Saying NO To Biometrics

11 January 2022, Version 2
This content is an early or alternative research output and has not been peer-reviewed by Cambridge University Press at the time of posting.

Abstract

This paper has been prepared to challenge the MNIS (Mauritius National Identity Scheme) in Mauritius. In the UK, the biometric national ID scheme was junked in 2010. Should Mauritius learn from the UK? A number of courts' decisions with respect to biometric data schemes have been analysed in depth. The dangers and risks of biometric technologies have been exposed. Even if the so called judgemental interferences of biometric technologies especially biometric IDs and databases with the human life (in the presence of adequate legal safeguards) could exceptionally be justified legally, there are ethical and social ramifications which illustrate that this is also an intrusion on human rights and should not be permissible at all.

Keywords

Biometric Data Schemes
MNIS
Fingerprints
RFID
DNA recognition
ID card
Miscarriages of Justice
Biometric Database
Cybersurveillance
Supreme Court of Mauritius
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council of the UK
The United Nations Human Rights Committee (HRC)

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