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Part I - Introduction to Intellectual Property Licensing

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 June 2022

Jorge L. Contreras
Affiliation:
University of Utah

Summary

Type
Chapter
Information
Intellectual Property Licensing and Transactions
Theory and Practice
, pp. 7 - 120
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2022
Creative Commons
Creative Common License - CCCreative Common License - BYCreative Common License - NCCreative Common License - ND
This content is Open Access and distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 https://creativecommons.org/cclicenses/

1 The Business of Licensing

Summary Contents

  1. 1.1 The Licensing Industry 9

  2. 1.2 Why License? 10

1.1 The Licensing Industry

Students of intellectual property (IP) law are often steeped in the theory and practice of IP litigation. Record labels sue parodists and illegal downloaders, patent owners sue infringers, luxury brands sue counterfeiters, employers sue employees who leak their valuable secrets. All of these cases and the doctrines that they create could lead to a view of the world of IP as a battlefield. Like armaments, firms acquire IP rights solely to attack others, to bludgeon competitors or extract rent from consumers.

But this view is wrong. It arises from the unfortunate fact that legal education emphasizes reported judicial decisions over all else, and judicial decisions arise from litigation. The reality, however, is that the vast majority of economic activity involving IP arises from transactions – business arrangements among firms and with consumers and, sometimes, the government.

According to one industry group, global revenues for product licensing – the licensing of brands, images and logos for products of various kinds – were nearly $300 billion in 2019.Footnote 1 In 2019, recorded music sales, including digital streaming, were approximately $20 billion,Footnote 2 sales of enterprise software were $439 billion,Footnote 3 and global sales of smartphones exceeded $400 billion. All told, trillions of dollars every year change hands on the basis of IP licenses and transactions – far more than the total sum of all the IP litigation that has ever been brought.

Whichever of these figures most resonates with you, it is undeniable that IP licensing is a major economic activity with far-reaching implications both in the United States and worldwide. Virtually every product, every financial transaction and every communication on Earth depends, in some way, on an IP license.

This chapter lays the groundwork for the detailed study of IP licensing that follows in this book. It describes the business and economic motivations behind IP transactions, and seeks to give the reader an appreciation for the scope and range of IP licensing in the marketplace.

1.2 Why License?

The government grants the owner of an IP right the exclusive authority to exploit that right in its jurisdiction. At first blush, this seems like a golden opportunity for the IP owner to go into business. It can make, use, sell, display and perform the IP-protected thing with no competition from others for the entire duration of the relevant right. Build the better mousetrap, show the new masterpiece, storm the market with the new brand.

A moment’s thought, however, dispels these aspirations to grandeur. In reality, many owners of IP cannot, or are not willing to, exploit their IP to the fullest degree, if at all.Footnote 4 The author of the next Great American Novel would be foolish to self-publish her work using nothing but a laser printer or a personal website. She needs a publisher that can exploit the full range of print and electronic distribution channels that exist today. The university researcher who develops an improved method of satellite navigation can’t afford the hundreds of millions of dollars necessary to launch a satellite into orbit – her invention is best utilized by a company or government that is already in the satellite business. The producer of an independent animated film can’t be expected to open a factory to produce the myriad lunchboxes, backpacks, T-shirts and action figures demanded by the fans of the film. Those tasks are best left to others already in the manufacturing trade. The list goes on.

The fact is that IP owners are often not in the best position to exploit their own IP. They need help. And the way to get that help is through licensing. Through a license, an IP owner legally grants somebody else – a “licensee” – the right to exploit some or all aspects of a particular IP right. In return, the IP owner – the “licensor” – usually receives some form of compensation, often money, but sometimes services, equity in a company, or a license to IP held by the licensee. All of these arrangements have as their goal a more efficient allocation of rights among the owner and others who may be in a better position to exploit those rights. The result of that allocation is the most efficient use of the IP rights, maximizing the profit that can collectively be achieved by the licensor and its licensees. As such, we can say that the goal of nearly all IP licensing transactions is to optimize allocative efficiency among IP owner and users. When this is accomplished properly, the greatest overall value will result, thus maximizing the social value of a given IP right.

