early 1960s, Scott testified nearly annually in New York City before the UN Committee on South West Africa. For the first decade he served as the sole spokesperson for the people of South West Africa. In the mid-1950s, he was joined by Mburumba Kerina (Eric Getzen), who, in 1952, snuck aboard a fishing boat in Walvis Bay to be able to reach and attend Lincoln University, a historically Black college in Pennsylvania.\(^{35}\) While an undergraduate at Lincoln, Kerina contacted Scott about joining the latter at the United Nations. Scott was ambivalent because Kerina had no invitation from the Herero Chiefs Council, but he agreed. (Later on, other South West Africans/Namibians joined Kerina and Scott in New York, representing different nationalist organizations


\(^{34}\) Prain and Campbell were important patrons and funders of the Africa Bureau. Correspondence about Scott’s interestingly charged friendship with Prain and Campbell can be found in Boxes 44, 63, GMS Papers. Robert Skinner, *The Foundations of Anti-Apartheid: Liberal Humanitarians and Transnational Activists in Britain and the United States, 1919–1964* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 118–55, details some of the Africa Bureau’s role in anti-apartheid advocacy.

and tribal/ethnic/religious groups.) Kerina and Scott had a contentious, asymmetrical relationship. Kerina called himself Scott’s “little brown boy,” while Scott complained to Chief Hosea Kutako about Kerina’s politicking, fearing that too many disagreeing South West African voices undermined their cause and that Kerina was representing himself rather than the South West African people.

Scott was correct in elements of his assessment: Angela Brooks of the Liberian UN delegation hosted an informal summit where she tried to smooth over the differences among South West African UN petitioners (in order to facilitate her own country’s advocacy on their behalf). In addition, South Africa did its best to exacerbate and publicize internal South West African divisions. Yet Scott also held a divergent position from that of Kerina, speaking for the Herero Chiefs Council, asking the international community for protection from South African misrule; while Kerina and other Namibian UN petitioners sought national independence. By 1960, Scott’s efficacy as a gatekeeper for Namibian nationalist claims-making was on the wane. Namibians could speak for themselves, even if not with one voice.

**REPORTING OR ADVOCACY?**

After Phizo reached London in June 1960, he started writing a report on Naga nationalism and alleged Indian human rights abuses. Two years later, George Patterson, a reporter for the Observer, presented Phizo’s report on the “Naga problem” at a public meeting where Hutton and other advocates vouched for the identities of four more Naga nationalists (Kaito Sukhai, Mowu Gwizan, Khodao Yanthan, and Yongkongangshi Longchar) who came to London to meet with Phizo. Patterson, a former missionary to Tibet, had provided information to Indian, US, and British intelligence about the Chinese invasion of Tibet (1950) and the organizing around the Dalai Lama’s flight to India (1959), while based in Darjeeling and working for David Astor’s Observer newspaper. In 1962, he had

37 Hosea Kutako letter to Michael Scott, October 6, 1955, Box 74, GMS Papers.
38 Meeting between Brooks and Kerina, described in F. Taylor Ostrander (of AMAX Mining) letter to an unnamed recipient, May 31, 1961, Box 93, GMS Papers. The Liberian delegation to the UN often hosted Kerina, giving him entrée to speak.
39 Kozonguizi tapes 1, TPA 48.4, Tony Emmett Interviews/Papers, Basler Afrika Bibliographien, Basel, Switzerland.
recently returned from a visit to Nagaland and Pakistan, where he had researched news stories and conducted negotiations with Mrs. Pandit and Pakistani officials in Karachi on behalf of Phizo.

David Astor personally paid Patterson’s expenses as “adviser to Phizo and as a general propagandist” and also provided the funding for the four other Naga nationalists to travel from Pakistan to London. Eventually, Astor grew ambivalent about directly supporting Naga nationalists. He decided to give the cash he had assigned to the Naga cause to the nongovernmental advocacy organization he had cofounded (the Minority Rights Group) and to pay money to Phizo “as from that body.” At Astor’s urging, the Minority Rights Group employed George Patterson “as its salaried director or general secretary.”

Astor’s financial support of Phizo, his Observer’s investigative reporting on the Naga question, and his creation of the Minority Rights Group formed a tangled financial knot. The personal nature of advocacy politics meant that finances, the infrastructure of a nongovernmental organization, and newspaper publicity could all originate from the same well-placed individual. It could be easy for the multiple facets of Astor’s advocacy on the Naga question to appear – and be written off – as a rich man’s side project. Astor himself was aware of this when he created the Minority Rights Group to address multiple “group-rights” concerns, bundling the Naga question with that of Kurds, Basques, and Aboriginal peoples in Australia (among others). The concept of “group rights” also neatly sidestepped questions that specific labeling – such as “nationalist,” “minority,” or “separatist” – inevitably raised. Creating a group rights organization to handle the Naga question (“question” being another term that sidestepped a specific political stance on an issue) also attempted to distance Astor’s advocacy from the courageous and innovative investigative reporting that the Observer did in Nagaland (Figure 2.1).

Independent news reporting from Nagaland was no easy feat. After violence broke out in the region in the early 1950s, the Indian government unofficially banned the international media from the region. An exception was made for a carefully chaperoned group of journalists in 1960, which included Henry Bradsher, Rawley Knox, and Neville Maxwell, who were taken about to cultural dance performances. They found the Indian

41 David Astor letter to Michael Scott, June 29, 1962, Box 5, GMS Papers.
42 Astor letter to Scott, June 29, 1962.
43 Astor letter to Scott, June 29, 1962.
44 Minority Rights Group meeting minutes, July 21, 1965, Box 44, GMS Papers.
45 Neville Maxwell and Henry Bradsher, email exchanges with author, February 2016.
government’s “performance” of peaceful cultural harmony difficult to watch, and drafted a satiric poem in response:

Dances and mudu, mudu and dances,
That’s how investigation advances.
Mudu and dances, dances and mudu.
Do not be obstreperous,
Do as you should do.
Mudu and dances, dances and mudu.46

Alternate lines were swapped into the poem – “Do not be fissiparous, do as you should do” – alluding to Nehru’s label for separatist movements within India. Then, at the end of a performance, the dancers gave Bradsher an amulet that, on close examination, contained carefully folded

46 Henry Bradsher, personal account, shared with author via email of February 7, 2016. Mudu is the home-brewed rice beer popular in the Naga Hills and elsewhere in Northeast India.
up lists of allegations of atrocities committed by the Indian Army in the Naga Hills, typed in English.47

A classic tale of weapons-of-the-weak-style subversion, this anecdote illustrates how Naga nationalists could use their status as a premodern tribal people to appear harmlessly apolitical to Indian authorities. At the same time, Nagas disrupted this stereotype with their reams of typed, English-language documents protesting against India and asserting their national sovereignty.48 They also consciously presented themselves as modern and therefore respectable to international and Indian audiences. Elwin complained that the Nagas in London were “dressed up like members of the YMCA,” and Indian commentators groused that the Naga nationalists wore the clothes of “life insurance salesmen.”49 Naga nationalists made a point of displaying themselves as modern, English-speaking, Western-oriented, and, most importantly, Christian, in contrast to the rest of India.

Nationalists of all sorts made important sartorial and linguistic choices in demonstrating their claims in person, on paper, and in their environment – from Yasser Arafat (Palestine)’s wearing Fidel Castro (Cuba)’s military fatigues and aligning his cause visually with left-wing revolution, to new nationalist elites’ renaming cities, streets, countries, and even their own selves. Usually, this nationalist branding occurred in reaction to Western-ruled imperial pasts or current opponents. In regard to Nagas, however, India had a vested interest in portraying them as an exotic, premodern tribal people; what Ursula Graham Bower Betts called the “spear-and-feathers contingent.”50 In opposition, Naga nationalists emphasized their Western-ness – a contrast that deliberately set them outside of India’s own international political self-presentation of sari-clad Mrs. Pandit speaking in the United Nations on behalf of disenfranchised South Asians and Africans in South Africa.

While Naga nationalists looked toward the Western Anglophone world, foreigners (who required an Indian visa) were not officially allowed to enter Nagaland. David Astor first disregarded India’s embargo

47 Henry Bradsher, personal account.
48 A massive number of similar and copied Naga nationalist documents listing atrocities allegedly committed by the Indian Army can be found in collections ranging from Naga villages (I visited personal and church collections in Kohima, Zubza, Mezoma, and Toulezuma) to the Bodleian library in Oxford, UK.
50 Ursula Graham Bower Betts letter to David Astor, July 15, 1966, Box 35, GMS Papers.
when another of his Observer reporters, Gavin Young, snuck into Nagaland through Burma in 1961. Young, an Oxford graduate – like Elwin, Hutton, and Astor himself (and most of the Observer staff) – was a charismatic, alcoholic foreign-news correspondent who always traveled with a Joseph Conrad novel.\(^5\) He served in Palestine in the late 1940s, then picked up Iraqi Arabic and roamed the Middle East as a freelance correspondent until the Suez Crisis. In 1960–1961, he was reporting on the Algerian war and Katanga’s secession from newly independent Congo-Leopoldville when, at Astor’s urging, he flew to Burma and met up (inside the Rangoon zoo) with Phizo’s Naga contacts.\(^5\) Young and his escorts then took a boat up the Chindwin River to Upper Burma and walked into Nagaland pretending that Young was a Baptist missionary.

Those, like Young, who reported on the end of empires while they usually supported national liberation, were engaged in a postimperial project in spite of themselves: they connected far-flung postcolonial war zones back to their former metropoles and their careers mirrored those of imperial civil servants from earlier decades. In some ways, Young was a postcolonial version of an imperial-era adventurer who brought tales from distant corners of the world to Western elite publics. He compared the Naga struggle to that of Algeria, particularly the nationalists’ intense concern for how they “played” to an international audience.\(^5\) Young praised the “disciplined Naga” who scanned the daily news from the BBC, Voice of America, All-India Radio, Moscow, Beijing and Pakistan and distributed it in digest form to the members of their movement.\(^5\)

A few months after he published his Naga articles, Young was an eyewitness to violence between UN peacekeepers and Katanga’s “refractory mercenaries” in Congo; several years later, he watched Buddhist protests and self-immolations in Vietnam.\(^5\) Besides telling fascinating stories, Young’s life and work linked Nagaland to the world’s other political-conflict hotspots – Algeria, Katanga, and eventually Vietnam – on which Young also reported with analytical verve and in dangerous

\(^{5}\) Robert Chesshyre, interview with author, August 10, 2016.

\(^{5}\) Steyn, Zapuphizo, 119.


circumstances. For Young, his journey to Nagaland was not a one-off job. It formed part of a pattern of international political bushfire-jumping during the wars of decolonization in the mid-twentieth century.

Young wrote three investigative articles on Nagaland as part of a series titled “The Commonwealth’s Unknown War.” He broke the story of the extensive, ongoing guerilla war in the region and interviewed a captured Indian pilot, Captain Misra, whose sister was married to a Bollywood actor.56 (The Bollywood connection and Misra’s capture by Naga nationalist insurgents may have led to this being the first time that political unrest in Nagaland made the mainstream Indian news.) Young also took a number of striking photographs of armed Naga nationalists and Misra’s downed Dakota plane, images that were repeatedly used in reporting on the Naga cause.

Young’s investigative journalism represented the success of Astor’s conflation of reporting and advocacy for Naga nationalist claims-making. Astor knew its power. He attempted to negotiate with the Indian High Commission in London, then headed by Mrs. Pandit, on the timing of the publication of Young’s articles, to try to persuade the Indian government to consider the idea of an independent fact-finding mission into Phizo’s allegations. Astor’s proposed mission would be led by Conor Cruise O’Brien, an Irish diplomat and writer (sometimes for the Observer) who had recently finished a controversial assignment as United Nations special ambassador to the secessionist province of Katanga in Congo.57 Astor, O’Brien, and Mrs. Pandit were all old friends. Astor viewed his offer to delay publication on Young’s stories as a gesture of his good faith in his Indian friends.58 Mrs. Pandit considered it quasi-blackmail by a Western meddler in a sovereign Indian affair that was none of his business.59

FISSURES AND FRACTURES

The disagreement between Scott, Astor, and Mrs. Pandit illustrated a central disconnect between Western advocates and their Indian partners on questions of political justice. Nehru and Mrs. Pandit were Indian leaders with constituents and direct political responsibilities, who viewed

56 Young, “The Commonwealth’s Unknown War,” parts 1, 2, 3, Observer, May 1, May 7, May 14, 1961.
57 “Record of Meeting Held at Baptist Church House, Holborn, on 24 May,” prepared by Lorna Richmond, May 31, 1961, Box 5, GMS Papers.
58 David Astor letter to Mrs. Pandit, July 1, 1960, Box 5, GMS Papers.
59 Mrs. Pandit letter to David Astor, June 27, 1960, Box 5, GMS Papers.
the Naga question as an Indian concern, not an international question. Indians and Westerners could work together on African decolonization matters but most definitely not on issues that exposed the limits of India’s own decolonization. Indian politicians considered those issues part of India’s own nation-building project. Astor and Scott were interested in how a Nagaland could be a test case for addressing the pressing questions concerning minority peoples within new postcolonial nations. Their position on the Naga question obviously differed from that of the Indian government, but it also contrasted with that of Phizo.

Phizo wanted independence for the Nagas. He sought an international investigation or intervention as a means to achieve that end. He argued that Nagaland was not part of India and should never have been part of the territorial consignment of British India to the independent governments of India and Pakistan in 1947. For Phizo, as for other nationalist leaders, sovereignty was a form of “written, legal magic” that embodied the authority of a people to claim to be a nation that deserved a state. He used the language of sovereignty as an incantation to span the gap between his exile in London and his nationalist ambitions.

Astor and Scott advocated for an unbiased international investigation of Phizo’s claims, not for an independent Naga nation-state. It is not completely clear whether Phizo himself caught the difference between what he and what his backers wanted for Nagaland. However, his seeming recalcitrance and perceived ingratitude for the hospitality he had received from Astor and the Africa Bureau make sense if he knew that his advocates were using him and his cause for their own ends. From this perspective, he was willing to go along with the inconsistency in goals as the price of their support, but he did not need to be grateful. Phizo cared about Naga sovereignty. Astor and Scott cared about the general issue of minority rights and the particular subject of Naga humanity, specifically, Phizo’s allegations of India’s human rights abuses.

India was also most concerned with sovereignty – Indian sovereignty. Mrs. Pandit found it “rather odd that a group of people should form themselves into a committee and sit in judgment between the Government of a country and a man who has committed acts of violence” – that is, was

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60 David Astor letter to J. P. Narayan, August 6, 1960, Box 5, GMS Papers.
61 Phizo statement, Naga National Council Press Release (undated, probably 1965), Box 17, GMS Papers.
62 Dunn comment, from his interview with Scott, October 1964, Box 77, GMS Papers.
a criminal – “in that country.” As she wrote to Astor, she believed that Phizo was leading him and Scott down a rabbit hole: “I feel like Alice in Wonderland and the strange tale of Mr. Phizo gets curiouser and curiouser as also does your part in it.”

Jayaprakash Narayan (JP), the Indian peace activist and civil society leader who was a friend and close colleague of Astor and Scott, also participated in the disagreement between Western advocates and Indian politicians over the Naga question. JP tried to persuade Scott and Astor of the perspective of those in India, where, with justification, “public opinion is most unsympathetic to Phizo, who is looked upon as the person chiefly responsible for the violence in Nagaland.” While as integral a figure as Astor and Scott in the same network of transnational advocacy that supported anticolonial nationalism, JP operated across significantly more constrained political terrain. He had much more domestic political clout – and therefore public responsibility – in his home country of India than Astor or Scott did in the UK. That influence meant that he had to be careful and considerate of the possible ramifications of his political statements in a manner that his Western civil society colleagues did not. These operational constraints illustrated the asymmetrical relations between advocates from postcolonial versus postimperial states. Scott and Astor had a freedom to speak in public and in private on polarizing issues about which their Indian colleagues had to be much more reserved. Further, for India and Indians, as JP pointed out, there were national security dimensions to the Naga question. “In view of Chinese troublemaking all along our northern borders, India is most sensitive to any separatist moves.”

Krishna Menon (Indian minister of defense, who had previously been Indian high commissioner to the UK) also highlighted how the Naga question was a threat to Indian territorial integrity and the idea of India as a whole. If the Nagas were granted independence, “other minority

63 Mrs. Pandit letter to Astor, June 27, 1960, Box 5, GMS Papers.
64 Mrs. Pandit letter to Astor, June 27, 1960 (emphasis added).
65 J. P. Narayan letter to David Astor, September 11, 1960, Box 5, GMS Papers.
66 This asymmetry of expression is mirrored in Scott’s and JP’s personal papers. Both collections (at the Weston Library, Oxford, UK, and the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi, India, respectively) are extensive, but Scott’s are much more candid and comprehensive regarding Naga claims-making and, therefore, the author draws upon them more heavily in reconstructing internal disagreements – a dynamic that mirrors the relationship between Indian and Western advocates in States-in-Waiting.
67 J. P. Narayan letter to David Astor, September 11, 1960, Box 5, GMS Papers.
peoples within the Union would then also demand it. The Indian union would be nibbled away.”68 Menon, borrowing from the early-twentieth-century anthropology that categorized the Nagas as “a collection of tribes” rather than a nation, said that they were not “a people like the Karens in Burma”; the Nagas were not “asking for national independence but for tribal independence.”69 Thus, for most Indian politicians, Nagas were both a domestic matter and an international threat. They saw the Nagas as a tribal people, not a nation. Nagas represented one of many separatist challenges within India that had the potential to undermine Indian national security from within by inspiring the Tamils, Sikhs, and others; and from without by opening the border to the Chinese.

Astor and Scott had become friends with Mrs. Pandit, Menon, and JP because of their shared support for Indian independence and for the rights of Indians in Southern Africa in the 1940s and 1950s.70 Scott and JP continued to be close collaborators in advocacy work for anticolonial nationalist movements into the 1960s. Behind the barbed annoyance of Mrs. Pandit, Menon, and JP toward Scott and Astor, however, was “colonial hangover”: a reaction to Brits interfering once again where they were not wanted, even if Astor et al. had been important metropolitan backers for Indian independence. International advocacy for a minority people within India upset notions of the success of India’s own national liberation. It created an avenue for meddlers from the former colonial power into the affairs of the postcolonial state. It was the backdoor for third-party intervention – a door that Indian politicians sought to keep firmly shut. Astor and Scott, on the other hand, saw their Naga advocacy as evidence that they were equal-opportunity critics of injustice. Their activism against the French in Algeria or against South Africa in South West Africa was not about personal animus against France or South Africa: rather, it was a principled stand against injustice everywhere, even in a country that was governed by their friends.71

68 David Astor, memo of conversation with Krishna Menon, June 28, 1960, Box 5, GMS Papers.
69 Astor, memo of conversation with Menon, June 28, 1960.
71 Astor letter to Narayan, August 6, 1960.
The moral question of pacifism hid in the background of the disagreements between Western advocates and Indian (state and non-state) leaders. JP and Mrs. Pandit condemned Phizo because he used violence and had led an insurgency that remained ongoing; JP argued that Phizo’s violence invalidated his cause.\(^{72}\) In contrast, Indians had achieved their national liberation through nonviolent means, at least in the popular imagination. Phizo also applied the Gandhian legacy to his own cause: “Nagaland is a country of Mahatma Gandhi’s dream” because “every village is a small republic and has its own councils and assemblies.”\(^{73}\) Reverend Scott himself was not a pacifist, though he espoused nonviolent protest and was a member of War Resisters’ International, the largest organization of the international peace movement. He felt that there were some causes whose innate justice and lack of alternative recourse made violence justifiable.

Neither Phizo nor Scott nor JP was directly religiously motivated in their political pursuits, but they were all strongly religiously oriented. Their faith – Baptist, Anglican, Hindu, respectively – interacted with their pursuits; even the agnostic Astor called Scott his “guru in the religion of doubt.”\(^{74}\) Their faith also placed them on the First World’s side of the Cold War against “godless” communism. Scott’s theology was that of practice rather than preaching. While he and his colleagues grounded their politics in morality, and suffered physical and financial repercussions from grueling travel and espousing unpopular causes, they were not ideologues – nor would many in their circles consider themselves leftists.\(^{75}\) Overarching concern with social justice had led Scott to join the Communist Party before the Second World War, but the rise of Stalin made him leave by war’s end. According to retired British civil servant Richard Kershaw, the Africa Bureau itself was funded by “mandarins, ex-intelligence, millionaires,” who “mistrusted the movement for colonial freedom.”\(^{76}\) Kershaw felt that “[t]hese Establishment figures wanted to

\(^{72}\) Narayan letter to Astor, September 11, 1960.


\(^{74}\) David Astor, interview by Cyril Dunn, c. 1975, Box 25, GMS Papers.

\(^{75}\) Winifred Armstrong, interview by author, June 13, 2017.

\(^{76}\) Richard Kershaw, interview by Anne Yates (undated), about the creation of Scott’s Africa Bureau. Kershaw had been at the Commonwealth Relations Office and resigned due to the “winds of change” policy shifts of the early 1960s, with which he disagreed. Box 103, GMS Papers.
remedy injustice but not advance communism . . . they wanted freedom, but not at all costs” and that these “rich, tough, old fashioned imperialists” backed Scott and his projects as an “action wedge” during decolonization – an element they could use to prop open a political door, maintaining access to sites of investment as governing authorities shifted from colonial to postcolonial.\(^{77}\)

Astor recommended Reverend Scott to US national security advisor McGeorge Bundy as the leading expert on African nationalist movements. When doing so, he was careful to emphasize that while Scott’s status as an Anglican priest, his complete “discretion,” and his unbiased political positioning allowed him to hold “the confidence of the African political leaders in all circumstances,” he was “by no means an uncritical supporter.”\(^{78}\) Scott’s “religion of practice” – he almost always wore his priest’s collar and lacked any concern for personal financial gain – made him a safe pair of hands for his backer’s interests, while his “religion of doubt” made him a welcome interlocutor for government officials accustomed to operating in political shades of gray.

In Reverend Scott’s formulation, the onus was on the international community, the UN institution, and the UN order to eradicate injustice before oppressed peoples had no choice but to resort to violence. He recognized the limitations of presenting himself as a savior or gatekeeper for oppressed peoples but continued to perform in that mode. In his own words,

\[\text{T}he \text{ human race needs to be saved from those who would save the human race from itself . . . [S]o long as man looks for a Savior, whether it be Christ or Buddha or Gandhi, and fails to look within himself, not relying upon Saviors, Saints, or Heroes to bring him Salvation, is there any hope that he can be saved?}\(^{79}\)

While advocating for nonviolence, he also used the prospect of violence as blackmail to get the international community to act. In the end, these contradictions, which were embodied in Scott’s political philosophy or “religion of doubt,” were incapacitating, not just for him but also for many others who took on the roles of advocates and gatekeepers for nationalist claims in international politics.

\(^{77}\) Kershaw interview by Yates (undated).
\(^{78}\) David Astor letter to McGeorge Bundy, September 21, 1962, Box 5, GMS Papers.
\(^{79}\) Michael Scott to David Astor, April 3, 1960 (capitalization in original), Box 5, GMS Papers.
The job of the gatekeeper was to open the gate for a nationalist claim to pass through and then drop away, not to make himself or herself the essential ingredient for the claim’s success.

John Davies, then the Anglican chaplain at the University of the Witwatersrand in Johannesburg and eventually the bishop of Shrewsbury (UK), pinpointed this tragic paradox of the advocate for anticolonial nationalism: “The enslavement of the ‘white liberal’ is his sense of indispensability: it is necessary, but difficult, to shake this off . . . if necessary by leaving.” Anticolonial nationalists were doomed until they got “far more real power, including the behind-the-scenes power which so often remains white while the more conspicuous power is taken by blacks.” Regarding the role of the advocate, he wrote, “One must speak, one must protest, one must do all that one can. Yet every time one does so, one is in effect supporting this conspiracy to keep blacks silent and powerless.”

Davies’s point – concerning the double-edged nature and eventual incapacity of advocacy – held across geographies of land, space, and power beyond the specific dynamics of apartheid South Africa.

Advocacy was a fragile business. The disagreement over the legitimacy of the Naga claim between Scott and Astor, on the one hand, and Mrs. Pandit and JP, on the other, showed in reverse how vital Indian support had been for Scott’s advocacy work in Southern Africa. In a similar manner to other international advocates (including Scott), JP also took on the role of gatekeeper for anticolonial nationalists in Southern and Eastern Africa in the early 1960s, appearing with Julius Nyerere (of Tanzania/Tanganyika), Kenneth Kaunda (of Zambia), and Jomo Kenyatta (of Kenya) at rallies and testifying on their behalf at the United Nations. In addition, he advocated for disenfranchised peoples within India, which was the frame in which he placed the Naga question. JP and his Indian colleagues found Scott and Astor’s support of Phizo dangerous because it was breaking apart an alliance between Western advocates and the Indian politicians who had supported their shared political justice projects.

CONCLUSION

India and Indians played an integral role in international advocacy on behalf of anticolonial nationalist liberation movements. Therefore, the

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80 All quotes in this paragraph are from John Davies, “A Note to Friends in SA and Elsewhere,” January 1971 (emphases in the original), Box 5, GMS Papers.
arrival in London of Phizo, a Naga nationalist, destabilized the network of concerned individuals who combined moral prestige with political connections to advocate for disenfranchised peoples within international politics. The bureaucracy of the United Nations institution may not have had room for minority peoples, but it had space for advocates such as Scott and JP to speak in favor of particular anticolonial nationalist claims – as long as they were brought into the room by state backers within the UN General Assembly. While advocates in international politics spoke in favor of anticolonial nationalists, their advocacy held imperial undertones – of paternalism, of elite responsibility, of speaking for those who were not allowed to speak for themselves – that could undermine the autonomy of the causes for which they served as conduits. Phizo came to London during the summer of 1960, a moment when new nations were becoming independent every week and the potential of a liberated postcolonial world seemed strongest. Yet a national claim from within a postcolonial state – especially India, the postcolonial state that served as the model for peaceful national liberation – dimmed the promise of national liberation even then.

The early 1960s was a transitional period when categories of “people,” “nation,” and “state” were fluid. Who was a minority and who a nation seemed to be subject to flexible interpretation. This perceived mutability created the space for well-placed individuals to navigate between nationalist claims and international politics without having the power or responsibility of actual national representation. During this period, most advocates of anticolonial nationalist liberation agreed upon the legitimacy of an independent Algeria from France as well as upon the illegitimacy of an independent Katanga from Congo-Leopoldville and of South African rule of South West Africa. They sought to spread that consensus to other questions, to nationalist claimants within independent states (such as Nagaland and Tibet) that did not enjoy the same supportive international consensus. Importantly, Astor and Scott believed that their “meddling” in Nagaland could be a possible model for advocacy interventions on behalf of minority claimants elsewhere around the globe. They and Phizo repeatedly compared the Naga question to anticolonial nationalist conflicts on the decolonizing African continent – particularly those in Algeria, Congo, and South West Africa. JP himself often made analogies between Tibet and these same African conflict zones. More

than direct comparisons, the repetition of injustices perpetuated in Algeria, Congo/Katanga, and South West Africa functioned as an invocation of legitimacy for particular nationalist claims.

Despite their differences of opinion regarding Naga nationalism, two months after Phizo arrived in London, JP reached out to Scott about the Naga question and recommended tabling it until they could talk in person at the “War Resisters International conference next Christmas.” JP was “very much looking forward to meeting” Scott again, who, he wrote, seemed to be “growing younger judging by [recent] photos!” JP and Scott had work to do together, to find nonviolent solutions to global decolonization, and their work was predicated upon mutual friendship and shared beliefs in the importance of peaceful national liberation and political justice. For JP, peoples who pursued their independence peacefully were more deserving of Scott’s attention than the Nagas: “Phizo and other Nagas like most ‘good Christians’ seem to believe in violence.” JP emphasized to Scott how important the latter’s personal Indian connections were for accomplishing his advocacy work; that the Nagas were waging armed insurgency; and that the range of global problems facing international advocates like themselves was broad.

On the agenda of the upcoming War Resisters International Conference was the formation of a World Peace Brigade, an international civil society organization that JP and Scott would lead. Their mission was to help decolonization escape its “entrapment in violence.” They had significant work to do; JP did not want that work derailed by what he perceived as the distraction of the Naga cause.

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82 All quotes in this paragraph are from: J. P Narayan letter to Michael Scott, August 10, 1960, Box 5, GMS Papers.
83 Narayan to Scott, August 10, 1960.
PART II

INTERNATIONAL ADVOCACY
In December 1960, the same month that the United Nations General Assembly declared national self-determination an international norm, Reverend Michael Scott and Jayaprakash Narayan (JP) met for a conference at Gandhigram Ashram in Madras State (now Tamil Nadu), India. Although Scott and JP did not agree on certain issues—such as the demands of Nagaland nationalist claimants within India—they both supported anticolonial nationalism across much of the decolonizing world and were committed proponents of non-violent political action. The Gandhigram Ashram conference was hosted by War Resister’s International, the flagship organization of the international peace movement, of which JP and Scott were key members.

The legacy of Mahatma Gandhi and Indian national liberation had brought the international peace movement to India: India as a model for peaceful national liberation, India with its political philosophy of “peaceful coexistence,” and India as a postcolonial state with its own violent divisions served as a source of inspiration, credibility, and contestation for global pacifists. Gandhigram was War Resisters’ International’s first conference in the decolonizing world—emphasizing that the international peace movement was turning its attention to the challenges of war and peace in those regions. The conference agenda focused on the Algerian war of independence from France; the Sub-Saharan African region of

\[1\] M. C. Chagla letter to Jawaharlal Nehru, July 7, 1960: “India represents the credo of nationalism and has given to the world the philosophy of peaceful co-existence.” Correspondence File 705, Jawaharlal Nehru Papers post-1947, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library (hereafter, “Nehru Papers”).
Katanga’s secession from newly independent Congo-Leopoldville; and the gathering confrontations facing the Indian government both on the Sino-Indian borders and over Goa, a Portuguese-held territory on India’s western coast. A year later, in 1961, India annexed Goa, ending European empire on the South Asian subcontinent. The following year, in 1962, India and China went to war over their contested Himalayan borderlands. Wars of decolonization loomed on the horizon for the global pacifist movement.

JP spoke at the Gandhigram conference, closing his address with a call for a new organization – the World Peace Brigade – to intervene in modes that the United Nations as a bureaucratic, state-centric institution could not. To carry out this scheme, he envisioned the brigade as an international civil society organization that would send peace activists to intervene nonviolently in confrontations between states, empires, and nationalist movements. He stated, “It would have been interesting to watch the action of an unarmed force in the Congo. The situation in that unfortunate land would have been quite different and the UN might have succeeded by now in its mission of peace.” JP pushed his audience to shift from pacifism as an abstention from violence, to nonviolent confrontation that actively sought to challenge the use of force. He asked his audience to consider violence in the decolonizing world as ground zero for the international peace movement and to see discrete violent flashpoints inside and outside India as part of a global pattern.

But just as freedom was never won free of struggle, the pursuit of peace could not be peaceful – a dichotomy captured in the term “peace brigade.” The effectiveness of Gandhian nonviolent mobilization, eventually called a peace army, or Shanti Sena, had relied on the threat of violence; ²

² The Indian Union territory of Puducherry had been bureaucratically united with India since 1954, but the international-legal handoff between France and India occurred in 1961. The colonial, postcolonial, and neocolonial dimensions of these entanglements are described in Jessica Namakkhal, Unsettling Utopia: The Making and Unmaking of French India (New York: Columbia University Press, 2021).


⁴ Gandhi allegedly coined the specific term Shanti Sena, or “peace army,” near the end of his life, as he was trying to rally a voluntary peacekeeping force to halt communal violence in Northern India; on the relationship between Gandhian nonviolence and the threat of violence, see Judith Brown, “Nonviolence on Trial,” in Gandhi: Prisoner of Hope (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1991), 314–95; Faisal Devji, The Impossible Indian: Gandhi and the Temptation of Violence (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012), 165.
Martin Luther King’s calls for nonviolent protest to end racial inequality in the United States worked in part because of the juxtaposition provided by Malcolm X’s insistence on achieving that goal “by any means necessary”; and the World Peace Brigade that JP called for sought to create a peace force in order to force peace. The concept of a nonviolent force had its roots in Gandhi’s early-twentieth-century activism in South Africa, also the point of origin for connections between Indian national liberation, anticolonial struggle in Southern Africa, and the tactic of using nonviolent civil disobedience to generate international attention. The seemingly nonviolent character of the mainstream Indian independence movement became a site of (and an ideal for) transnational advocacy.

THE WORLD PEACE BRIGADE

In January 1962, a year after the Gandhigram conference ended – a year that saw intense planning by the American Quaker Arlo Tatum, seconded from War Resisters’ International – the World Peace Brigade was officially launched. Modeled on Gandhi’s peace army and composed of people from various liberation, disarmament, human rights, and civil rights groups across the world, the Brigade was founded as an organization that would support anticolonial struggles through nonviolent means. Its planners chose a Quaker high school in sleepy, provincial Brummana, Lebanon, for the organization’s founding conference, because of its pro-pinquity to the Israel–Palestine dispute, and because Israelis could be permitted entry.


Conference attendees structured the Brigade to have three regional councils, or headquarters: in North America (New York), Europe (London, at the War Resisters’ International office), and Asia (Rajghat, Varanasi, India); symptomatic of some of the organization’s eventual challenges, there was no African regional council. Each regional council had a different religious slant: Hindu/Sarvodaya (Asia), Anglican (Europe), and American Friends/Quaker (North America). The Brigade’s central council included a chairperson from each region as well as individual Quakers, Sarvodaya workers, pacifists, and US civil rights and anti–nuclear weapons activists. The organization combined Americans, Britons, and Indians, some of whom worked on a host of sometimes religiously oriented pacifist causes, and some of whom had been involved in the Indian independence struggle either directly – as nationalist claimants – or as international advocates. JP Narayan, Reverend Michael Scott, and A. J. Muste (a US clergyman active in the peace, labor, and civil rights movements) formed the Brigade’s leadership; listed as advisors on the organization’s letterhead were Martin Luther King; Kenneth Kaunda, leader of the United National Independence Party (UNIP) of Northern Rhodesia and the first president of an independent Zambia; Julius Nyerere, prime minister of Tanganyika and later president of Tanzania, its successor state; and Eleanor Roosevelt.

The World Peace Brigade’s Asia office shared its leadership and mailing address with the Indian Sarvodaya movement. A concept that Gandhi developed, sarvodaya (“universal uplift” or “well-being of all”) celebrated manual labor, the voluntary equal distribution of wealth, and small-scale self-sufficient communities. After Indian independence (1947)
and Gandhi’s death (1948), the idea of sarvodaya transformed into the Sarvodaya movement, which aimed to rectify social, economic, and political injustices within India – an Indian civil rights movement that remained outside of government or electoral politics and espoused nonviolence and volunteerism as an operating method and a source of legitimacy. JP Narayan was one of its main leaders. The Brigade was conceived as an internationally scaled Sarvodaya movement, growing out of the transnational connections between activists in the United States, Britain, and elsewhere who had supported Gandhi. While many of the pre-1947 solidarities between the Indian nationalists who became the governing elite of independent India and their US and European colleagues had eroded by the 1950s and early 1960s, peace activists’ affinities with Indians outside government in the Sarvodaya movement remained.

The Brigade stressed the importance of the individual in service of “peace action.” As Albert Bigelow, an antinuclear activist wrote in his thoughts on the Brigade’s founding conference, “Men can be human, responsible, autonomous … [in places] precisely at the point of tension of war.” As individuals, Brigade members would provide “pilot examples” and bear “prophetic witness” to the unrest of decolonization. The Brigade would define, support, and train up the “right” kind of anticolonial nationalist leadership to shift nationalism into the correct political form (democratic self-rule, with no nationalization of industry or expulsion of settler-colonial or diaspora communities)


9 The other being Vinobha Bhave, the Indian social reformer.


13 Bigelow, “Some Reflections.”
through nonviolent methods. It vouched for the peaceful yet legitimately nationalist credentials of its chosen protégés in the international media and at the United Nations.

Members of the World Peace Brigade, and the overlapping circles of anticolonial nationalist and pacifist activism in which its participants were embedded, formed a transnational advocacy network. These networks, motivated by shared values, were loosely organized spheres of nongovernmental activism that crossed national borders. Anticolonialists have often operated transnationally, both before and after the Second World War. Such networks have allowed them access to spheres of influence that remained closed to them within their colonized country. Understandings of these anticolonial transnational networks generally focus on solidarities between colonized and formerly colonized or otherwise disenfranchised peoples; these are often termed “South–South” connections.

However, the Brigade and the wider community of activism in which it operated differed from many of these networks in two key ways: First, its membership predominantly came from a departing imperial colonizer (Britain), rising indirect empire (the United States), and new postcolonial state (India), not from active anticolonial nationalist movements. Second, while Indians, along with some African American civil rights activists,


played crucial roles in terms of leadership, membership, and inspiration, the Brigade and its network drew much of their finances as well as significant portions of their leadership and membership from white allies – to use ahistorical language. Advocates from the Brigade community derived their prestige and influence from the various movements to which they belonged, as well as their degree of proximity to spheres of political power that lay within (or were allied with) the United States during the Cold War.

In this way, the Brigade was a First World construction – built upon the geopolitical framework after the Second World War that divided the world into those who supported or were backed by the United States, those who supported or were backed by the Second World of the Soviet Union and its satellite states, and those in the postcolonial or decolonizing “Third World.” Alongside its First World orientation, the Brigade set out to find ways to address violence in the decolonizing Third World. The analytical disconnect between its First World alignment and its Third World mission undermined the Brigade’s neutral peace politics, which presented an alternative to the prospect of (what it perceived to be) uncontrolled, violent, and potentially communist-supported national liberation.

