The idea of a national security state that thrives on perpetuating a national climate of insecurity is often associated with the Global South. The military is geared to protect a nascent state that remains fallible despite years of experimentation with civilian control. More likely, having tasted and exercised power in the past, the military has entrenched for itself a reputation for being the indubitable guardian of normality and the security of the population, and even as the seeder of the correct formula for economic prosperity (Ahmad, 1985; Luckham, 1991). South Korea, also widely known by its formal name, Republic of Korea (ROK), is not completely distinct in its practice of civil–military relations from the rest of Asia. As we will argue in this chapter, the tussle over democracy in civil–military relations is more a symptom than a primary explanatory framework for South Korea. This is in view of the heavy social, psychological, and ideological burdens imposed by the legacies of Japanese colonialism, as well as the panicked improvisation of the South Korean economic growth strategies that started under General Park Chung-hee’s direction between 1961 and 1979. In short, South Korea’s current political stability was attained at a cost and its economic powerhouse status achieved through compromises arbitered by military rule and justified against a geopolitical environment of exaggerated insecurity.

The stereotypical Global South narrative about generals turning autocrats in pursuit of national salvation against civilian ineptitude and corruption is very much borne out by existing literature on South Korean civil–military relations. One distinct strand treats civil–military relations as the dramatic rise and fall of civilians pulling the puppet strings of military and paramilitary factions to stay in power (Cotton, 1991; Kim, 1998). Conversely, in the cases of the presidencies of Park Chung-hee, Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo, elites within the military traded uniforms for civilian business suits to consolidate the appearance of civilian political supremacy (Cotton, 1991, pp 210–13; Croissant, et al, 2012, pp 19–20).