“the goal of nearly all IP licensing transactions is to optimize allocative efficiency among the IP owner and users.”

With the principle of allocative efficiency in mind, consider the following economic rationales that motivate IP licensing from the perspectives of the IP owner (the licensor) and the potential user of that IP (the licensee).Footnote 5

1.2.1 Market Expansion (Divide and Conquer)

The owner of an IP right – whether a patent, a copyright, a trademark or something else – may not have the internal capacity to exploit that right to its fullest extent, or at all. By licensing that IP right to someone with different capabilities and resources, segments of the market that are otherwise unaddressed may be addressed. For example, a small biotech company discovers a new process for detecting DNA variants. The process will be valuable to the company’s own research on diabetes therapies, but could be used in many other applications as well. When different licensees use the process in their own research, its use is expanded far beyond that of the original IP owner. Likewise, the creator of a popular comic book character may not manufacture consumer goods. But if it licenses the copyright in the character to consumer product companies, the character will appear on lunchboxes, backpacks and self-adhesive stickers that otherwise would not exist. Nor does a famous auto maker like Ferrari or Porsche produce T-shirts, key chains or sunglasses, but by licensing its marks to manufacturers of those products, it can satisfy consumer demand that would otherwise go unfulfilled. Some IP owners, such as universities and government laboratories, are unable to go into business at all, making licensing one of the only routes to commercialization of their IP.Footnote 6 Each of these examples illustrates the creation of new product and service markets for IP rights that might not exist without the IP owner’s ability to license its rights to others.Footnote 7

Figure 1.1 Auto makers like Ferrari do not manufacture the merchandise that bears their famous logos. This merchandise exists thanks to licensing.

1.2.2 Geographic Expansion

Like market expansion, IP licensing enables IP owners to expand the territorial reach of their IP rights.Footnote 8 Many products and services have international appeal, but local markets are often difficult to enter without assistance. Depending on the product and the market, significant regulatory approvals and clearances may be required, advertising and packaging materials must be localized, and adequate distribution channels must be identified and secured. Large multinationals sometimes do all of this by themselves, but most IP owners, even those of considerable size, cannot. Thus, in order to distribute products and services worldwide, local manufacturing, distribution, sales, support and agency partners are often needed. And to the extent that these local partners will be manufacturing, reproducing, modifying or displaying anything covered by IP rights, licenses will be required.

The Risk of CannibalizationFootnote 9

“Licensing for market expansion raises the issue of cannibalization. The licensor company will analyze at what point its licensees’ product sales may eat into (cannibalize) its own profits. Apple Computer faced this difficult challenge in the 1990s when it considered licensing its proprietary operating system to PC system manufacturers such as Dell, Vobis, Olivetti, and Acer. If Apple licensed to these companies for cloning, they would reduce the cost of manufacture, eliminate extras like design features, and drag the Apple technology and pricing – and possibly its brand – into commodity status. No one at Apple was able to assess systematically the cannibalization risk, or suggest ways to limit it, other than to exclude Apple’s most profitable geographic markets from the licenses. But those markets were precisely the markets that attracted the potential licensees. At the time they were not interested in making Apple clones only for the “rest of world” or “ROW” market (not Asia, Europe, or the United States). The potential licensees also wanted freedom to innovate based on Apple’s operating system, a competition that was potentially frightening to Apple. Apple ultimately decided not to pursue licensing its operating system.”

Cynthia Cannady, Technology Licensing and Development Agreements 51–52 (Oxford Univ. Press, 2013).

1.2.3 Capacity Expansion

In many cases, an IP owner may not possess the internal resources needed to exploit its rights fully, and can only do so with the financial or other assistance of others. A small biotech company does not have hundreds of millions of dollars required to conduct the clinical trials necessary to obtain regulatory approval for a new drug, nor do most screenwriters have the means to produce a television series based on a new script. In other words, an IP right may have value, but it is incomplete or not ready for market without further inputs – money, expertise, resources or additional innovation. In order to put these IP rights to productive use, assistance from others is often required. To do so, the biotech company can license its IP to a large pharmaceutical firm, and the screenwriter can license her script to a film studio or production company. In both cases, a product will be produced where none might exist otherwise, and the licensee and licensor will share the profits of the result.