LEADERSHIP: MUSTE, NARAYAN, SCOTT

The structure of the World Peace Brigade prioritized the individual advocate – particularly the charismatic individual of moral stature – as the solution to international problems of war, violence, disenfranchisement, and dependency. When pondering Katanga’s secession from Congo-Leopoldville in Sub-Saharan Africa, JP’s wife and colleague, Asha Devi, queried what she herself could do if she were parachuted into the midst of the Congo Crisis. Devi proposed that a nationally unaffiliated person of Gandhian training and discipline, dropped into a conflict zone, might succeed in negotiating between opposing parties in a situation that stymied official diplomacy.

The Brigade was a collection of individuals who shared this belief. Its three chairmen (Figure 3.1) – A. J. Muste (1885–1967); J. P. Narayan

17 This framework was first described by Alfred Sauvy, “Trois mondes, une planète,” L’Observateur 14, no. 118 (August 14, 1952): 14. In the subsequent decades, the hierarchy imbedded in notions of a First, Second, and Third World have made them contested political terms. Here, they are used in their contemporary context, rather than the meanings the terms took on over time.

(1902–1979); and Michael Scott (1907–1983) – were founders, board members, and supporters of multiple activist organizations and possessed moral clout among their colleagues and followers. They stood at the center of the international peace movement, espoused nonviolent interventionism, and were activists for causes specific to the country in which they held citizenship. In addition, they had leadership roles in faith communities that were nationally oriented but had international followings.

Abraham Johannes Muste chaired the Brigade’s North American Regional Council. Muste was an ordained Protestant minister and had worked for organized labor in the United States throughout the 1930s. In 1940, he became a leader of US Christian pacifism, heading the Fellowship for Reconciliation and the Institute for the Rights of Man, among other Quaker-oriented organizations. He was active in the US civil rights movement and mentored the African American civil rights leader Bayard Rustin (also a Quaker) and pan-Africanist Bill Sutherland, who both joined the World Peace Brigade. Muste was a brilliant administrator and accomplished fundraiser, able to shift between roles as organizational figurehead and éminence grise. He skillfully moderated the internecine conflicts endemic to voluntary associations run on shoestring budgets, and he tapped US philanthropists to fund his

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enterprises. He died in 1967, a few months after his visit to and deportation from South Vietnam (and his meeting with North Vietnamese leaders in Hanoi) in protest of the United States’ war against that country.

Muste, along with George Houser (also a Protestant minister) of the American Committee on Africa, an anti-apartheid advocacy organization, was one of the few on the antiwar American left who could get along well both with elements of the US Democratic Party establishment – often donors to their organizations – and with the growing, more radical New Left. Such activists were quiet diplomats who did not mind ceding prime billing to let the claimants they supported take center stage. They belonged to a tradition of Protestant activism known and perceived as safe by more establishment types, and they were willing to suffer physical and financial discomfort in pursuit of their goals. For example, Houser and colleagues would travel across the United States by car, at times sleeping in it overnight, singing hymns during the day and road-tripping from donor meetings to college campus speeches.

In the late 1950s, Jayaprakash Narayan (JP), chair of the Brigade’s Asian Regional Council, had such a substantial international profile that many in the US Department of State assumed that he would be Nehru’s successor as Indian prime minister, a belief based more on JP’s prestige abroad than on political dynamics within India. JP was deeply invested in Indian domestic development, the Sarvodaya movement, and the Bhoodan movement for voluntary land reform. He lent his prestige to certain nationalists (particularly Tanganyika/Tanzania’s Julius Nyerere, Northern Rhodesia/Zambia’s Kenneth Kaunda, and Kenya’s Jomo Kenyatta) and attempted to tap into South Asian diaspora communities in Southern and Eastern Africa for logistical and popular support.

22 Jennifer Davis, eulogy, November 6, 2015, George Houser Memorial Service, Union Theological Seminary, New York City. Davis was executive director of the American Committee on Africa, 1981–2001.
23 General Records of the US Department of State, 1955–1959. Series 791.5/7-356 to 791.00/11-3056 contains innumerable allusions to JP as the most likely successor to Nehru as Indian prime minister. JP’s extensive collection of personal papers are at the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi.
25 Bill Sutherland to Michael Scott, January 26, 1963, on JP’s contacts in Nairobi, Box 2, WPB NARC Papers.
As the figurehead for the student-led “JP movement,” he emerged as an opponent of Indian prime minister Indira Gandhi when she suspended civil liberties and cancelled elections during the Indian Emergency (1975–1977).\(^6\) JP had a track record of ambiguous support for the political grievances of Kashmir, Tibet, and Nagaland.\(^7\) He expressed this ambiguity by deliberately avoiding giving direct answers to binary political questions; he had the gift – at times a curse – of straddling opposing positions. Sometimes this made him an ideally placed negotiator while, at other times, he was in danger of alienating his own side.

The chair of the Brigade’s European Regional Council, Michael Scott, an Anglican clergyman, first came to India in the 1930s as an undercover courier for the Communist Party, on the staff of the Bishop of Bombay. His overarching concern for political justice had bridged his theology and communist sympathies. After the Second World War he grew disillusioned with Stalinism and took a posting to Johannesburg, giving himself the first-hand experience he used when he testified on behalf of India at the UN’s Fourth Committee on Colonialism hearings on South Africa’s restrictive 1946 Asiatic Land Tenure and Representation Act, which limited where South Asians could own property in South Africa. By 1960, Scott was a veteran UN petitioner, speaking nearly annually on behalf of the rights of the Herero people of South West Africa at the UN Committee on South West Africa, sometimes with the logistical support of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), an African American civil rights organization.\(^8\)

Scott was deeply concerned with the fates of minority peoples within new postcolonial states and tacked some unofficial diplomacy onto his visit to the War Resisters’ International Gandhigram conference, held in India in December 1960–January 1961. Passing through Delhi right before and after the conference, Scott talked with Prime Minister Nehru about national independence for the Naga people in India’s Northeast, and the future of their exiled leader, Angami Zapu Phizo, who was at that time ensconced at Scott’s London-based advocacy organization, the


Africa Bureau. The International Friends (Quaker) Centre in North Delhi had agreed to serve as a neutral, private ground for Scott and Nehru’s conversation since Scott had told Indian Quakers that “he was not sponsoring Phizo’s claim, ... only his right for a chance to talk with his own people” and return to India. Most importantly, Nehru’s own government was not privy to the content or occurrence of these secret meetings until Nehru himself chose to divulge them in a January 1961 press conference.

The fact that Scott, a non-Indian and private British citizen, could hold secret negotiations with the prime minister of India on a thorny diplomatic matter involving the latter’s country indicates that Scott – along with certain other leaders of the international peace movement – was held in great respect by and had sway with particular top government officials. These off-the-record, unofficial meetings also showed how international civil society spaces such as the Friends Center facilitated unofficial diplomacy and highlighted the involvement of the Friends Service Committee. Many Quakers had been active participants and advocates for the Indian independence movement; in the 1960s, some turned to the US civil rights movement and to the unfinished business of decolonization, such as the place of minority peoples within newly independent nation-states.

The lives and work of Muste, JP, and Scott typify how a well-placed, well-connected individual could act as an iconic figure metonymic of a larger cause, as a link between different realms of politics, and as a gatekeeper on behalf of those who lacked the ability or access to represent themselves in circles of power. Each stood at the center of liberal, anticommunist civil society activism within his own country, and each was often more practical, even more expedient, than his ideological goals might imply. They were moralists who functioned with more finesse and ability as individuals than they did within the organization they

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cofounded, the World Peace Brigade. They operated within the interstices, the unregulated spaces, of the United Nations as both a set of bureaucracies and as a system of international order, because they saw the institution as inadequately addressing the process of decolonization. However, when the Brigade was established as an organization, its weaknesses were revealed: lack of money, staffed by volunteers with day jobs, and led by unofficial politicians with many and varied – and at times conflicting – ideological commitments.

**THE AFRICA FREEDOM ACTION PROJECT**

February 1962 to February 1963 saw intense activity by Brigade members. They conducted seminars in civil disobedience in Dar es Salaam and testified to the UN Special Committee of 17 on Decolonization concerning Katanga’s secession from the former Belgian Congo, which they viewed as an illegitimate, neoisperial, rather than national, claim because of Katanga’s direct links to Western multinational mining interests. Brigade members were also some of the few non-Africans to attend conferences sponsored by the Pan-African Freedom Movement of Eastern, Central, and Southern Africa (PAFMEC[S]A) and to consult with African nationalist leaders there. In addition to these activities, one of their most significant undertakings was their launch of the African Action Freedom Project in East Africa. This project included a planned march from Tanganyika to Northern Rhodesia, with Northern Rhodesian/Zambian nationalist leader Kenneth Kaunda, to help generate international attention and support for the Zambian independence movement.31

In the early 1960s, the Indian Ocean port of Dar es Salaam, Tanganyika, was an obvious point of entry for a host of international actors who sought to work with the forces of national liberation.32 It had been a hub for global exchange and connection since the nineteenth century.33 Tanganyika had a newly independent government led by Prime Minister Julius Nyerere – a charismatic leader, anticolonialist,

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31 The specific start-and-end locations of the planned march remained unspecified.
and political thinker with a growing African and international profile.\textsuperscript{34} The city itself had an increasingly vibrant university and cultural sensibility.\textsuperscript{35} It also had relative geographic propinquity to the landlocked “decolonization hot spots” of Katanga and the Rhodesias. A variety of intelligence agencies operating in the city competed with each other to recruit informants among nationalist movements, university students, and the general population.\textsuperscript{36}

All these characteristics made Dar es Salaam an ideal site for the World Peace Brigade’s work of transforming anticolonial nationalist movements into peaceful, anticommunist, postcolonial states – and of building an international civil society nonviolent militia: a civitia.\textsuperscript{37} In early 1962, the Brigade launched the Africa Freedom Action Project with the aim of aiding the breakup of the white-ruled Central African Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (present-day Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Malawi). At first, Michael Scott was the primary project leader. After he left Dar es Salaam in summer 1962, Bill Sutherland assumed leadership of the project.

Dar es Salaam figured as the project’s headquarters for supporting and training anticolonial nationalists in nonviolent civil disobedience of the type used by Gandhi and the US civil rights movement. Project participants aimed to make the city what they termed the “anti-Algiers,” alluding to the city’s Arabic name (“Abode of Peace”) and contrasting the Brigade’s training of anticolonial nationalists in Gandhian civil disobedience to the violence of Algerian decolonization and the new Algerian government’s military training for other national liberation movements.\textsuperscript{38} Project members saw themselves as “nonviolent technicians” who would organize and teach Africans “how to be effective” on a mass march.\textsuperscript{39}

\textsuperscript{34} Issa Shivji, Saida Yahya-Othman, and Ng’wanza Kamata, \textit{Julius Nyerere: Development as Rebellion}, vols. 1–3 (Dar es Salaam: Mkuki na Nyota Publishers, 2020). Many thanks to Issa Shivji for outlining this collaborative biographical project and its source base during my 2016 research trip to Dar es Salaam.


\textsuperscript{37} “Civitas” is the descriptive term for the World Peace Brigade used by A. J. Muste; see, Bigelow, “Some Reflections.”

\textsuperscript{38} A. J. Muste letter to North American Regional Council Members, July 30, 1963, Box 2, NARC Papers.

They led training programs and held rallies – featuring themselves and regional nationalist leaders – of around five thousand people in Dar es Salaam and of almost ten thousand at Mbeya, in southwest Tanganyika.

Absent from the Brigade’s planning was its ideological competition – the many African anticolonial nationalist guerrilla camps that stood on the outskirts of the city. The leadership of Namibian, Mozambican, Zambian, Zimbabwean, and South African anticolonial nationalists, either based in or repeatedly passing through Dar es Salaam, sought succor and support from a range of individuals attached to governments, corporations, and nongovernmental organizations, including members of the World Peace Brigade. These nationalists had an assortment of advocates from whom to draw backing, as well as actual paramilitary training camps on the doorstep of Dar es Salaam. The “Algerian model” encircled the anti-Algiers.

One of the few African leaders who actively engaged with the Africa Freedom Action Project was the Northern Rhodesian/Zambian nationalist Kenneth Kaunda. In early February 1962, Kaunda met Bayard Rustin, Bill Sutherland, and Michael Scott in Addis Ababa at the Fourth PAFMEC(S)A Conference. There, the Brigade members pitched the Freedom Action Project to Kaunda as a nonviolent civil-disobedience campaign in support of Zambian independence; as its first endeavor, the project planned a march from Mbeya (near the Tanganyika–Northern Rhodesia border) into Northern Rhodesia. This march would spearhead a six-month general strike that Kaunda planned to launch against the British colonial state that governed Northern Rhodesia. The threatened strike and march were tools to pressure British colonial authorities, hastening their withdrawal by making them

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view Zambian independence more favorably compared to the rising costs of governing. Kaunda supported the Brigade’s scheme, announcing that the proposed march would be equipped with bibles, not guns – thus linking the endeavor to the faith-based peace politics of the Brigade community rather than to the revolutionary nationalism of other liberation movements.43

An April 1962 profile of Kaunda in the New York Times emphasized his commitment to multiracialism and “his record for keeping hot-headed supporters under control.”44 The US “paper of record” described Kaunda as a “son of a missionary” and a “disciple of Gandhi,” who neither drank nor smoked and who emulated Abraham Lincoln. The Times portrayed the Northern Rhodesian leader as the “right” kind of anticolonial nationalist, who channeled the fervor of his “hot-headed” supporters through personal discipline and a sensibility aligned with that of the Gandhian World Peace Brigade. Kaunda had traveled to the United States twice in the previous two years, as the guest of George Houser’s American Committee on Africa (a member of the Brigade community), where he made a positive impression on John F. Kennedy and garnered the endorsement of Life magazine as “a patriotic practitioner of democracy” and a “soft-spoken believer in non-violence.”45 There was a history of multiracial, self-proclaimed “liberal” organizing in colonial Northern Rhodesia that Kaunda may not have directly espoused but from which he benefited as he positioned himself as the internationally recognized, safely religious, peaceful, and anticommunist leader of an independent Zambia.46

43 DeRoche, “Dreams and Disappointments,” 375. According to A. J. Muste, “Kaunda, on Principle, and Nyerere, on Personality” supported the project, which was primarily staffed by Suresh Ram, Rustin, Scott, and Sutherland; see, Sutherland and Meyers, Guns and Gandhi in Africa, 63.
46 On multiracialism and political organizing in the run-up to Zambian independence, see Jan-Bart Gewald, Marja Hinfelaar, and Giacomo Macola, eds., Living the End of Empire: Politics and Society in Late Colonial Zambia (Leiden: Brill, 2011).
As the British-colonial Central African Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland unraveled into white supremacist and Black majority-ruled states against the background of racial and Cold War politics, Kenneth Kaunda was attempting to navigate that complicated political terrain. The future of the Rhodesias, whether as white-ruled British dominions or as independent postcolonial states or as something in between, was seemingly up for grabs in the early 1960s. White-settler colonials could rely on personal connections within the British government to make their case for an Australia in the Southern African Copperbelt. Black African leaders, on the other hand, lacking these direct connections, had to demonstrate from afar their regional popularity and their ability to manage their constituents. In his push for Zambian independence, Kaunda had to show the British two things: that the anticolonial movement was of sufficient strength for London to take it seriously, and that he could speak for and manage Northern Rhodesian anticolonial nationalism. Kaunda needed to present anticolonial nationalism as dangerous – but not too dangerous.

In early 1962, before Zambian independence, it was therefore opportune – in terms of both Kaunda’s goals and peace advocacy – for the Brigade to help Kaunda with this balancing act by grabbing local and international headlines through its planned march into Northern Rhodesia, designed to increase the “right” kind of pressure on the British: nonviolent, anticommunist, seemingly democratic-participatory. Kaunda’s pre-independence authority rested on his skillful


50 “Michael Scott Is Far Too Busy in Dar,” Sunday News (Tanganika), May 6, 1962, University of Dar es Salaam East Africana Collections, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. Also,
embodiment of the “correct” form of anticolonial nationalism as a “principled non-violent Christian leader” with legitimate anticolonial nationalist credentials: a leader whom Western governments and multinational mining corporations could consider “reasonable” and safe for foreign investment.51

By autumn of that year, however, Kaunda no longer needed the support of the Brigade: the Northern Rhodesian election allowed his United National Independence Party (UNIP) to form a coalition government and enter formal politics. The election empowered Northern Rhodesian nationalists and undermined the purpose of the Africa Freedom Action Project’s work in that region. As Kaunda became the presumptive leader of a likely independent Zambia, his need for the Brigade evaporated. He had used the agitation over its planned peace march as leverage while constitutional proposals for Northern Rhodesia were debated in London. However, when Britain began to negotiate with him seriously about a political transition toward an independent state, he could prioritize his much-needed connections with investors – mining companies and development organizations – over those with peace activists. At the last minute, he pulled the plug on the proposed march (and the strike) as a gesture of good faith to London.52

Members of the World Peace Brigade had functioned as important gatekeepers for Kaunda, setting up meetings for him with government officials and investors, who often sat on the board of development or advocacy organizations, or both.53 The gatekeeper’s job was to open metaphorical gates and forward a nationalist claim on to the next, more powerful advocate. Brigade members’ effectiveness in making these connections for Kaunda played a role in Kaunda’s successful bid for national leadership and Zambian independence. Yet that same success caused Kaunda to withdrawal from the Africa Freedom Action Project, thereby undermining the Brigade’s work in East Africa.


51 Larmer, Rethinking African Politics, 51.

52 In a hasty, barbed note to Scott in the spring of 1963, A. J. Muste expressed his “continued regret that conditions . . . made it impossible for [Scott] to remain in Africa last year.” Muste said that he “recognize[d] that the situation might not have provided any opening for” the Brigade; “[o]n the other hand,” he wrote, “it might have”; see A. J. Muste note to Michael Scott, May 24, 1963, Box 1, WPB NARC Papers.

53 This process is described more fully in Chapter 4, “The Spectre of Katanga.”
Despite its original utility for Kaunda, the Brigade’s Africa Freedom Action Project in Dar es Salaam was not able to find another African nationalist leader interested in its services. Losing momentum, the project shut down after a year (in 1963), as its leadership’s focus shifted toward other endeavors. Without a concrete aim after Kaunda lost interest, in September 1962 Bill Sutherland, de facto project leader after Scott left in summer 1962, fantasized about a march to South West Africa – either a land march from Tanganyika or a “sea movement” from Congo-Leopoldville – that would generate international attention for both anticolonial nationalist liberation in Southern Africa and the Africa Freedom Action Project. But just four months later, at the start of the new year, a worn-out Sutherland dropped Scott a note one night: “Since the generator is not working at the moment and water is not being pumped properly from the well, [I am] getting the hell out of here. I may continue writing letters in some bar; although I’m somewhat on the wagon.”

“LIBERALIST” INTERNATIONALISM AND ITS WEAKNESSES

Shortly afterward, in February 1963, the Brigade – mired in internal ideological disagreement, lacking nationalist backing, and losing money – closed the Africa Freedom Action Project. Bill Sutherland wrote to A. J. Muste about its demise:

It is our failure to come up with a dramatic and imaginative program for South Rhodesia, South West Africa, Mozambique or any other place which excludes us. If a tried and able group of Afro-Americans from the Birmingham scene could be brought over here with strategists like Bayard [Rustin] ... I’m sure the Southern Africans, Eduardo Mondlane of Mozambique – even [South West African People’s Organization leader Sam] Nujoma would listen. It’s just that terrorism and guerrilla warfare are the only methods which appear relevant to the Southern African scene that Julius [Nyerere] falls into step with [Algerian president Ahmed] Ben Bella."

Sutherland highlighted the failure of the Brigade’s twin aims: internationalizing the US civil rights movement and making Dar es Salaam a center for nonviolent anticolonial struggle – the metaphorical anti-Algiers. The

54 Bill Sutherland to A. J. Muste, Bayard Rustin, and Michael Scott, September 16, 1962, Box 1, WPB NARC.
55 Bill Sutherland letter to Michael Scott, January 26, 1963, Box 1, WPB NARC; Sutherland alluded to his alcoholism, which became a liability to the project.
56 Bill Sutherland letter to A. J. Muste, May 31, 1963, Box 1, WPB NARC Papers.
inadequate number of US civil rights activists was his first explanation for the collapse of the anti-Algiers. His second was “that terrorism and guerrilla warfare [were] the only methods which appear relevant” to anticolonial nationalist movements.

Muste’s own epitaph for the project blamed its shortcomings in part on Brigade leadership, at the level of the individual – specifically, Scott’s abandonment and Sutherland’s drinking. He also felt, as he wrote in a letter (likely in 1963), that the demise of the project was part of the growing pains for a new type of politics: “Ventures of this kind are necessarily experimental in nature.” Muste alluded to the Brigade’s aim to “bear prophetic witness” to political change rather than engineer that change itself. This aim encapsulated the conundrum of advocacy, which could disempower – or even supplant – its cause if advocacy ended up exceeding the strength and influence of the cause on whose behalf it worked.

A 1962 article by Barbara Deming in Muste’s Liberation magazine, written before the Africa Freedom Action Project dissolved, gave the most thorough account of the Brigade’s aims while simultaneously indicating the deeper flaws in the organization. A prominent feminist, pacifist, attendee at the Brigade’s founding conference, and close colleague of the Brigade community, Deming was an excellent writer and theorist of nonviolent sociopolitical change. Her tagline for the Brigade was “to revolutionize the concept of revolution.” She captured the tension at the heart of the Brigade’s attempt to be an international “people’s movement” whose membership did not belong to the peoples it sought to liberate. She opened her piece with the image of a cluster of Brigade members (Americans, Indians, and Europeans) “bent over a map weighing the possibilities of a trek by an international team into some part of Black Africa to set up a non-violent training center there, and to assist the African leaders in their struggle for self-determination.” The imperial echoes of Deming’s words are hard to ignore: non-Africans pouring over a map of “some part of Black Africa,” planning their expedition. She closed with a caveat: “Before the African project could be definite, there had of course to be consultations with independence

57 Muste letter to Suresh Ram, undated, probably fall 1963, Box 1, WPB NARC Papers.
59 Deming, “International Peace Brigade.”
leaders there.” Revealingly, as noted earlier, the World Peace Brigade had no regional council for the African continent or African leadership.

In 1960, two years before the Brigade launched the Africa Freedom Action Project, George Loft, the American Friends Service Committee representative in Salisbury, Rhodesia, met with the governor of Northern Rhodesia to discuss a project on the “Christian approach to the issues the Federation will face in 1960.” Loft pleaded for the organized participation of anticolonial nationalist leaders “such as Kenneth Kaunda.” “We tend to forget,” he argued, “that most of our African leadership has come through some phase of Christian mission work; it would be well for them to be reminded of their Christian heritage and responsibilities; it would be equally desirable to remind the European community at large that the African leaders have such a heritage.”

Loft’s successor, Lyle Tatum, who took up his post as the Friends Service Committee’s Salisbury, Rhodesia, representative later in 1960, was the brother of the founding secretary of the World Peace Brigade, Arlo Tatum. Lyle decided to pursue a faster and more personal integrationist policy than had Loft, and invited Black Africans into his rented home in a white-only Salisbury neighborhood. Facing eviction for having done so, Lyle Tatum circulated a poll among his neighbors in October, seeking textual evidence of their views on the matter. Some respondents said that they had no objection as long as gatherings were personal rather than political and guests “behave themselves in a civilized and orderly manner.” Others emphasized how long they had been in Rhodesia: “27 years,” an “old Rhodesian,” “three generations in Rhodesia,” and said that multiracialism was doomed to failure – look at Congo – and that Lyle Tatum should turn his attention to the American South.

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60 Deming, “International Peace Brigade.”
61 After his stint in Rhodesia, Loft served as the director of the Quaker program at the UN (1961–1963) and the vice-president of the African-American Institute (1963–1966).
62 George Loft letter to Sir Evelyn Horn, January 2, 1960, International Service Division, 1960. Latin America Program, Africa Program Box, File 62968, AFSC Papers. “The Federation” was the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (1953–1963), which was made up of what are currently Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Malawi.
63 Poll options included sympathy for the Tatum family’s “multi-racialist” point of view; no sympathy, but respect for their right to entertain whomever they liked in their own home; and no sympathy as well as a request for the Tatums to move.
64 Tatum poll info, October 1960, File 62968, AFSC Papers. Lucie White shows that expressions of generational connection to Rhodesia made by white settlers were more imaginary than real. White, Unpopular Sovereignty, 4: “Of the seven hundred original pioneers who arrived in 1890, only fifteen lived in the country in 1924.” “There were
The Tatum family shifted houses and organized a series of community development projects, building homes, schools, and gardens with a staff of multiracial volunteers.

Reading through the responses made Lyle more sympathetic to the point of view of his segregationist neighbors. In a July 1962 letter to Muste and Sutherland (responding to one that Muste had written to Lyle in April), Lyle criticized the Brigade’s closeness with Kaunda’s UNIP party, arguing that it corrupted the Brigade’s attempt to craft a reputation for itself as an honest broker for the region’s conflicts. In particular, he denounced JP’s, Sutherland’s, and Scott’s testimony before the UN:

There was nothing in the World Peace Brigade’s testimony which was anything like evidence under US law. Most of it was hearsay, and the information . . . was not original and could have been submitted by UNIP . . . I feel there is a heady wine of high places about [the] World Peace Brigade that needs watching – UN testimony, prime ministers as friends and patrons, etc. It is easy to get led down the primrose path of this heady wine. The World Peace Brigade is not and cannot be number one with any of these people, even Kaunda.65

Beyond the issue of whether the Brigade, as organized, should advocate for multiracial societies in specific African territories, Lyle’s disapproval addressed issues inherent in an international organization taking defined nationalist stances. At what point would it cease to be an independent agent? What loyalty would nationalist elites have toward a collection of underfunded idealists once they had access to development assistance and the foreign policy representatives of actual countries? For instance, although Julius Nyerere had invited the Brigade to Dar es Salaam, he had more interest in signing agreements with existent governments than with Sutherland and Muste. Further, Lyle warned, “even Kaunda” – at that time, in the early 1960s, still fighting for Zambia’s recognition – would lose interest at some point in working with the Brigade. The Brigade was useful to the leader of a nationalist movement who lacked official recognition but not so much to a president or prime minister of an actual state.

Continuing in the same letter with his denunciations of the Brigade’s activities, Lyle suggested the elimination of the words “settler,” “native,” and “imperialism” from Brigade literature, as they “immediately stamp

almost equal numbers of white immigrants and white emigrants for most of the early 1960s.”

65 Lyle Tatum letter to A. J. Muste and Bill Sutherland, July 19, 1962, Box 3, WPB NARC Papers.
the political orientation of the material, foreclose readership outside of the pro-nationalist groups, and antagonize those with whom we seek reconciliation.”

Lyle’s discomfort with terminology that highlighted racial political hierarchies and preference for words like “partnership” marked a turn from antiracism, as Muste wrote in his stinging April 1962 letter to Lyle: “Issues are often controversial precisely because they matter, they confront people with decisions they do not want to make. ‘Partnership’ became a bad word because it was used for what amounted to phony partnership.”

Lyle’s attempt to view his white Rhodesian neighbors as legitimately African was part of a broader conversation at the time about whether European settlers in Southern Africa were African or European. This conversation paralleled that of France around Algerian independence and the place of the pied noir – the white-settler population, often of Italian and Spanish descent, who were “repatriated” to France following Algerian independence. It also resonated with the question of Indian diaspora communities in South and East Africa and their political relationships with independent India and Pakistan, former European metropole, and their new postcolonial African government. Where and how these groups fit within postcolonial states shifted with time and political context. However, in the run-up to independence, demonstrating “multiracialism” – inclusion of Asian and white-settler populations in a prospectively democratically (i.e., Black African majority) ruled postcolonial state – was necessary in order for an anticolonial nationalist leader to demonstrate his legitimate credentials to an international audience (and Western financial elites), as Kaunda himself knew well.

After his argument with Lyle Tatum over the Brigade’s support of Kaunda, Muste had another ideological disagreement on the Northern Rhodesia question, this time with Robert S. Steinbock, an American Quaker businessman who donated money to the American Friends Service Committee (which helped fund the Brigade) and who objected

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66 Tatum letter to Muste and Sutherland, July 19, 1962.
68 White chooses not to use the term “settler colonialism” in part to sidestep this conversation: Unpopular Sovereignty, 25.
to the “direct and implicit political nature of the World Peace Brigade.” Steinbock thought that the Brigade acted in “coordinate relationship with several political organizations professing and practicing extremist policies in Africa.” He drew an analogy between the Brigade’s planned march to Northern Rhodesia and US anti-immigrant fears:

AJ Muste appealed on humanitarian grounds to pacifists to support a nonviolent march from Tanganyika to help the (according to him) oppressed masses in Rhodesia. I wonder what Friends would say if, say 10,000 Mexicans were banded together and led by AJ Muste in support of some political movement in this country.

Another division within the Brigade community grew between those who believed pacifist principles should come before questions of political justice and those who did not, such as Muste and Scott. This division became a deep problem for the Brigade during its second major Third World endeavor, a planned march from New Delhi to Peking to draw international attention to the continued tensions on the contested Sino-Indian border following the 1962 war between India and China.

As these divisions indicated – between those who were pure pacifists and those who were not, between those who thought reconciliation with members of white supremacist regimes might be possible and those who did not – the World Peace Brigade did not have unified positions. It was an amalgamation – a set of alliances of shared interests and affinities – rather than an integrated movement, making it difficult to characterize its politics under a single label. The Brigade also drew upon supporters who belonged to circles sympathetic to its aims but did not participate in its endeavors. Its members and sympathizers were liberal, anticommunist supporters of both anticolonial nationalism and peaceful regime-change. They drew inspiration from and were part of the political community that inspired John F. Kennedy’s Peace Corps, a project that overlapped in time and theme with the Brigade’s creation. Brigade members saw themselves as unarmed peacekeepers who could be seconded to the United Nations as a peace force in much the same way that countries rented out members of their own military to the UN as armed peacekeepers. The

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71 Robert S. Steinbock, letter to the editor, *Friends Journal*, December 1, 1962. All quotes from Steinbock in this chapter are from this source.

72 Arlo to Lyle Tatum, April 7, 1961: “We are in hopes that the Brigade could offer its unarmed service in the areas of tension and conflict to the UN ... It would give the UN a choice of sending armed or unarmed persons into a particular area and I scarcely see how it could be less successful in the Congo than sending in armed men with instructions not to use their weapons.” File 45B, Devi Prasad Papers.
UN, especially its Fourth Committee on Colonialism, which handled decolonization questions, shaped Brigade activism. Members of the Brigade served as character witnesses, testifying regularly in front of its subcommittees in support of particular anticolonial nationalists.

UN civil servants were often friends and ideological sympathizers of Brigade members and occupied a similar position on the ideological spectrum: proponents of peaceful, anticommunist (i.e., opposed to the nationalization of industry) national liberation, in the shape of an independent postcolonial state. The UN’s decolonization dilemma, exemplified by its peacekeeping difficulties in Congo, set the scene for the contentious ideological landscape confronting the Brigade. In his play Murderous Angles, Conor Cruise O’Brien, former UN special advisor to the secessionist Congolese province of Katanga as well as a friend of the Brigade community, defined “liberals” (embodied by UN secretary general Dag Hammarskjöld) and “liberationists” (embodied by Congolese nationalist leader Patrice Lumumba) as ideological competitors on a mutually deadly collision course.\(^3\) Liberals prioritized peace and political stability over the overthrow of unjust regimes; liberationists, the opposite.

The World Peace Brigade and its overlapping circles of supporters espoused this liberalist perspective. Though some had been sympathetic to communism before Stalin and the Second World War and were labeled “communist” by their political opponents, they were no longer aligned with the political ideology. At times, the old “communist” label created difficulties for Brigade members and affiliated organizations: for instance, on account of his Communist Party past, for decades Scott’s US visa for petitioning the UN specified that he could only be present in the US within a fifty-block radius of the UN building in Turtle Bay.\(^4\) In addition, because of his “unstable” communist past, South Africa claimed that Scott was an unreliable advocate and should not be granted hearings at the UN.\(^5\) Furthermore, the Brigade’s American parent organizations had to repeatedly testify to their anticommunist bonafides at the US Congress’s Un-American Activities Committee as they included members

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\(^{5}\) “13e Sessie van die V.V.O.: Suidwes-Afrika Aangeleenthede,” November 8, 1958. Annexure V. AS Series (SWAS) 373 File AS.50/2/3/2 (v. 2), National Archives of Namibia.
who had once joined the Communist Party. Yet, in spite of these allegations against the Brigade, the reality stood that its community was and remained anticommunist.

Alongside UN peacekeeping in Congo, the foreign policy of John F. Kennedy – as US senator, presidential candidate, president-elect, and eventually president – influenced the Brigade community. At first, Kennedy provided it with inspiration and potential avenues of access to political decision-making. Before becoming president, Kennedy served as the chairman of the newly created US Senate Subcommittee on African Affairs. Since the US Department of State lacked an Africa office until 1958, the subcommittee sourced its own information network. Kennedy solicited memos, speech drafts, and introductions to anticolonial nationalist leaders from a range of interested individuals and civil society organizations who were experts (e.g., elements of the Brigade community) on topics related to decolonization and Africa. As a “president-in-waiting,” Kennedy made use of the transnational civil society connections that underpinned the Brigade; later on, as president with his own Department of State that now had an established Africa office and with increased needs for sensitivity and secrecy, the Kennedy team dissolved many of these civil society ties.

Chronicling this shift in late 1961, Winifred Courtney wrote an article on President Kennedy’s first year in office, in *Africa South in Exile*, an anticolonial nationalist advocacy magazine. Courtney, an American Quaker, was the UN observer for a number of religious left–oriented advocacy organizations: George Houser’s American Committee on Africa, Muste’s Fellowship of Reconciliation, and the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom. She reported on UN activities to her organizations, which, in turn, circulated these reports in their publications and newsletters. She was a friend of nationalist leaders Mburumba Kerina (Namibia) and Tom Mboya (Kenya); she and her family in Westchester, New York, often hosted Scott on his visits to New York City to testify at the United Nations on behalf of Namibian

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77 Winifred Armstrong interview with author, June 21, 2015.

nationalists (after he was allowed outside of his fifty-block radius); and she edited some of Scott’s speeches. In her article “Kennedy’s New Frontier,” Courtney highlighted the crucial difference between Kennedy as a senator versus as a president:

During the dying days of the Eisenhower Administration, John F. Kennedy seemed to understand world revolution [i.e. decolonization] remarkably well. He recognized that in the eyes of emerging peoples, the US has been all too often the defender of colonial and dictatorial oppression rather than the great bastion of freedom it fancies itself to be. This he emphasized in his Senate speech on American policy over Algeria a few years ago, which angered the French. His experience as Chairman of the Senate’s Africa Subcommittee had given him sympathetic insight into the problems of the whole continent. But the gap between opposition criticism and day-to-day practice in office is invariably wide.79

According to Courtney, Kennedy, as president, became the prisoner “of his own ability – which after all got him elected – to ride two horses at once: The Cold War and World Development under World Law,” meaning the channeling of anticolonial nationalist movements into peaceful, anticommunist postcolonial states.80 Courtney considered the Cold War as antithetical to this “liberalist” decolonization project: Kennedy’s flaw was that he saw the Cold War and decolonization “as a circus team, rather than as the mutually antagonistic forces that they are, bound to dump him catastrophically in the end.”81

However, contra to Courtney’s distinction, the channeling of decolonization into peaceful, liberalist (noncommunist) states was Cold War politics. The Brigade’s conception of Dar es Salaam as the anti-Algiers aligned ideologically and analytically with the First World even though it criticized divisive United States–Soviet Union international relations. Within this First World political context, the Brigade stood at the intersection of a slew of international civil society organizations – including Quakers – that advocated for nonviolent, anticommunist political justice. But mobilizing financial provision for such advocacy required ingenuity. Funding for international civil society endeavors like the World Peace Brigade came from a patchwork of state, corporate, and foundation sources facilitated by personal connections. In India, JP asked Nehru for money, and the Mahatma Gandhi National Memorial Trust in India also

funded Brigade work. Individual members paid for their own travel, sometimes through personal fundraising, sometimes through the budgets of their own affiliated organizations.

Brigade members’ parent organizations – such as the Africa Bureau, Fellowship of Reconciliation, Minority Rights Group, War Resisters’ International, Friends Service Committee, among others – were often indirect recipients of CIA money intended to promote global anticommunism. For instance, Scott’s Africa Bureau received financial support from the Fairfield Foundation, and JP headed the Indian branch of the Congress for Cultural Freedom – two of the largest CIA-funded anticommunist advocacy organizations. Despite this CIA support for the Brigade, vehement anticommunists within the US government and of course in Southern African settler governments denounced Brigade members as socialists, leftists, and even communists. In addition, many Brigade members did not know the original source of their funding, nor did that financial support shift their goals or methods. As stated by the *Times of India*, if “the CIA believes that it is achieving something more than goodwill by its liberal donations, that is obviously the concern of the American tax-payer and not those of whom innocently benefit from the transaction.”

85 For an example of such criticism of Rustin, Sutherland, and Scott, see State Department Decimal Files, 745c.C00/2-2362, Deputy Director for Eastern and Southern African Affairs William Wight to Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Henry Tasca, February 23, 1962, quoted in DeRoche, “Dreams and Disappointments,” 375. By the early 1960s, most members of the World Peace Brigade were prohibited from entering both South Africa and Southern Rhodesia.
86 *Times of India*, April 30 1967.
Still, financial connections and aid demonstrated aspects of ideological alignment – at least that elements within the CIA perceived the utility of Brigade members’ work toward supporting First World interests during decolonization. The Brigade’s anti-Algiers was a Cold War project, positioning Gandhian peaceworkers in Dar es Salaam as the political alternative to Ahmed Ben Bella’s National Liberation Front in Algeria, which did more than train anticolonial nationalists in guerrilla warfare. In 1963, with Ben Bella as president, Algeria nationalized a portion of its industry, its banking, and its media, and eliminated French land ownership.

