The Game of Fluctuating Interests: USA and the Security Architecture in the South China Sea

13 January 2022, Version 1
This content is an early or alternative research output and has not been peer-reviewed by Cambridge University Press at the time of posting.

Abstract

Throughout the past period, both the U.S and China further expanded their escalation actions (especially during the Trump and the Biden administrations). Within this context, the aim of this paper is to analyze the structural factors that steer the Chinese side to either keep escalating (potentially invading Taiwan), or to practice fluctuation of interests. By questioning the balance of power theorem between China and their adversaries (notably the United States, United Kingdom, and Australia). The literature about China's rise is voluminous, and consistently pinpoints key historical moments of increased tensions among the Western and Eastern fronts. Evidence points to significant variations within the Chinese modus operandi when it comes to use of force in territorial disputes. As it stands, our position is that barriers to direct conflict between the U.S and China are far too significant.

Keywords

China
Taiwan
South China Sea
United States
CCP
Warfare
Escalation

Comments

Comments are not moderated before they are posted, but they can be removed by the site moderators if they are found to be in contravention of our Commenting and Discussion Policy [opens in a new tab] - please read this policy before you post. Comments should be used for scholarly discussion of the content in question. You can find more information about how to use the commenting feature here [opens in a new tab] .
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy [opens in a new tab] and Terms of Service [opens in a new tab] apply.