1.2.4 Modularization

Even for large firms that theoretically have the capacity to take all the steps necessary to commercialize their IP, it may not be efficient for them to do so. First, there is substantial evidence that firms can increase efficiency and save costs by allocating specific tasks along the production chain to specialized (and lowest cost) suppliers, rather than performing these tasks internally.Footnote 10 This approach is sometimes referred to as “modularization” – the division of a multi-step process into discrete modules that can be performed by independent actors. For example, suppose that FryCo has developed an innovative, environmentally friendly coating for nonstick cookware. FryCo could, conceivably, purchase a fleet of delivery trucks to ensure that every consumer and retailer in the country had access to its wares. But unless FryCo’s sales volume is huge, it would be far more efficient to allocate delivery to a specialized service such as FedEx or UPS, allowing FryCo to focus on its core competencies. Likewise, if FryCo’s principal contribution is its secret nonstick coating, then it could focus its manufacturing efforts on production of that coating, while allocating the production of iron skillets to an established manufacturer of such products and granting it a license to apply FryCo’s proprietary coating to their surfaces. As Professor Jonathan Barnett observes, “licensing enables firms to select the sequence of ‘make/buy’ transactions that deliver innovations (or products and services embodying innovations) at the lowest possible cost.”Footnote 11

A related benefit of supply chain modularization is risk mitigation. Put simply, if FryCo manufactured its own iron skillets and its skillet factory burned down, it would suffer a significant business interruption. However, if FryCo sourced skillets to its specifications from, say, three different vendors in different locations, then the loss of any one of them would not be catastrophic. Modularization enables the producer to reduce its reliance on any single source of necessary components, thereby reducing risk in the production process.Footnote 12

Finally, modularization can enable firms to invest in multiple projects concurrently, rather than focusing all of their resources on one project at a time. As a result, a firm can spread its risk among a portfolio of projects, some of which may succeed and some of which may fail.Footnote 13

Figure 1.2 Jonathan Barnett illustrates how licensing enables motion picture firms to divide distribution rights among multiple entities, each with a specific role in the supply chain.Footnote 14

1.2.5 Monetization: Direct

In some cases an entity acquires IP rights primarily to earn revenue from licensing them. This is the case with research universities, which spend large sums on research, but which never intend to bring products or services to the commercial market. Their primary goal in obtaining IP rights – usually patents – is to license them to the private sector so that others can exploit them in exchange for payments. This business model is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 14.

Commercial entities can also find themselves in possession of IP rights that they do not have the capacity or desire to exploit themselves, but which they can profitably license to others. Sometimes, this occurs when business priorities shift, or when product lines that were covered by patents are no longer successful in the marketplace, leaving behind few product sales, but a rich portfolio of patent rights to license. Prominent product manufacturers like Palm, Blackberry, Nokia, Motorola and Ericsson saw the virtual evaporation of their product markets (mostly phones and other handheld communications devices), but were left with sizeable portfolios of patents representing substantial opportunities for licensing income.

Licensing for income generation is also practiced by companies that remain active in product markets, but which find themselves with portfolios of valuable patents that can be licensed. IBM, for example, earned more than $723 million in annual IP licensing revenue in 2018, and chip maker Qualcomm earns between $1 billion and $1.5 billion from its licensing business per quarter. This type of licensing revenue need not be related to products sold by the IP owner. For example, from about 2011 to 2015, Microsoft aggressively asserted and licensed patents covering Google’s Android operating system against smartphone makers such as Samsung, LG, HTC and Foxconn, earning Microsoft billions of dollars in revenue in a market segment in which it was a marginal player, at best.Footnote 15

Royalties for Sale

Many IP licenses involve the payment of ongoing royalties to the licensor. In some cases these royalties can be quite high. But sometimes a licensor needs cash quickly, and cannot afford, or does not want, to wait for years to collect the total value of its IP. Licensors may thus resort to well-known financial instruments used in industries such as equipment leasing and mortgage financing to “sell” future royalty streams for an immediate, up-front sum.