CONCLUSION

Beginning in the 1920s, notions of a “dark” or “colored world” – W. E. B. Du Bois’s “color line” – had provided a sense of solidarity between African Americans and peoples in the colonial world engaged in nationalist struggles. There was a strong affective relationship between 1950s–1960s anticolonial nationalism and US civil rights, though one focused on national independence from external/imperial rule, and the other, on political equality within the preexisting state. The World Peace Brigade’s anticolonial nationalist advocacy mission also grew out of past Western advocacy for Indian independence. This transnational network stretched beyond the white Anglosphere: from the Indian independence movement through the 1960s, African American and Indian activists exchanged ideas and tactics in their struggles for democratic participation. The World Peace Brigade was also a product of this “colored cosmopolitanism.”

90 Ramachandra Guha, Rebels against the Raj: Western Fighters for India’s Freedom (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2022). The activities of such figures as C. F. Andrews, Annie Besant, Samuel Stokes, and Marjorie Sykes exemplify this history.
92 Slate, Colored Cosmopolitanism.
In addition, the organization relied upon Third World elite politicians and the personal invitations of such national and nationalist leaders as Julius Nyerere and Kenneth Kaunda to launch its projects. Dependence on personal prestige and elite invitations did not negate the democratic, political justice–oriented aims of the Brigade. Nevertheless, it emphasized that connections between Martin Luther King (whose involvement was limited to his presence on Brigade letterhead), Jayaprakash Narayan, and Kenneth Kaunda were elite solidarities that did not necessarily reach the grassroots of anticolonial national liberation movements in East Africa.

Once in office, most leaders of postcolonial states shifted from global antiracism and anti-imperialism to state-promoting and state-protecting visions of their own country’s position in an international order made up of states. For instance, Indian political leaders were often imperfect guardians of the rights and liberties of minority peoples within their own borders. Independent India’s limited concern for civil rights within India (and its desire for US government development aid) decreased its interest in publicizing civil rights abuses in the United States.93 As exemplified by the career of Kenneth Kaunda, when nationalist leaders became national leaders, transnational civil society ties became subsidiary to formal, state-to-state relations; such ties lost much of their impact because leaders of governments no longer needed them. Conversely, for nationalist claims within postcolonial nations, those transnational civil society connections were their diplomatic relations.

The World Peace Brigade proposed the possibility of nonviolent, anticommunist, majority-ruled postcolonial states. The organization supported peaceful regime change rather than radical nationalist liberation. It also prioritized the individual as the vessel of political change because this focus allowed the Brigade to remain outside of state-centric international relations, positioning it to be an honest broker between opposing sides, and reinforcing the importance of the individuals who made up the organization. Yet its prioritizing of individual solutions to structural international problems let the political “structure” – the order of nation-states that made up the international political system – off the hook. In a cynical reading, it also focused the spotlight on the personal moral stature of Brigade members rather than on the causes they espoused. As a result, the Brigade did not integrate itself into the fabric of the societies on whose behalf it sought to advocate and was at the

93 Slate, Colored Cosmopolitanism, 202–42.
mercy of the attention span and frailty of those individuals who com-
posed the organization and of those, such as Kaunda and Nyerere, who 
had invited them in the first place.

The Brigade was one element in a brew of state and non-state actors –
including mining companies and development organizations – that tried
to mold anticolonial nationalism into the “correct” political (state-like)
shape. While some of these actors had points of access to Northern 
Rhodesia/Zambia’s Kenneth Kaunda and other nationalists through colo-
nial officials and particular domestic constituencies (such as trade
unions), 94 individual Brigade members themselves were also links to those 
officials and constituencies. Before a nation gained its independence,
transnational advocacy networks (such as the Brigade community) am-
plified nationalist claimants, positioning them as states-in-waiting.
Although advocates could not provide the technical expertise or financial
means required for economic planning or other core functions of newly
independent states who wished to fulfill domestic expectations for rapid
social and economic progress, they could – and did – connect anticolonial
nationalists to those who were able to mobilize foreign capital for state-
building purposes in the fluid and rapidly changing political terrain of
global decolonization. The catch was that once nationalists gained genu-
ine political power, they no longer needed Brigade intervention.

In 1963, the Brigade closed down its Africa Freedom Action Project in
Dar es Salaam. Not only did Kenneth Kaunda no longer rely on the
project for help in Zambia’s nationalist effort, but, in addition, the
project’s notion of Dar es Salaam as the anti-Algiers was increasingly
challenged. Over time, Dar es Salaam became one of the strongest loca-
tions not just for military training (already occurring in the early 1960s)
but also of African socialist thought, from Julius Nyerere’s Ujamaa
writings to the African diaspora and Western socialists at the University
of Dar es Salaam.95 As early as 1963 – just a year after the project began –
members of the Brigade were well aware that “Julius” was falling “into

94 Carolien Stolte, “Introduction: Trade Union Networks and the Politics of Expertise in an
95 Julius Nyerere, Ujamaa-Essays on Socialism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971);
Emma Hunter, Political Thought and the Public Sphere in Tanzania: Freedom,
Democracy and Citizenship in the Era of Decolonization (Cambridge: Cambridge
others, congregated at the University of Dar es Salaam, and Bill Sutherland stayed in the
city after the Brigade left, joining this liberationist intelligencia.
step with Ben Bella.” Increasingly across the subsequent decade, Nyerere shifted to the left, became entangled with China, and the city took on a liberationist ideological slant. The African Americans who came to Dar es Salaam in the 1970s were Black Panthers, not pacifist members of the mainstream US civil rights movement.

In this way, the Brigade’s effort to build an anti-Algiers project in Dar es Salaam dissolved. However, the Africa Freedom Action Project was the Africa – not the Northern Rhodesia – Freedom Action Project; members of the Brigade community were involved in a host of decolonizing questions in Sub-Saharan Africa. While they supported anticolonial nationalism in some places, such as the white-settler states of South Africa, South West Africa/Namibia, and Southern Rhodesia, in another instance – that of Katanga – they worked to undermine an incipient nationalist claim.

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96 Sutherland to Muste, May 31, 1963, Box 1, WPB NARC Papers.
During the early 1960s, the World Peace Brigade worked to transform nationalist movements into peaceful, anticommunist, democratic postcolonial states. In this process, the Brigade was just one of many advocacy organizations in a sphere of unofficial international politics, a sphere in which corporations also paired with nongovernmental organizations to provide assistance, funding, and de facto recognition to nationalist claims across the political spectrum. The political turmoil and international attention surrounding the United Nations intervention in Congo and the breakup of its neighboring Central African Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (1960–1965) made Sub-Saharan Africa the epicenter for this dynamic of unofficial, transnational advocacy.

Personal connections between nationalists and their advocates fueled this informal politics. In his 2013 memoir, the Africanist historian Terence Ranger described a 1958 New Year’s Eve dinner party at Rhodesian nationalist Paul Mushonga’s house in the suburb of Highfield in Salisbury, Rhodesia, capturing in freeze-frame this world of individual advocates and how their roles changed with decolonization. Mushonga’s guests included George and Eleanor Loft of the Friends Service Committee in Salisbury, as well as the Observer journalist Cyril Dunn, who would later attempt but leave incomplete a biography of Brigade leader Reverend Michael Scott. Since the Quakers were there en famille, Ranger wrote, “the room seemed to be overflowing with white babies. . . . It was a jovial scene – everyone except the Quakers drinking beer or spirits out of bottles.”

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Within five years, Ranger had been deported to Dar es Salaam (1963), where he joined the liberationist intelligentsia in the city; Dunn was reporting on the lackadaisical judicial standards in Dallas following the assassination of John F. Kennedy (1963);² Mushonga had died in an alleged car accident (1962).³ George Loft had become vice president of the African-American Institute in New York City (1963), a nongovernmental organization that aimed to link the United States with “the students and leaders of emerging Black African states.”⁴

The African-American Institute had been founded in 1953 by two American academics from Historically Black Universities: William Leo Hansberry of Howard University, and Horace Mann Bond of Lincoln University, which was the alma mater of both Kwame Nkrumah (first president of Ghana) and Mburumba Kerina (a Namibian nationalist). The following year, Allen Dulles, director of the US Central Intelligence Agency, asked Harold K. Hochschild, head of the American Metal Climax mining company (AMAX), to chair the board of the Institute. At its helm for most of the subsequent decade, Hochschild shepherded chosen African anticolonial nationalist leaders on their trips to Washington, DC, and steered funds to their projects. AMAX had mining interests and shares in operations stretching from the province of Katanga in the southeastern end of Congo-Leopoldville, through the Rhodesias, to the northern portion of South West Africa. Hochschild had personal connections with US politicians and with African leaders. He was active in international Africa advocacy organizations and belonged to a group of informed and interested individuals who stood at the intersection of global economic and political investment on the decolonizing African continent.⁵

Hochschild and the organizations in which he played leadership roles – AMAX and the African-American Institute – could serve as character

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⁵ James Ferguson, Global Shadows: Africa in the Neoliberal World Order (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006), 4–16, provides an overview of scholarship on the political economy (and choice of that term) of colonial to postcolonial Africa. For discussion of AMAX’ interests in Katanga, see Introduction, footnote 53.
references for, and implicit or even explicit supporters of, particular anticolonial nationalists, especially Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia and the Namibian nationalists who made up the South West African People’s Organization (SWAPO), among others. Nationalists petitioned AMAX and the Institute for financial support at the same time, often on the same trip to New York, that they petitioned the United Nations for political recognition; Hochschild and Adlai Stevenson, the US ambassador to the UN, compared notes. Individuals such as Hochschild and organizations such as the African-American Institute and the World Peace Brigade operated in a sphere of politics whose inhabitants did not officially represent a government but who dealt with the business of government – that is, with issues of representation, sovereignty, and independence – for regions of the world that were struggling for independence, that is, for states-in-waiting.

It may seem counterintuitive for a mining company with operations in regions controlled by colonial or settler-colonial regimes to choose to support anticolonial nationalist aspirations. However, in 1962 AMAX chose to back certain anticolonial nationalists in Southern Africa. It did so in direct response to the international blowback that its competitor, Union Minière, received for backing the secessionist Congolese province of Katanga. Katanga hovered over the imagination of advocates and nationalists as the ultimate example of illegitimate nationalism – the potential of failed national liberation – in which Western imperial interests had co-opted a state-in-waiting and violated postcolonial state sovereignty, in this case, that of Congo-Leopoldville, newly independent from Belgium.

**KATANGA’S Scession FROM CONGO**

On July 30, 1960, Belgium acceded to the demands for independence made by nationalists in its colony of Belgian Congo, and the State of Congo-Leopoldville was born. Belgium came to this decision, in the

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7 “Evolution of the Recent Attacks on Mining Companies Operating in Southern Africa,” AMAX unauthored report, December 1962, Box 25, Winifred Armstrong Papers, Hoover Institution (hereafter “WA Hoover Papers”). Armstrong started working at AMAX in 1965, so she herself did not write or have any input into this report.
8 There was also a neighboring colony of French Congo, which became independent Congo-Brazzaville (or the Republic of the Congo) in April 1960.
words of Michel Struelens of Belgium’s Bureau of Tourism in Congo (and eventual representative in New York of the breakaway Congolese Republic of Katanga), because of “sheer funk – obsession with the Algerian war – and a rather Machiavellian calculation” that it could better maintain its Congolese investments in an independent Congo. Thirteen days later, the mineral-rich Katanga province in southeastern Congo seceded from newly independent Congo, launching the events known as “the Congo Crisis.” In response, Patrice Lumumba, the democratically elected leader of Congo-Leopoldville, asked the United Nations to intervene militarily to prevent Katanga’s secession. Katanga’s secession was eventually suppressed during a five-year period of warfare and UN intervention. During this period, the spectre of Katanga – that is, of anticolonial nationalism allegedly hijacked by a nationalist regime defined by its connections to the West and its anticommunist credentials – hung over nationalist aspirants and their advocates. Some, such as the Brigade community, opposed Katanga as neocolonialist. Others, who also backed white-settler rule in South Africa and Rhodesia, supported it and blamed the US and its European allies for failing to adequately sustain one of their anticommunist, postcolonial nationalist allies in the decolonizing world.

Katanga’s secession and its failure seemed to impose a Cold War dichotomy on the process of decolonization: a dichotomy between communist- and anticommunist-sympathizing organizations, movements, and governments. While this binary shaped how nationalists made and mobilized their claims, it often did not reflect the political aims, orientations, or experiences of many people and organizations operating outside and around spheres of government. For instance, a corporation such as AMAX, working in tandem with the African-American Institute, was connected to circles of international civil society activism as well as to national governments. Positioned to navigate between these shifting political categories, it negotiated with and funded education and training programs for new postcolonial elites as well as anticolonial nationalist exiles – who, they wagered, might be the new national elite once their

9 Michel Streulens, La Relève, August 27, 1960.
territories became independent. The company had up-to-date information about the decolonizing world, including peoples and places far outside the knowledge of most in the West (including in governments), and access to power. It chose to work behind the scenes, through personal connections and affiliated organizations, supporting certain anticolonial nationalists.

In the early 1960s, the United Nations sought to be the global arbiter for issues of national sovereignty and independence. The Congo Crisis, and the UN’s attempt to prevent Katanga’s secession, was to be its test run. Both the leadership of the UN, which included Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld and his brain trust of the “Congo Toilers” – Ralph Bunche, Andrew Cordier, Indar Jit Rikhye, Alexander MacFarquhar, and Francis Nwokedi, among others – and their critics were highly conscious of how the UN’s legacy would be shaped by the organization’s intervention.

Ralph Bunche arrived in Congo for its independence festivities and stayed through late August 1960. By the end, he was drained and sleep deprived, fearing that his presence portrayed the Congo intervention as a US Cold War endeavor rather than a UN intervention. Bunche fell out with Lumumba, who asked the Soviets for material support when UN forces would not take up arms to prevent the secession of Katanga. For Bunche, assisting Congo was “like trying to give first aid to a wounded rattlesnake.”

Andrew Cordier was interim UN representative

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13 “Congo Toilers” is a term used by Cordier in his correspondence. For example, Cordier to Bunche, acceptance of Invitation, December 30, 1960, Box 104, Cordier Papers, Columbia University. This group included the Americans Ralph Bunche (UN mediator for Palestine, innovator behind the concept of UN Trust Territories, and undersecretary general for the UN); Andrew Cordier (original chief negotiator for the UN in Congo, undersecretary for the UN General Assembly, and also Hammarskjöld’s conduit to the US government); Hammarskjöld’s Africa expert, Heinz Wieschhoff, an Austrian naturalized–US citizen and anthropologist who had last visited the Congo in the 1920s; Indians C. V. Narasimhan, a career UN civil servant, later a special representative to the Congo, and Major General I. J. Rikhye, who wrote the military manual used by the UN mission; Frances Nwokedi (the first Nigerian UN permanent secretary) and Robert Gardiner (founder of the Ghanaian civil service, later a special representative to Congo), who both handled Congolese civilian development and economist Alexander MacFarquhar, a Scot who spent his career in the British Indian civil service, was secretary of commerce for the newly independent Pakistan and eventually a UN undersecretary.


16 Urquhart, *Ralph Bunche*, 322.
to Congo when Lumumba’s government split apart in September 1960 and Lumumba was murdered in January 1961. Cordier had allowed Lumumba to leave UN protection, and closed airports and the radio to calm violence – or to prevent Lumumba from mustering political support, or both, depending upon interpretation.\textsuperscript{17} Lumumba’s death and Cordier’s perceived role catalyzed the February 1961 UN Security Council Resolution that changed its use of force doctrine from “no-initiative on the use of force” to “self-defense” of UN forces, galvanizing the institution to actively prevent Katanga’s secession.

Katanga – led by Moise Tshombe, a missionary-educated businessman from the Lunda people, an ethnic group in Katanga and Northern Rhodesia – had the financial backing of the Belgian multinational mining company Union Minière and the support of the Belgian government, while the UN supported a united Congo. Although the January 1961 assassination of Congolese president Lumumba in Katanga gave the United Nations the political will to use military force to halt the secession, it was still tough political and military terrain for the organization. The settler-colonial government of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland allied with Tshombe’s regime and provided a haven for Tshombe’s mercenaries (who returned to Katanga through an unregulated border after UN forces expelled them).\textsuperscript{18} Faced with UN occupation, Tshombe called the UN forces “Communist troops” assisted by foreign powers\textsuperscript{19} and launched an international publicity campaign in the Belgian, British, and US newspapers, designed to present Katanga as a “prosperous, peaceful, pro-western state in the process of being destroyed by a communist-oriented United Nations.”\textsuperscript{20}

\textsuperscript{17} Belgian agents killed Lumumba while he was in Katangese custody. Release of Belgian and US records in 2002 show that while the CIA very much wanted to oust Lumumba, it was probably not directly involved; see Ludo de Witte, \textit{The Assassination of Lumumba} (London: Verso, 2002). De Witte is quite disparaging of the US and the UN but sees no planned collusion. The specifics of Cordier’s role in January–February 1961 are murky, as is Cordier’s general role at the UN as Hammarskjöld’s number two, with close ties to the US government. Cordier has often been described, even if obliquely, as a CIA plant at the UN, including in Mark Mazower, \textit{Governing the World: The History of an Idea, 1815 to the Present} (New York: Penguin Press, 2012), 268.

\textsuperscript{18} George Ivan Smith to David Owen, “Report on Nyasaland and Rhodesia,” p. 5, June 1, 1962, Box 125, Cordier Papers.


Tshombe sent Michel Streulens (a graduate student at American University in Washington, DC, and formerly of the Belgian Congo Bureau of Tourism) as his designated ambassador to the United Nations in New York. UN leadership denied him an audience – which they could easily do, since he did not represent a UN member-state. Streulens teamed up with the American Committee for Aid to Katangese Freedom Fighters (hereafter, Americans for Katangese Freedom) to stir up US support for Tshombe. Americans for Katangese Freedom – run by US congressman Walter Judd (R-MN) and African American political activist Max Yergan (former missionaries to China and South Africa, respectively), along with the public relations specialist Marvin Liebman – was one of many American advocacy organizations that supported anticommmunist movements in China, Tibet, Katanga, the Rhodesias, and elsewhere, as well as apartheid rule in South Africa. There was a slew of such organizations, with rotating names but the same anticommmunist political platform and the same set of individuals involved. The Americans for Katangese Freedom explicitly linked the Congo Crisis to the Cold War – as shown in a typical comment from an organizational pamphlet: “Do not let the people of Katanga go the same way as the gallant people of Hungary, China, and Tibet who were betrayed into Communist slavery by the fault of free nations and their peoples.”

Untold Story of UN Betrayal (1962), is also a piece of this publicity campaign. In addition, Katanga sponsored trips for US congressmen and senators to the region.

21 “Mr. Streulens sounds like a very brash young man and we’ll probably be hearing a lot more from him.” Andrew Cordier to Leo Malania, September 19, 1960, Box 161, Cordier Papers. Streulens wrote a scholarly account of the UN intervention in Congo, Michel Streulens, The United Nations in the Congo or O.N.U.C. and International Politics (Brussels: Max Arnold, 1976).


23 Americans for Katangese Freedom pamphlet, July 20, 1962, Box 43, Marvin Liebman Papers, Hoover Institution.
worked with sympathetic US politicians, placing Katanga in the context of other nationalist insurgent movements.

The United Nations also considered Katanga part of a global network – of counterrevolutionary forces with wider ambitions on the decolonizing African continent. UN leadership believed that Tshombe’s Katangese mercenaries had “links with the OAS [Organisation de l’armée secrète, a pro-French Algeria terrorist organization] . . . if they help Tshombe to a victory at Elisabethville [Katanga’s capital], they might find extreme European interests in these areas which would support them and bring an industrial [i.e., supported by mining companies] potential in behind them.”

The UN special representative to Katanga, Conor Cruise O’Brien, was an outspoken champion of anticolonial nationalism, as well as a close friend and colleague of World Peace Brigade members. O’Brien arrived in Katanga and attempted to expel Tshombe’s European mercenaries as the embodiment of outside interference in Congolese affairs. This was a difficult task since the settler-colonial government of the Central African Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, allied with Tshombe’s regime, provided a haven for expelled mercenaries who would then return through the unregulated border. Tshombe himself was involved “pretty heavily in Rhodesian party politics, and not in support to the African majority parties,” such as Kenneth Kaunda’s United National Independence Party in Northern Rhodesia.

Kaunda, a Northern Rhodesian nationalist, presented himself in international media as a Westernized, Christian, neo-Gandhian leader of a state-in-waiting. Similarly, Tshombe’s credentials as Western-educated and Christian were a repeated refrain for Americans for Katangese Freedom. They used Union Minière’s support of Tshombe to demonstrate that he was pro-business and anticommunist, simultaneously complaining that other Western corporations – namely, AMAX – were aligning with African anticolonial nationalists, “licking the boots of Kaunda.”

Americans for Katangese Freedom also made an illuminating slippage in its materials, using “arms” instead of “aid” to Katanga in a fundraising letter.

In some ways, Katanga served as Northern Rhodesia/Zambia’s distorted mirror. The two countries shared geography, geology, and some degree of

26 Ruth Alexander, Mirror, October 21, 1962, Box 43, Marvin Liebman Papers.
27 Charles Willoughby to Max Yergan, December 30, 1961, Box 43, Marvin Liebman Papers.
ethnicity. Both Kaunda and Tshombe were missionary-educated and they were expert at the portrayal of respectable nationalist leadership for international audiences. They each chose and were chosen by a different mining company and a different advocacy network: Kaunda, AMAX, and the World Peace Brigade; Tshombe, Union Minière, and Americans for Katangese Freedom. Yet Kaunda was able to make his advocates depend on him, while Tshombe remained dependent on his advocates.

The United Nations justified its opposition to Tshombe’s regime because the institution feared the territorial unraveling of new postcolonial states. Postcolonial state sovereignty was a delicate entity whose fragility threatened to undermine the UN’s legitimacy as the guarantor of that sovereignty. From the international institutional perspective, decolonization could go only so far, and no further, before it dissolved into chaos. Ralph Bunche, a much-respected UN mediator, worried that “sub”-national sovereign claims would destroy the tenuous stability of postcolonial nation-states. In addition, the UN did not consider that Katanga’s government represented a legitimately nationalist African movement but, rather, saw it as a front for Western and settler-colonial interests. There was significant evidence for this perception, beyond the efforts of Americans for Katangese Freedom: the French military initially acquiesced to the recruitment of some of its officers to Tshombe’s mercenary forces; Tshombe and Roy Welensky (prime minister of the Central African Federation) supported each other; Union Minière and other regional multinational mining companies, such as Tanganyika Concessions (in which AMAX also invested), shared shareholders.


This “declaration of dependence” deserves further interrogation. In the 1960s, the United Nations saw a rapid expansion of its membership. It recognized many new postcolonial states and signified their sovereignty by granting them seats in the UN General Assembly. In the process, the UN came to have a vested interest in the importance of international-legal sovereignty as a defining feature of national sovereignty since it prioritized the importance of the UN institution as its source.\(^3\)

Tshombe’s Katanga proposed an alternative model – one of possible confederation – and this threatened the UN’s conception of postcolonial statehood. According to Bunche, Tshombe showed an “unhealthy interest” in the United States’ Articles of Confederation as a possible model for a prospective Congolese federation: Tshombe “seemed only to be encouraged when [informed] that the [Articles] had failed to work” – eluding to the Katangese leader’s lack of interest in supporting a unified, independent Congo.\(^4\) The colonial boundaries of Congo, like most colonial boundaries, did not consider cross-border or regional affiliations. Katanga’s minister of finance told the New York Times that Katanga shared more commonalities with Northern Rhodesia than with the rest of Congo.\(^5\) At issue were questions of national or ethnic authenticity, regional autonomy, and international backing that could either support or undermine perceived national legitimacy. Tshombe claimed a “tribal” affiliation for Katanga, to counter the idea of a Congolese nation.\(^6\) This affiliation evoked the colonial “empowerment” of the tribe as a political unit in order to undermine the potential of national independence. At the same time, it attempted to demonstrate regional and ethnic precolonial authenticity in contrast to a national, Léopoldville-based government that had inherited colonial territorial boundaries.\(^7\)

To prevent Katanga’s secession, UN military forces occupied key positions in the region, at Elizabethville and Jadotville, taking and receiving

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\(^4\) Urquhart, Hammarskjöld, 392. Tshombe also invoked the Battle of Bunker Hill in his propaganda films.


\(^6\) Tshombe’s political party was the Confédération des Associations Tribales du Katanga, in contrast to Lumumba’s Mouvement National Congolais–Lumumba.

casualties. UN secretary general Hammarskjöld flew in to handle the peace talks with a disempowered Tshombe, but he died in a September 1961 plane crash before negotiating a ceasefire agreement. Hammarskjöld’s death and the end of Katanga’s secession concluded the first phase of the UN intervention in Congo. Its official intervention in Congo ended in 1965, after the subsequent suppression of Congolese liberationist militias that led to a coup by (and consolidation of power under) Joseph Mobutu Sese Seko. In the decades since, intermittent war and violence (and subsequent UN interventions) have continued. For anticolonial nationalists and their international advocates, the “spectre of Katanga” remained as a warning of what could happen if decolonization “went wrong.”

THE KENNEDY TEAM AND DECOLONIZATION

The Congo Crisis and the secession of Katanga from Congo drew Western attention to Central and Southern Africa, a region previously considered peripheral to Great Power politics, even when it had been central to imperialism and global war. The US government did not have a State Department office on African issues until 1958; instead, it “worked directly with the colonials.” Sensing a political opportunity in this vacuum of information and strategic thinking, then Senator John F. Kennedy, chair of the newly formed US Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on African Affairs, sought out Americans with recent experience and expertise on matters pertaining to that continent. As part of this exploration, in 1958 JFK’s team hired Winifred Armstrong as an unofficial consultant for their staff.

38 It is unclear if these military operations had Hammarskjöld’s direct permission. O’Brien said they did, in his To Katanga and Back, 283. However, this statement is unconfirmed outside of O’Brien’s account, and Hammarskjöld died before he could verify it.

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Armstrong graduated from Swarthmore College in 1951 and traveled to the African continent five years later. After meeting with and receiving briefings and contacts from Western advocates in Paris, Brussels, and London, Armstrong purchased a round-trip plane ticket to Cape Town that allowed her to stop along the way up and down each coast. Over a period of two years, she traveled to an array of countries/colonies: Ghana, Togo(land), Dahomey (now Benin), Nigeria, (Belgian) Congo, South Africa, the Rhodesias (now Zambia and Zimbabwe), Tanganyika (now Tanzania), Kenya, Uganda, Sudan, and Egypt. She “visited and stayed with African and European families, at universities, schools, hospitals, and missions; and met political and educational leaders, [and those] concerned with community development, business and industry, religion, and labor.”  

By the time Armstrong returned to the United States in 1958, she had established friendships and connections with particular nationalist leaders in much of Southern Africa. She also had more recent experience on the continent than almost anyone else in the United States. Kennedy recruited Armstrong to work unofficially for his Senate office – and then to his presidential campaign – for her African connections, knowledge, and experience. An initial six-week job turned into nearly two years of work.

While working for Kennedy’s 1960 presidential campaign and transition team, Armstrong pushed the US to take a more nuanced and serious approach to national liberation in Africa. She argued that US foreign relations strategy needed to disaggregate binaries of “African versus European and colonial versus anticolonial interests” to find a “meaningful balance” in the formulation of policy. Most importantly, she believed that the US needed to “down-grade the importance of scoring Cold War points” in order to take “the initiative in formulating or at least actively supporting political, economic, and social proposals” for new nations on the decolonizing African continent. In 1960, when seventeen African countries became independent, Armstrong sent telegrams of congratulations from Kennedy to many new nationalist leaders. Nobody else in Washington was reaching out in this manner; and for their recipients,

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42 Armstrong CV, Correspondence 1960 File, Box 2, Winifred Armstrong Papers, JFKL.
these “telegrams of recognition” strongly signaled Kennedy’s interest in and support of African liberation.45

Armstrong shared a degree of friendship with particular African anticolonial nationalists. She was part of a sphere of international support on behalf of anticolonial nationalists; a sphere that included the World Peace Brigade community as well as individuals associated with A. J. Muste’s Fellowship of Reconciliation and Reverend Michael Scott’s Africa Bureau.46 Subsequently, she tried to assist these advocates when they traveled to the US to give testimony to the UN on behalf of African nationalists. She closed a position paper to president-elect Kennedy’s presumptive UN delegation with an extended plea to ease visa restrictions for Reverend Scott, “head of the Africa Bureau in London, [who] has been permitted over the past ten years [of petitioning the UN on behalf of South West Africa] free movement only in a 50-block area of Manhattan.”47

The Africanist and Angola expert John Marcum also worked with the Kennedy team on decolonization questions. Together, Armstrong and Marcum advised Kennedy’s presidential campaign on African issues. Armstrong briefed Averell Harriman (a long-time Democratic politician as well as a foreign policy advisor) before his August 1960 fact-finding trip to Congo and West Africa, and set up his meetings with local politicians and dignitaries in those places, while Marcum traveled along as an escort. Armstrong also briefed Edward M. Kennedy, the president-elect’s brother, before his 1960 trip with a group of Democratic senators to Leopoldville and Elizabethville (Katanga’s capital), during Katanga’s secession.48 Both Harriman’s and Edward Kennedy’s trips served as recognition of decolonization’s regime changes but were not meant to bind the United States to a particular policy direction. John F. Kennedy was running for the presidency; he was not yet the president. Indeed, the foreign policy of the Kennedy campaign and transition team could be compared to that of a state-in-waiting – or, more accurately, a regime-in-waiting. Harriman traveled as a private citizen, and Edward Kennedy,

46 A. J. Muste (1886–1967) was a US Christian pacifist leader who headed the Quaker-oriented activist organization Fellowship for Reconciliation, among others; Michael Scott (1907–1983) was a British anti-apartheid activist who headed the Africa Bureau, a London-based African advocacy organization. Both were leaders of the World Peace Brigade (the subject of Chapter 2).
48 Edward Kennedy was not himself yet a senator; he was elected as the US senator from Massachusetts in 1962.
though sent as a proxy for his brother, was viewed as a political lightweight in Washington, DC, and was under instructions not to say anything that could be construed as outright support from the president-elect, just to listen.\textsuperscript{49} However, for African anticolonial nationalists, these unofficial visits sent strong signals of future US support, and their optimism about this possibility was particularly strengthened after John F. Kennedy was elected president in November 1960.

Armstrong and Marcum always worked for Kennedy in unofficial capacities and on short-term contracts. When Kennedy became president, with an Africa office having been established at the US Department of State, their political orientation and methods were perceived as less necessary and potentially too complicating for US interests; their African connections, for which they were originally hired, were too potentially polarizing for a president. Marcum moved to Lincoln University and continued to work with the Kennedy administration to create a training program for African refugees— including leaders of nationalist movements, some of whom were graduates of Lincoln University.

Armstrong shifted to the National Planning Association, an American civil society research institute. She continued her field research in Sub-Saharan Africa and co-wrote a report on African private enterprise that included biographical sketches of African entrepreneurs, highlighting the importance she placed on individual agency in understanding structural political and economic questions.\textsuperscript{50} Following her stint at the National Planning Association, AMAX hired Armstrong in 1965 for the same reasons that Kennedy had hired her in 1958: her knowledge of and connections to Africa’s new nationalist leaders before they had become heads of state, and her understanding of the political, social, and economic circumstances of both new postcolonial states and states-in-waiting. These skills were of great value for a corporation that sought to successfully navigate the forces of decolonization and, thereby, continue to reap profits from the territories involved.

THE DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING OF INDEPENDENCE

In December 1960, at the instigation of the Soviet Union and with the support of the United States, the UN General Assembly made a

\textsuperscript{49} Armstrong interview with the author, November 28, 2015; Armstrong interview with the author, February 4, 2018.

“Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.” This declaration on the granting of independence illuminated the idea of the UN as the organ of international recognition for new postcolonial states, as well as the limits inherent to that proposed role. By articulating an international norm concerning independence for “colonial countries and peoples,” the declaration was a foundational cornerstone for nationalist claimants and their international advocates worldwide, though it did not refer to peoples within postcolonial (or indeed metropolitan) states. In addition, because the UN set up a committee to monitor the declaration, “it became a year-round source of critique of imperial rule” as well as a portal for advocates and nationalists to access international politics.

And yet, by affirming the postcolonial unitary state as the end goal of the decolonization process, the declaration only supported nationalisms that did not revise the international boundaries of UN member-states – particularly of postcolonial ones, which were becoming the majority of the UN General Assembly.

Two years later, in 1962 – during the gathering clouds of Cold War conflict over Cuba and the continuing UN intervention in Congo – the UN committee to monitor the declaration, titled the “Special Committee of 17,” held its annual hearings in Dar es Salaam to assess the declaration’s impact, and the World Peace Brigade submitted a report to them. The Brigade argued that Western support for Katanga’s secession, motivated by a desire to continue to extract mineral wealth from that territory, “made Western democracy look like a giant runaway circus calliope”: while “pleasant music came from the top” of the carnival steam organ, its wheels crushed “the people down below.”

Kenneth Kaunda also personally testified in front of the UN Special Committee of 17 in Dar es Salaam in 1962. There, the Soviet member, happy to draw international attention to Western malfeasance in Southern Africa, asked him which “foreign companies control the copper

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51 Also known as the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1514.
mines in Northern Rhodesia and what links there might be between these companies and the companies which were engaged in similar activities in neighboring Katanga.” Kaunda did not answer the question directly. Instead, he cited an article that Michael Scott of the World Peace Brigade used later that year (in his own testimony to the same committee) to describe the interlocking directorships of mining companies in the Southern African Copperbelt, drawing upon the scholarship of anthropologist Alvin Wolfe.

A few months after Kaunda testified, Michael Scott did so as well to the same UN Special Committee of 17, in September 1962. He attacked mining companies in Southern Africa as obstacles to Western support for national self-determination because of their continuing efforts to exploit mineral resources in that region. He alleged that (1) Britain refused to intervene on the issue of white-settler colonial rule in Southern Rhodesia because of the “powerful vested interest” of mining companies; (2) the structure of mining interests relied on cheap African labor and white domination; and (3) the British South Africa Company, Anglo American, Union Minière, the Rhodesian Selection Trust, Tanganyika Concessions, and AMAX – all involved with various African postcolonial states and states-in-waiting – shared interlocking and overlapping boards of directors and shareholders.

Scott attacked the “autonomous industrial system in Southern Africa that is beyond the control of African nations,” relying, as Kaunda did, on Wolfe’s research. AMAX took careful, anxious notice, tracking Scott’s allegations through UN, US government, and newspaper sources as it put together a private report to counter Scott’s testimony. While Kaunda – wanting to avoid the perception of too close an alignment with the Soviets – had reassured AMAX as well as the Rhodesian Selection Trust mining company privately about his future amenability, AMAX was

54 Kaunda testimony to Special Committee of 17, April 19, 1962, Lowenstein Papers, Subseries 2.11, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Wilson Library.
56 Special Committee of 17 on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, September 7, 1962, verbatim record of the 1033rd meeting. Allard Kenneth Lowenstein Papers, Subseries 2.11.
horrified by the charges made by Scott. It worried about looking like the Union Minière of Southern Africa: “[O]nly I.G. Farben during and after the [Second World] war would compete with Union Minière’s new public image” as a Western corporation continuing imperial policy in blackface. AMAX could not dispute the composition of its board, so it began a multiyear campaign to demonstrate support for anticolonial nationalist African elites who were becoming the leaders of new postcolonial states with mines – while it continued to mine in South African-ruled South West Africa. AMAX wanted to escape being branded “the I. G. Farben of decolonization,” but without altering its mining operations.

Scott’s financial backers – that is, the board of his advocacy organization, the Africa Bureau – did not find his “interlocking directorship” comments amusing, just as they had initially been upset by Kaunda’s testimony. Sir Ronald Prain of the Rhodesian Selection Trust, a long-time donor and member of the Africa Bureau’s board of directors (as well as a friend and colleague of the Hochschilds of AMAX), was furious and demanded an apology from Scott. Scott wriggled out, claiming that he respected Sir Ronald’s “sincere conviction” but that his (Scott’s) UN testimony had provided the Rhodesian Selection Trust with the “opportunity of stating its case” and countering the “myths and smears” that had been “promulgated in the UN” because Western mining companies’ continued interests in “Katanga seemed to support the allegations.” Kaunda, as noted, had sought to placate those who would be among independent Zambia’s largest foreign investors, apologizing to top officials from AMAX and the Rhodesian Selection Trust for submitting Wolfe’s piece. When Kaunda justified his use of the piece because there was no other reputable reporting on the mining question, AMAX promised to provide him with a written brief outlining the “international financial relationships of the Copperbelt mining companies.”

58 AMAX, “Evolution of the Recent Attacks on Mining Companies Operating in Southern Africa,” December 1962, Box 25, Armstrong Hoover Papers. This private report is an internal AMAX document written before Armstrong worked for the company.
59 AMAX, “Evolution of the Recent Attacks.”
62 F. Taylor Ostrander to Ronald L. Prain, December 5, 1962, Box 25, Armstrong Hoover Papers. This document is AMAX correspondence before Armstrong worked for the company.
Eventually, Scott was able to facilitate a rapprochement with Prain, and also between Prain, the Rhodesian Selection Trust, and Kaunda. Scott, Kaunda, and Prain had private meetings on the future of Northern Rhodesian/Zambian development; when Kaunda visited London in 1963, he had at least four meetings with Prain, who offered to act as “an intermediary” between Kaunda and “the Rockefeller Foundation’s offer” to give development assistance to soon-to-be independent Zambia. The Kaunda-Scott-Prain-Rockefeller Foundation linkage shows the significant influence and benefits of advocacy in action. Scott and Prain played crucial roles connecting Kaunda to US developmental assistance when Zambia was still a state-in-waiting; Scott vouched for Kaunda to Prain, Prain vouched for Kaunda to the Rockefeller Foundation, and doors that might otherwise have been closed to an anticolonial nationalist leader were opened. Strategically, Kaunda and Scott publicly distanced themselves from Western mining companies while working closely with them in private.