Who buys IP royalty streams? One publicly traded firm, Royalty Pharma (RPRX – NASDAQ), specializes in pharmaceutical royalties. According to one source, Royalty Pharma spent $3.3 billion to acquire a share of the Cystic Fibrosis Foundation’s royalties from Vertex Pharmaceuticals’ cystic fibrosis treatments, and $1.24 billion for the University of California’s royalties from the prostate cancer drug Xtandi, among many others.Footnote 16 Likewise, the Canadian Pensions Plan Investment Board agreed to pay LifeArc $1.3 billion for its royalty interest in Merck’s Keytruda cancer immunotherapy drug.

In some cases, royalty streams can be auctioned to the public. A share of the famous “perpetual” Listerine royalty (see Section 12.2.3) earning $32,000 per year was sold to an anonymous bidder for $560,000 at an auction in 2020.Footnote 17

But perhaps the most creative IP royalty sale was the 1997 securitization and public offering of 7.9 percent coupon bonds backed by the income from twenty-five pre-1990 recordings by singer David Bowie. The so-called “Bowie Bonds,” all of which were purchased by The Prudential Insurance Co., earned Bowie $55 million in a single transaction, and by 2016 had reportedly served as the model for more than 100 similar transactions in the music industry.Footnote 18

More recently, with the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic and the indefinite suspension of live musical performances, an increasing number of artists, including legendary performers like Neil Young and Bob Dylan, have sold off the rights in their song catalogs to make ends meet.Footnote 19

1.2.6 Monetization: Indirect

Sometimes, the owner of an IP right may lack the ability and the resources to commercialize that IP right. For example, an individual inventor may make a breakthrough discovery in a field dominated by large players with which he or she cannot effectively compete, a start-up company may fail to raise sufficient funding to stay afloat, a company with a rich IP portfolio may be liquidated in bankruptcy, a company may be acquired by another firm that offers a competing product and a large firm may decide to discontinue a business line to which it holds IP rights. In all of these cases, the IP owner holds an asset that it spent valuable resources to create, but which it can no longer utilize productively. As a result, the IP owner’s best (or only) option may be to license or sell the underutilized IP right to an entity that can make productive use of it. But finding such an entity may be difficult, and the small inventor, the failed start-up, the bankruptcy trustee and the disinterested acquirer may lack the ability to do so.

Enter the middlemen, known variously as patent licensing firms, nonpracticing entities (NPEs), patent assertion entities (PAEs) and patent “trolls.”Footnote 20 These entities acquire IP rights from any of the sources described above and then seek to license them to others purely for economic gain, without creating or selling products or developing IP of their own. Despite the heated rhetoric that pervades this discussion, there is nothing inherently illegal or immoral about seeking to monetize IP assets, just as there is nothing wrong with financial institutions transacting in portfolios of consumer loans, mortgages or credit card debt.

The Debate over Patent Trolls

“Patent troll” is a pejorative moniker commonly assigned to [non-practicing entities] (NPEs) because they allegedly wait for an industry to develop, then appear to exact a toll on companies who commercialize the technology. According to the detractors’ narrative, trolls are recent fly-by-night shops that assert business-method and internet patents. Trolls assert low-quality patents in low-quality litigation. They obtain patents from failed companies in fire sales. Worse, because trolls do not make anything, their patents do not provide anything of value to society. In short, according to their critics, patent trolls represent a significant break from past practices and foreshadow the downfall of innovative society.

NPEs are not, however, without their defenders. According to their proponents, NPEs create patent markets, and those markets enhance investment in start-up companies by providing additional liquidity options. NPEs help businesses crushed by larger competitors – competitors who infringe valid patents with impunity. NPEs allow individual inventors to monetize their inventions. These functions, the proponents argue, justify the existence of NPEs.

Michael Risch, Patent Troll Myths, 42 Seton Hall L. Rev. 457, 459 (2012)

We need not delve into the debate over NPEs, PAEs and patent trolls, which has been ongoing for years. It involves questions well beyond the scope of this book, including the appropriateness of certain litigation tactics and the underlying quality of many patents that are asserted in litigation. While some PAEs shoot first and negotiate later, others would seemingly prefer to license their IP assets without resorting to expensive and risky litigation. The common motivating factor for licensing among these entities is the generation of financial returns.