Scott’s “interlocking directorates” comment became a repeated phrase for Southern African nationalists and their advocates at the UN. The big mining multinationals in the Copperbelt in the early 1960s were Union Minière, AMAX, Prain’s Rhodesian Selection Trust (eventually a subsidiary of AMAX), and Anglo-American. They had a number of subsidiaries that they did not operate but in which they held shares; shareholders from each mining multinational sat on the others’ boards, lending credence to Scott’s allegations.

In Northern Rhodesia, Prain’s Rhodesian Selection Trust (of which AMAX held controlling shares) had implemented a developmentalist approach toward its Black African workforce since the Second World War. Rhodesian Selection Trust had loaned millions of pounds to the Northern Rhodesian and Nyasaland colonial governments with the stipulation that the funds be spent in regions where they recruited their Black African labor. The company also broke the color bar, working to desegregate high-skilled jobs previously monopolized by white workers, an effort that those workers strongly opposed. Prain’s early adoption of antiracist policies deserves recognition, but it was also linked to the profit

63 Ronald Prain to Michael Scott, April 4, 1963, Box 66, GMS Papers.
motive. He believed that opening high-skilled positions to Black Africans would lower wages for all workers.  

The Hochschilds of AMAX supported Prain’s education and training programs, which they thought would improve the quality and efficiency of their Black African labor force and simultaneously undercut the potential of nationalist agitation. By the early 1960s, both Prain and the Hochschilds had a decade-long commitment to liberal, antiracist development in their Copperbelt mines, a commitment that also served their own economic interests. Black African technicians could be paid less than white ones, and peaceful regime change from colony to independent state allowed for continuity of mining operations. For these reasons, in their view, Kaunda’s platform of nonviolence and multiracialism made him an attractive leader of a postcolonial state. His embrace of a decolonization process that worked with, rather than against, Western economic interests was even more valuable to his international backers when contrasted to the violence and expense of the UN’s military intervention in Katanga. The decimation of Union Minière’s reputation due to that company’s backing of Katanga’s secession from Congo led AMAX to take strong measures to distinguish itself from the other Copperbelt corporations.

While AMAX attempted to differentiate itself from various other Southern African mining operations in order to minimize international perception of its involvement in contentious global hot spots, the World Peace Brigade worked to knit together its advocacy against Katanga’s secession, South African rule of South West Africa, apartheid in South Africa, and colonialism across southern Africa. The Brigade’s protest at the South African consulate in New York City in October 1962, headlined by Bayard Rustin, Scott, and other members of the Brigade community, explicitly combined these issues. This “bundling” was tactical: to gather as many supporters as possible to its cause by expanding its scope.

In his 1962 testimony to the UN Special Committee of 17, Michael Scott warned about greater looming issues instigated by the spectre of Katanga, which illustrated “what waste, destruction and suffering could

be caused by political breakdowns and the failure to find adequate constitutional means of solving problems of conflicting interests and national ambitions. . . Resistance to injustice, tyranny and deprivation of rights was part of the struggle for peace,” since violence in Central and Southern Africa would lead to “the power struggle between the so-called East and West.”

Scott used the threat of violence and Cold War conflict to try to get the UN to act. His motto: Violence will take over where law founded on justice ends. He blamed extra-legal violence against Kenneth Kaunda’s United National Independence Party (in Zambia) on “criminals from Katanga” allied with the settler-colonial government of the Central African Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. In Scott’s formulation, Kaunda’s nonviolent resistance to oppression would lead to a racially representative government, peacefully achieved; whereas, the counterrevolutionary nationalism of Moise Tshombe in Katanga and of the white-settler colony of Rhodesia would undermine Kaunda’s political ascendancy and the challenge that ascendancy would pose to their power in the region.

**FEDERATION THINKING AND THE COLD WAR TRAP**

Regional dynamics engulfed the Congo Crisis. Katanga bordered the Central African Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (1953–1963), whose breakup seemed imminent in the early 1960s. The Central African Federation was a British effort to find a halfway solution between empire and national independence in Southern Africa. This attempted compromise faltered between the competing demands of African nationalists and of settler-colonials for self-rule. Kenneth Kaunda of Northern Rhodesia was a leader in the nationalist effort, supported by the World Peace Brigade, for an independent Zambia; simultaneously, Moise Tshombe of Katanga, and Roy Welensky of Southern Rhodesia were in talks to forge a Copperbelt state on the bones of the Federation. While sharing geographic contiguity, a degree of overlapping ethnic groups, and

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69 Scott, Special Committee of 17 to Monitor the Declaration on the Granting of Independence, 173, BB/0991, National Archives of Namibia.

70 Scott, Special Committee of 17 to Monitor the Declaration, 173.


73 George Ivan Smith to David Owen, Report on Nyasaland and Rhodesia, p. 5, June 1, 1962, Box 125, Cordier Papers.
copper mines, Northern Rhodesia/Zambia was considered the site of a legitimate nationalist movement while Katanga was a neocolonial front for a Western mining company.

The UN’s Declaration on the Granting of Independence, which sought to establish an international norm of national self-determination, coincided in time with proposals for regional federations throughout the decolonizing world – and might seem to be in opposition to such proposals. At first glance, some of these proposals for federation (including that which became the Organization of African Unity) appeared as if they might challenge the unitary sovereignty of states. However, in political practice the federations that came into existence were institutional frameworks that focused on protecting the sovereignty of their members rather than expanding their own federated power structures. Rather than offering an alternative to the postcolonial state, the federations that came into existence ended up as vehicles for those states to project greater international influence. Perhaps, instead of providing an expansive political vision beyond the shape (and limits) of the state, proposed federations – even the short-lived postcolonial ones such as the United Arab Republic (1958–1961) or the West Indian Federation (1958–1962) – were demonstrations of affinity between separate polities rather than structures of overarching unity surrounding them.

The Central African Federation, a colonial rather than postcolonial political structure, rarely features in these conversations about federations. It proposed a political possibility – of allegedly multiracial, shared government as a halfway measure between empire and independence – and then reversed its initial mission by dissolving into territorially bound, racially determined states. Discussing the probable demise of the Central African Federation, the Soviet representative on the UN Special Committee of 17 brought up the alleged secret talks between Tshombe of Katanga and Roy Welensky (prime minister of the Central African Federation) on “the union of Katanga with Northern Rhodesia.” According to the Soviets, António de Oliveira Salazar, prime minister and de facto dictator of Portugal, was also in talks with Welensky about “the establishment of a confederation between the CAF and the Portuguese colonies in Africa. It was their hope that that confederation, [with the] close cooperation of the Republic of South Africa … would

75 Getachew, Worldmaking after Empire, 141.
make it possible to maintain white domination” in Central and Southern Africa.” This white confederacy would be “backed by enormous economic and political forces,” since Northern Rhodesia’s copper production was in the hands of Anglo-American Corporation and of AMAX, who, according to the Soviets, wanted easier access to Katanga’s copper.

In November 1962, Jacob Kuhangua, a Namibian nationalist and member of the South West African People’s Organization (SWAPO), had just returned from Congo-Léopoldville, where he had met with Angolan nationalists. In testimony before the UN’s Special Committee of 17, Kuhangua said that SWAPO and the National Liberation Front of Angola “intended to announce to the international community their intention of forming in the future a Federation of the Independent States of Angola, Bechuanaland [which became independent Botswana in 1966] and South West Africa.” Their “intention to announce” a proposed federation to an international audience was more important than any actual plans for a federation. Similarly, whether or not Welensky and Tshombe had any realistic plans to federate a Copperbelt state was less important than their announced plans to do so – because such plans indicated their rejection of the colonial geopolitical and territorial definitions of Congo-Léopoldville and Northern Rhodesia (independent Zambia in 1964). In the same way, from the other end of the political spectrum, Kuhangua’s intent to form a Namibian-Angolan federation indicated a similar rejection of colonial borders and state structures. These announced plans for federations remained deliberately vague. They were tools for demonstrating alliance and affinity rather than sustained attempts to redraw political units.

The Congo Crisis showed leaders of new postcolonial states the threat to their own fragile sovereignty posed by competing nationalist movements with powerful international backers (such as Katanga). As demonstrated throughout the crisis, decolonization struggles could easily take on a Cold War character in a manner that had little to do with the Cold War or the global-political stance of particular nationalist organizations. In addition, nationalist claimants were not simply acted

76 Jacob Kuhangua testimony to Special Committee of 17 to monitor the Declaration on the Granting of Independence, p. 187, BB/0991, National Archives of Namibia (NAN).
77 Kuhangua to Special Committee of 17, p. 188, BB/0991, NAN.
78 Kuhangua to Special Committee of 17, p. 442, BB/0991, NAN. Italics added.
79 Getachew, Worldmaking after Empire, p. 141.
upon by the Great Powers; they also played “the Cold War game.” In that “game,” for instance, Michel Streulens (Tshombe’s Belgian press agent in New York City), playing off residual McCarthyism, lobbed US legislators to label both the UN and Patrice Lumumba, the democratically elected leader of Congo, as communist fronts. As noted, Kaunda made nice with all. While conciliating the Soviets by calling out the activities of Western corporations, he also made private agreements with the same corporations. In the words of a contemporary commentator, African nationalists “were attempting to do something more or less in this time frame the Indian government was failing at – and that is[,] not to be either partisan or an agent of one or the other of the major power blocs. And if the Indians could not do it, it’s no surprise that [they] did not do it either.” Avoiding the “Cold War trap” confounded not just Indians or Africans; it confounded the UN institution as well.

Advocates of nationalist claimants were also not immune from Cold War thinking. Michael Scott’s strategic formulation during the 1962 UN hearings before the Special Committee of ’71 relied on the threat of Cold War intervention: If the UN did not handle the problems of political injustice in the decolonizing world, then nationalist movements would become violent; if they became violent, then they would invite First World–Second World proxy wars in the Third World. This relationship between the Cold War, decolonization, and the role of the United Nations underscored how the Cold War endangered the United Nations’ ability to function as it was intended to and, thereby, to justify its own role in handing questions of international war and peace.

After the Second World War, UN intervention in Congo as well as wider patterns of decolonization took place within the possibilities of action prescribed by the Cold War framework – whether the parties involved liked it or not, tried to break away from it or not, or were aware of it or not. While the Cold War political straitjacket provided the opportunity for the UN to take the leadership role in Congo, UN officials understood how it also limited what the UN could do. As early as July 23, 1960 – twelve days after Katanga declared independence from just-liberated Congo-Léopoldville – UN secretary general Dag

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80 In the 1950s, US senator Joe McCarthy sparked an era of paranoia known as “McCarthyism,” or the “red scare,” by claiming that communists had infiltrated the US government.

81 Transcript from 2004 Wilson Center Congo Crisis Workshop, Herbert Weiss, p. 83. (Hereafter, cited as “Transcript, Speaker, page number.”)
Hammarskjöld cabled, “If the Cold War settles on the Congo, our whole effort is lost.”

How, then, do we conceptualize decolonization outside a Cold War frame? A better way to “frame” the question might be: How were the people actively involved in the process of decolonization thinking about it at the time? Nationalists and their advocates had their own interests and goals even as they were enmeshed in Cold War politics. While the US foreign policy establishment and its intelligence operatives knew very little about politics in Congo before 1960, they knew a lot about the international webs of missionaries and business interests in the region. The UN special envoy to Katanga Conor Cruise O’Brien, amusingly detailed how the US would lobby Ireland within the General Assembly on “colonial” issues by “producing a sensible, relevant missionary (Roman Catholic) if available and if vote of sufficient importance.” O’Brien’s remark hints at the interplay of multiple international networks – of missionaries, activists, and scholars; but also of business interests, of diaspora populations (sometimes created by decolonization), and eventually of development assistance experts. These were networks that the nationalists themselves mobilized to access power; networks that shaped and often constrained nationalist movements because they – the networks themselves – served multiple interests.

CONCLUSION

Networks of nationalist claimants and their advocates operated behind the scenes through personal connections even as they performed in public on the floor of the United Nations. As noted, Michael Scott introduced Kenneth Kaunda to Ronald Prain of the Rhodesian Selection Trust, who in turn brought Kaunda to the attention of the Rockefeller Foundation, a process that reinforced Kaunda’s transition from nationalist to national leader. In this way, Kaunda used advocates to develop and enhance his status with global powers and business interests before he became independent Zambia’s first president. In another example, Winifred Armstrong lobbied on behalf of Mburumba Kerina of South West Africa when she worked for then US senator John F. Kennedy. She helped

82 Quoted in Brian Urquhart, Ralph Bunche, 334.
83 Transcript, Devlin, p. 23. Union Minière helped the US build the atomic bomb; and the US often used international missionaries as lobbyists within the UN General Assembly.
84 O’Brien, To Katanga and Back, 19. Italics in original.
regularize Kerina’s visa status in the US so that he could attend the Second Afro-Asian People’s Conference in Tunis in January 1960, aiding the development of his international profile as a Namibian nationalist claimant. Networks of nationalists and their advocates were multiple, multidirectional, and overlapping; when Kerina asked Armstrong to urge Kennedy “to meet privately with the Union Government [of South Africa]” about the possibility of making South West Africa a UN Trust Territory, he reminded her to send written corroboration of his international petitioning to other Namibian nationalist claimants. Kerina’s petitioning worked in two different directions: from Armstrong to Kennedy to Christian Herter (US secretary of state, 1959–1961), and through Armstrong to leaders of rival Namibian nationalist formations.

As connectors between spheres of Great Power politics, multinational corporations, and international institutions, advocates formed bridges of continuity between empire and independence during the moments when decolonization promised to reorder international relations. Both Tshombe’s and Kaunda’s international advocates worked to legitimize these nationalists (and thus their claims) in international politics by stressing their “civilizational” similarities with Western norms of respectable leadership. Nationalist leaders made use of the prestige and connections of advocates who worked behind the scenes, maneuvering within the international-legal interstices of the United Nations institution. These interested individuals and organizations disaggregated Cold War binaries at the same time that they served Cold War projects, forming the strands of informal communication during moments of possible rupture. When formal modes of continuity – of capital, development, and state-to-state diplomacy – reasserted themselves in new, postcolonial states, these advocates, these unofficial politicians, dropped away. They were useful gatekeepers for advancing nationalist leaders in the realm of

84 John Kennedy to JM Swing, Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization Service (drafted by Armstrong), January 15, 1960, Box 3, Winifred Armstrong Papers, Schomburg Center for Black Culture, New York City.
85 Including Sam Nujoma, Andimba Toivo ya Toivo, as well as the Herero and Nama chiefs. Mburumba Kerina to Winifred Armstrong, December 21, 1959, Box 3, Armstrong Schomburg Center Papers.
86 John Kennedy to Christian Herter, letter (drafted by Armstrong), undated, probably January 1960, Box 3, Armstrong Schomburg Center Papers.
87 These notions of respectable leadership also held for how Soviets chose to back particular nationalist leaders; Andrew Ivaska, “Leveraging Alternatives: Early FRELIMO, the Soviet Union, and the Infrastructure of African Political Exile,” Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 41, no. 1 (2021): 11–26.
international politics and support, but their activities were incompatible with the sovereignty of the national leaders who came to lead independent states.

Nationalist movements generally condensed their state-making aspirations to align with colonial boundaries. With important exceptions, such as Bangladesh, secessionist insurgent movements that would have revised colonial borders tended to fail. Kwame Nkrumah (president of Ghana and a founding member of the Organization of African Unity) and Julius Nyerere (prime minister of Tanganyika and president of Tanzania, its successor state) looked to a United States of Africa rather than to a United States of Ghana or Tanzania.\(^8^9\) They – as well as Moise Tshombe of Katanga and Roy Welensky of the Central African Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, with their imagined federated Copperbelt state; or Jacob Kuhangua of SWAPO with his proposed Namibia-Botswana-Angola amalgamation – called for forms of African federation, not federated power structures within their respective states and states-in-waiting.

Katanga’s secession raised a three-headed spectre: of illegitimate nationalism, of decolonization’s potential failure, and of the challenge of “sub”-nationalisms to the emergent postcolonial international order of the expanding membership of the UN General Assembly. At a practical level, from the perspective of the UN, Katanga’s secession sabotaged the hope of a functional, democratic, independent Congo – and of the UN’s playing a key role in midwifing that creation.\(^9^0\) In addition, Katanga’s secession called newly nationalized state boundaries into question, therefore raising the prospect of international intervention – by the UN, multinational corporations, and Cold War actors – to police those boundaries. These interventions operated beyond Congo’s geographic limits and had an immediate impact on the wider financial concerns and political spheres in which Katanga was embedded: on the arcs of international investment, resource extraction, and controlled labor mobility surrounding mining in contiguous regions of Southern and Central Africa.\(^9^1\)

For the United Nations – attempting to position itself as the arbitrator of legitimate national self-determination – Katanga represented the

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tarnishing of decolonization’s promise at the moment of the process’s seeming greatest possibility. For that reason, anticolonial nationalist claimants and their advocates would not have wanted their efforts labeled under any title that included the name “Katanga.” The spectre of Katanga created a sense of revulsion and fear for proponents of anticolonial nationalist liberation because it rendered alternative postcolonial political possibilities both less feasible and less desirable – potentially the thin end of the wedge of neocolonialism.

Capital and Claims-Making

The historical trajectory of states-in-waiting – nationalist insurgent movements that claimed but had not yet received independence – was determined by many overlapping factors: their international-legal status vis-à-vis the United Nations, their popular support within their territories, the presence or absence of regional allies, their role in global Cold War politics, and the influence and impact of their international advocates, who often served as the connectors between these geopolitical spheres. In addition, a territory’s possession (or lack) of economic resources desired by multinational corporations shaped the pathways of particular nationalist claimants. In Southern Africa, the presence of natural resources made advocacy networks thick, overladen, multiple, and intertwined.

Especially in the context of the Cold War, nationalist claimants could find support from a range of governments, corporations, nongovernmental organizations, and the advocates who operated between these realms. Competition at the United Nations among nationalists and advocates for each other’s attention worked in both directions, creating what the advocate and World Peace Brigade member Reverend Michael Scott termed “bargaining football,” where anticolonial nationalist movements vied for the notice, logistical support, and the legitimacy that international forums could provide. Alongside this politicking at the United Nations, multinational mining companies sought to gain and maintain access to resources when colonies became new postcolonial states led by former nationalist

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Winifred Armstrong, notes on conversation, October 28, 1958, Box 3, Winifred Armstrong Papers, Schomburg Center for Black Culture, New York City.
movements. This dynamic created multiple interests and increased the competition between claimants and advocates.

MINING NATIONALISM IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

South West Africa, present day Namibia, was a German colony from 1884 until 1915. Following imperial Germany’s defeat during the First World War, the territory became a League of Nations mandate administered by South Africa. When the League became the United Nations, League of Nations mandates were transformed into UN trust territories and placed along the path of eventual, theoretical independence. However, South Africa sought to absorb South West Africa within its own sovereign borders, rather than allow it to become a trust territory. In response, Namibian claimants and their advocates petitioned the UN from 1946 onward to prevent this territorial incorporation (particular ethnic groups in Namibia had also petitioned the League of Nations, protesting the violent abuses of German imperial rule). Attempting to navigate these competing forces, as a practical matter the United Nations categorized South West Africa as a “former League of Nations mandate” rather than as a South African province, trust territory, or independent state. Because it was a former mandate, Namibia had its own UN committee – the Committee on South West Africa – which became a crucial portal for its nationalist claims-making. As decolonization shifted global norms in favor of national self-determination, the UN General Assembly officially dissolved the mandate in 1966, recognizing the potentiality of Namibia’s independence. However, Namibia remained de facto South African territory until the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of apartheid, eventually becoming independent only in 1990.

2 Regarding terminology of South West Africa/Namibia: The UN General Assembly adopted the name “Namibia” in 1966. Mburumba Kerina allegedly coined the name “Namibia” in conversation with Sukarno (the first president of Indonesia) sometime between 1960 and 1961; by 1962 many Namibian nationalists used it, but it was not agreed upon by all. There are arguments against using the term “South West Africa” because of potentially providing legitimacy to an apartheid state, and against using the term “Namibia” anachronistically, before it was in common use, and also arguments about when common use occurred in the years before 1966. In States-in-Waiting, I use the terms “Namibia” and “South West Africa” in analytical rather than strictly chronological context, in order to refer to nationalist conceptions of the territory versus those of international law.

The international-legal dimensions of Namibia’s struggle for national liberation are well known and well told. In addition, the territory was integrated within international politics through mining interests. A mine can mean more than a mine: the promise of resources and development can represent more than what lies beneath the land; claims to territory and its resources are central to the demand for sovereignty. Because of its German colonial past in which its colonizers did not recognize indigenous territorial rights, Namibia’s subterranean resources were (and are) not the property of individual landowners but, rather, of the ruling South West African Authority (and today, the Government of Namibia). Therefore, mining companies owned licenses to extract minerals rather than owning the mineral deposits themselves. Who controlled the South West African/Namibian government, then, was directly related to who could receive a license to access the country’s valuable mineral resources.

From 1907 onward, and intensifying after the Second World War, Tsumeb Mine in Northern Namibia was a productive copper mine and a center of regional migration and economic life. In the words of a migrant laborer family who moved to Tsumeb in the 1950s, “[I]t was a town like ... how do you call it, in a word? Manna? Milk and Honey!” By local standards, Tsumeb was “big” and “bustling,” though it took less

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than a half hour to cross the width of the town by foot. It was a company town where “life centered on the mine, a huge complex of buildings and monstrous machines where work never stopped.”

According to the Namibian nationalist John Ya-Otto, Tsumeb mine attracted people from all over the country . . . [members of the ethnic groups of] Hereros, Namas, Damaras, and Ovambos all lived side by side. Nearly all the men worked for the American Tsumeb Corporation as clerks, drivers, machine operators or staff in the company’s hotels and white workers’ bunkhouses. Most of the actual miners were contract workers who were confined to the compound, a cluster of big dormitories surrounded by a tall cement wall . . . [T]he police were always ready to pick up anyone who strayed into town. Only on Sundays were the workers free to leave the compound . . .

Ya-Otto’s reflection suggests the importance of Tsumeb mine as a regional nexus for the intermingling – which remained tightly controlled by apartheid segregation – of ethnic and racial groups, with a US-based multinational corporate employer. The issues of labor organizing, ethnic political alignment, and (the potential of) international oversight/interest converged at the mine.


10 Ya-Otto quote, in Ya-Otto with Gjerstad and Mercer, Battle-Front Namibia, 13.

11 Ya-Otto quote, in Ya-Otto with Gjerstad and Mercer, Battle-Front Namibia, 13.
Newmont Mining Company, which operated Tsumeb mine, owned 30 percent of the mine; American Metal Climax mining company (AMAX), 30 percent; Rhodesian/Roan Selection Trust, 14 percent; and multiple investors divided the final 26 percent. Much of the anticolonial nationalist agitation and advocacy concerning Tsumeb focused on AMAX, as the larger and more famous company, rather than on Newmont, its operating company. Additionally, AMAX – both because of the ties that its founding chairman, Harold K. Hochschild, had to the African-American Institute (a civil society advocacy organization that facilitated connections between the United States and African anticolonial nationalists, as well as newly independent African governments) and because of the company’s past desegregation of its labor force in Zambia – was considered a more sympathetic interlocutor and therefore a more productive target of nationalist agitation.

The presence of a US multinational corporation that was perceived as sympathetic to anticolonial nationalism, combined with a labor force dominated by the Ovambo ethnic group, which composed the leadership of the nationalist South West African People’s Organization (SWAPO) – made Tsumeb mine a prime site for nationalist claims-making and contestation. It situated South West Africa within the political and economic context of Southern African copper mining, and interconnected nationalist and anti-apartheid movements in Zambia, Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, and South Africa. Simultaneously, South West Africa’s status as a former League of Nations mandate set Namibian nationalists apart from other nationalist movements in that the Namibians had a direct portal for their

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14 Newmont also operated Okiep copper mine in South Africa and had interests in particular Zamibian copper mines, while AMAX operated particular Zambian mines and had shareholding interests in Tsumeb as well as Okiep.
international claims-making in the form of their own UN committee. The
presence of this international stage shaped the Namibian independence
struggle, while the regional context of resource extraction increased the
number of international actors involved behind the scenes at the UN
Committee on South West Africa.

Mining companies do not have a reputation for supporting anticolonial
nationalist movements. Indeed, corporate support for liberation move-
ments could potentially undermine the perceived legitimacy of the inde-
pendence struggle itself. In the case of Namibia, this did not occur because
the negotiations between nationalists, advocates, and corporate directors
occurred behind closed doors. These negotiations and conversations with
capitalists sat uncomfortably with nationalist movements’ public claims-
making and historical narrative-making. Because their meetings and cor-
respondence were unofficial, “off the record,” often secret, the connections
they fostered are difficult to find in available records. Yet even in their
limited documentation, these private exchanges make visible the presence
of capital and capitalists in the process of decolonization, a presence that
did not ignore state power but also did not rely upon it.

Certain conversations – such as those between SWAPO and mining
companies – could not be made public for two reasons: First, because
leaders of nationalist movements had no standing to be official negotiating
partners with international institutions, governments, or corporations.
Second, because if word of those negotiations reached their territories, it
would tarnish the anticolonial, nationalist legitimacy of the leader in
question by revealing his association with Western capitalist interests.
As with many other states-in-waiting, Namibian nationalists benefited
from private advocacy and were careful to distinguish between those
entities they would associate with in public and those they would not.

BRANDING THE NATION-STATE-TO-BE

The nationalist movement that became SWAPO – which was recognized
by the UN General Assembly in 1973 as the “authentic voice of the
Namibian people” and has been the ruling party of independent Namibia since 1990 – was founded in Cape Town, South Africa, in
1957 as the Ovamboland People’s Congress.15 The date and

15 Dates for the founding and the specific name of the Ovamboland People’s Congress or
Organization range from 1957 to 1959. Mburuma Kerina, “A Brief History of the
South West Africa People’s Organisation,” undated (likely August 1, 1960), gives the
circumstances behind SWAPO’s founding are subject to debate in Namibian history, demonstrating the legacies of the contestations within the nationalist movement.\textsuperscript{16}

In the late 1950s, a group of predominantly Ovambo workers and students, including Andimba Toivo ya Toivo, Jariretundu Kozonguizi (who was Herero), and Jacob Kuhangua met for private international-law discussions in the basement of Jack Simons, a professor at the University of Cape Town.\textsuperscript{17} Simons’s seminars dealt with South West Africa’s international-legal mandate status and how to use it to craft a national independence strategy. Ya Toivo sent an audiotaped petition – hidden in a hollowed-out copy of Robert Louis Stevenson’s\textit{ Treasure Island} – to the UN Committee on South West Africa, through Mburumba Kerina. Kerina, who was of mixed ethnicity, was the first Namibian to join Michael Scott in 1956 at the United Nations in New York City, when Scott petitioned the UN – as the personal, accredited representative of Herero chief Hosea Kutako – on behalf of Namibian nationalists, as he did annually from 1946 onward.

After Ya Toivo “got naughty” and sent the tape, the South African government deported him to South West Africa in December 1958, where

\begin{itemize}
\item founding date as 1958. 372 File AS.50/2/3/2 (v.2), National Archives of Namibia South West Africa Secretariat AS-Series (hereafter, “NAN SWAS”). Andimba Toivo ya Toivo gave the date as 1957; Ya Toivo interview with the author, July 29, 2015. Ya Toivo passed away on June 9, 2017; I am very grateful to have had the opportunity to meet and interview him.
\item A clear overview of the founding of and contestation between SWAPO and SWANU is in Lauren Dobell,\textit{ Swapo’s Struggle for Namibia: War by Other Means} (Basel: P. Schlettwein, 1998), 27–32. In his study, Tony Emmett,\textit{ Popular Resistance and the Roots of Nationalism in Namibia, 1913–1966} (Basel: P. Schlettwein, 1999), argues that there were three groups involved in post-1945 Namibian petitioning: the “traditional” leadership (the Herero Chiefs’ Council, who spoke through Michael Scott at the UN), contract workers (SWAPO), and the student diaspora (SWANU). Emmett shows how conflicts between these factions led to disunity and eventually to the rise of SWAPO as the dominant nationalist organization, but he also imposes a division between the SWANU “intelligentsia” and the labor-dominated SWAPO that simplifies their competitive dynamic. This reading has shaped much of the historiographical understanding of SWAPO-SWANU rivalry because of the importance of Emmett’s work and the use of his rich interview collection by subsequent scholars.
\item Toivo ya Toivo interview, July 29, 2015. Also referred to in Ray Alexander’s\textit{ Oral History}, University of Cape Town Historical Collections. Simons and Alexander were placed on successive South African banned lists after 1952 and were kicked out of the country in 1965. Simons also provided a history, political economy, and international law curriculum to African National Congress nationalist insurgents in Zambian camps. Syllabus is in Simons’s papers at the University of Cape Town’s Historical Collections, if these papers were not damaged by the 2021 fire.
\end{itemize}
he lived under surveillance for a decade.\(^\text{18}\) He ran the general store (and allegedly SWAPO’s regional intelligence operations) in Ondangwa (250 kilometers northwest of Tsumeb), where SWAPO members would link up before traveling to Tsumeb, a destination for Ovambo contract laborers who worked in the mine and were a source of SWAPO’s recruits.\(^\text{19}\) In 1968, the South African apartheid regime tried Ya Toivo for treason and imprisoned him for sixteen years on Robben Island with Nelson Mandela, a leader of the South African anti-apartheid movement and, eventually, the first president of post-apartheid South Africa.

While Ya Toivo remained in South West Africa, his Cape Town colleague, Kozonguizi – eventually the leader of SWAPO’s rival, SWANU (the South West African National Union) – made his way to New York City and joined Kerina and Scott at the United Nations.\(^\text{20}\) During the period from 1959 to 1960, Kerina, Sam Nujoma (who emerged as the leader of SWAPO and ultimately became Namibia’s first president), and Kuhangua combined the ethnically defined Ovamboland People’s Congress (founded in Cape Town) with the Ovamboland People’s Organization (based in Windhoek) into the nationally defined South West African National Congress; in the early 1960s it was renamed the South West African People’s Organization.\(^\text{21}\)

In New York City in 1959, Kerina wrote to Ya Toivo stressing the importance of changing the nationalist movement’s name in order to give the organization a “national character which can be of great use to” its political positioning at the UN.\(^\text{22}\) The purpose of such a name change was

\(^{18}\) Ya Toivo interview, 29 July 2015.


\(^{20}\) Kozonguizi formed SWANU before the Ovamboland People’s Organization rebranded itself as the explicitly nationalist SWAPO. While there are differing accounts for the inability of SWAPO and SWANU to fuse into a single, long-lasting nationalist movement, the divisions were fueled by ethnic and personal tensions, particularly between Kerina and Kozonguizi. Ronald Dreyer, *Namibia and Southern Africa: Regional Dimensions of Decolonization* (London: Routledge, 1994), 34.


\(^{22}\) Kerina to Ya Toivo, November 17, 1959, letter confiscated from Ya Toivo by SW African Authority, AACLRS.013, Box 2 Exhibit G, National Archives of Namibia (hereafter,
to underline the national rather than the ethnic character of the organization. If other ethnic groups did “not want to cooperate . . . just go ahead and change” the movement’s name, Kerina wrote. And if other groups chose to join – Kerina discussed the possibility of SWAPO’s having a Herero vice president underneath Ya Toivo and Nujoma (who were Ovambo) – he emphasized that it was important *not* to alter the movement’s current leadership to reflect the national character of the newly named organization. Nationalist claims-making rather than ethnic affiliation was a project that Kerina knew SWAPO needed to perform, even if it was not yet an identity that existed on the ground. Kerina, Ya Toivo, and Nujoma were thinking long-term with their national aspirations. This nationalist rebranding, and the internal contention it obscured, showed the importance of advocating for a territorially rather than an ethnically defined nation (however colonial might be its boundaries) in order to gain international legitimacy and the potential of future recognition.

Enshrining these vestigial, colonial turned international-legal borders into national (“Namibian”) and international (that of the United Nations) consciousness was a project, not predetermined, in 1959. Between 1957 and 1958, the UN Good Offices Committee on South West Africa considered splitting the territory, turning Ovamboland and surrounding northern areas (including Tsumeb) into a new kind of Trust territory, administered by South Africa (as it had been under the League of Nations). This proposal would then have allowed the southern portion of Namibia to be annexed fully as a province of South Africa. In October 1958, the UN General Assembly rejected this proposal for “partition and annexation.” In his 1959 letter to Ya Toivo, Kerina argued for the importance of a national (rather than ethnic) framing for their claims-making – not necessarily because he wanted the movement to maintain Ovambo dominance, but because he believed that it was integral that the “national” geographic territory of the Mandate become the borders of what they hoped would become their eventual independent state.


23 Kerina to Ya Toivo, November 17, 1959.
26 I am grateful to Bernard Moore for articulating this point.
Years later, in the late 1960s, after SWAPO had emerged as the dominant organization in the Namibian nationalist movement and the name “Namibia” had replaced “South West Africa” at the United Nations, national-territorial names remained a site of political dispute. In 1968, SWANU, SWAPO’s by-then disempowered rival, petitioned the UN to “protest against the name Namibia.” 27 Most of SWANU’s membership came from a different ethnic group than that of SWAPO; tensions between the groups grew as SWAPO received more international support. SWANU’s protest addressed issues of self-determination: “[W]e expect that our people should have been asked first before the christening ceremony was staged.” The UN General Assembly gave “us a new name” and claimed it “to be our wish. . . . What next will be decided or done in our name?” 28 The UN’s official name change of “South West Africa” to “Namibia” occurred with the support of some, but not all, Namibian nationalists. SWANU’s objection to the name “Namibia” was a symptom of its antagonism toward SWAPO’s ascendance at the UN. SWANU’s rejection of the name also reflected a rebuff to the UN as the institutional “bequeather” of international recognition because the institution had legitimized Namibia under the framework of SWANU’s rival. Even a name meant to symbolize a rebuff to colonialism by discarding a colonial label (“South West Africa”) could share the imperial connotation of outsiders naming – and thereby determining – a people through bestowing international recognition.

At the United Nations in the late 1950s and early 1960s, SWAPO (under the mostly Ovambo leadership of Nujoma, Kuhangua, and Kerina) and SWANU (under the mostly Herero leadership of Kozonguizi) tried to present themselves as unified and nationalist rather than in competition and ethnically defined. 29 At the time, both organizations had limited name recognition within their country itself. According to one of their international advocates in 1961, Randolph Vigne (a South African Liberal Party politician and member of the anti-apartheid movement who went on a fact-finding mission to South West Africa in 1961), “[N]either SWAPO nor SWANU were known” in the country, “. . . [y]et

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28 “Petition from the National Executive,” 191.
29 Kerina identifies as half Ovambo, half Herero, and was able to pass as mixed race to sneak out of South West Africa in 1952.
the same [ordinary] people insisted that every man knew through the UN they might get their country back.”

He argued that SWAPO lacked leadership in South West Africa and did nothing in-country: “all [wa]s centered in the work of the petitioners at the UN.”

Vigne’s words can be read as disparaging the “naiveté” of a people who see their potential political deliverance in the hands of a distant international institution. At the same time, the sentiment captured ordinary Namibians’ understanding of the importance of the United Nations as the authority that maintained their figurative separateness from South Africa, even as apartheid rule persisted. That figurative separateness had important long-term implications since it made it less likely that a future post-apartheid South Africa would rule a future independent Namibia.

However, in the immediate time horizon, Namibian nationalists grew increasingly frustrated with the slow pace and apparent futility of UN petitioning, as well as with Western governments’ backing for South Africa; thus, many sought support from alternative international backers. Kerina (then still with SWAPO) traveled to Sukarno’s Indonesia to study for his PhD at Padjadjaran University in Bandung and to seek international support; Kozonguizi of SWANU went to communist China in 1960 to generate similar attention. While internal divisions within the members of the Namibian nationalist movement were externally portrayed as ideological, they were often personality driven.

While in Peking, Kozonguizi gave a radio speech in which he allegedly called the United States “imperialist” and the United Nations “incompetent.” Subsequently, he argued that his words had been

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31 Vigne March 1961 Report, p. 5. I think Vigne exaggerates, because he was not allowed to spend time in Ovamboland, which was the location of most SWAPO support.

32 Mburumba Kerina interview with the author, May 4, 2016, where he recounted a conversation with Michael Scott that if the former League of Nations mandate dissolved and South West Africa became a fifth province of South Africa under international law, then there was no way a theoretical post-independent, democratically elected South African government would relinquish the territory.

33 Interview with Kerina, May 4, 2016.

34 Speech repeatedly described in: Kozonguizi to Brian Bunting Correspondence, October–November 1960, Brian Bunting Collection, Mayibuye Centre, University of the Western Cape. Also, Ruth First, *South West Africa* (New York: Penguin, 1963), 206–7.
Yet, as the speech took on a life of its own, it was not the words that Kozonguizi may or may not have uttered but their reception and interpretation that mattered. For Western audiences, Vigne reported in 1961, “Kozonguizi’s Peking speech brought the Cold War to South West Africa.”

In addition to SWANU’s perceived communist affiliation, labor relations gave certain Western capitalists another reason to negotiate with SWAPO. As early as 1960, Newmont, the managing company of Tsumeb mine, held a meeting with the newly named SWAPO in New York City. Newmont feared that SWAPO’s nationalist organizing in Tsumeb could help the labor union that was trying to organize the primarily Ovambo workers at the mine. Three of the SWAPO representatives at this 1960 meeting were Nujoma, Kerina, and Jacob Kuhangua, while Newmont’s representative was its vice-president of global operations, Marcus Banghart (who was American). Banghart described SWAPO as potentially “dangerous.” It was a movement Newmont needed to take seriously in its future planning. The specific outcomes from this meeting are not known. However, the absence of SWAPO support for trade unions in Namibia until the mid-1980s marked a striking silence in its nationalist history.

A transcript of this may be included in “Text of a Radio Broadcast Dated 19 August 1960, SW African National Union Chairman Interviewed in Peking” or “Text of a Radio Broadcast Dated 28 August 1960, Recorded Speech by Jariretundu Kozonguizi, President of the National Union of South West Africa” – both collected from UN General Assembly Committee on South West Africa, October 27, 1960, AC.4/447. From “Letter from the Permanent Representative of the Union of South Africa with Enclosures,” held in Allard K. Lowenstein papers, Subseries 2.11, UNC-Chapel Hill Wilson Library. Also available through Aluka digital library.

33 Kozonguizi tapes 1, TPA 48.4, Tony Emmett Interviews/Papers, Basler Afrika Bibliographien, Basel, Switzerland.
36 Banghart and Scheck, “Memorandum.” This meeting is also described in Moore et al., “Balancing the Scales,” 1–2.
37 Banghart and Scheck, “Memorandum.”
The disconnect between labor mobilization and SWAPO can appear counterintuitive because unionism and anticolonialism in many decolonizing contexts would seem to go hand in hand. In particular, SWAPO’s predecessor organizations had their roots in the activism of Ovambo contract workers. The 1950s-era advocacy for South West Africa included the work of South African trade unionist Ray Alexander (the partner of Jack Simons, noted earlier, who taught international law in his basement to Ya Toivo and other South West Africans in Cape Town) in Lüderitz Bay on the Atlantic coast of Namibia, where she organized workers in the country’s fishmeal and canning plants for the Food and Canning Workers Union. However, unions could also be perceived as a potential threat because they provided an alternative source of popular mobilization to that of nationalist movements. It is not accidental that leaders of postcolonial states often clashed with trade unions as they attempted to consolidate their power after independence.

It suited some international backers of anticolonial nationalism to publicly blame SWANU’s alleged communism for their decision to back SWAPO in the early 1960s. However, materially SWAPO had the potential to be the more useful partner, providing mining companies with


42 Nujoma and Kerina, “A Brief History.”


45 The Organization of African Unity recognized SWAPO as the sole legitimate authority in Namibia in 1968, the date when SWAPO’s dominance of Namibian nationalism is usually charted. It is ironic that SWAPO was chosen by particular international advocates in the early 1960s as the noncommunist option within the Namibian nationalist movement when, by the 1970s, it would be identified with communism and, by the 1980s, identified by US president Ronald Reagan as a “Marxist-terrorist band”; Michael McFaul, “Rethinking the ‘Reagan Doctrine’ in Angola,” International Security 14, no. 3 (1990): 131. For the larger regional context of SWAPO’s alliance with Cuba during the 1970s and 1980s, see Piero Gleijeses, Visions of Freedom: Havana, Washington,
a practical reason beyond Kozonguizi’s alleged communism to support SWAPO’s bid for leadership of the Namibian nationalist movement. This was a crucial moment before SWAPO’s dominance was assumed or assured: Hidden issues of labor relations, regional ethnic divisions, and resource extraction made SWAPO the more useful prospective working partner for Newmont and AMAX in the long term. At the same time, in 1960, it was not guaranteed that SWAPO would lead Namibian nationalism – nor was it foreseeable that Namibian independence was still thirty years away. Indeed, independence seemed on the horizon for the territory’s Copperbelt neighbors, where AMAX and other multinational mining companies had formed mutually beneficial relationships with emerging nationalist leaders, such as Kenneth Kaunda in soon-to-be-independent Zambia. Some mining companies had long-term goals of ongoing and future investment that stretched from the colonial through the postcolonial periods. From this perspective, staying on the side of a potential, future government (and in the process, reinforcing that nationalist movement’s legitimacy against that of their competitors) was practical politics.

SWAPO and SWANU claimed to represent the same state-in-waiting. Throughout the Cold War period, any actual ideological differences between the two groups mattered much less than the external, international projection of “communist” or “capitalist” ideology onto them and how their leadership responded to that projection. Ethnicity remained a silent, though salient, category for popular mobilization, subsumed by the “national” label required for achieving international recognition of nationalist legitimacy. The significance (and arbitrariness) of that label as a requirement for such recognition showed the relationship between claims-making and international institutional legitimacy for nationalist movements. Claims of national sovereignty needed external recognition to have the potential to be realized, even when predicated upon ideals of national self-determination.

PUBLIC CLAIMS-MAKING VERSUS PRIVATE ADVOCACY

In 1962, SWAPO had one of its first reorganizations. Its president, Sam Nujoma, broke with Kerina “because he had written to AMAX asking for


money without the consent and agreement of SWAPO.” Nujoma made this statement in New Age, responding to an allegation made in that newspaper a month prior that SWAPO had expelled Kerina because the latter had been in negotiations with SWANU about merging the two organizations. Nujoma explained that, on the contrary, SWAPO had expelled Kerina because of his associations with Western capitalists rather than with alternative Namibian nationalists. That explanation and the fact that Nujoma had published his remarks in New Age, a publication edited by Brian Bunting, a member of the by-then underground South African Communist Party, were both strong signals of SWAPO’s public anti-capitalist politics.

It was crucial for SWAPO to avoid the appearance of closeness to AMAX and other Western financial interests. In his public statement on Kerina’s expulsion, Nujoma mentioned that Kerina’s negotiations with AMAX ran counter to SWAPO’s position that “we do not commit ourselves to anything that might endanger the future of our country,” highlighting AMAX’s willingness to do business with the apartheid labor regime that controlled the staffing of Tsumeb mine. Nujoma did not say that negotiating with AMAX was per se against SWAPO policy; rather, that Kerina’s doing so without permission was against SWAPO policy. He also ignored the fact that Newmont, not AMAX, managed Tsumeb, and that he and Kerina had negotiated with Tsumeb management two years prior to Kerina’s expulsion from SWAPO. Because AMAX had a much larger international profile than Newmont, nationalist claimants often referred to AMAX as the owner of mining operations in which it was only a shareholder, instead of talking about the companies that actually managed specific mines – demonstrating the importance of Tsumeb mine as a focus of international attention as well as resource extraction.

47 Sam Nujoma, “Kerina Expelled from SWAPO,” New Age, November 8, 1962.” Historical Collections, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa: “Mr. Kerina was officially expelled from SWAPO on October 20, 1962 at the meeting of SWAPO held at the UN headquarters in New York.”

48 Years later, Kerina, adrift from SWAPO, ironically turned to the political heirs of the right-wing, anticommunist, US-based clique that had advocated for an independent Katanga in the early 1960s. He asked them for financial support in return for providing material for anti-SWAPO pamphlets. National Community to Restore Internal Security, “A Citizen’s Inquiry on Namibia and SWAPO,” Kerina testimony, July 1981. PÅ/1117, NAN.

49 Nujoma, “Kerina Expelled from SWAPO.”

50 Banghart and Scheck, “Memorandum.”
During their Cape Town period in the late 1950s, Ya Toivo and Kozonguizi became friends and colleagues with a range of South African communists such as Brian Bunting and Jack Simons, as well as liberals such as Vigne. The divisions between white South African communists and liberals were not of critical importance to Namibian nationalists in their early Cape Town years. The apartheid state’s crackdown in the early 1960s ended a period of “lawfare” where it had been possible for the anti-apartheid movement to use the courts to fight “for liberty” that could not be gotten “through legislation.” Many South African advocates for both the anti-apartheid movement and Namibian nationalist claims-making went into exile after the apartheid regime’s bannings and imprisonments that followed the militant wing of the African National Congress (ANC)’s shift to violence in 1961 in the wake of the Sharpeville massacre. (The ANC was the most prominent anti-apartheid organization in South Africa and has governed that country since 1994.) There was a degree of uneasiness between Namibian nationalists and the ANC. Namibian nationalists hesitated to incorporate the Namibian liberation struggle into the general anti-apartheid movement in South Africa, since they feared that a future Black majority–ruled South Africa would not be amenable to Namibian independence. Yet in the early Cape Town years, Namibian nationalists worked fully with the South African anti-apartheid movement.

Throughout the 1960s, as many Namibian nationalist leaders were forced into exile by the South African government, they became participants in an anticolonial nationalist circuit of university education, military training, and expatriate living. Kerina attended Lincoln University

Ya Toivo with the author, 29 July 2015.
Leon Levy with the author, 14 August 2015.
Interview with Mburumba Kerina, 4 May 2016.
in Pennsylvania, also the alma mater for Nnamdi Azikiwe and Kwame Nkrumah, the first presidents of Nigeria and Ghana, respectively. SWAPO members congregated in Algeria, Zambia, Tanzania, and Angola for military training and organization.\textsuperscript{56} Funding for these scholarships, training programs, and camps came from a patchwork of external backers and advocacy organizations – and included financial support from AMAX channeled through the African-American Institute (with whom AMAX shared board members), an American advocacy organization that facilitated connections between the United States and students and leaders from newly independent African states and states-in-waiting.

Internal divisions within the Namibian nationalist movement took on Cold War colors as nationalists looked for international advocates – who, in turn, supported nationalist claimants based on a combination of the latter’s perceived internal legitimacy, utility, and external position in the Cold War. By the late 1960s, SWAPO itself sought some communist backing (particularly from Cuba and China) but was likewise careful to distance itself from outright communist alignment so as not to alienate Western supporters.\textsuperscript{57} While anticolonial nationalists attempted to manipulate Cold War tensions (with varying degrees of success), presenting dueling public and private faces to different strategic audiences, eventually their perceived position(s) within the Cold War alignment acted as a constraint on their possible actions. Kozanguizi’s Peking speech and its aftermath, which marginalized his political party, provides an example of how detrimental both the immediate effects and the after-effects of this characterization could be.

This focus on public versus private ideological orientations can make it easy to brand certain anticolonial nationalists as opportunists rather than legitimate nationalists. Further, the communist-versus-capitalist binary can be misleading as an analytical framework for understanding decolonization struggles. It obscures nationalists’ own attempts to take advantage of the Cold War, sometimes by signaling support for one side or the other


in order to attract external backing, other times by owning its idioms and expressions. From the mid-1970s onward, SWAPO often used the language of Marxist-Leninist nationalist liberation groups in its public statements. This performance has continued well beyond the Cold War era: in his eulogy for Ya Toivo upon his passing in 2017, Namibian president Hage Geingob addressed him as “Comrade Andimba,” showing how liberationist political culture still permeated the organization’s public pronouncements.

AMAX AND SWAPO

The impact of decolonization on resource extraction and land ownership was cast as a Cold War ideological contest between communism and capitalism by Great Power politics. In the early 1960s, the Congo Crisis, precipitated by Katanga’s attempt to break away from Congo-Léopoldville, provided the template for delegitimizing certain nationalists because of their close public association with Western capital. Within this environment, Namibian nationalists called attention to the continued imperialism of multinational mining companies and their interlocking directorates of shareholders, with a particular focus on Tsumeb Mine and AMAX’s holdings there.

In December 1962, the UN Committee on South West Africa held hearings focused on Tsumeb mine and the wider context of Southern African copper mining. The Moroccan representative on the committee asked about resource extraction and development in that territory. Michael Scott of the World Peace Brigade, speaking to the committee as the personal representative of the Herero Chief Hosea Kutako, quoted from “The Team Rules Mining in Southern Africa,” an article by the anthropologist and advocate Alvin Wolfe that heavily criticized AMAX. This was at least the third time this article had been cited in testimony to a UN committee in a six-month period: Kenneth Kaunda of Northern Rhodesia/Zambia had referred to it in his April 1962 testimony on the mining companies who controlled resource extraction in the

Copperbelt, and Scott had previously used it in testimony against Katanga during the Congo Crisis in the early 1960s.\(^6\)

During these December 1962 hearings, Kozonguizi of SWANU attacked US imperialism and neocolonialism, with a specific mention of AMAX and its subsidiary, Tsumeb Corporation.\(^6\) Similarly, SWAPO submitted a sixty-page memo listing every foreign mining company with subsidiaries in South West Africa. These companies, the memo read, with their “giant, world-wide monopolistic interests and the influence that they wield in the political circles of their own countries, are partners in the invisible, internationalized forces which control the present and determine the future of South West Africa.”\(^6\) Thus, Namibian nationalists – whether or not of rival organizations – and their advocates drew direct lines between resource extraction and Western capitalist support for apartheid, using a similar script to anticolonial nationalist critiques of the Central African Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland as well as of Katanga.

AMAX was not pleased when unnamed friends at the US Mission to the UN notified the corporation about Kozonguizi’s, Scott’s, and SWAPO’s statements at the December hearings. It submitted to the Committee on South West Africa a brief on Tsumeb Corporation, the details of US investment, and the limitations under which Tsumeb operated due to strictures of the South African regime.\(^6\) As an addendum, AMAX noted the differences in the conditions of its employed African laborers in the Tsumeb region (very poor) and in its mines in (then) Northern Rhodesia (much better): the latter had become an example of how training and development programs might create a desegregated, highly skilled labor force. The company blamed the differences on the difficulties of dealing with the apartheid regime.

AMAX came away from the 1962 hearings of the UN Committee on South West Africa determined to be seen as supportive of certain

\(^{61}\) Kaunda testimony to Special Committee on Decolonization, April 24, 1962, Lowenstein Papers, Subseries 2.11. Scott’s testimony is described in F. Taylor Ostrander, “AMAX Internal Memo to Management,” November 26, 1962, Box 25, Armstrong Hoover Papers.


\(^{63}\) AMAX, “Evolution of the Recent Attacks.” The SWAPO memo that is quoted in the internal, unauthored AMAX memo of December 1962 is also included in the Peter Katjavivi microfilms collections, PA 1/8/1.

\(^{64}\) AMAX, “Evolution of the Recent Attacks.”
anticolonial nationalists rather than as a backer of settler-colonial regimes. Three years later, in 1965, a year after Zambian independence, AMAX decided to “contribute to, rather than back away from, the forces for change” in Southern Africa, “this most backward part of the developing world.” AMAX would “search out whatever opportunity exists to display in the explosive situation in South West Africa the same type of industrial statesmanship which has characterized [its] investment policy in Northern Rhodesia.” Under this policy, AMAX hired the advocate Winifred Armstrong, who had previously served in an unofficial capacity for then US senator John F. Kennedy as an advisor on African politics. Her personal connections and friendships with particular African anticolonial nationalists were useful in pursuit of AMAX’s new policy of “industrial statesmanship.”

In 1960, working for Kennedy when he was president-elect, Armstrong had tried to ease visa restrictions and financial difficulties for UN petitioners from South West Africa. At AMAX, she continued the company’s circumscribed support of particular South West Africans. Since 1962, according to an internal AMAX memo written in 1965, the mining company had committed nearly 9,000 USD “to assist in bringing South West Africans over to the US from Africa.” Another internal AMAX memo, written earlier in 1965, notes, however, that because of the “necessity to veil the source of the funds” from the eyes of the South African government – as well as because of the relatively modest amount of the funds – “their public relations impact has been limited.” Namibian nationalists continued their refusal to publicly participate in AMAX-sponsored scholarship and development programs, nor did AMAX want to be directly linked to such support.


68 Erasmus H. Kloman, Jr., confidential memo, March 17, 1965, Box 2, Armstrong Papers, the Hoover Institution.
In 1965, Jacob Kuhangua of SWAPO privately asked AMAX for money to build and maintain a Dar es Salaam refugee center. For AMAX, it was crucial that “the money should be used through some responsible agency,” not received from the corporation directly. The company justified its assistance because “even though the fortunes of the exiled parties . . . may be at a low ebb at present . . . they might be of future importance.” Once again the Cold War context came into the picture: Erasmus Kloman Jr., an investment economist at AMAX, wrote in a confidential memo that Namibian nationalists in Dar es Salaam “ought not to be so highly dependent on help from the East”; instead, “they ought to be helped by the Western private sector.” For AMAX, the ideal model of US political aid was that provided by private enterprise and channeled through responsible nongovernmental organizations like the African-American Institute, an entity in which it exerted influence. The company was careful to support leaders whom it believed to be moderate, anticommunist, and nonviolent – in its view, peaceful political transition would lead to peaceful mining, preferably without nationalization of industry.

Kuhangua never got to run an AMAX–African-American Institute–SWAPO refugee center in Dar es Salaam. The center was never built, and for good reason: neither SWAPO nor AMAX wanted to take the risk of making their connection public. However, their negotiations over the center showed how nationalist claimants and their international advocates embarked on complex dances of private alignment and public divergence.

AMAX’s limited, careful advocacy had repercussions for the shape of the Namibian nationalist movement, not because it gave that movement substantial support but because of how that support was construed from the outside. As described earlier, Nujoma, the head of SWAPO, had publicly blamed his split with Kerina on the latter’s negotiations with AMAX. The South West African Authority (which governed South West Africa for the apartheid regime) knew about AMAX’s advocacy and used it to exacerbate inter-Namibian rivalries. One of their informal advocates told Kozonguizi of SWANU that South Africa’s “intelligence service . . . had learned of the relationship between SWAPO representatives in New York with AMAX” through “Top Secret correspondence between the

69 Kloman, confidential memo, March 17, 1965.
70 Kloman, confidential memo, March 17, 1965.
71 Kloman, confidential memo, March 17, 1965.
Kozonguizi was told that both US organizations were helping SWAPO because they considered SWAPO “pro-West in outlook, as against SWANU’s hostile attitude towards the West.” While South African interests were hardly a reliable, disinterested source for AMAX’s relations with SWAPO, it is telling how they found the issue of AMAX and African-American Institute’s support useful to exacerbate fractures within the Namibian nationalist movement. Paradoxically, South Africa also characterized SWAPO as “communist” – another example of the strategic malleability of the “communist” and “capitalist” labels.

Like South Africa, AMAX kept itself informed about internal Namibian nationalist rivalries. Kerina, expelled from SWAPO, came looking for support from AMAX in 1966 for his own political projects. He expressed “high regard for the Hochschilds,” the brothers who had held leadership roles at the corporation, but he felt that AMAX, through its financial contributions, was becoming dangerously aligned with SWAPO. Winifred Armstrong, as AMAX’s representative, clarified to Kerina that AMAX did not contribute to SWAPO but, rather, to the African-American Institute. She also made a note to AMAX management that the US State Department, the American Committee on Africa (an American anti-apartheid advocacy organization led by George Houser), and the foreign ministries of many Southern and Central African states regarded Kerina as “a double-dealer” and that his “many statements need to be taken with caution.”

In contrast, when Kuhangua of SWAPO came to AMAX asking for funding for the refugee center in Dar es Salaam, he mentioned that he understood AMAX’s “policy of contributing only to organizations which administer or sponsor programs in which [it was] interested.” In making a subsequent funding request, Kuhangua also indicated “that the mines will be equally if not more important to an independent South


75 Armstrong to F. T. Ostrander, February 17, 1966, Box 2, Armstrong Papers, the Hoover Institution.

76 Winifred Armstrong to Harold K. Hochschild, June 28, 1966, Box 2, Armstrong Papers, the Hoover Institution.

77 Armstrong to Hochschild, June 28, 1966.
West Africa than they are at present,” assuring AMAX of his and
Nujoma’s pro-American credentials. Shortly thereafter, Kuhangua was
knifed on the streets of Dar es Salaam by another member of SWAPO.
Armstrong visited him in the New York City hospital where he was being
treated; she noticed that Kuhangua’s SWAPO colleagues were taking
advantage of his disability to sideline him within the nationalist
movement.

THE SOUTH WEST AFRICA CASE AT THE INTERNATIONAL
COURT OF JUSTICE

Back in 1957, Reverend Michael Scott had presented a memo to Ghana’s
new president, Kwame Nkrumah, on bringing the case of South West
Africa to the International Court of Justice. In the memo, Scott argued
that South West Africa was South Africa’s Achilles heel – thus, it could be
a backdoor to dismantling the growing structures of apartheid. He
suggested that such a case would show that South Africa had violated
the “sacred trust” of the League of Nations mandate through apartheid
rule and by its refusal to relinquish the territory.

Scott’s plan was not taken up until the pivotal year of 1960, when the
UN General Assembly declared national self-determination an inter-
national norm. Moving to assert that norm, Ethiopia and Liberia, as
African countries that had been members of the League of Nations,
instituted proceedings against South Africa in the International Court
on behalf of South West Africa. The case challenged the legitimacy of
South African rule of the territory and became the central piece of
international advocacy on behalf of Namibian nationalist claims-making.
After the case was taken up, Scott played a much less active role in
Namibian claims-making. He did not enjoy warm relations with
SWAPO, since he remained closer to the Herero Chiefly leadership and
was skeptical of what he perceived as SWAPO’s domination of other

78 Winifred Armstrong to F. T. Ostrander, August 4, 1966, Box 2, Armstrong
Hoover Papers.
79 Winifred Armstrong, undated note, late 1966, Box 2, Armstrong Hoover Papers.
80 Michael Scott, A Time to Speak (London: Farber and Faber, 1958), 350; Chris Saunders,
81 Scott, A Time to Speak, 35. 82 Scott, A Time to Speak, 40.
Namibian ethnic groups. He placed his faith in the International Court to carry out a nonviolent international-legal strategy in pursuit of Namibian independence.

Yet even Scott had doubts about the various structures he had hoped could resolve nationalist claims of self-determination. He pondered how “we” – the international community of the United Nations and the circle of civil society advocates with whom he worked (through its interstices) – can “write a Charter to promote human rights, and then proceed to ask for a committee to define them, for a Court of Justice to interpret them. That way lies disaster . . .”. Scott left a telling ellipsis after this statement, refusing to engage with the alternative to these international-legal structures, even as he critiqued them.

The South West Africa case at the International Court was the second major international institutional confrontation between South Africa and newly (or soon-to-be) independent nations, confrontations that illuminated the United Nations’ potential to address questions of national liberation, self-determination, and discrimination in Southern Africa. The first occurred in 1946 when Mrs. Pandit, pre-independent India’s ambassador to the United Nations, brought up the issue of discrimination against South Asians in South Africa. Among other sources, she used testimony procured by Scott, from when he worked in his parish in the Johannesburg slum of Tobruk during the 1940s; this testimony showcased the historical collaboration between Indian politicians and Western advocates as well as the utility of the United Nations as a forum to

83 Examples of this perception in Scott’s papers include Hosea Kutako to Scott, October 6, 1955, Box 74. Transcript of Cyrill Dunn interview with David Astor, May 10, 1975; and Scott editorial in the Times (of London) on Kutako’s death, August 15, 1970, both Box 5, GMS Papers.
85 Scott, A Time to Speak, 239; Scott published his memoir two years before the International Court of Justice took up the South West Africa case.
support anticolonial nationalism. It also began the process of making South Africa a pariah state in postwar international politics.

The International Court’s South West Africa case was a significant intervention, with far-reaching impact. In 1962, the Court issued an advisory opinion that seemed favorable to the plaintiffs (Ethiopia and Liberia) and gave certain Namibian nationalists observer status at the Court. Those given observer status included Nujoma of SWAPO but not Kozonguizi of SWANU, lending legitimacy to the former and undermining that of the latter. Then, in 1966, the Court handed down a surprise split verdict against the norm of self-determination, stating that the plaintiffs had no standing, having not established “any legal right or interest” in the case. This “nondecision” closed the possibility that the United Nations institution could – or would – formally address and successfully arbitrate the legitimacy of nationalist claims.

During the case, both supporters and opponents of anticolonial nationalism and Namibian independence used intermediaries to provide evidence and testimony to international political and legal circles – the former against and the latter in favor of South Africa’s continued control over South West Africa. South Africa employed their own missionary-anthropologist who argued for the legitimacy of apartheid, or “separate development,” as “respectful” modernization that did not mean abandoning the “sacred heritage” of particular ethnic groups. This emphasis on the categorization and “protection” of particular Namibian communities in South Africa’s testimony was drawn from the Odendaal Commission (1964), a South African enquiry into the organizational and ethnic composition of South West Africa carried out for the purpose of preventing “the emergence of nationalism.” The Odendaal Plan outlined an organizational system for Namibia based around

88 Spender ruling in Dugard, The South West Africa/Namibia Dispute, 261.
politically “independent” territorial entities. Namibian nationalists viewed Odendaal as a classic colonial “divide and rule” ethnic strategy. It linked ethnicity to territory in a manner meant to undercut the territorial foundations of the nationalist movement – which were, ironically, the structure of the Mandate.

At the International Court, South Africa’s main source for up-to-date information on Namibian nationalism was Kurt Dahlmann, the editor of the Allgemeine Zeitung, Windhoek’s German-language newspaper. Dahlmann immigrated to Namibia in 1958; as a former Second World War Luftwaffe pilot with his own airplane and a West German passport, he was one of the very few pro-apartheid white South West Africans or South Africans who had the means and documentation to travel around the decolonizing African continent. Flying himself, he attended most of the independence festivities across the continent and personally conversed with many of the Namibian nationalists in exile.⁹¹

In this way, Dahlmann became South Africa’s “native political parties” expert for their case at the International Court of Justice, submitting a report that concluded, “Ethiopia and Liberia were opposed to any factual enquiry into the situation in South West Africa.”⁹² Instead, he wrote, their case rested on “the theory that an international legal norm [of national self-determination] exists which is objectively determinable.”⁹³ Dahlmann questioned whether a people who lacked independence were necessarily oppressed, arguing that Namibian nationalists and their advocates had to make the case that oppression was the issue at hand, and that it existed in South West Africa. And if South Africa had to disprove “oppression” for the Court to rule in its favor, it could (and did) do so by discrediting the reliability of Namibian claimants at the UN. Therefore, the disorganization and in-fighting within the Namibian nationalist movement and their (according to Dahlmann) “exaggerated” claims at the UN mattered when judging the legitimacy of their cause. However, if the issue were the international-legal definition of South West Africa’s status – mandate? independent state? South African province? – then what happened inside the territory did not matter.

⁹¹ Author conversation with Dag Henrichsen, the archivist for Dahlmann’s papers, May 25, 2016.
⁹³ Dahlmann, “One Man Many Parties.”
In brief, under Dahlmann’s reasoning, if the issue were how, rather than that, South Africa ruled South West Africa, then it was necessary for Namibian nationalists to provide proof that South African rule oppressed people living in South West Africa. This, of course, was rather difficult for Namibian nationalists to do since, by 1966, those in a position to give testimony to the UN and the International Court had been in exile for a number of years. Parsing through the layers of obfuscation of what apartheid rule actually meant for black and mixed-race peoples in Namibia, Dahlmann made a pointed observation about the components of legitimacy for nationalist claims in international politics: Was South African rule itself illegitimate? Or was it how South Africa ruled South West Africa that was illegitimate? If the latter, how could evidence provided by “disorganized” nationalist factions, whose leaders lived in exile, demonstrate what the “Namibian people” “legitimately” felt? Dahlmann expressed concern about the legitimacy of Namibian nationalist claims-making in order to undermine any genuine discussion on the topic of Namibian independence. Nevertheless, the question that hid beneath his derailment of that primary issue was one with which advocates of independence themselves grappled: What were the components of legitimate nationalism?

CONCLUSION

Global structural forces of resource extraction and power politics shaped the actions of nationalist claimants, their advocates, and their opponents during postwar decolonization, an era when territorial control and international institutional recognition of “legitimate” states seemed to shift from year to year, or even week to week. The often-violent transition from colony to state mapped the boundaries of independent states onto regions with a host of internal nationalist claims.

Namibia’s nationalist movement was shaped by factors that included Cold War politics, the territory’s lucrative natural resources, its status as a former League of Nations mandate, the leadership of rival nationalist groups, and the complex networks of its international advocates that navigated between these spheres. That Namibia was a former mandate with its own UN committee, combined with its natural resources – a combination not present for many states-in-waiting – greatly influenced the strategies and networks involved in Namibia’s struggle for independence.
Material interests and ideological concerns are rarely separate spheres of political action. The long, drawn-out, nearly thirty-year international advocacy campaign for international economic sanctions against apartheid South Africa demonstrated how material and ideological pressure points could be combined to generate political action. In Namibia, Tsumeb mine became important to Namibian nationalist claims-making in part because it was a productive copper mine in a region whose labor force shared ethnicity with the dominant Namibian nationalist movement. In addition, the mine became a site for Western attention and therefore the potential of Western intervention in the politics of the region. Namibian nationalists and their international advocates attempted to harness the power of capital to serve their struggle for independence. Throughout this process, unofficial advocates facilitated the negotiations between capitalists and nationalists, which were often secret. That nationalists and advocates hid their affiliations with capital did not undercut the moral dimension of much of their work nor enable one to write off individual achievements as substitutes for state or corporate power – to do so would critically simplify the complex analytical and political terrain on which they operated.

South West Africa, as a former League of Nations Mandate rather than an official colony of South Africa, was, in Namibian nationalist Jacob Kuhangua’s words, “neither territory nor nation” but an artificial creation, “an international balancing act that could not endure” in the long term. South West Africa’s artificial international creation as a former mandate provided the foundation for its nationalist claims-making – a strategy that made nationalists extremely reliant on international


96 Kuhangua, UN Committee to Monitor the Declaration on the Granting of Independence, p. 442, BB/0991 NAN.
advocates for the invitations, passports, visas, and funding required to access the United Nations and its related organizations. Advocacy (corporate, civil society, governmental, international institutional) had a significant role maintaining South West Africa/Namibia’s territorial integrity because it was originally an international structure. Namibian nationalists were well aware of the precarious, double-edged benefit of their status as a former international Mandate, which combined the promise with the original denial of national self-determination. 97

PART III

THE BOUNDARIES OF DECOLONIZATION
Abbreviations
BT: Bhutan
EP: East Pakistan

Administrative boundaries, country names, and disputed regions c.1963

MAP 6.1 Southern Asia in the aftermath of the 1962 Sino-Indian War. Map by Geoffrey Wallace
Marching into the Great Wall of State

Many of the unofficial advocates for states-in-waiting, for nationalist insurgent movements claiming statehood, were individuals affiliated or identified with the international peace movement. At times, these transnational advocates found themselves championing independence struggles in states-in-waiting that were situated within newly decolonized postcolonial nation-states. While some within these postcolonial state governments may themselves have relied on these advocates during their own independence struggles, they opposed such advocacy after they won their independence, since it had the potential to undermine their own state sovereignty. The 1963 Friendship March – launched by the World Peace Brigade, a transnational civil society organization set up to find peaceful solutions to global decolonization, exemplified this contradiction. The Friendship March started in New Delhi, India, and intended to cross the Chinese border in the immediate aftermath of the 1962 Sino-Indian War.

**SINO-INDIAN WAR ZONES**

Following Indian independence (1947) and the victory of the Chinese Communist Party in the Chinese civil war, which resulted in the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (1949), an uneasy truce between India and China allowed each to build military installations in the regions where their borders remained unresolved: Kashmir and Arunachal Pradesh/North East Frontier Agency (located in Northeast India, the same region as Nagaland, a territory struggling for independence from India). In October 1962, Jawaharlal Nehru, the Indian prime minister, announced that India would clear what he considered Indian territory
of Chinese military incursions, and China invaded India. The Indian army was already stretched thin, with peacekeeping commitments to the UN in Congo (due to Katanga’s attempted secession from Congo) as well as with its ongoing “pacification” efforts in Nagaland. The Chinese invasion completely routed the Indian military. After making a statement of borderland dominance, China declared a ceasefire and withdrew from most of its military advances so that it did not have to respond to the international pressure that would have accompanied a more permanent occupation.

For Indians, the defeat stung bitterly. In the words of Nehru’s biographer, Sarvepalli Gopal, “No one who lived in India through the winter months of 1962 can forget the deep humiliation felt by all Indians.” The 1962 Sino-Indian War is often considered an end date – of nonalignment, of hindu-chini-bhau-bhau (“India and China as brothers,” a 1950s Indian catchphrase for diplomacy with China); of domestic Nehruvianism (the balance between state-planned economic centralization and individual freedoms); and, eventually, of Nehru himself, who died in May 1964. While his health had been unstable throughout the 1960s, it is possible that the trauma of defeat accelerated Nehru’s death. The 1962 war highlighted and exacerbated the many acute challenges facing the Indian central government, instantiating the frame of national security around India’s “fissiparous tendencies” – its regional autonomic demands – especially in regions that had experienced Chinese invasion: the Indian Northeast and Kashmir. The 1962 war lasted just over a month, but it had ongoing effects in securitizing and nationalizing borderlands regions, especially as it did not resolve the disputed border between India and

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2 Manjari Chatterjee Miller, Wronged by Empire: Post-Imperial Ideology and Foreign Policy in India and China (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2013), 63.


4 Most famously, Ramachandra Guha, India after Gandhi (New York: Macmillan, 2007); also, Shashi Tharoor, Nehru: The Invention of India (New Delhi: Arcade Publishing, 2011 [2003]).
China. Three thousand Indian citizens of Chinese origin were interned in camps in India, and tribal peoples in Northeast India came to be racialized as “chinki” – foreign, and visually linked to a national foe.

Neville Maxwell – an Australian journalist who visited Nagaland in Northeast India as part of a 1960 reporting mission and who was a contributing writer to the Minority Rights Group, a nongovernmental organization originally set up to address the Naga’s nationalist claims – wrote the formative revisionist account of the Sino-Indian War. This account was revisionist because Maxwell blamed Nehru for deliberately provoking the Chinese: the “Indian side is impaled on Nehru’s folly of declaring India’s boundaries fixed, final and non-negotiable ... A boundary dispute is soluble only in the context of negotiations.” A harsh critic of Nehru, Maxwell considered India not only “the product of the British imperium,” but also more fixed-boundary-centric than empire had ever been. He concurred with the belief that decolonization internationalized imperial boundaries, making the more permeable border zones of empire into hard borders between nation-states. From this perspective, the ambiguity of empire had allowed for more political flexibility for some subject peoples, at least from a perception that did not focus on the extreme violence and disenfranchisement of most forms of imperial rule.

Maxwell’s critique of India as “Bharat” (or political India) – that it was postimperial rather than anticolonial – remains an important corrective to visions of India that overlook continuities between empire and

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9 Neville Maxwell to Michael Scott, October 31, 1973, Box 35, GMS Papers.
independence. Yet his focus on the constitutional, juridical mode of Indian politics as its defining feature ignored the India that had become independent in popular understanding by embracing Gandhi’s saintly idiom of politics, which had served as an inspiration for the postwar international peace movement and had been enmeshed in transnational anti-imperialism during the interwar era. This India had achieved independence through nonviolence (at least, in the general view), with transnational advocacy and support from many of Maxwell’s own colleagues and friends, and had held an internationalist political vision that stretched beyond India’s territorial borders. Gandhi himself had argued that his “ambition is much higher than independence. Through the deliverance of India, I seek to deliver the so-called weaker races of the world.”

THE FRIENDSHIP MARCH’S FOUNDATIONAL DISAGREEMENTS

In response to growing tensions between India and China, the World Peace Brigade began planning a “friendship march” scheduled to cross the Indian Northeast on its planned route from New Delhi to Peking. However, the spring of 1963 was not a felicitous moment to attempt a peaceful crossing of the Sino-Indian border to improve Sino-Indian

10 Rajeev Bhargava, “History, Nation and Community: Reflections on Nationalist Historiography of India and Pakistan,” Economic and Political Weekly 35, no. 4 (January 2000): 193–200, provides an overview of imperial and nationalist historiographies in the wake of the creation of independent India and Pakistan. It is also important to note that India as “Bharat” can refer to the idea of a Hindu India not “defaced” by British colonialism or Mughal (Muslim) conquest. For example, Aatish Taseer, “In India, a Name Is Rarely Just a Name,” New York Times, July 26, 2017.


relations: before the march could start, war broke out between the two countries on October 20, 1962, ending a month later. Regardless, the Brigade went ahead with the march on schedule.

In India, the march was predominantly identified with Jayaprakash Narayan (JP), the leader of the Brigade’s Asian Regional Council, and led by his lieutenants Siddharaj Dhadda, Suresh Ram, and Muthukumaraswamy Aramvalarthanathan (M. Aram). JP was an Indian civil society organizer with a significant national and international profile who played a leadership role in India and abroad through the Sarvodaya movement, a civil society program that continued Gandhian nonviolent activism after Indian independence. Alongside Dhadda, Ram, and Aram (who were also important members of the Sarvodaya movement, as were most all Indian Brigade members), JP directed the march with Americans Ed Lazar and Charles C. (Charlie) Walker of the American Friends Service Committee, a US-based Quaker civil society organization. The enterprise totaled 19 marchers – 11 Indian and 5 American, with Japanese, Burmese, and British members of the Brigade cycling in and out. Echoing Gandhi’s strategy for peaceful political change and mass mobilization, it charted its course through Sarvodaya ashrams, holding meetings and rallies along the way that drew 1,500–4,000 interested local participants. JP’s three lieutenants were dedicated Gandhians whose efforts preceded and exceeded that of the Brigade. Ram had recently closed up the Brigade’s Africa Freedom Action Project in Dar es Salaam; Dhadda had become an anti-capitalist campaigner, taking on both the Indian government and multinational


[15] As discussed in Chapter 3, the World Peace Brigade’s South Asia office shared its leadership and mailing address with the Indian Sarvodaya movement. Sarvodaya (“universal uplift” or “well-being of all”) celebrated manual labor, the voluntary equal distribution of wealth, and small-scale self-sufficient communities. After Indian independence (1947) and Gandhi’s death (1948), the idea of “sarvodaya” transformed into the Sarvodaya movement, which aimed to rectify social, economic, and political injustice within India – an Indian civil rights movement that remained outside of government or electoral politics and espoused nonviolence as an operating method and a source of legitimacy. Jayaprakash Narayan (JP) was one of its main leaders, with Vinoba Bhave.

[16] Sen, *India, China, and the World*, 440, has slightly different figures (13 core marchers, of whom 10 were Indian). In any case, the Friendship March was small in number and large in the distance they sought to cover.

corporations in Indian court; and M. Aram went on to champion peace in Nagaland. Unfortunately, symptomatic of the rift in the Brigade community between its Western and Sarvodaya members, Ram, Dhadda, and Aram’s views on strategy and their deep experiences with the political realities in India did not seem to drive the Brigade’s own organizational dialogue concerning the march.