1.2.7 Rights Aggregation

In some cases an entity’s IP protects only a portion of an overall product, or constitutes an improvement on somebody else’s IP. In these cases an entity’s IP cannot practically be exploited without the cooperation of others. Sometimes, no one entity can act in a field without obtaining permissions from others – such fields are said to be characterized by “blocking” positions. For example, in Standard Oil Co. (Indiana) v. United States, 283 U.S. 163 (1931), four large oil companies each held patents necessary to perform the process of “cracking” crude oil to make gasoline. Each company’s patents were blocking – none could perform the process without the cooperation of the others.Footnote 21 Likewise, in Nadel v. Play-By-Play Toys & Novelties, Inc., 208 F.3d 368 (2d Cir. 1999),Footnote 22 an independent toy designer created a spinning plush toy based on Warner Bros. “Tazmanian Devil” character. He could not market his toy without the permission of Warner Bros., nor could Warner Bros. market the toy without his permission.

Figure 1.3 The debate over “patent trolls” has been raging for over a decade.

One important function of IP licensing is enabling entities to overcome these blocking positions, so that they may operate productively in the field. That is, without licensing an entity would have to acquire ownership of all blocking rights or create an entirely new product or service that does not infringe the IP of others. Both of these alternatives are often impossible, making licensing the best and only option for the productive use of one’s own IP. Licensing of this nature can occur through individual licensing negotiations, cross-licenses (in which each party grants parallel licenses to the other), or pursuant to IP pools in which the rights of multiple IP owners are licensed on an aggregated basis (discussed in Chapter 26). While these transactions are often quite different in nature, they share the common feature of eliminating barriers to the efficient utilization of IP within a market sector.

1.2.8 Platform Leadership

In some instances the developer of a technology or creative platform may wish to license rights to others to encourage the broad use of its platform. This approach was adopted early by the makers of video game consoles (Sony, Nintendo, Microsoft), which sought to encourage game developers to write games optimized for their platforms. Today, the Apple App Store and Google Play exemplify a similar approach.Footnote 23 Similar motivations are at work in the area of open source software (Section 19.2), technical interoperability standards (Chapter 20) and many patent “pledges” (Section 19.4).

In each case, the owner of a platform technology makes it available, often without charge, to encourage the independent development of products and services compatible with the platform. With a platform’s growth and adoption, the IP owner can sell ancillary products and services, effectively using the broadly licensed rights as “loss leaders” to promote other revenue-generating activities. For example, IBM’s open source licensing of its Linux-based operating system led to substantial revenue from the sale of Linux servers and professional services, and Google’s release of its Android operating system on an open source basis led to its widespread adoption and substantial ad revenue for Google.Footnote 24 Likewise, the developers of important interoperability standards such as Bluetooth and USB license patents covering these standards on a royalty-free basis, as the broad adoption of these standards enables them to sell more products and services (e.g., laptops, routers, chips, network services) that rely on those standards.

Figure 1.4 Large information technology companies like IBM and Google embraced the open source Linux operating system to support the sale of associated hardware, services and advertising.

Notes and Questions

1. Cannibalization. What is cannibalization of a market? Why did cannibalization concerns deter Apple from licensing its operating system to other manufacturers, as Microsoft had done?

2. Unplugging bottlenecks. As noted in note 7, Professors Contreras and Sherkow claim that “even if the IP owner has the theoretical capability to address all of the different markets that can be addressed by an IP right, it is likely that licensing rights to others in some of those markets will result in the more rapid deployment of new products and services (i.e., retaining all rights in the original IP owner could create bottlenecks in the development of new products and services).” Why would an IP owner’s retention of rights create developmental bottlenecks? How can these bottlenecks be avoided?

3. The troll debate. What objections can be raised to the monetization of IP rights? Is there anything inherently wrong with using IP as a money-making investment? What types of litigation behavior might have made PAEs unpopular in many circles?

4. Platforms. How do the Apple App Store and Google Play exemplify a platform leadership strategy? What goals do you think Apple and Google have with respect to these platforms? What other online platforms have a similar strategy?