Before it even left Delhi, controversy hindered the Brigade’s transnational mission. Western pacifists sharply disagreed with Indian Gandhians who refused to condemn Indian state violence during the 1962 Sino-Indian War as well as in Nagaland and Kashmir. The Chinese government, viewing the march as “a group of Indian reactionaries in collusion with US imperialists” instead of as a neutral, international peace project, pressured Burma, Pakistan, and the British in Hong Kong to deny the marchers visas. In addition, two of the Brigade’s leaders were also engaged in transnational advocacy on behalf of nationalist movements in Nagaland and Tibet, territories, respectively within India and China, who strongly opposed such struggles for independence.

Descriptions of these various controversies come through mostly in the correspondence of the Brigade’s Western members, for several possible reasons: The march had a strong American presence and the Brigade’s North American chairman, A. J. Muste, remained in New York and therefore needed to be notified in writing of his lieutenants’ activities. In addition, since many of the controversies swirling around the march dealt with questions of Southern Asian security, Western members of the Brigade needed to receive extensive background to understand them, while the political contexts encompassing Tibet, Nagaland, and Sino-Indian border disputes were well known to Indian Brigade members. It may also be that the Brigade’s disagreements and divergences concerning these geopolitical hotspots were less important from the primary perspective of Indian Brigade members, who wrote about them more

18 *Siddharaj Dhatta v. Union of India*, High Court of Delhi, Civil Appeal No. 4362 of 1994, Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 7865 of 1994.
19 After leading the closing rally for the march in Ledo, Assam, M. Aram spent eight years in Nagaland (1964–1972) attempting to maintain a ceasefire agreement between Naga nationalist insurgents and the Indian government.
20 *Peace News*, April 19, 1963; *Liberation*, May 1963. *Liberation* magazine issues are housed in the Swarthmore College Library Peace Collections, while *Peace News* is housed at the University of Bradford (UK).
obliquely and with seemingly less vehemence. Converstely, because the questions of Tibet, Nagaland, and the Sino-Indian border concerned Indian national security and state-building, these issues could have been too politically charged for Indian Brigade members to feel comfortable addressing them directly in writing. Indian Brigade members, particularly J. P. Narayan, had domestic influence and responsibilities – therefore, a lot more at stake during the march than did their Western counterparts.

In addition, the Cold War hedged in the narrow path of transnationalism. In theory, human rights and development, as well as activism for disarmament, peace, and racial equality, were realms where the Cold War’s binary (which demanded that a state or organization identify as either capitalist or as communist) did not have to bind political action. However, on the Delhi-to-Peking Friendship March, the Brigade found itself caught in the Cold War trap. While the Brigade saw itself as unaligned, the Cold War context still mattered – but not in terms of an us-versus-them dualism. Disentangling the impact of the Cold War on the Brigade’s Friendship March is not a question of “taking off” or “reading through” a “Cold War lens.” Rather, it is the recognition that the neutrality of an allegedly apolitical transnational movement was not value-neutral. The Brigade could not escape politics, whether they be

\[1\] The papers of the North American Regional Council are at the Wisconsin Historical Society, Madison, Wisconsin (which houses a large repository of collections related to left-wing US civil society activism). Those of the European Regional Council are among Devi Prasad’s papers at the International Institute of Social History in Amsterdam (whose collections include a focus on European social movements). Those of the Asian Regional Council are among JP Narayan’s papers in the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi (the repository of papers of prominent Indian figures from the post-independence era).


the nationalist politics of its leaders’ advocacy, the national politics of the countries in which it operated, or the international political environment in which their endeavors were embedded. Instead, the march and the personal and ideological conflicts it roused became a new forum for how these structural politics played out.24

The controversy over the correct understanding of nonviolence arose at the march’s launch, when some Western supporters of the Brigade challenged the march for not adhering to its apolitical, nonviolent, non-national aspirations. Particular Western members of the Brigade community felt that the Indian state was not living up to its Gandhian promise of peaceful political action and that the Sarvodaya movement did not properly condemn the Indian government’s violence in the Sino-Indian War and against Naga nationalist insurgents within the Indian state. For example, Bertrand Russell, the elder statesman of the international peace movement, was deeply “saddened” that the Gandhi Peace Foundation (one of the parent organizations and funders of the Brigade) had not spoken up for the peaceful resolution of the Sino-Indian dispute and “for an end to the cruel war against the Naga.”25 Russell argued that “peace should be [the] object” of the Sarvodaya movement instead of the organization’s being run as an arm of Indian “government policy.”26

As with many Western supporters of the Brigade, Russell did not fully comprehend or sympathize with the domestic political challenges facing Sarvodaya movement members; it was significantly easier to criticize the Indian government when one was not an Indian citizen. That reality also gave Russell space to compare what India considered its own nation-building project with European colonialism: “It is no more justified for India to seek to set up puppet spokesmen for the Naga while she uses her army to destroy villages and torture people, than it was for the French in Algeria.”27

At the same time, Indian Gandhians themselves valued British march organizer and Brigade member Reverend Michael Scott’s gift for empathy and moral sensitivity, which crossed cultural boundaries. Shankarrao Deo, a Sarvodaya member of the march, was struck by Scott’s “simple” and “noble” heart.28 Writing in the march’s first month of progress, Deo

24 Thank you to David Engerman for help articulating this point.
26 Russell to Suresh Ram, September 21, 1963.
27 Russell to Suresh Ram, September 21, 1963.
28 Shankarrao Deo to A. J. Muste, March 27, 1963, Box 2, WPB NARC Papers.
appreciated Scott’s “friendliness and readiness to understand” the complexity of the pacifist position for Indian Gandhians in the wake of the Sino-Indian War.\textsuperscript{29} This same acceptance, with shades of gray, that allowed the explicitly nonviolent Sarvodaya movement to support its government during wartime mirrored Scott’s support for nationalist claimants, such as Nagas, who engaged in violence.

Marchers from the United States, however, found the position of Indian Gandhians frustrating. For Brigade member Ed Lazar, the top-down control of the Gandhian movement and its “centralized decision-making apparatuses” were exasperating: “Two men – Vinoba [Bhave] and JP – make the decisions (with rare exceptions), all important matters are referred to them for ‘blessings.’”\textsuperscript{30} Lazar thought that this centralization meant that peace “workers’ initiative has been snuffed out.” If “sainthood” became “a requirement for nonviolent action” then “bold non-violent experiments” would never get off the ground.\textsuperscript{31} His criticism of the Sarvodaya movement contained elements of chauvinism, negatively contrasting Eastern “saintly” passivity to Western “bold experiments.” Part of Lazar’s discomfort with the culture of Sarvodaya peace workers was that in his “own group” (meaning among the Americans – a revealing possessive for an allegedly international endeavor), he was “dealing” with a fair amount of “guru phobia.”\textsuperscript{32}

The US battalion of the Brigade found the “saintly idiom” of Indian politics an uncomfortable fit. Born during the Indian independence movement, that idiom was the political mode that Gandhi used to bridge the gap between the elite Congress Party and the mass movement.\textsuperscript{33} Saintly politics focused on voluntary sacrifice, appealing to a person’s best self. It promoted nonviolence even at the potential cost of the individual’s life and livelihood. In theory, the saintly idiom attempted to reform politics not through the exercise of power but by remaining at a distance from the functions of government. This form of political expression inspired the World Peace Brigade’s creation. It also provided an impossibly high

\textsuperscript{29} Deo to Muste, March 27, 1963.
\textsuperscript{30} Ed Lazar to A. J. Muste, March 24, 1963, Box 2, WPB NARC Papers.
\textsuperscript{33} W. H. Morris-Jones defined three distinctive idioms or languages of Indian politics – modern, traditional, and saintly. The modern idiom as articulated in the Indian constitution, law courts, and administration/civil service; the traditional idiom as the language of village organization, caste system, and tribal groups; and the idiom of saintly politics, referring to the politics of Gandhi, Vinoba Bhave, and JP; Morris-Jones, \textit{The Government and Politics of India} (London: Hutchinson and Co, 1964).
standard and burden on its individual members: that they behave like twentieth-century saints.

Another Western criticism of the relationship between the Sarvodaya movement and the Indian government was reflected in the debate on whether Brigade leaders could publicly take personal political stances that undermined the march’s overarching purpose. In January 1963, two months before the march set off, one of JP’s lieutenants, Siddharaj Dhadda, wrote to Muste on the edits the Brigade’s Asian Regional Council had made to the march’s “aims and objectives” document:

Two things have been omitted. One, the reference to the exclusion of China from the UN ... The other clause omitted is where you had said that “Individual Marchers should be free to voice opposition to war etc.” We thought that no distinction need be made between what individual marchers could say and what the group could say.34

The Asian Regional Council’s (i.e., the Indian) revisions highlighted the ongoing division within the Brigade between members who supported pacifism as the abstention from violence and those who did not disavow violence for the purpose of self-defense or political justice. The second position justified Indian state violence against alleged Chinese aggression during the 1962 Sino-Indian War. Dhadda’s comments to Muste on the march’s aims and objectives articulated, then elided, the differences between the individual person and the collective Brigade as the unit of political action. The members of the Brigade preferred to operate as individuals rather than as an organization, because doing so allowed for more freedom to speak out on issues – but for less cohesion. Yet, in spite of its inclination toward individual political freedom, the Asian Regional Council did not want to be the sponsoring organization for Westerners who actively criticized the Indian government, and experience the repercussions for that criticism.

TRANSNATIONAL ADVOCACY VERSUS STATE SOVEREIGNTY

As with most postcolonial states, when India gained its independence in 1947, it forcefully opposed the independence of any territories within its newly sovereign boundaries.35 Post-independence, India made the case

34 Siddharaj Dhadda to A. J. Muste, January 18, 1963, Box 1, WPB NARC Papers.
35 Srinath Raghavan, War and Peace in Modern India: A Strategic History of the Nehru Years (New Delhi: Permanent Black, 2010), describes this process for Hyderabad, Junagarh, and Kashmir. Other regions such as Manipur and of course Nagaland epitomize these processes.
This practical ideological transition from anticolonial nationalist movement seeking independence to postcolonial state working to govern its territory highlighted the tension between transnational advocacy and state sovereignty: on the one hand, the decolonizing world gained statehood and international recognition through membership in the state-centric United Nations; on the other, liberation movements and advocacy networks practiced politics beyond the forms and boundaries of nations and states. Transnational movements sought to transcend the necessities and controls of the state as the constituent unit of international order. Yet, as the contradictions faced by the World Peace Brigade and other transnational advocates made clear, such transcendence was impossible. Instead, transnational movements themselves became conduits for conflict about the nationalizing process – about which grouping of political “selves” would be “determined” a state, and by whom.

Post-independence India was riddled with what Nehru called its “fissiparous tendencies” – the destabilizing questions of Kashmir, Sikh and Tamil nationalisms, linguistic movements particularly (but not exclusively) in South India and in Assam, and labor/class/caste unrest. For Nehru, “separateness has always been the weakness of India. Fissiparous tendencies, whether they belong to Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs, Christians or others, are very dangerous and wrong tendencies. They belong to petty and backward minds.” They threatened the rule of the Indian Union government and the fundamental project of an independent India, the creation of an Indian nation.

These claims of difference or separateness – linguistic, ethnic, religious, etc. – could overlap and exacerbate each other. For example, representatives from “tribal” or hill peoples in Assam (which included the Naga Hills until 1963) argued in 1961, “[I]f Assamese becomes the sole official

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language of the [Indian] State [of Assam], the people of the Hills in particular will suffer from serious handicaps”; therefore, they continued, the Assam Language Act of 1960 needed to be repealed, or “Separate States created.”

Lack of respect for linguistic differences inflamed ethnic differences. While demands for autonomy were usually mobilized around a single claim of difference – of nation, language, ethnicity, religion, etc. – multiple strands of difference could underlie each particular claim.

Not all of these fissiparous tendencies were presumed to be equally dangerous to the Indian state. In the Northeast, the Indian government usually squashed or ignored tribal peoples’ claims when they were mobilized along religious lines (often around particular Protestant denominations) – the shadow of the 1947 India–Pakistan partition meant that religious mobilization threatened the ideological foundations of independent India – but listened to some degree when they framed claims of resistance on the basis of ethnicity or language. Linguistic or ethnic claims in the Northeast were constructed around anti-Assamese or anti-Bengali sentiment, rather than against the Indian central government; tribal claims in Northeast India were appealed to the Indian central government for support against the State of Assam. As a nationalist leader, Nehru had been influenced by the Soviet pattern of managing a multiethnic polity during the interwar era.

Nationalist movements within nation-states maneuvered across geopolitical scales – that is, between spheres of local, national, regional, international, or global politics – to find support for their claims. For example, they might seek backing from the central government to

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39 “Non-Cooperation Movement by the Council of Action of the All-Party Hill Leaders Conference,” June 20, 1961, TAD/Com/24, Assam State Archives, Guwahati Assam.


circumnavigate the immediate oppressive rule of local authorities. (Interestingly, this strategy paralleled how activists in the US civil rights movement called on the US federal government to intervene to end the legal discrimination of US states against Black American citizens.) Taking this strategy to a different political arena, some minority nationalists then sought to “jump” past their ruling national government to petition the United Nations if they felt that their central government was not a viable negotiating partner. These processes were far from unique in the Indian (or the US) circumstances. Nationalist movements and minority groups made self-determinist claims on local, regional, national – and international – bases as a matter of practical policy.

The 1962 Sino-Indian War placed the rubric of national security over India’s fissiparous tendencies. Some of India’s internal demands for autonomy have had an obvious international dynamic, such as the demands made by Kashmir, the subject of multiple wars between India and Pakistan. Others, like Nagaland, held latent international dimensions. Still others, such as the Dravidian and Tamil demands in Madras State/Tamil Nadu and for a Sikh Khalistan in Punjab during the early 1960s, were more domestically separatist, though later they drew upon significant diaspora support. Nevertheless, they all composed the brew of “anti-national” movements (in the terminology of India’s central government) with which the Indian Union had to contend.

At the moment of India’s international-legal creation in 1947, the British Raj’s colonial sovereignty over that country was divided into two parts and handed over to the Congress Party and the Muslim League, who led the new governments of India and Pakistan, respectively. Decolonization did not mean that postcolonial India dissolved into its many constituent pieces (Princely States, Frontier Agencies, Excluded Territories, the remaining French and Portuguese colonial enclaves, etc.) that then had an opportunity to decide what their postcolonial political

42 Neil Smith, Uneven Development: Nature, Capital and the Production of Space (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2010 [1984]), utilized the concept of the “politics of scale” to interrogate how scales are constructed and then how that construction is contested.

43 This is analogous to “forum shopping” in political science scholarship; Hannah Murphy and Aynsley Kellow, “Forum Shopping in Global Governance: Understanding States, Business and NGOs in Multiple Arenas,” Global Policy 4, no. 2 (2013): 139–49.

44 For an example of this policy language, see “Anti-national Activities,” TAD/Con25/64, Assam State Archives, Guwahati, Assam. “Anti-national” continues to the present day to be an epithet attached to people and movements that criticize the Indian central government.
form would be. Instead, decolonization meant a power transfer from one authority to two others, newly created. The negotiations that might have happened in a hypothetical constitutional convention occurred in the ways that the independent government of India (and Pakistan) dealt with their fissiparous tendencies. Into this violent and potentially violent situation, the Indian Gandhians of the Sarvodaya movement stepped, with their international allies from the World Peace Brigade, seeking to revitalize India’s nonviolent political roots by tackling its postcolonial conflicts.

The 1960s decolonization crises on the African continent – in Congo, South West Africa, Zambia, Rhodesia, and elsewhere – may have seemed far removed from India; however, regional political elites in the Northeast were aware of the similarities between those crises and their own tense political environment. The Assam Tribune, an English-language daily tied to the ruling Assam State Congress Party, repeatedly gave significant page space to the UN intervention in Congo (1960–1965) to halt the secession of Katanga. There was great regional interest in and attention to questions of secession in postcolonial states because Assamese elites felt threatened by the prospect of insurgency from “tribal” peoples in the Naga Hills and elsewhere who demanded autonomy or independence. For those in Northeast India – and in India in general – questions of “sub”-nationalist insurgency and claims-making were both a national and a global phenomenon, despite ruling governments’ efforts to localize them.

Two weeks after Dhadda’s note to Muste on the march’s goals, the latter wrote to Michael Scott on the question of whether Scott was “free to raise the Naga matter,” on the Friendship March – meaning, whether


46 For example, the front pages of the Assam Tribune issues of July 10, 1964, October 9, 1964, November 26, 1965, and January 6, 1966. Assam Tribune Archives, Guwahati Assam.

47 A. J. Muste to Michael Scott, February 1, 1963, Box 1, WPB NARC Papers.
Scott could bring up the issue of the nationalist movement in the Naga Hills to break free of postcolonial India, a struggle supported by Scott and others associated with the march. Muste did not want “special” political concerns, such as the Naga question, and their public discussions to distract from “one’s fundamental attitude toward the issue of war and violence.” Brigade member Bayard Rustin, whose 1930s membership in the Communist Party and 1950s prosecution for homosexuality had sidelined him within the US civil rights movement, brought up fears that Indian public opinion against Scott’s “intervention” on “the Naga question” would “effect [Scott’s] usefulness” to the march. In response to Rustin’s concerns, Muste decided that Scott’s role should be up to the Brigade’s Indian members, who resolved that Scott’s Naga advocacy did not make him ineligible to participate. However, Muste warned Scott, “this should not be taken to indicate complete freedom.” The same rules that applied to Scott would apply to Indian members of the march, who “were deeply concerned about the release of Sheikh Abdullah,” the Kashmiri leader imprisoned in India. Muste danced around the hot-button issue of individual positions in contrast to group identification and cohesion. By comparing Scott’s Naga advocacy with that of JP for Sheikh Abdullah and Kashmir, Muste showed that Scott’s nationalist sponsorship was not an isolated issue but one of many contentious political positions taken by the Brigade’s leadership.

In the end, pressure from the Indian press rather than the Brigade’s Asian Regional Council made Scott leave the march within its first week. Indian critics argued that Scott was using the cover of international peace politics to meddle in Indian domestic affairs. This criticism had merit. While in Delhi planning the march, Scott was acting as a go-between between Angami Zapu Phizo, the Naga nationalist leader in exile, and Indian prime minister Nehru. Using Scott as a messenger, Phizo proposed to return to India in order to broker a ceasefire agreement between Naga nationalists and the Indian government. Scott hoped that once the Naga “hostiles” (the term used by the Indian government for Naga nationalist insurgents) accepted a “Nagaland within the framework of the [Indian] constitution, … Phizo’s followers would run for office,” which would reintegrate them into Naga politics without violence. Then, once the

48 Muste to Scott, February 1, 1963. 49 Muste to Scott, February 1, 1963.
51 Ed Lazar to A. J. Muste, March 8, 1963, Box 2, WPB NARC Papers.
52 Lazar to Muste, March 8, 1963.
region had achieved peace for a transition period of approximately five years, a revision of the political status of Nagaland would be up for negotiation.\textsuperscript{53} This plan provided a carrot for Naga nationalists to engage in peace politics, without stating the degree of autonomy or independence for Nagaland that might be up for debate in five years.

Nehru refused this proposal. Phizo’s offer as relayed by Scott would undermine Nehru’s own negotiations with the “moderate” Nagas, the new leadership of Nagaland, the proposed Indian state to be established in December 1963 within the Indian Union. According to Ed Lazar, writing from the road in the march’s first week of progress, there seemed to be “little hope for the Nagaland question” since the Indian government was planning an offensive against Naga nationalist insurgents involving 20,000–40,000 troops.\textsuperscript{54}

\section*{IN PURSUIT OF ELUSIVE CHINESE VISAS}

From the start, the Indian and Chinese governments opposed elements of the Brigade’s wider politics in which the Friendship March was embedded. Certain Brigade leaders supported particular nationalist claims of states-in-waiting – specifically, JP for Tibetan claims against China and Scott for Naga claims against India. Therefore, ultimately China refused to give the marchers visas and the Indian press forced Scott off the march.

Although the marchers never received Chinese visas, they did spend six months walking across Northern and Northeast India. At first, they encountered significant local hostility. The government of the Indian state of Uttar Pradesh considered putting them in prison for disturbing the peace, and they repeatedly met Hindu nationalist counter-demonstrators on their route.\textsuperscript{55} When they reached Patna in JP’s native Indian state of Bihar, they drew large crowds for their public meetings, as well as positive news reporting.\textsuperscript{56} However, the international-territorial aims of the march – providing a physical, human connection in the form of individual bodies between the capital cities of dueling nations – remained unfulfilled.

JP himself was a focal point for much of the controversy surrounding the march. While Western Brigade members might have perceived him and the Sarvodaya movement as too supportive of the Indian

government, JP had many public Indian detractors. These critics were strongest among Hindu nationalists who vehemently rejected JP’s critique of Hindu nationalism as communalism and therefore as anti-national. However, it was his support of an independent Tibet that created insurmountable international complications for the Brigade. Ed Lazar noted:

The presence of JP [on the March] highlighted the most complex question the group has faced thus far... JP had requested the government [of India] to recognize the Dalai Lama as the head of the émigré government in exile of Tibet. JP, as you know, feels that Tibet is an independent nation in which the Chinese have committed cultural genocide. At the time of Sino-Indian fighting JP called for the liberation of Tibet by the Indian army (he has retracted this particular plea now that the actual fighting has ceased).  

JP’s support for international (and Indian) recognition of and liberation for Tibet compromised the third-party integrity and practical logistics of a march whose members needed visas from the Chinese government. JP believed that Tibet had never been Chinese and held that “the Tibetan people are as much entitled to freedom as the Indian people or the people of the Congo.” On the issue of negotiation over the contested India-China border, he argued, “It can only be private individuals and not States or their Officers who can be entrusted with arbitration.”  While Tibet was necessarily off the agenda for the Friendship March, which proclaimed impartiality between India and China, this issue hovered over JP’s and Indian Gandhians’ participation in the march, calling into question – at least to Chinese authorities – the march’s allegedly nonpartisan motives.

The Brigade tried to work through unofficial channels to procure their elusive Chinese visas. In particular, they hoped Ida Pruitt could facilitate this task. Pruitt was the child of American Baptist missionaries. She was born and raised in China and worked with the Chinese resistance against the Japanese, eventually joining with Communist Chinese forces. Throughout her career, she was active in social work, social justice, and

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58 Ed Lazar, Report on the Beginning of the Friendship March, March 6, 1963, Box 1, WPB NARC.


60 A. J. Muste to Siddharaj Dhadda, March 15, 1963, Box 1, WPB NARC Papers.
According to A.J. Muste, she advised the Brigade that since “relations between China and India are ‘delicate,’” they should make it clear that there was “interest and support for the March outside India.” She recommended that Muste should be sure to emphasize the Brigade’s general “anti-US militarism” stance. In particular, she suggested that he reach out to the Chinese Peace Council – the Chinese branch of the World Peace Council, which was a Soviet Cominform “peace offensive” aimed at linking up with international peace and disarmament activists against US militarism. Pruitt had been “invited to go to China as a guest of the Chinese government in 1959”; upon her return, US authorities confiscated her passport, deeming her a flight risk and a potentially dangerous conduit to Communist China.

While Pruitt was not able to procure visas for the Friendship March, she guided their submission materials and, like so many international advocates, endured some of the same visa/passport difficulties as those on whose behalf she worked. Her suggestion that Muste reach out to the Communist Peace Council – and Muste’s inability to take it up since it fell outside of his network of contacts – illuminated the presence of an international communist peace movement distinct from the Brigade community’s orbit. The total separation between the Brigade community and their communist counterparts in the international peace movement made it hard for the Brigade to claim independence from Cold War politics, even as the Brigade believed itself to be neutral and apolitical – a feature of the Cold War trap.

After JP’s position on the Tibet question emerged as the sticking point for the denial of Chinese visas, Muste tried to pin down JP’s stance precisely: “The one thing [that] I am eager for now is to get from you ... material relating to your own statements and activities in re[gard to] the Tibetan situation.” Muste pressed JP on what exactly was the

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61 Pruitt’s papers are at the Schlesinger Library, the Radcliffe Institute for Advanced Study, Harvard University.
63 Muste to Dhadda, March 15, 1963.
65 George Willoughby to A. J. Muste, March 14, 1963, Box 1, WPB NARC Papers.
Tibet for which he advocated: “I recall your alluding to the setting up of a Tibetan government ‘in exile.’ Does this mean a conventional ‘government in exile’ which would be working toward violent change in the existing regime and engaged in subversion, sabotage etc. in pursuit of that objective?”

The question of whether violence could ever be a justified response to political injustice returned as contested ideological terrain for the Brigade. Ed Lazar wondered if a statement by the Brigade leadership – JP, Scott, and Muste – “on the attitude of the March towards the Sino-Indian dispute might be necessary and useful” for settling the Brigade’s internal debate between total pacifism and nonviolent interventionism. Such a joint statement never emerged. It would have required Muste to get from JP “on the one hand, an accurate picture of positions he has taken and statements he may have made and, on the other hand, a clear idea about his present views and the kind of statement he is prepared to make” on the question of Tibet. This clarity was not forthcoming.

With JP embroiled in politics over Tibet and Scott entangled in the Naga question, JP’s lieutenant Siddharaj Dhadda recommended that Muste handle the marchers’ route to China. Looking for Pakistani or Burmese alternatives, Muste worked through Clarence Pickett, who was a close friend of Zafarullah Khan (a Pakistani, he was at that time the president of the UN General Assembly) as well as of the US ambassador to Burma. Muste also pushed British Member of Parliament Fenner Brockway to advocate for the Brigade at the Far Eastern Desk at the British Colonial Office in order to facilitate possible passage to Hong Kong; so that, even if the march could not cross the Sino-Indian border, it could sail to Hong Kong and call attention to its aims in a liminal Chinese locale.

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70 Muste to Dhadda, March 15, 1963.
71 A. J. Muste to JP Narayan, April 19, 1963, Box 1, WPB NARC Papers.
72 Siddharaj Dhadda to A. J. Muste, April 11, 1963, Box 1, WPB NARC Papers. Symptomatic of its muddled internal compass and as if the Brigade unconsciously knew the impossibility of its goal, the Friendship March did not have a predetermined route. Its route was a practical, ad hoc matter, determined by where the Indian members of the Sarvodaya movement would accommodate the marchers overnight and provision them on their trek. If the marchers could have entered China, it is unclear where and with whom they would have been housed.
73 A. J. Muste to Siddharaj Dhadda and Ed Lazar, April 25, 1963, Box 1, WPB NARC Papers.
74 A. J. Muste to Siddharaj Dhadda, September 27, 1963, Box 1, WPB NARC Papers.
Though these efforts were futile, they showed the reach of the Brigade community into national governments and international institutional circles, illuminating the historical constellation of the international peace movement and the wider reaches of those sympathetic to it. Brockway had been the founding chair of War Resisters’ International (the Brigade’s parent organization) back in the 1920s; and Pickett, the executive secretary of the American Friends Service Committee from the same period. Brigade members attempted to operate through a web of transnational activism that had its roots in the interwar period. However, the structures of empire that had facilitated that activism (even anticolonial), in terms of travel and the ambiguity of border movement and regulations, no longer existed.

INTERNATIONAL VERSUS NATIONAL CIVIL RIGHTS

Another factor that undermined the Friendship March was the competing demands for time and resources that other political justice projects placed upon the Brigade. While there was a strong American contingent on the Friendship March, key American members of the Brigade were absent because the Delhi-to-Peking Friendship March was not the most imperative piece of political justice activism for the United States in 1963. More urgent was the US civil rights movement’s March on Washington (scheduled for August 1963), planned by Brigade member Bayard Rustin (who had been central to setting up the Brigade’s Africa Freedom Action Project in Dar es Salaam during the winter of 1962). The presence of two ambitious marches on opposite sides of the world in the same year, both organized by Brigade members, highlighted the diffused attention of the Brigade community. Even as late as April 1963, Rustin was having difficulty getting leave from the War Resisters’ League to organize the US march, then billed as a prospective “Emancipation March on Washington for Jobs.”

In his refusal to release Rustin to focus on the US civil rights movement, Muste argued: “Civil rights, economic issues, including abolition of unemployment, and peace – are all one cause.” As a way to justify the constraints on personnel, time, energy, focus, and resources under which

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76 A. J. Muste to A. Phillips Randolph, April 15, 1963, Box 7, Folder 6, Bayard Rustin Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, DC.
he operated, Muste contended that all endeavors of the Brigade community fit within the same overarching mission. However, protests in Birmingham, Alabama, in May 1963 and the Kennedy administration’s decision to send a civil rights bill to the US Congress changed Muste’s political calculation; in June 1963 Rustin was able to turn his attention and efforts to organizing the March on Washington.

Muste’s initial hesitancy for Rustin to focus his total attention on US civil rights deserves further explanation. The bundling of various political justice causes (anticolonial nationalism, nuclear disarmament, US civil rights, minority rights) under the mantle of “international civil rights,” or “international political justice,” or the “international peace movement,” or indeed all three, formalized the connections – and the tensions – between the individuals who worked on these causes. The World Peace Brigade was an attempted instantiation of this bundling. These causes did not always align ideologically, and even when they did, they still bled time, energy, focus, and finances from each other. Yet this interwoven conglomeration of activisms – religious, labor, pacifist, etc. – was what allowed Rustin to build the March on Washington “out of nothing.”

Rustin captured this contradiction when he described the process of building consensus within this combustible arrangement that shared goals if not priorities: “Consensus does not mean that everybody agrees. It means that the person who disagrees must disagree so vigorously … that he is prepared to fight with everybody else.”

In the eyes of mainstream contemporary commentators, the March on Washington conferred conventional legitimacy on mass action and public protest. The liberalist presentation of the marchers as a “gentle,” “polite,” “orderly,” “cordial,” “law-abiding” “army” aided this perception. It was the first of many iconic marches on the US capital, creating the march on the center of the US federal government as a symbol for civil society mobilization that criticized the state. In contrast, the Friendship March passed through a region that had been made into a political periphery by war and postcolonial state-making, and marked the demise of the World Peace Brigade as an organ of the international peace movement.

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78 Bayard Rustin interview in Columbia University Oral History Collections; D’Emelio, *Lost Prophet*, 342.
Both marches were ambitious endeavors, but they were exact opposites in scale, duration, distance, focus, participation, and outcome. The March on Washington was a national, single-day event with approximately 250,000 participants who converged on the Washington Mall for a series of speeches by US civil rights leaders, including Martin Luther King. The Friendship March was an international six-month endeavor by nineteen walkers who crossed nearly 3,000 kilometers of territory, engaging with local populations by leading nonviolent civil-disobedience workshops in Gandhian ashrams en route. Political change is not easy at any scale, but the Brigade’s dream of escaping national allegiances made its transnational activism an even more fraught enterprise than that of its American cousin.

The conceptual divisions between nationalist claims-making and transnational advocacy that emerged within the planning and execution of the Friendship March exacerbated the Brigade’s interpersonal tensions. In May 1963, frustrated by the divergence between the Brigade’s activism and his own projects, Scott floated his resignation from the entire organization, not just the march: “Unless the whole scope and concept of the World Peace Brigade can be changed I cannot continue to act as Chairman.” He still believed in the need for some “kind of an international [peace] force,” though he made an illuminating typo, mis-writing “peace” force as “police” force. Scott followed “with intense interest” the “immensely significant … developments in [the American] South,” searching them for the “lessons” they might “imply for the situation confronting us in Southern Africa.” Looking for the common thread, he still pinned his hopes on a peace force to force peace. “Organized separately from the UN itself,” it would address the political justice questions of disenfranchised peoples within independent states, which the UN was not equipped to handle. Scott searched for but did not find the organizational and analytical forms that would combine the political justice questions of US civil rights, apartheid Southern Africa, and minority issues in India. The World Peace Brigade could not provide the vehicle he sought. It did not successfully formalize the transnational advocacy of its leaders and members because the issues at play – nationalist claims-making (support for those demanding sovereignty) and civil or minority rights within states (limits on state sovereignty) – could not be bound together.

Muste responded that it was not the Brigade that had failed Scott but, rather, Scott who had failed the Brigade. “The Naga matter was not one which the World Peace Brigade undertook,” he said to Scott, adding that Scott’s “preoccupation” with the Nagas “was a distinct disadvantage to the March.” There were also “quite fundamental differences in the thinking of yourself and some of the rest of us about the nature” of the Brigade, that it should even be in the business of advocacy on behalf of nationalist claimants. Muste’s riposte to Scott’s ruminations – and his refusal to accept Scott’s resignation – replayed Muste’s annoyance with what he considered to be Scott’s abandonment of the Africa Freedom Action Project in Dar es Salaam the previous year. He closed his letter with another, more tactful reason for the Brigade’s failings—political timing: what “the situation would now be if . . . the Kaunda freedom march had taken place, if the Sino Indian conflict had not erupted, would be difficult to say.” While the early 1960s had seemed to be an opportune moment for the Brigade’s mission, events had overtaken them.

The same month as Scott’s threatened resignation, JP also offered to resign from the Brigade, did resign, and then withdrew his resignation. This was a pattern for him. Charlie Walker, one of the Brigade’s US marchers, wrote to Muste in May 1963: “JP ‘resigned’ from a number of organizations, partly because he did not wish to embarrass them, partly because he wished to be free to speak his mind, and in the case of [the Brigade] for both reasons plus the criticism from the Westerners.” Alluding to Muste’s aggressive attempts to pin him down on Tibet, JP found this mode of criticism, particularly its “harsh” and “cross-examining” manner, disrespectful. According to Walker, Julius Nyerere (a Tanganyikan anticolonial nationalist leader and, at that time, president of Tanganyika) also had difficulties with JP “on his work in East Africa” the previous year, 1962. These obstacles involved JP’s pattern of making certain statements that could be easily misconstrued, of not providing specifics about these statements, and of using the resulting tumult as a

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84 Muste to Scott, May 22, 1963.
85 Muste to Scott, May 22, 1963. The Kaunda freedom march, discussed in Chapter 3, was an Africa Freedom Project plan to support the Zambian nationalist struggle; it fell through when Kenneth Kaunda, later first president of independent Zambia, withdrew his support when serious negotiations began with Great Britain for Zambia’s independence.
justification for withdrawing when it did not seem that the shared endeavor would succeed. Of the “big three” in the Brigade – JP, Muste, and Scott – JP was the most circumspect about what he left behind on paper regarding their internal disagreements, allowing him to portray himself as a bystander of interpersonal conflict rather than a direct participant. Scott and Muste’s disagreements about the Brigade’s role on the march, therefore, need to be read against the grain since they were a triangular conversation in which JP played a featured, if self-muffled, role.

According to Muste, it was the “injection” of the Naga question and Scott’s “insistence” on advocating for Naga independence that fractured unity between Indian and Western marchers. Suresh Ram considered Scott’s 1963 attempt to bring the Naga claim to the United Nations “a painful surprise.” For Muste, the Brigade “had clearly taken the position that the Naga matter could not be injected into the March,” but Scott “could not give [it] up … [otherwise, he] would have been an extremely valuable asset.” Muste wondered whether, if Scott had prioritized the endeavor, the march would have been able to procure its elusive Chinese visas. However, Muste said, the Brigade’s “experience in Africa, as well as India,” showed that Scott “is not capable of this” single-minded focus. He continued: “In a certain sense, this is his strength; but it also creates serious problems.” What worked for an individual did not hold for an organization.

Scott’s rebelliousness – his addition of an Indian minority or civil rights concern into an international peace project – upset a delicate equilibrium. The Brigade saw itself as internationally apolitical, unallied with the interests of state power. It called into question the impenetrableness of national borders by attempting to cross them physically, and it deprioritized national security concerns by finding violence, state-sanctioned or otherwise, invalid. Yet the Brigade also respected tricky domestic political terrain, refusing to “inject” contentious political questions into – and seeing them as a distraction from – its transnational mission. There was also a tactical consideration to the Brigade’s annoyance with Scott’s Naga advocacy: in reality, he made it more difficult for Indian Gandhians to work behind the scenes on the Naga issue.

89 A. J. Muste to Devi Prasad, May 16, 1963, Box 2, WPB NARC Papers.
90 Suresh Ram to A. J. Muste, May 11, 1963, Box 2, WPB NARC Papers.
91 Muste to Prasad, May 16, 1963.
92 Muste to Prasad, May 16, 1963.
Back in the United States, Bayard Rustin was “almost contemptuous” toward “these anarchistic people who will not do what they are told” because they were “apolitical” purists. He had found some of the Brigade’s endeavors, particularly in decolonizing Africa, “enormously worthwhile precisely because [they were not] just a kind of pacifist bearing witness [but] linked up with a major anticolonial movement.” In an Indian context, however, he felt that the Brigade’s remaining separate from minority-rights issues cast doubt on its support for matters of political injustice within the state—something of deep concern for a US civil rights activist.

Scott was not the only leader of the Brigade who thought that the organization might eventually take up the question of Nagaland. According to a letter from Charlie Walker to Muste, JP himself “was considering some specialized role for a few key people in regards [to] the Naga question.” In conversations with Narayan Desai (an Indian member of the Brigade) in Patna in August 1963, the letter continued, JP “concluded this was a job for a highly skilled person or persons who understood both conventional political dynamics and had the imagination and ability to relate nonviolence to specific issues and choices arising within that context.” Perhaps this proposed Naga peace project could be modeled on “the role Bayard [Rustin]” and Muste “played in East Africa” during the Brigade’s Africa Freedom Action Project. “The obvious difficulty is, as JP and [Narayan Desai] observed, such people are scarce and they are always needed where they already are.” On the one hand, the Brigade community lacked enough “great men” to tackle all the interwoven political questions it sought to address. On the other, its individual leaders’ many causes and interests undermined the Brigade’s own activities. The Brigade community itself did not see an incompatibility. From its perspective, Scott’s advocacy for Nagaland (in India) and JP’s for Tibet (in China) proved that the Brigade was not aligned with either country. However, that was not the point of view of either the Indian or the Chinese government.

CONCLUSION

As a practical matter, the Friendship March failed to have much measurable impact improving Sino-Indian relations, its primary goal. It never
managed to get entry visas from China. Without travel documents, the
marchers had to halt in Ledo, Assam, in January 1964. Yet the World
Peace Brigade’s “parts” – the individuals who composed the organiza-
tion – were more significant than the whole. They were international
Gandhian peace workers, soldiers in a global peace brigade, and their
aim was political transformation: of norms (of war and peace), of defini-
tions (of “state” and “non-state”), and of categories (of “national” and
“international”). Their walk across North and Northeast India changed
the international peace movement but not in the manner that they had
hoped and anticipated. It was an end of the World Peace Brigade, rather
than a beginning of further global intervention. The Brigade had “proved
too grandiose in its ambitions, too lacking in resources and too reliant on
key personalities in the USA and India (who had many other demands on
their time).”

According to Muste, its leadership in India, the United
States, and Britain were “separated by immense distances, . . . one of the
chief reasons for its difficulties.”

War Resisters’ International, the Brigade’s parent organization,
blamed the latter’s demise on a mismanagement of political scales: the
Brigade had imposed “an international structure” instead of allowing its
activities to grow from the local to the national level and then to the
international. Brigade members had “been projected into alien situations
without adequate preparation.”

While one difficulty of the Brigade’s Africa Freedom Action Project in
Dar es Salaam had been that it was not an African project, Ed Lazar, who
stayed on the Freedom March for its full duration, thought that the fatal
flaw of the Friendship March was that it became an Indian endeavor
rather than an international one. The Friendship March showed that
an enterprise dominated by Brigade members who were Indians on a
march through India could still walk into a set of difficulties – those
caused not by their being “alien” to the country but by the collision
between transnational advocacy and state sovereignty.

The theme of conflict between scales of political power – national,
regional, international, local – enveloped Brigade activities. Advocacy

98 April Carter, Peace Movements: International Protest and World Politics since 1945
100 War Resister’s International, “Report from Lansbury House,” undated (probably 1966),
Box 41, Folder 6, A. J. Muste Papers, Microfilm.
101 Ed Lazar, Assam Friendship March Conference, January 1964. A. J. Muste Papers,
Box 41, Folder 3. Available on microfilm.
worked between these scales, facilitating the movement of nationalist claims through international politics. Advocates could operate at the interstices of these scales as individuals, personally, privately, and incrementally. Navigating scales required long-term, in-depth, interconnected work of the sort that JP, Muste, and Scott had significant experience as individuals; in an organization, however, they foun dered. Their inability to work together is of less surprise than that they came together in the first place, as the Brigade was a collection of outsized individuals whose causes competed for focus and funding.

The World Peace Brigade was misnamed: it did not represent the world, was not particularly peaceful, and lacked the cohesion and size of a military brigade. Its parts – the experience, passion, and work of A. J. Muste, Jayaprakash Narayan, Bayard Rustin, and Michael Scott, among others – were greater than its whole. The Brigade was an “army of generals not an army of soldiers.” The history of the Brigade’s Delhi-to-Peking Friendship March became a narrative of internal organizational divisions around the issues of nationalist insurgency in India and China and the legitimacy of Indian state violence during the Sino-Indian War – questions that had a degree of geographical overlap with each other and with the march’s route across North and Northeast India.

These internal and external conflicts illuminated the mismatch between the Brigade’s aims and operations. In the words of April Carter, a member of the Brigade community who had friends and colleagues on the march, the World Peace Brigade “illustrated the pitfalls . . . of an international group publicly challenging nationalist sentiments” on questions of national security. It was a transnational, apolitical organization, whose leadership held defined national-political stances and who functioned most efficiently outside of the organization. The Brigade sank under the

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102 Lydia Walker, “The Political Geography of International Advocacy: Indian and American Cold War Civil Society for Tibet,” *American Historical Review* 127, no. 4 (2022): 1381, discusses the key role played by advocacy in moving nationalist claims through different geopolitical scales; that is, in making a local or regional question one of international importance.

103 How political processes are affected by spatial structures, also known as “political geography,” is usually shown by the use of a three-scale structure with state at the “center,” the study of international relations “above” it, and the study of localities “below” it; David Harvey, “Places, Regions, Territories,” in *Cosmopolitanism and the Geographies of Freedom* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 166–201, considers these scales to be contextual rather than trans-historical or trans-spatial.


weight of these contradictions – between transnational advocacy and state sovereignty, between the individual versus the organization – which had been visible since its Africa Freedom Action Project in Dar es Salaam.

The Brigade’s lifecycle – active from 1961 to 1964, officially dissolved in 1966 – reflected the diminution of its wider community’s international advocacy on behalf of nationalist claimants as the accelerated decolonization of the early 1960s slowed. Emblematically, Muste died in February 1967, following his deportation from South Vietnam, as he attempted to negotiate between sides during the US war in Southeast Asia.) However, before the dissolution of this network of advocacy that worked to facilitate nationalist claims-making, JP and Scott had a concluding joint mission: a final journey to Northeast India to forge peace in Nagaland.

The individual tensions within the Brigade exposed and fed the contradictions between transnational advocacy and state sovereignty. The frictions on view during the Friendship March – between Western and Indian Brigade members, between the purpose of the march and JP’s advocacy for Tibet as well as Scott’s for Nagaland; and even, to a lesser degree, between Muste and Rustin concerning the morality and politics of focusing only on US civil rights – illuminated the fissures within the Brigade as a political project. These divisions were not only personal, they were also analytic, since they were symptoms of competing political priorities. They articulated the struggle to make transnational advocacy compatible with state sovereignty when these ideas operated on two different scales of political geography: the first, crossing (and questioning) national boundaries as well as those within the state by supporting minority nationalisms; the second, shoring up the political unit (and unity) of the state.

Thirty-nine countries became independent between 1960 and 1966, while between 1966 and 1975 seventeen countries became independent.

Itty Abraham, How India Became Territorial: Foreign Policy, Diaspora, Geopolitics (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2014), 4, considers the “international in terms of the outcome of a multi-scaler process.”

The Friendship March – the World Peace Brigade’s attempt to walk from India to China in order to promote peace between those countries – halted in Ledo, Assam, India, in January 1964. Because elements of the march’s leadership supported nationalist movements within those two countries, China would not grant visas to allow the march to cross the border and the Indian government grew increasingly hostile toward the endeavor. Three weeks later and 300 kilometers from where the march ended, the Nagaland Baptist Church Council held a convention in Wokha, Nagaland, “crying in the wilderness for peace.”¹ Led by the missionary Reverend Longri Ao, nicknamed the “Naga Prophet,” the Council chose two of the World Peace Brigade’s leaders – Jayaprakash Narayan (JP) and Reverend Michael Scott – along with the chief minister of Assam, Bimala Prasad Chaliha, to head a peace mission with the purpose of arbitrating between the Indian government and Naga nationalist insurgents in Northeast India.² The Peace Mission hoped to establish a platform of mutual trust from which peace could grow. However, “peace” did not correspond with “independence” – a distinction that echoed the


² Process described by I. Temjenba, speech from the 52nd Indo-Naga Ceasefire Day at Chedema Peace Hall, September 23, 2016, Chedema, Nagaland. Speech printed in the *Eastern Mirror* newspaper, viewed at the Nagaland Baptist Church Council Library, Kohima, Nagaland.
divergence between the aims of nationalist insurgent claimants and their transnational advocates.

That year, 1964, was not the first time the Naga Baptist Church had mediated between nationalist insurgency and Indian rule. In 1963, Scott had kept Reverend Ao abreast of his negotiations between Naga nationalists and Indian prime minister Nehru during the Friendship March; and a Naga Hills Ministers Peace Mission had taken place in the 1950s. This latest effort, the 1964 Nagaland Peace Mission, was a civil society endeavor – made up of unofficial (i.e., Chaliha was not acting in his official capacity as Assam’s chief minister), allegedly unaffiliated, volunteers – that sought to reconcile the question of Nagaland’s political shape within, or alongside, that of India’s.

Negotiations under the auspices of a civil society mission that did not officially represent either a nationalist movement or a state government seemed safely apolitical. However, the transnational network in which JP and Scott were key members was integrated into official government as well as international institutional circles of power and affiliated with a number of sometimes overlapping, sometimes contradictory movements and interests. JP and Scott were far from politically disinterested free agents – and the web of political causes that bound them extended to the Peace Mission.

**SOVEREIGNTY ON THE EDGE**

The Nagaland Peace Mission was a site for fashioning postcolonial state sovereignty in a classic borderland, a former edge of empire, a “neo-colonial” hinterland. Sovereignty is the international recognition of – and the totalizing control over – the zone of national self-determination, the political narrative that clothes power with legitimacy. Placement in a “periphery’s periphery” – in a region lightly connected to its governing

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capital as well as to global centers of power or governance – intensified claims of self-determination predicated on minority difference while attenuating the path of these claims to international forums. Nagaland’s physical distance from New Delhi provided intellectual space for advocates who worked to reconcile Naga self-determination with Indian sovereignty. JP, Scott, and Chaliha had experience grappling with the process of constructing sovereignty for postcolonial states and nationalist movements claiming that status. They, and others who took part in the Peace Mission, found in the end that Indian sovereignty and Naga self-determination were a call and response: they were distinct political ideas, articulated by different parties; each was a direct commentary upon and a repudiation of the other.5

Before examining the Peace Mission and its powerbrokers, it is important to note a subject that is not centered in this narrative: factionalization within the Naga nationalist movement. The Naga nationalist leader Angami Zapu Phizo had left Nagaland in the late 1950s not only to gain international attention for the cause of Naga independence but also because he was losing control over the nationalist movement as some Nagas sought to strike a deal with New Delhi. By remaining in exile; Phizo was able to maintain symbolic leadership because he did not tarnish his authority by compromising with India; yet exile meant that he could not control the Naga nationalist insurgent movement on the ground. Each Naga negotiation with New Delhi, past and present, has created parties who signed off on negotiations and those who refused to do so, fracturing the Naga nationalist movement. Since these fissures often occurred along tribal lines, they were used by the Indian government to undermine the legitimacy of a Naga nation within a tribal society.6 Choosing at which scale to locate a political question – national, international, regional, local, even tribal – is itself an argument as well as a matter of power relationships.7 The Indian government has had a vested interest in defining Nagas as a set of tribal peoples rather than a nation and the Naga claim as a domestic or regional concern rather than an international

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one – while Phizo, along with Scott, placed the Naga struggle within an international frame.

Situating the Naga claim of independence within the worldwide politics of decolonization explores global state-making processes outside the frame of the postcolonial state, by shifting focus from decolonization’s promise to its limits, from its liberations to its oppressions. Yet, without nuance, critiques of postcolonial state sovereignty can slip into imperial nostalgia. Indeed, the networks that connected Nagas to international politics were imperial remnants, linked to the region through the legacies of colonial rule and missionary conversion. The primacy placed on advocates such as JP and Scott as interlocutors between nationalist movements and state governments reflected hierarchies of power within an international system being rearranged, rather than redistributed, by decolonization. Their role also demonstrated the weakness of the Naga claim: that it remained the purview of unofficial advocates rather than of the United Nations.

Decolonization led to the triumph of certain nationalist claimants over others, of an India over a Nagaland. Over time, the “victors” have dominated narratives of colonies-turned-states, shaping who has received a “national” history of their independence struggle. In consequence, the narratives of those excluded from new state governments and positions of influence became local or regional rather than national or international. Yet, these historical actors continued their international activities in a variety of forms that worked around or challenged states—through civil society organizations or insurgent movements, or both. The histories of states-in-waiting and of those left behind by decolonization—both nationalists and their advocates—requires recognition that they were political and moral actors who sought liberation but were unable to delink themselves from the oppressions, past and present, that functioned as constraints.

THE POLITICS OF RECONCILIATION

The Naga Church was an entity that transcended the national scale of India and the regional context in which the church was embedded, because of its own global connections drawn from the history of missionary activity in the Indian Northeast. It was also the most powerful civil society organization in the region, maintaining an ambivalent relationship

with the Indian government, which had worked to sever the church’s ties to the United States by constraining American missionary activity. New Delhi forced the “indigenization” – the term used by American Baptists for the training and empowering of indigenous Christians to take on church leadership positions – of the Baptist Church in Northeast India decades earlier than American Baptists chose to shift leadership positions in Burma, Congo, South India, and elsewhere to people from the community in which they served.\(^9\) Indigenization ran parallel to decolonization and was itself an attempt to manage the forms that decolonization might take.

Missionaries from the United States portrayed themselves as bastions of Western/First World civilization threatened by decolonization and Cold War crises. Gerald Weaver, an American Baptist missionary serving in Congo during the Congo Crisis in the early 1960s, considered himself part of the anticommunist vanguard in the decolonizing world. As he wrote in 1961, for those “on the outside of the United States looking in, it seems so much easier to see that we have talked away one previous Western stronghold after another and the Communists have reaped the benefits.”\(^10\) This perspective aligned neatly with the domino theory of communist expansion and concern with American failure to adequately combat it, espoused by US administrations from Eisenhower to Reagan and employed by settler-colonial regimes in Southern Africa to justify their opposition to decolonization.\(^11\) It displayed the anticommunist frame in which American Baptist missionaries saw decolonization, a frame that the Naga Baptist Church also used.

Kijungluba Ao, a Naga Baptist leader who would receive the Dahlberg Peace Award from the American Baptist Convention and the Padma Shri Award from the Indian government, worried that Nagas were not “very far from the dangerous disease” of communism due to the fact that the departure of foreign missionaries was “weakening our united effort to

\(^9\) Regarding Naga Hills: F. Delano to M. D. Farnum, November 4, 1955, Reel 328. Regarding Congo: Gerald Weaver to Forrest Smith, July 17, 1960 (During the Congo Crisis), Reel 424, American Baptist Foreign Mission Society Papers, Atlanta, Georgia.

\(^10\) Gerald Weaver to F. Smith, February 11, 1961, Reel 242, ABFMS Papers.

witness for Christ.” Additionally, this was a pitch for money from the United States to support the Naga Church. He also said that Naga Baptists were “a community of people who were sophisticated enough to know their responsibility” – responsibility to God and responsibility to peace.

Nagas saw themselves as sophisticated, civilized, and Westernized. Christian identity, connected to an increasingly politically conservative American religious denomination, was of crucial importance for Naga nationalists as well as for the Naga Baptist Church. “Nagaland for Christ!” was (and remains) a popular nationalist insurgent rallying cry. It also meant that appeals to atheist Communist China had the potential to undermine the legitimacy of the Naga nationalist movement. “Maoist” as a pejorative adjective, with its atheist/authoritarian connotations, has been and continues to be a label placed on Naga nationalists by their opponents. Most importantly for JP on the Peace Mission, Christian identity meant that an Indian Union that included Nagaland on equal footing with its other constituent parts had to have room in its conception of India to contain a non–Hindu-majority Indian state alongside Kashmir.

12 Kijungluba Ao to A. F. Merrill, August 2, 1966, Reel 426 K, ABFMS Papers. On Kijungluba’s Dahlberg Award, the Federal Government of Nagaland wrote the American Baptist Mission Society, May 19, 1965:

It is learnt that our Baptist Mission had decided to show honour to one of our Church leaders by awarding ‘Dahlberg Peace Award.’ It will be a great surprise to keep the people of Nagaland and the FGN ignored [sic] of the purport of the award that is going to be given to one of our citizens. I would like to request you therefore, to furnish us the details of the purport and the objectives of making this award, which we are very much aware of. Signed Isak C. Swu, Foreign Secretary, sent c/o Peace Mission.

After the Naga nationalist movement split over the Shillong Accords in 1975, Isak led one of the factions, the National Socialist Council of Nagaland; Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM). Isak died on June 28, 2016.

13 Nagas did receive some weapons from China, most famously when a group of Naga nationalists under General Mowu Angami walked to China in 1968, but they received only what they were able to carry back with them. Most of the weapons used by Naga insurgents were either leftovers from the Second World War or bought from Indian traders, sometimes even Indian soldiers. Marcus Franke, War and Nationalism in South Asia: The Indian State and the Nagas (London: Routledge, 2009), 130–33.

14 For example, Prerna Katiya, “‘We Expect an Early Solution to Naga Issue’: Nagaland Chief Minister TR Zeliang,” Economic Times, October 29, 2017.

The Nagaland Baptist Church Council organized the Peace Mission. After choosing its members for the mission, the Church Council set up a negotiating committee of Naga leaders, which included themselves, family members of Phizo, and the Federal Government of Nagaland, which was the dominant Naga nationalist insurgent movement in the region during this period. The church council also reached out to the Indian government, which formed its own negotiating committee under the leadership of Foreign Secretary Y. D. Gundevia.

These two committees then agreed to the Church Council’s selection of the Nagaland Peace Mission: Chaliha (Assam’s chief minister), JP, and Scott. This choice was not accidental; it mirrored internal World Peace Brigade proposals. All three men had been active in nonviolent anticolonial nationalist resistance – JP and Chaliha for Indian independence; Scott against South African apartheid and rule over South West Africa; and both JP and Scott in the 1962 Africa Freedom Action Project in Dar es Salaam to support African liberation struggles and in the 1963 Friendship March. At the Peace Mission, Chaliha represented the regional context of the Indian Northeast; and Scott, the potential of international intervention. JP brought his status as an outsider to Indian electoral politics as well as his moral authority as a Gandhian. He hoped to speak for the idea of an Indian Union rather than for the government of India, since he did not align “state” and “nation” in his conception of Indian sovereignty, citing Gandhi for ideological backing: “Gandhiji was clear in his mind that the State could never be the sole instrument for creating the India of his dreams.”

The Indian government saw the Indo-Naga state-versus-nation conflict as an example of the relationship between tribal peoples and the Indian government. According to Gundevia, the government’s top representative in the Peace Mission talks, Indians and Nagas did not live, and had never lived, “as two nations side by side.” He argued that Nagas were

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19 The term “Indo-Naga” itself is deceptively neutral, since it implies a form of symmetry in the relationship. Those on the side of the Indian government believe that this is inaccurate and, further, that it provides Naga insurgents with the legitimacy of parity.
not a nation but a tribal people, defined in that manner in the Indian constitution as part of the 1960 negotiations for the creation of an Indian state of Nagaland. In Gundevia’s formulation, this status did not make Nagas unique, since there were constitutionally defined tribes “right in the Centre of India” with the same “peculiar social set-up.” As a tribe, the Nagas already had a form of “protected autonomy”; however, this was itself a contradictory notion: if autonomy needed to be protected, were a people functionally autonomous?

Gundevia reasoned that historically the territory of “Nagaland was a part and parcel of India.” Therefore, the creation of an independent Naga state would break with this history and involve changing Indian national boundaries, which was out of the question. “Boundaries are drawn slowly and we cannot redraw the boundaries unless after a war.” As a part of British India, Nagaland was therefore part of independent India.

Decolonization did not usually seek to alter colonial boundaries (with, in Gundevia’s formulation, the important exception of the partitions of Pakistan and India in 1947 and their bloody aftermaths); rather, it enshrined them. According to Gundevia, while a “certain section of the people of Nagaland want a Sovereign State,” this did not apply to all Nagas, certainly not those in the government of, and receiving salaries from, the Indian state of Nagaland. Therefore, he wanted to know “what is meant by an independent Sovereign State” when that demand did not include all Nagas, when Nagas were not a nation but a tribal people, when tribes already had particular and varying degrees of autonomy within India. In summation, Gundevia argued: British India had

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21 Academic discussions on the applicability of categories such as “tribe” and (more recently) “indigeneity” in India have a long history, and include the debate between G. S. Ghurye, The Scheduled Tribes: The Aborigines So-Called and Their Future (Bombay: Bhatkal Press, 1963 [1943]) and Verrier Elwin, The Tribal World of Verrier Elwin: An Autobiography (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1964) on the distinction between “caste” and “tribe,” a debate that was bound up with the Indian nation-building project. A version of this debate continues between those who see tribe as a colonial construct – for example, Alpa Shah, “The Dark Side of Indigeneity: Indigenous People, Rights and Development in India,” History Compass 5, no. 6 (2007): 1806–32 – versus those who emphasize the uniqueness of particular tribal peoples; for example, Deepek Kumar Behera and Georg Pfeffer, eds., “Tribal Situation in India: An Introduction,” in Contemporary Society: Tribal Studies, Vol. VI: Tribal Situation in India (New Delhi: Concept Publishing, 2003), ix–xvii.

22 Gundevia, “Programme for Peace Conference.”

23 Gundevia, “Programme for Peace Conference.”

24 Gundevia, “Programme for Peace Conference.”
historically included Nagaland. Colonial boundaries were inherited by
the postcolonial state and were not to be redrawn short of war, which was
an activity that occurred between two (or more) sovereign states, such as
India and China, and did not include India’s counterinsurgency oper-
ations against Naga insurgents.\(^{25}\)

For Naga nationalists in-country (the Federal Government of
Nagaland, aka the “government-in-waiting” of Phizo’s group of hardline
nationalists), an “independent sovereign state” meant just that: an
autonomous, self-governing sovereign state with international-legal sov-
ereignty – a status that, for the Nagas, would have to be achieved through
external recognition and intervention since Naga nationalist insurgents
did not occupy all of the territory they claimed, as nationalist conceptions
of Nagaland included regions outside of the Federal Government’s mili-
tary control. To gain sovereignty, in the form of both external recognition
and internal territorial dominance, they needed international oversight,
and they did not fully trust either the Baptist Church Council or members
of the Peace Mission to help them achieve such control. The Federal
Government wanted peace talks “under the witness of the United
Nations,” and those talks needed to be between themselves and the
government of India alone. They felt that the government of the Indian
state of Nagaland, created in 1963 by constitutional amendment after
Nehru’s negotiations with “moderate” Nagas in 1960, should not be at
the negotiating table. “No political solutions can be done under the
initiative of this false state.”\(^{26}\)

In a manner similar to other peoples’ demanding independence, the
Federal Government threatened to turn to the communist world for
support: “If the UN, the supreme organization of the day, is not in a
position to execute its sacred charter towards the Nagas, the Nagas are
strongly prepared to take aid from any quarter.”\(^{27}\) Here, Naga national-
ists signaled the prospect of aid from Communist China and thus of a
Southern-Asian Cold War front. Despite the little aid that Naga

\(^{25}\) Gundevia, “Programme for Peace Conference.”

\(^{26}\) Scato Swu, Kedahge, Federal Government of Nagaland, to Michael Scott, April 4, 1964,
Box 17, GMS Papers. (“Kedahge” was the title for the president of the
Federal Government.)

\(^{27}\) S. Swu to Scott, April 4, 1964. Another appeal to the UN is in “Naga’s Right to
Independence: Rebel Leader to Appeal for UN Recognition,” May 3, 1965, Zaphuvise
Lhousa Papers, Mezoma Nagaland; also, “The Govt. of Nagaland Memorandum to the
Secretary General of Nagaland, United Nations New York,” March 4, 1957, Zaphuvise
Lhousa Papers, Mezoma Nagaland.
nationalists received from China during this period, this was no idle threat to India, who had lost a war with China two years prior, at which time the Chinese had voluntarily halted less than 300 kilometers away from the Naga Hills.

Another option the Federal Government of Nagaland proposed was that the “World Council of Churches sends a Fact Finding Commission.” The World Council of Churches had held its Third International Assembly in New Delhi in 1961, coinciding in time and place with the meeting of the Institute of Comparative Constitutional Law. The Nagaland Baptist Church Council sent a delegation to the Assembly, led by Longri Ao. Many of the British lawyers who wrote the constitutions for decolonizing British African colonies and were friends of the Brigade community informally attended the Assembly, as well, and formally attended the institute’s meeting. The keynote address at the Delhi Assembly featured a critique of unrestrained state sovereignty. It proposed international-legal structures as an alternative, asking states to submit to the “jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice” and other “international regulations.”

Religion and law are distinct realms, and international law and comparative constitutional law are separate fields; yet the intersection between personnel, time, and location of these two gatherings highlighted the overlapping circles of people who inhabited these multiple spheres. Nearly all the organizations and individuals whom nationalists called upon to support their claims against empires and postimperial formations were in search of an alternative universalism to state sovereignty. However, what these advocates proposed – bounded sovereignty and non-national vehicles for self-determination – contradicted the aims of

28 Scato Swu to Michael Scott, April 4, 1964, Box 17, GMS Papers.
29 Assam Baptist Leader, September 1961, CBC NEI Archives.
30 DGTS II 4/3, Dingle Macintosh Foot Papers, Churchill College, Cambridge, UK. Dingle Foot attended both events; he was a prominent constitutional lawyer (a member of the bar or appeared in the courts of Ghana, Sri Lanka, Northern Rhodesia, Sierra Leone, India, Bahrain, Malaysia, Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika, Nyasaland, and Pakistan), member of the British parliament, member of the Brigade community, brother of Hugh and Michael Foot, and active Anglican.
the nationalists who hoped that the intervention of advocates would help enable their states-in-waiting to gain full national independence. At the same time, it made sense, based on the World Council of Churches’ critique of state sovereignty in New Delhi a few years previously, that Naga nationalists might see that organization as a potential sympathetic intermediary.

“THE NAGALAND DRAMA”

While Naga nationalists reached out to, and sought to work with, a range of nongovernmental organizations and unofficial individuals to negotiate on their behalf with the Indian government, they doubted that many of these intermediaries fully grasped the dire situation in their region. The Federal Government of Nagaland had accused the Nagaland Baptist Church Council of cowardice in its previous dealings with New Delhi, and resented the phrase “peace-talk,” seeing it as cheap talk when, according to Scato Swu, the president of the Federal Government, Naga “rights are denied.” Scato continued, “Peace-talk [also] clearly implies a political settlement, and we [are] only prepared to have a direct talk between the Government of India and the Federal Government of Nagaland, after declaring [an] effective ceasefire.” They claimed that the military assistance that the Indian government was allegedly receiving from the United States and the UK after the 1962 Sino-Indian War was in reality being used to fight Naga nationalists.

Media and reporting, that is, narrative dissemination for external audiences, was a battleground between nationalists and their ruling authorities. While India controlled almost all news reporting on Nagaland, Naga nationalists closely followed international media. A few days after Scato Swu heard a Radio News report, the Lima (Peru) Football Disaster in which a referee’s controversial call led to the death of...
and injury of 800 people, he compared the members of the Peace Mission to referees in a football match, reminding them of the bloody stakes of their responsibility. Scato’s analogy to an event that had occurred on the other side of the world three days earlier showed how closely even insurgents living in the jungle followed international currents. Scato also warned Scott that he was getting misleading information from Phizo (in exile in London) and Shilu Ao (chief minister of the Indian State of Nagaland), and instead needed to be in direct contact with the Federal Government of Nagaland. Though they lived under martial law as well as under a media and travel ban, Naga nationalists in Nagaland paid attention to the world they sought to invite in to recognize them.

On September 6, 1964, the Federal Government of Nagaland and the government of India signed a ceasefire agreement. Both sides suspended violent operations, including forced labor and population relocations (Indian government), and arms procurement and sabotage (Naga nationalist insurgents). The ceasefire created a “period of stoppage of operations, in order to promote an atmosphere conducive to peaceful occupations and free discussion” under the auspices of the Peace Mission. The ceasefire agreement was the platform on which the Peace Mission’s negotiations rested.

Both the nationalist insurgents and the “ordinary” Nagas who were sick of violence respected the Peace Mission because it took care to establish that it was negotiating a settlement between two (though not equivalent) political entities, which provided legitimacy to the Naga claim. From the Naga perspective, equal consideration of the government of India and the Federal Government “meant that the Peace Mission recognized Nagaland; so any agreement between India and Nagaland,

\[37\] Scato Swu to Members of the Peace Mission, May 27, 1964, VK Nuh Papers. Letter was copied to: “(1) All authorities, Federal Government of Nagaland to understand that ours is more than a football match. (2) Executive Secretary, Naga Baptist Church Council, he is requested to ask the churches to pray all the more; for an early intervention of Jesus Christ the Prince of peace. (3) The President, Government of India, to deepen and high ten his mighty philosophy. (4) Prime Minister of India, to glorify his principles of Panch Sheel.”


\[39\] Scato Swu to Scott, April 4, 1964.


\[41\] 1964 Ceasefire Agreement, 259–60.

\[42\] Author interview with Niketu Iralu, February 10, 2016. Concept in parentheses is my own.
was automatically international, since it was between two separate countries.” However, from the Indian point of view, the potential of internationalization (symbolized by Scott’s presence) delegitimized the Peace Mission, even though the Indian government had been willing to sign the ceasefire agreement that brought Scott to Nagaland and provided him with the visa and permit to enter a region where foreigners were generally prohibited.

The Peace Mission’s intended modus operandi was the extended truce, which it hoped to “be a protracted affair” since “public opinion takes time to assert itself fully.” Nagas had endured over a decade of violence. Once people knew peace, the Mission believed, they would be willing “to give anything to ensure” its continuance. The Peace Mission, showing its Baptist and Gandhian roots, would bear witness – a repeated refrain – to the atrocities committed by both Naga insurgents (aka, “the underground”) and the Indian military.

Peace Mission leaders went from Naga village to Naga village in beat-up jeeps over almost nonexistent roads. JP, who generally wore khadi kurtas in India and abroad, appeared in Western suits with his trademark sunglasses. Scott was “so tall he had to hunch in his government World War Two white jeep. When he stood, he seemed to shoot up into the sky.” Most Nagas assumed that he was a Baptist rather than Anglican minister, a convenient misapprehension that Scott did not bother to correct.

Chaliha, though (or perhaps because of his status as) Assam’s chief minister, kept a lower profile, mostly staying silent in meetings. He and Scott got on well; better than either did with JP, with whom Scott had always had strong differences on the Naga question. According to Scott, Chaliha was a “big, quiet thoughtful man of great presence ... a devout [Hindu]. [He] put some fiber into” the moderate, pro-Indian Naga leadership “when [they were] seized with doubt. The Peace Mission will succeed,” he said over and over again, stating aspiration so that it could

43 Author interview with Iralu, February 10, 2016.
44 Kijungluba Ao to A. F. Merrill, February 8, 1965, Reel 426 K, ABFMS Papers.
45 Kijungluba to Merrill, February 8, 1965.
46 Pictures from Nagaland are the only images I have seen of JP regularly in Western clothing during this period.
47 Author interview with Kaka Iralu (who was eight when he met Scott), February 4, 2016.
48 Transcript of Cyril Dunn interview with Michael Scott, March 13, 1977, Box 52, GMS Papers.
become fact.\textsuperscript{49} He also kept the security dimensions alive in discussion (especially those concerning recent Chinese incursions), reminding Nagas that a civil society intervention like the Peace Mission would have been impossible in China or if Nagaland were under Chinese rule, stating, “In a Communist country there is no such freedom of speech.”\textsuperscript{50} Scott noted that, of the three, Chaliha – as a serving politician who had virulently anti-Naga constituents who were on the receiving end of the train explosions allegedly caused by Naga nationalist insurgents – took the largest personal political risk.\textsuperscript{51}

JP worked for internal unity in the form of regional autonomy. In his political vision, regional autonomy \textit{within} an Indian Union equaled a greater India, as more peoples could claim their home within the Indian state. He believed that the Naga nationalists did not understand what belonging to the Indian Union meant and how it differed from British colonial rule. He wrote in 1965, “Nagaland is not a colony or dependency of India, ruled and exploited by India, but just like any other Indian state, it is self-governing with its proportionate share in the affairs of the Indian government.”\textsuperscript{52} JP believed that building an India that included Nagaland would allow the Indian Union to truly call upon its Gandhian anticolonial nationalist legitimacy. For JP, the Peace Mission was an opportunity to explain the structure of the Indian Union – and their place in it – to a people who he believed did not know what they were refusing. Trying to convince Naga nationalists of this perspective, he spent much of the Peace Mission in individual, private talks with them, to the frustration of Chaliha and Scott.\textsuperscript{53}

JP was not the only one carrying out private negotiations under the cover of the Peace Mission; the Indian government was doing the very same thing.\textsuperscript{54} Indeed, an argument could be made that the prime purpose of the Peace Mission from the Indian government’s perspective was to

\begin{itemize}
\item Transcript of Cyril Dunn interview with Scott in Shillong, October 1964, Box 5, GMS Papers.
\item Dunn interview with Scott, October 1964.
\item Cyril Dunn interview with Michael Scott, March 13, 1977.
\item Comment by G. K. Pillai, May 1, 2016, Indian home secretary (2009–2011), on the contents of the Home Ministry’s Nagaland files. These files are not currently open to researchers. Nagaland’s files were housed in the Indian Ministry of External Affairs.
\end{itemize}
provide a public smokescreen for, and ease of access to, secret bilateral conversations with Naga nationalist insurgents who had previously been living in jungle camps. While the different parties involved in the Peace Mission had opposing interests, they all initially found the Mission a useful vehicle to serve those interests.

SCOTT’S SEVEN SCENARIOS

A week after the Peace Mission brokered a ceasefire between Naga nationalists and the Indian government in September 1964, Scott drafted a private memo to himself on seven possible forms the Indo-Naga relationship might take. The first form would be an independent Nagaland, which the Federal Government of Nagaland believed was already the on-the-ground reality in much (but not all) of the territory they claimed. The Indian government viewed this form as secession. Second: Nagaland would have a status akin to that of Bhutan: officially independent but with a treaty in which India controlled Nagaland’s foreign relations. Third: Nagaland would be an Indian protectorate with administrative autonomy (as Sikkim was from 1950 to 1973, when it was incorporated into India). Fourth: Nagaland and India would have a relationship comparable to that of Puerto Rico and the United States (since 1952, Puerto Rico has been an unincorporated US territory with its own constitution approved by the US Congress). Interestingly, the Indian government also made an analogy between Nagaland and Puerto Rico, though in the context of comparing the Naga nationalist movement with the Puerto Rican independence movement.

Scott’s fifth possibility revisited the Cripps plan, a 1942 attempt by the British government to head off the Indian independence movement with the promise of full dominion status after the Second World War. This plan involved a grouping of autonomous Hill States in the Northeast, modeled on the British protectorates in Southern Africa that became the

before 1972, when they were brought under the Home Ministry – hence the Peace Mission’s falling under Gundevia’s brief as foreign secretary.

55 Michael Scott, internal memo, September 12, 1964, Box 17, GMS Papers.
independent states of Botswana, Lesotho, and Eswatini.\textsuperscript{57} The \textit{sixth} possible form for Nagaland was analogous to what had been the Princely States in British India, which had been ostensibly sovereign as they were ruled by indigenous princes while subject to British authority.\textsuperscript{58} **Seventh:** Nagaland would be “an independent sovereign state within a confederation or even within the Indian Union on terms which could still be within the provisions of Article 2 of the [Indian] Constitution.”\textsuperscript{59} This bore similarities to JP’s plan for Nagaland, with the crucial addition of the words “independent” and “sovereign.”\textsuperscript{60} 

Each of Scott’s possible scenarios articulated the many ways that the state of India could have been constructed back in 1947, when it became independent from Britain, and amounted to a revision of the Indian Union. Some of his options looked back toward the colonial period for models of constrained sovereignty. They all attempted to reshape the idea of independence – Naga and Indian – in ways that were analytically creative but impossible as a practical matter since the Indian government felt that it had nothing to gain and everything to lose from a change in status quo.

In Scott’s ideal, an “independent,” “sovereign” State of Nagaland would retain the borders of the existing Indian State of Nagaland (i.e., the Naga-inhabited territories in Burma, Assam, Manipur, and NEFA would not be integrated into it). There would be a new election in which the Federal Government of Nagaland (the Naga nationalist insurgents) and the State Government of Nagaland (the government of the Indian State of Nagaland made up of Naga moderates) would both participate. This was feasible, according to Scott, because their “two constitutions are not so dissimilar as to make this adaption impossible.”\textsuperscript{61}

Subsequently, in Scott’s plan, the new Nagaland determined by this election would then “voluntarily accede to the [Indian] Union.” The new

\textsuperscript{57} David R. Syiemlieh, ed., \textit{On the Edge of Empire: Four British Plans for North East India, 1941–1947} (New Delhi: Thousand Oaks Press, 2014), gets at some proposed plans that different British colonial civil servants had for keeping parts of the Indian Northeast under British control after Indian independence, including perhaps as a League of Nations mandate like Namibia (pp. 134, 136).


\textsuperscript{59} Scott, internal memo, September 12, 1964.

\textsuperscript{60} It is relatively easy for the Indian government to create new states within the Indian union. Article Two of the Indian Constitution reads: “[T]he parliament may, by law, admit new states into Union of India or establish new states on terms and conditions it deems fit.”

\textsuperscript{61} Scott, internal memo, September 12, 1964.
Nagaland’s external affairs (foreign relations and defense) would be handled by India “except that Nagaland would have the right to raise its own Defense Force,” which would only serve in the Naga Hills but would have the “obligation of resisting any invasion of Nagaland or of India through its territory.”62 “The [new] Government of Nagaland would have representation as a State in Indian Embassies where there were special interests of the State [of Nagaland] involved. This might apply to predominantly Christian countries which have had a special association with Nagaland such as Britain and the USA” and eventually when circumstances “improve Pakistan, China, Burma, Thailand.”63 Scott articulated a conception of state sovereignty where its layers—domestic affairs, diplomacy, military—could be peeled off and apportioned to different ruling authorities, in a similar manner to the unevenness of empire in particular regions, such as the Indian Princely States. His depiction of the historic relationships between Nagaland and the United States and Britain corresponded with Naga people’s ideas of the importance of their personal connections to American and British advocates but not with how official representatives of those two countries perceived the Naga people.

THE PEACE MISSION DERAILED

After two years of negotiations, the Peace Mission stalled. Its proposals, including Scott’s plan for a new Nagaland, never distilled into a policy because they were “not really accepted by either side.”64 Eventually, Naga nationalists came to see JP as a representative of the Indian government, not an honest broker. At a public event in central India, JP said that India’s fierce response to Pakistan during the 1965 Indo-Pakistan War would make the Nagas “more realistic” in their demands for autonomy. The Hindi word that JP used for “put down” or “suppress” a rebellion was translated to non–Hindi-speaking Nagas as “liquidating an insurrection,” angering Naga nationalists who felt that he was threatening them if they did not acquiesce to Indian rule.65 JP argued that he had been misinterpreted, but since his explanations failed to appease Naga

62 Michael Scott, internal memo, September 12, 1964.
63 Scott, internal memo, September 12, 1964.
64 Michael Scott, internal memo, June 5, 1965, Box 17, GMS Papers.
65 According to quotes given by JP in the Assam Tribune article of February 26, 1966, “JP Resigns from the Peace Mission,” the word was “dabao,” used in “an interview with newsmen some time ago in Rajasthan.” I have not been able to find the exact interview with the surrounding context.
nationalists, he resigned. After JP’s official departure in February 1966 (he still participated as an unofficial adviser), the Peace Mission unraveled.