5. Giving it away. What would motivate the holder of a valuable IP right to give it away for free? Is this behavior irrational? How would you decide when a “give away” strategy is worth pursuing? Consider these issues when you read about open source software and patent pledges in Chapter 19.

Problem 1.1

Which IP licensing model would you recommend for each of the following companies? State any assumptions about the company’s business that support your recommendation.

  1. a. FryCo, a small chemical company that has developed an environmentally friendly nonstick cooking surface.

  2. b. Twenty-First Century Films, an independent documentary film producer.

  3. c. DeLuxe, a luxury brand known for its high-end leather accessories such as handbags, wallets and belts.

  4. d. Droplet Labs, a start-up company that has patented a process for testing a single drop of a patient’s blood for twenty different pathogens.

Problem 1.2

Your client Fizzy Cola is a producer of craft soft drinks based in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. Fizzy tells you that it would like to expand internationally to South America, the European Union, China, Japan and South Korea. What licensing and internationalization strategy would you recommend for Fizzy?

2 Ownership and Assignment of Intellectual Property

Summary Contents

  1. 2.1 Assignments of Intellectual Property, Generally 19

  2. 2.2 Assignment of Copyrights and the Work Made for Hire Doctrine 22

  3. 2.3 Assignment of Patent Rights 27

  4. 2.4 Trademark Assignments and Goodwill 37

  5. 2.5 Assignment of Trade Secrets 41

  6. 2.6 Joint Ownership 42

The owner of an intellectual property (IP) right, whether a patent, copyright, trademark, trade secret or other right, has the exclusive right to exploit that right. Ownership of an IP right is thus the most effective and potent means for utilizing that right. But what does it mean to “own” an IP right and how does a person – an individual or a firm – acquire ownership of it? This chapter explores transfers and assignments of IP ownership, first in general, and then with respect to special considerations pertinent to patents, copyrights and trademarks. Assignments and transfers of IP licenses, another important topic, are covered in Section 13.3, and attempts to prohibit an assignor of IP from later challenging the validity of transferred IP (through a contractual no-challenge clause or the common law doctrine of “assignor estoppel”) are covered in Chapter 22.

2.1 Assignments of Intellectual Property, Generally

Once it is in existence, an item of IP may be bought, sold, transferred and assigned much as any other form of property. Like real and personal property, IP can be conveyed through contract, bankruptcy sale, will or intestate succession, and can change hands through any number of corporate transactions such as mergers, asset sales, spinoffs and stock sales.

The following case illustrates how IP rights will be treated by the courts much as any other assets transferred among parties. In this case, the court must interpret a “bill of sale,” the document listing assets conveyed in a particular transaction. Just as with bushels of grain or tons of steel, particular IP rights can be listed in a bill of sale and the manner in which they are listed will determine what the buyer receives.

Systems Unlimited v. Cisco Systems

228 Fed. Appx. 854 (11th Cir. 2007) (cert. denied)

Per Curiam

Following the settlement of a dispute between Systems Unlimited, Inc. and Cisco Systems, Inc. over the ownership of certain intellectual property, Cisco agreed to covey the property to Systems. In the resulting bill of sale, Cisco:

granted, bargained, sold, transferred and delivered, and by these presents does grant, bargain, sell, transfer and deliver unto [Systems], its successor and assigns, the following:

Any and all of [Cisco]’s right, title and interest in any copyrights, patents, trademarks, trade secrets and other intellectual property of any kind associated with any software, code or data, including without limitation host controller software and billing software, whether embedded or in any other form (including without limitations, disks, CDs and magnetic tapes), and including any and all available copies thereof and any and all books and records related thereto by [Cisco]

Cisco never delivered [copies of] any of the software to Systems. Alleging that it had been damaged by the non-delivery, Systems sued Cisco for breaching the bill of sale contract and for violating the attendant obligations to deliver the software under the Uniform Commercial Code.

Systems contends that the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Cisco because: (1) the plain language of the bill of sale required Cisco to deliver the software; (2) the bill of sale, when read in conjunction with other contemporaneous agreements, required delivery; and (3) the UCC, which governs the bill of sale, requires that all goods be delivered at a reasonable time. Systems is wrong on each point.