That May, the Indian government deported Michael Scott after he wrote a letter on behalf of the Nagas to the secretary general of the United Nations. The next day, the Assam State Assembly succeeded in pressuring Chaliha to resign from the peace mission due to a series of train explosions attributed to Naga nationalist insurgents. The Assam Tribune reported that Chaliha “hoped that the people would appreciate that under the new circumstances it was no longer possible for him to continue in the Peace Mission. He said that he had advised the Baptist Church Council to dissolve the Peace Mission.”

With the approval of the Naga Baptist Church, the Peace Mission had appointed the Nagaland Observer Team to oversee adherence to the ceasefire agreement of September 1964. After the Peace Mission dissolved, the observer team took over, led by M. Aram (who had participated in the World Peace Brigade’s 1963 Friendship March) and made up of members of the Sarvodaya movement, which was the Gandhian Indian civil society movement in which JP held a leadership role. According to JP, Aram, a South Indian, was the most qualified “non-Naga Indian … to speak about the advent of peace in near war-torn Nagaland” and a “leading participant in the drama of peace-making which is yet to be completed.” Overseeing the ceasefire proved a thankless task since both the Peace Mission and the observer team lacked real investigative or enforcement powers regarding allegations of ceasefire violations.

M. Aram steered the observer team with Marjorie Sykes, a British Quaker who took Indian citizenship after Indian independence. Indian

70 J. P. Narayan, From Socialism to Sarvodaya (Raighat, Varanasi: Akhil Bharat Sarva Seva Sangh Prakashan, 1970 [1958]).
72 M. Aram to Peace Mission, May 28, 1965, Box 17, GMS Papers: “I am given to understand that not infrequently informers give false or exaggerated reports perhaps since they bring some monetary benefit. It may be good if as far as possible reports are verified before serious complaints are made.”
Gandhians chose Sykes because they thought Naga nationalists might respond better to the observer team if a white person was involved after Scott’s departure. She lived in the Kothari Hills in Maharashtra and travelled third class on the railway nearly 3,000 kilometers to Dimapur, Nagaland. An ascetic, a “very grey, drab” woman, she took Quaker simplicity to the extreme. An exacting pacifist, she believed that Naga nationalists’ violent insurgency invalidated their cause.

In a 1968 letter to his friend and patron David Astor, Michael Scott blamed Indian Gandhians, British Quakers, and even the Naga Baptist Church for the failure of the Peace Mission. Scott wrote that the Baptist Church “never had the confidence of the Naga people” and neither did “Miss Sykes and Dr. Aram” if they “are honest,” since they never blamed India for any of the violence in the region. He continued: “One or two Indians who did – e.g. Suresh Ram [who spent a year in Dar es Salaam with the Brigade’s Africa Freedom Action Project] – were removed” from the Naga question. Scott gave himself, Phizo, and Astor credit for publicizing the “Naga side of the story,” thereby providing Naga nationalists with the leverage to negotiate a ceasefire with the Indian government.

He closed his no-holds-barred letter to Astor:

You must forgive my vehemence. But when I read of the Burmese Government presenting the Indian Army with the heads of Naga officers they had captured . . . it makes me want to throw up. The [Quakers and Gandhians] really ought to be confronted with the hollowness of this sort of holiness . . . God-fearing pro-Indians have assisted the devious attempts of India to evade the issues.

Scott’s impassioned attack – on JP, the Sarvodaya movement, and the Quakers who “sided” with them and the Indian government rather than with himself and Astor on the question of minority rights – displayed the compound fracture in the World Peace Brigade community’s advocacy network caused by the Naga question. A nationalist claim within independent India upset the network’s conceptual basis for its support for national liberation. Sharp, personal acrimony over questions of national legitimacy, state power, and use of force shattered the remnants of the Brigade community, already weakened by the limited utility of their

73 Author interview with Jack Sutters, April 1, 2015.
74 Michael Scott to David Astor, August 1968, Box 17, GMS Papers.
75 Scott to Astor, August 1968.
76 Scott to Astor, August 1968.
77 Scott to Astor, August 1968.
78 Scott to Astor, August 1968.
Africa Freedom Action Project in Dar es Salaam and by the failure of their Delhi-to-Peking Friendship March.

THE IMPERIALISM OF DECOLONIZATION

Reckoning with imperial remnants – whether they were former colonial borders, former colonial officials, or ongoing paternalist ways of understanding states-in-waiting – remained a continuing theme for nationalist claims-making and its international advocacy. Charles Pawsey, the last British district commissioner to the Naga Hills, who had vouched for Phizo’s identity in London in 1960, was the embodiment of these imperial remnants. In 1965, Pawsey returned to Nagaland during the Peace Mission, his travel expenses paid secretly – so he would not appear to be an Indian agent – by the Indian government.80

Most people attached to the Peace Mission welcomed Pawsey’s presence, but for very different reasons. Gundevia, the leader of the Indian committee to the mission, claimed somewhat disingenuously that no one had invited Pawsey: that he came because “he wanted to come” as an individual with historic and personal connections to the Naga people.81 Shilu Ao, the chief minister of the Indian State of Nagaland, maintained that Pawsey was “not a foreigner” and that he had come “as a friend” when the Naga people “asked for him.”82 Disagreeing with that viewpoint, Scott and the representatives from the Federal Government of Nagaland felt that Pawsey’s arrival meant that the Indian government should allow other “foreign neutral observers” into the region, such as a potential UN observer mission, as existed in Kashmir.83 And while the Federal Government (the Naga nationalist insurgents) welcomed the potential of foreign observation that Pawsey might portend, they found his visit “confusing.” Did Nagas not have enough confidence in themselves that “they needed outsiders to solve” their problems for them?84

Each party identified Pawsey as an “advocate” – but was unsure which side he backed. Whom did Pawsey represent? He had standing at the Peace Mission negotiations as a former colonial official, brought in by the current, postcolonial government, with personal ties to individual Nagas. He had an interest in peace for a people, region, and situation for which he had borne responsibility. He had overseen the 1947 handover of the Naga Hills to the newly independent Indian government while knowing that many Nagas had rejected that transfer of power. Pawsey, a man in his seventies with sufficient means to retire comfortably to a Grade II- listed sixteenth-century, six-bedroom home in the Suffolk countryside, did not travel all the way to Nagaland simply because the Indian government had paid him to do so.

Yet, “hiring” a retired colonial official to use his personal influence with members of a minority people to promote the government’s point of view demonstrated the continuing imperial rather than postcolonial nature of the independent Indian state. In the words of Phizo’s nephew Challe, from the Naga nationalist perspective, “Made in England [was] a very apt label” for independent India. Simultaneously, the Naga nationalist claim had its own imperial remnants, particularly that of its political geography as an excluded hill region where the British had ruled with a lighter footprint than elsewhere in India, and of the religious influence of Christian conversion that had created global connections that did not pass through New Delhi. Elements of Naga nationalist claims-making, the dynamics of the Indo-Naga relationship, and the paternalism of advocacy all had imperial origins, even as its participants sought to create new political possibilities that did not turn back the clock to empire.

CONCLUSION

Reverend Michael Scott’s deportation from India in May 1966 marked a complete turnaround from decades earlier when the Indian delegation at the UN had made possible his advocacy on behalf of Namibian nationalists. After his deportation and the demise of the Peace Mission, Scott kept on searching for an international-legal solution for the Naga question within India as well as for the broader issue of minority peoples within the United Nations order. Since 1960, Scott and other advocates had

85 Challe Iralu to Laura Thompson, September 5, 1959, Box 41, Institute of Ethnic Affairs correspondence file, National Anthropological Archives, the Smithsonian, Washington, DC.
repeatedly tried to place the Naga case before the UN, writing to that organization’s secretary general, to its Ghanaian and Algerian UN delegations, and to nongovernmental organizations that had a strong UN observer presence. These requests did not receive support, for various reasons: no one wanted to “strain the international fabric” unnecessarily; there was fear that the continuous Indo-China border dispute might cause a US-China war; and only a state could petition the UN, not a human rights organization.

In 1973, in response to these roadblocks, Scott argued in a letter to Neville Maxwell – who had visited Nagaland on a journalist mission of 1960, and who wrote a report on the Naga claim for David Astor’s Minority Rights Group – that “India’s policy [towards Nagaland] is a form of post imperial colonialism” since it based its claim “to Nagaland on the original British military occupation.” Therefore, he wrote, “the rest of the world” should not accept India’s “claim to leadership in the Third World’s ‘anticolonial struggle.’” Postimperial colonialism differs semantically from postcolonial imperialism, but both terms highlight the forms of imperial relations rerouted and reasserted after national independence. “Postcolonial” labels a chronological period after formal empire, while “postimperial” denotes the ongoing practical and theoretical systems of what had been imperial domination.

On the question of disenfranchised peoples within postcolonial states, Scott, in the same letter to Maxwell, saw a “new type of colonialism emerging”: “The rights of indigenous peoples are not recognized by international law or the United Nations ... [Because of South West

86 Michael Scott to U. Thant, UN secretary general, October 26, 1965; Keith to Michael Scott (on the prospect of Ghana’s involvement), November 21, 1965; Roger Baldwin (of the International League for the Rights of Man) to A. Z. Phizo, December 2, 1960; Michael Scott to Ahmed Ben Bella, May 20, 1963; all in: Box 28, GMS Papers. Roger Baldwin to Gershon Collier of the UN Committee of 24/Mission of Sierra Leon to the UN, October 21, 1966, asking if he would bring the issue “of the Naga peoples in India” to the Committee of 24 as a “colonial problem,” Box 35, GMS Papers.


89 Maxwell also wrote a revisionist account of the Sino-Indian War. His various writings and activities had earned him persona non grata status with the Indian government. Neville Maxwell, *India, the Nagas, and the Northeast* (London: Minority Rights Group, 1973); Neville Maxwell, *India’s China War* (Random House, 2000 [1970]).

90 Michael Scott to Neville Maxwell, September 15, 1973, Box 28, GMS Papers.

91 In literary theory, there is a debate between the usage of “post-colonial” versus “postcolonial” on how best to capture the temporal specificity as well as the ongoing power relationships incapsulated in these terms; see Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths, and Helen Tiffin, eds., *The Post-Colonial Studies Reader* (London: Routledge, 2003 [1995]).
Africa/Namibia’s historic mandate status], South Africa is the only country where the internal minority problems are investigated by the UN.”

Scott continually placed Namibian nationalism vis-à-vis South Africa within the frame of minority peoples within postcolonial states because, as the original spokesman for the Herero people of (what became) Namibia, he knew well the ethnic divisions within the Namibian nationalist claim. He also took the long view that the importance of the original South West African mandate was that it prevented the Namibian claim from being subsumed by the African National Congress and into the South African liberation movement.

Maxwell linked his reply to Scott back to the issue of the postimperial (rather than postcolonial) nature of the independent Indian state: “The STATE is the basic unit of the international community, law is tailored to its requirements, and so minorities in conflict with the STATE have no recourse in the UN or anywhere else.” For Maxwell, this was a statement of fact about the United Nations order, good or bad; for Scott, rectifying this inequity represented his life’s work. This was an argument between advocates, not nationalists.

Nationalists whose nationalisms were prefaced by the modifiers “minority” or “sub” were those who Gavin Young, the Observer journalist who first broke the Naga story to a mainstream Western audience, called the “consequential victims of national liberation.” Young was also an agent with MI6, the British secret foreign intelligence service, as were many of the Observer’s international correspondents. Empire and its dissolution, national liberation and its limits, advocacy and international observation – through scholarship, journalism, intelligence work, or some combination of the three – were intertwined. Advocates and nationalists participated in imperial modes of power at the same time that they fought against them. The imperialism of decolonization mirrored the paternalism of advocacy. The inability to address the question of, and to come up with an adequate label for, minority peoples within postcolonial states was the limit and the consequence of national liberation – celebrating the creation of new nation-states.

93 Mburumba Kerina interview with author, May 4, 2016; also, Cyril Dunne to Michael Scott, January 20, 1977, Box 78, GMS Papers.
95 Cyril Dunn interview with Richard Kershaw, undated, Box 103, GMS Papers.
required eliding the continued presence of those who did not fit or did not see themselves as fitting into that particular state-like shape.

Michael Scott captured the drama he depended upon in his role as a gatekeeper for nationalist claims in international politics through an excerpt from the third act of George Bernard Shaw’s *Man and Superman* (1903), which he copied into a personal file where he kept his own poetry:

This is the true joy in life, the being used for a purpose recognized by yourself as a mighty one; the being thoroughly worn out before you are thrown on the scrap heap; the being a force of nature instead of a feverish selfish little clod of ailments and grievances complaining that the world will not devote itself to making you happy. And also the real tragedy in life is the being used by personally minded men for purposes which you recognize to be base . . . All the rest is at worst mere misfortune or mortality; this alone is misery slavery hell on earth.⁹⁶

Scott and his colleagues in their transnational network of advocacy achieved significance through the causes they espoused. Those causes either “succeeded” and outpaced the need for their advocates, or “failed” – and the work of the advocates proved futile. Transnational advocates often deemed nationalists themselves “ungrateful” (if their claim succeeded and they no longer needed to cooperate with advocates) or “difficult” (if their claim failed and they continued to require advocacy).

Phizo also appreciated George Barnard Shaw. Writing to his nephew in January 1960 while stuck in East Pakistan en route to Zürich, Phizo quoted from *The Devil’s Disciple* (1897), a play that Shaw set during the nationalist movement that was the American Revolution. Shaw portrayed rebellion against the British empire alongside the factionalizing caused by a family inheritance: “The worst sin towards our fellow creatures is not to hate them, but to be indifferent to them: that’s the essence of inhumanity.”⁹⁷ Phizo knew that international indifference would sink the Naga claim – that Nagas needed to be recognized as sovereign in order to be recognized at all: “[A]ny organization without a sovereign territory cannot be articulately universal in its human scope. . . . Whether we call it a political aim or national ideology, it makes very little difference.”⁹⁸ As a practical matter, Phizo saw advocates as the first step toward shaking off

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⁹⁷ Quote by Shaw, in A. Z. Phizo to Challe Iralu, January 2, 1960, Box 41, Laura Thompson Papers.
⁹⁸ Phizo to Challe, January 2, 1960.
the world’s indifference in order to gain international recognition. In contrast, advocates perceived themselves as the stewards, the gatekeepers, of nationalist visions, seeking to constrain unbridled nationalism and channel the forces of decolonization. Phizo’s demand for sovereignty was the dream they sought to constrain, while his use of the word itself was what spurred them to action. Autonomy in the form of constrained sovereignty or non-national self-determination remained persistently undefined since there were no international institutional mechanisms for its recognition (as Phizo pointed out). Mrs. Pandit, India’s diplomatic spokeswoman who was sidelined from politics after the death of her brother, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, in 1964, had believed that the Nagas were leading their Western advocates down a rabbit hole: “I feel like Alice in Wonderland and the strange tale of Mr. Phizo gets curiouse and curiouse." 

She was alluding back to a remark that her brother had made in 1950 regarding Kashmir, in which he said that “all kinds of attempts are made to leave the real world behind and to look at it through some looking glass, where everything is inverted.” Referring to the prime minister’s statement at the time, Zafarullah Khan, then Pakistan’s Foreign Secretary and UN representative, later a judge on the International Court of Justice, switched up the allusion – where it is the image that is inverted, not the mirror itself – and accused Nehru of refusing to recognize that India’s fissiparous tendencies bore a resemblance to anticolonial nationalist claims across the decolonizing world. However, Nehru did know better. He had expressed in private correspondence to Assam’s chief minister, Chaliha, in 1960 that the Naga Hills needed the “largest possible autonomy” because any other attitude “will be contrary to what is happening in Africa.” “New States, big and small – and some very small – are appearing on the scene every few weeks as independent States.” Therefore, he could not “oppose full autonomy”

99 Mrs. Pandit to David Astor, June 27, 1960, Box 5, GMS Papers.
100 Mrs. Pandit was evoking one of Nehru’s famous press statements “over this Kashmir episode,” which he called a piece of “Alice in Wonderland business” where “all kinds of attempts are made to leave the real world behind and to look at it through some looking glass, where everything is inverted,” India Opinion (Natal), September 8, 1950. Digital Innovation South Africa collections, UKZN. Available at http://disa.ukzn.ac.za/indian-opinion-1950-1961.
for the Naga Hills. Yet, he wrote to his chief ministers, in spite of the need
to show the world that India supported self-determination, an Indian state
of Nagaland would be a “special type of State” within the Indian
Union. In Indian Nagaland, Nehru wrote, “Naturally [Naga] auton-
omy will be limited because of law and other conditions.” In addition,
Zafarullah Khan himself did not see East Pakistan or Baluchistan when he
looked at Pakistan through the looking glass of national self-interest,
where nationalist claims within one’s own country and against one’s
own sovereignty were inverted and, therefore, could not possibly be
“legitimately national.”

Advocates derived their status from the perception that they stood
outside of national or personal self-interest. Scott believed, as he wrote
in 1977, that “the most powerful weapon” he wielded for his causes was
“selflessness.” He did “not go to Nagaland to fight for the Naga cause.
[He] went to try and make it possible for diametrically opposing groups
of human beings to confront one another in argument and reason it
out.” Selflessness, apolitical positioning remained key: “If one acts
disinterestedly something miraculously comes out of it. The Nagas do
get a bit of respite. South Africa does have to begin to change. It is not
miraculous as usually understood. It is the normal process of cre-
ation.” Scott’s aims were both more modest and more revolutionary
than peace. First, to provide breathing space within obdurate conflicts;
and second, to remake the United Nations order so as to enable it to
recognize as legitimate the political claims of peoples within states in
international politics.

For Scott, this revision of world order was a “creation,” “a battle
against [human] intractability, stupidity, self-centeredness.” The advocate
was “only free in the sense of being able to help or hinder the process. Ego
trips [did not] help much” though they are good stories, and “can be
humorous, heroic and even beautiful at times.” Drastic innovations in
world order were necessary, though rare, because there were not enough
saints in politics, people in the Brigade community, individuals who
“were willing to give themselves unreservedly to this life.” Scott’s
own inverted reflection in the mirror of self-interest missed how much

103 Jawaharlal Nehru to chief ministers, August 1, 1960, Jawaharlal Nehru Papers SG (post
104 Nehru to Chaliha, June 25, 1960.
105 Michael Scott to Cyril Dunn, January 27, 1977, Box 17, GMS Papers.
108 All quotes in this paragraph are from: Scott to Dunn, January 27, 1977.
his mission resembled an ego trip, though one from which he did not receive much personal or material benefit. It was also a mission from which he was sidelined in 1966, with his deportation from India and the end of an international-legal strategy for Namibian independence, which he had helped to spearhead.

Seeking forgiveness for his failures, he wrote Laura Thompson, the anthropologist and fellow traveler in advocacy who had first brought Angami Zapu Phizo to his attention in 1960. She absolved him but hinted that he may have outstayed his remit: “You have surely done infinitely more than your share and the problem now is to see that none of your work is lost so far as the Nagas and the South West Africans are concerned.”\(^\text{109}\) In the end, however necessary that people such as Thompson or Scott were, or perceived themselves to be, they had to leave, as Thompson pointed out: “The burden of leadership” must shift “to native shoulders.”\(^\text{110}\) Indigenization – of Christian or of advocacy mission work – was a necessary decolonization, with all of that process’s promise, limits, and impossibilities.

\(^{109}\) Laura Thompson to Michael Scott, October 16, 1966, Box 41, Laura Thompson Papers, National Anthropological Archives, the Smithsonian, Washington, DC.

\(^{110}\) Thompson to Scott, October 16, 1966.
Conclusion

In late February 1964 – shortly after the World Peace Brigade was forced to reroute its Delhi-to-Beijing Friendship March and, instead, to halt in Assam, India; and during the Nagaland Baptist Church Council’s convention that called for a Nagaland Peace Mission – Devi Prasad of War Resisters’ International and Reverend Michael Scott of the Brigade met in London to discuss the difficulties faced by the Brigade arising from the question of Naga nationalism within India. Prasad suggested that a party of three to five people “acceptable” to the Indian government and “the [Naga nationalist, pro-independence] Phizo group . . . should be sent to the Naga Hills not only to find out facts but also for the purpose of reconciliation.”¹ This proposal ran in tandem with that of the Naga Baptist Church, which would invite Scott and fellow Brigade leader Jayaprakash Narayan (JP) to Nagaland later that year to be part of its proposed Peace Mission. While Scott agreed with Prasad’s proposal, he worried about what was happening – or rather not happening – to the Brigade. According to Scott, “The World Peace Brigade started without knowing what it was expected to do” and “took up ‘protest’ as its main function.”² He felt that the Brigade had never moved past protest to the work of solving seemingly intractable political problems – to the work of reconciliation. In this formulation, protest and reconciliation opposed each other: the former, potentially wasteful of effort and opportunity; the latter, the Holy Grail of international peace efforts.

¹ Devi Prasad, Notes on conversation with Michael Scott, February 25, 1964, Box 59, GMS Papers.
² As quoted in Prasad, Notes on conversation with Scott.
As illustrated by many episodes chronicled in *States-in-Waiting*, this February 1964 exchange between Prasad and Scott displayed the Brigade community’s negative capability: its members’ drive to operate beyond the feasibility of their enterprises, even as they encountered repeated, sometimes even career-ending roadblocks. Through their arrested outcomes, their work made visible the constraints of a postcolonial political order that officially claimed to celebrate and facilitate national liberation, while in practice restricting access to that recognition. As individuals, nationalists and their advocates fought, rejected, and attempted to transcend the limits of decolonization – limits placed on which nationalist claim could become an independent state, as well as the constraints inherent to many postcolonial states’ functional sovereignty – while remaining fully aware of those limits. Their visa, passport difficulties and deportations challenged the national boundaries they were attempting to remake, while also demonstrating the continuing supremacy of those boundaries. Nationalists and their advocates kept pressing against the limits of a system of international order that refused to empower or recognize them as political actors, relegating their work to a sphere of unofficial, irregular, and quasi-recognized politics. This sphere was not actually separate from formal state-to-state relations; it was a political no-man’s-land that reflected the institutionalized international order’s confusion about, and resistance to, questions of national self-determination for states-in-waiting that did not align with former colonial territorial boundaries.

After the Second World War, both the formal international order of the United Nations and Cold War political alignments recognized national self-determination as an international norm but only acknowledged claims of national self-determination that resisted European empires. However, claims within postcolonial states persisted, as did those within many other countries, including indigenous movements in North America and the Basque and Catalan movements in Spain. These claims often operated through informal networks and forums because they were deliberately politically and legally invisible to international institutions. Over time, these networks created interwoven layers of

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3 The concept of “negative capability” is an allusion to John Keats’s letter to George and Thomas Keats, December 21, 1817. Available at http://mason.gmu.edu/~rnanian/Keats-NegativeCapability.html.

international relations and spheres of action that took on the question of states-in-waiting.

The process of decolonization created states-in-waiting in postcolonial states. States-in-waiting were territorially linked communities within (or across) newly decolonized states; they were left unliberated when the latter gained independence – and therefore recognition – within the state-centric international order. By foregrounding the nationalist movements that arose from these regions, States-in-Waiting illuminates the un-endings of decolonization – the unfinished, messy, and improvised way that the state-centric system of international order replaced empire. Nationalist claimants from communities left out of the global order (as it was radically expanded by decolonization) were forced to work through unofficial channels to advance their claims in the arena of international politics. Therefore, the ambiguous and at times unreliable role of their international advocates – the intermediaries they used to navigate these channels – highlighted the uncertainties of the transitions from empires to states. These uncertainties, and the concomitant political weakness of the various positions of different nationalists, left certain nationalist claims seemingly perpetually awaiting international recognition.

As particular regions seeking independence continued to be states-in-waiting, unofficial advocacy on their behalf became an integral component of their international politics. Indeed, persistent reliance on such advocacy became a defining characteristic of those movements that remained states-in-waiting. For independence struggles across the decolonization divide, that is, both before and after formal independence, advocates could be pivotal but not central to the process of nationalist claims-making. In turn, nationalists were central but not always empowered to be pivotal – that is, to be able to represent their region’s struggle for independence in international politics. However, while advocacy was an integral characteristic of states-in-waiting, it was not the cause or the defining feature of whether or not a nationalist claim succeeded in achieving its goal of statehood.

States-in-Waiting has followed the activities of a network of advocates that had formed before the Second World War and during the struggle for Indian independence. Subsequently, these advocates tried to help 1960s decolonization escape its “entrapment in violence”:⁵ They assisted

Kenneth Kaunda’s ascension to leadership of Zambia, a former state-in-waiting. While Namibia was a state-in-waiting, they helped maintain its status as a League of Nations mandate, in this way preventing its international-legal absorption into apartheid South Africa. They also worked to undermine the legitimacy of Katanga, another state-in-waiting, which attempted to secede from Congo-Léopoldville (present-day Democratic Republic of the Congo). However, the state-in-waiting of Nagaland, a nationalist claim within India, a postcolonial state with impeccable anticolonial nationalist credentials, alienated the network’s Indian membership and disrupted the underlying basis for this network’s original support of national liberation struggles, which was anticolonialism.

* * *

The Naga nationalist Angami Zapu Phizo never returned to Nagaland until after his death in 1990. Living in exile for thirty years in London, his home became a metaphorical embassy as advocates and the few Nagas who were able to travel abroad sought to pay their respects to the grand old man of the Naga independence movement. Always well dressed and sharply focused, Phizo would hold court in his parlor while his household stinted on food and fuel when visitors were not present. In the years after the Nagaland Peace Mission’s attempt to find an equitable, acceptable solution to the Naga claim, the Naga nationalist movement fractured into competing insurgent groups, and the region remains under martial law with an extensive Indian military presence. Regular violence persisted until the cold peace of a ceasefire agreement in the late 1990s, which, with modifications, has since been extended indefinitely to the present day, without a publicly available agreement addressing the Naga nationalist claim.

Amid this bleak political situation, Phizo’s body returned home by chartered plane in May 1990, ten days after his death. His coffin, draped in the Naga rainbow flag and driven in a brand-new pick-up truck, climbed the sixty-five-kilometer road from the airport in Dimapur to the Naga capital of Kohima. Crowds of Nagas in traditional ceremonial warrior dress lined the route, silently bearing witness, all quiet except for the rhythmic shooting of Second World War-era rifles into the air.6

6 Account of Phizo’s funeral described in an interview by the author with Visier Sanyü, December 15, 2019; and “25th Anniversary of the Funeral of AZ Phizo, Eastern Mirror
In this way, Phizo received a “state funeral” from a state-in-waiting. Mourners chose their attire because their leader had passed away, and they had “served him as his soldiers.” They waited for his body to pass, because he was the “father of [their] Nagaland.” Phizo’s death marked an end for Naga nationalist claims-making in the context of decolonization’s potential for national liberation as the Cold War waned and as rights discourses on nationalism were supplanted by those focused on human rights, indigeneity, and ethnicity for many disenfranchised peoples across the globe.

Phizo’s 1960 arrival in London had coincided in time with the United Nations Declaration on the Granting of Independence and the recognition of independence for seventeen African countries. The declaration stated that “the subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation” violates their human rights and that “peoples have the right to self-determination.” It set UN trust territories (i.e., former League of Nations mandates) firmly on the road to independence and positioned colonial rule and self-determination as oppositional practices, in which the end of empire led to the exercise of self-determination for all peoples—a political fiction that over time has grown more nuanced but has not been fundamentally overturned.

The political shifts of the 1960s, when nearly fifty countries became independent (depending on how you count them), increased people’s optimism about the possibility of national liberation. However, communities whose nationalist claims remained unrecognized during this decade, and subsequent decades, did not disappear. Many, including Nagas, continued their nationalist demands, but other modes and methods of claims-making gained international traction, such as concepts of indigeneity and ethnicity. The end of apartheid and the Cold War also

(Nagaland, India), May 1, 2015. Available at https://easternmirrornagaland.com/25th-anniversary-of-the-funeral-of-a-z-phizo/. Umatic films by Visier Sanyü of episodic interviews that surround the events of Phizo’s funeral were restored and digitized with support from the International Institute of Social History (Amsterdam) and then translated and transcribed with support from the Provost’s Early Career Scholar funding scheme, The Ohio State University.

marked a shift toward the frequent use of the term “ethnicity,” which connects the construction of political identity to the global-economic shifts of the 1990s and after.

Ethnicity and indigeneity have provided nonnational modes of claims-making for peoples who seek to remain distinct from their ruling governments. The incomplete political struggles of those left behind by decolonization require categories of understanding that lie outside the lens of the postcolonial state. “Indigeneity” highlights the specific historical experiences of particular communities that consider themselves outside of nationally made histories and state-building projects, providing a common identifier for making shared political claims across broad geographies. The concept creates seemingly politically safer, potentially more feasible grounds than that of nationalism for claims of autonomy and difference. Yet, claims of indigeneity remain dependent upon definitions by, and the time horizon of, the state from which communities seek to carve out an autonomous sphere, since indigeneity as an international-legal concept depends upon a people’s territorial origins’ predating those of their governing state. Critics of the term and its usage point out that it relies upon notions of “primordial” “primitiveness” that awkwardly echo colonial categorizations. Indeed, the imperial discourses and


11 There are regional dynamics to the global spread of indigenous claims-making in international politics, which was dominated by groups in the Americas in the 1970s; came to have a strong Sami/European presence that complicated notions of belonging to the welfare state; later, included more Asian peoples, especially from the Pacific Islands and upland Southeast Asia that have had long-term, explicitly nationalist movements, and then incorporated groups on the African continent that have had adversarial relationships with postcolonial state governments ruled by former anticolonial nationalist movements. For the San peoples in Southern Africa, see Maria Sapignoli, *Hunting Justice: Development, Law, and Activism in the Kalahari* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2018). For the generation of an international discourse of indigenous claims-making, see Andrew Canessa, “Indigenous Conflict in Bolivia Explored through an African Lens: Towards a Comparative Analysis of Indigeneity,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 60, no. 2 (2018): 308–37. For comparative connections between North America and Australia, see Audra Simpson, “Under the Sign of Sovereignty: Certainty, Ambivalence, and Law in Native North America and Indigenous Australia,” *Wicazo Sa Review* 25, no. 2 (2010): 107–24.

connections that underpinned much of the resistance to ruling states during twentieth-century decolonization are foundational features of these movements, which have utilized similar advocates as did states-in-waiting to access international institutions.\(^\text{13}\)

While not all Nagas see indigeneity as the appropriate structure in which to frame their claim, by the 1990s some had come to “believe that relations with other indigenous peoples, and a connection to the United Nations’ efforts for the rights of indigenous peoples, could only strengthen” their cause.\(^\text{14}\) Other nationalist claimants—such as Jariretundu Kozonguizi, originally of SWANU, or Mburumba Kerina, briefly of SWAPO, who both came to feel marginalized from the majoritarian nationalist movement of SWAPO during the Namibian liberation struggle—shifted to ethnically defined organizations, such as the Herero Chiefs Council (for whom Kozonguizi was a legal advisor) or political parties that came to be perceived as more accommodationist with South Africa.\(^\text{15}\) Evolving journeys of claims-making thwart narratives of

\(^{13}\) To access the UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations, organizations had to be accredited, leading to a politics of accreditation in which established nongovernmental organizations with such status would bring particular indigenous claimants to the Working Group through their organizational structure, acting as gatekeepers in a similar manner to the politics of advocacy described in *States-in-Waiting*. These observations are drawn from the draft reports of the UN Working Group on Indigenous Peoples, 1987–1990, held in the records of the International League for the Rights and Liberation of Peoples, International Institute for Social History, Amsterdam.


Mburumba Kerina’s long political career has not yet been researched and accessed in a scholarly way. Apart from numerous unpublished interviews with him by various scholars since the late 1970s and limited access to his dispersed private archives, a few autobiographies of contemporary activists and politicians provide fleeting glimpses into more personal encounters. In the case of his biography, too, conflicting details prevail. His controversial entanglements with Namibian, South African, and US (state) organizations, in particular, which took place in very volatile Cold War and highly manipulative propaganda-war contexts, warrant further archival research.
decolonization as a unidirectional (from dependent colonies ruled by empires to independent self-governed states), progressive process of self-determination leading to national liberation in the singular shape of the state.

In its 2007 Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, the United Nations recognized a nonbinding right to self-determination for indigenous peoples. Yet that process decoupled self-determination from international-legal sovereignty, even as, from the perspective of indigenous claimants, “the broken promises of decolonization were the basis of Indigenous populations’ movement toward human rights.” James (Sa’ke’j) Henderson, the North American indigenous legal theorist who wrote those words, explicitly invoked the experiences of Nagas, Karens, and Kachins (of Myanmar), as well as of the South Sudanese, as those who were promised a state and then betrayed by postcolonial institutions of international order. South Sudan, which became independent in 2011 and remains a zone of conflict, demonstrates the continued global scope of states-in-waiting and how the elusive prize of independence does not necessarily equate with lasting peace.

The question that states-in-waiting pose to the current system of international order defies resolution or a set of “lessons learned”: unless the lesson is one of recognition that every liberation and its celebration includes a subjugation. This reality creates a counternarrative of decolonization that contains a history that former colonizers, postcolonial governments, and international institutions seek to obscure in order to shift attention away from their own responsibility, or impotence, or both. Today, (a portion of) Nagaland is a state in the Indian Union, but one continuously ruled under martial law through the Armed Forces Special Powers Act of 1958, a legal instrument originally forged under British empire.


18 Henderson, Indigenous Diplomacy, 111.
Other states-in-waiting face similar incomplete decolonizations. After Katanga’s secession failed in 1962, its leader Moïse Tshombe went into exile in Spain, though he remained involved in Congolese politics. In 1967, his private plane was hijacked, and he was imprisoned in Algiers. His international advocates petitioned the United Nations on his behalf, comparing Tshombe with Namibian nationalists, including Andimba Toivo ya Toivo, who was then on trial for “terrorism” in South Africa. Ya Toivo had been arrested in 1966 and tortured by South African authorities after SWAPO launched a military action following the 1966 International Court of Justice’s (non)decision on South West Africa. Ya Toivo was tried under South Africa’s Terrorism Act; his statement on February 1, 1968, became a famous declaration of resistance:

We do not now, and will not in the future, recognize your right to govern us; to make laws for us, in which we had no say; to treat our country as if it was your property and us as if you are our masters.

To secure Tshombe’s release, Katanga’s advocates attempted to draw upon the international anger that Ya Toivo’s incarceration generated. But their efforts were futile. Tshombe died in 1969 after two years of imprisonment. Since Katanga’s halted secession in 1962, insurgency has continued intermittently; violence in the region was particularly intense during the Second Congo War of 1997–2003. Since 1960, the country (now the Democratic Republic of Congo) has been the site of three United Nations peacekeeping interventions, the latest of which remains ongoing, as of this writing.


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19 Marvin Liebman to Morris E. Abrams, senior adviser to the US delegation to the UN, November 14, 1967, Box 29, Liebman Papers, the Hoover Institution.
21 Lila Acheson and DeWitt Wallace telegram, undated (probably 1968), Box 35, Liebman Papers.
23 Michael Scott to Kenneth Kaunda, July 7, 1980, Box 63, GMS Papers.
from power in 1991, as the end of the Cold War revised global power
dynamics. As part of this geopolitical realignment, Namibia became
independent in 1990 under the rule of Swapo, the political party (the
former nationalist movement of SWAPO).

In Namibia as of this writing, the tensions between nationalism and
ethnicity, as well as present politics and historic identity, swirl around the
issue of German reparations for the colonial genocide of the Herero and
Nama peoples. In 2021, the German government apologized to the
Namibian government for the genocide and agreed to pay over a billion
euros over a thirty-year period toward development projects without
using the formal term “reparations” or making an international-legal
statement of responsibility. This sum is close to the amount of
German aid Namibia received in the thirty years since independence and
so does not represent a change in the status quo. In response, representa-
tives of the Herero and Nama peoples have demanded that any apology
and monetary reparations be made directly to them, as the ethnic
descendants of the peoples massacred by Germany between 1904 and
1908, rather than to the Swapo-led, Ovambo-dominated Namibian
government, and that it resolve the issue of land stolen from their
ancestors, land which is mostly owned by the descendants of white
German settlers, who are present-day Namibian citizens. This debate
shows the contentious knot of nation, government, ethnicity, and terri-
toriality, and how intertwined it is with colonial pasts and postcolonial
presents. At issue is who gets to legitimately speak for historic peoples in
politics; whether an anticolonial nationalist movement turned postco-
lonial state government can represent peoples from a century before its
existence in international negotiations; and whether historical repar-
ations can occur without change of land ownership, the most personal
form of sovereignty.

While temporality structures the context and language of the claims
that remain states-in-waiting, the questions themselves persist across
decades (or even centuries), geographies, and political regimes. States-in-
Waiting has related a counternarrative of decolonization, of nationalist
impossibility embedded in that of possibility, a narrative that did not end

24 Joseph Cotterill, “Battle for Namibia Reparations: German Deal Was Never About Us,”
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Conclusion
as the horizon of optimistic national expectation closed in the late 1960s. Many of the same nationalist claims took new forms, used different modes of political discourse, but still posed the same questions: What peoples are able to make a legitimate claim of self-determination? What processes, forums, and power relationships determine that legitimacy through international recognition? The answers to these questions evolve with subsequent geopolitical shifts on the scale of twentieth-century global decolonization. The questions themselves remain remarkably consistent across time, space, and regime.
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