The bill of sale is interpreted in accord with its plain language absent some ambiguity. Here, the parties agree that the bill of sale is clear and unambiguous.

The bill of sale provides that Cisco will “grant, bargain, sell, transfer and deliver unto [Systems] … [a]ny and all of [Cisco]’s right, title and interest in any copyrights, patents, trademarks, trade secrets and other intellectual property of a kind associated with any software, code or data.” As the district court explained, this language unambiguously means that Cisco was required by the bill of sale to transfer to Systems all of its rights in intellectual property associated with certain software and data. There is no mention in the plain language of the contract itself of Cisco being obligated to transfer the actual software, and we will not imply any such obligation absent some good reason under law.

Systems says there are two good reasons to imply an obligation by Cisco to transfer the software. First, Systems argues that the bill of sale must be interpreted in conjunction with the settlement agreement between Systems and Cisco and other documents relating to the intellectual property. These other agreements, Systems claims, include an obligation by Cisco to deliver the software with any conveyance of intellectual property.

Assuming without deciding that the other agreements include language requiring Cisco to deliver the software, they are not relevant here because Systems has never alleged Cisco violated these other agreements. Systems’ complaint alleges only a violation of the bill of sale contract, and there is no obligation in that contract to deliver the software. The bill of sale does not reference or incorporate any other agreement.

To get around this point, Systems argues that “when instruments relate to the same matters, are between the same parties, and made part of substantially one transaction, they are to be taken together.” It is true that this is one of the canons for construing a contract under California law. But it is also true that this canon, as with most others, is inapplicable where the contract that is alleged to have been breached is unambiguous. Here, the language of the bill of sale is unambiguous. Thus, there is no need to apply any canons of construction.

Systems also argues that the UCC imposes a duty on Cisco to deliver the software. We will assume without deciding that Systems’ reading of the UCC is correct. Even so, the provisions of the UCC only apply to contracts that deal predominately with “transactions in goods.” The sale of intellectual property, which is what is involved here, is not a transaction in goods. Thus, the UCC does not apply. Accordingly, the plain language of the bill of sale governs and, as the district court held, it does not include a provision requiring Cisco to deliver any software.

AFFIRMED.

Notes and Questions

1. IP and the UCC. The court in Systems v. Cisco holds that IP licenses and other transactions are not governed by Article 2 of the UCC, which pertains to sales of goods. In Section 3.4 we will discuss whether and to what degree Article 2 applies to IP licenses. But this case relates not to a license, but to a “sale” of software. Why doesn’t UCC Article 2 apply? Should it?

2. Delivery of what? What does this language from the bill of sale refer to, if not delivery of software: “including any and all available copies thereof”? Does this language represent a drafting mistake by Systems’ attorney? Or an intentional omission by Cisco?

3. The need for software. Why is Systems so upset that Cisco has allegedly refused to deliver the software in question? How useful is an assignment of copyright and other IP to someone who is not in possession of the software code that is copyrighted? Has Cisco “pulled a fast one” on Systems and the court, or is there a valid business reason that could justify Cisco’s failure to deliver the software?

4. Statute of frauds. Assignments of copyrights, patents and trademarks must all be in writing (17 U.S.C. § 204(a), 35 U.S.C. § 261, 15 U.S.C. § 1060(3)). Why? This requirement does not apply to most licenses, which may be oral. Can you think of a good reason for this distinction?

5. State law and mutual mistake. Despite the federal statutory nature of patents, courts have long held that the question of who holds title to a patent is a matter of state contract law.Footnote 1 This issue arose in an interesting way in Schwendimann v. Arkwright Advanced Coating, Inc., 959 F.3d 1065 (Fed. Cir. 2020). In Schwendimann, the plaintiff’s former company purported to assign her a patent application in 2003. Due to a clerical error by the law firm handling the matter, the assignment document filed with the patent office listed the wrong patent name and number. In 2011, the plaintiff filed an action asserting the patent against an alleged infringer. The defendant, discovering the incorrect assignment document from 2003, moved to dismiss on the ground that the plaintiff did not hold any enforceable rights at the time she filed suit and thus lacked standing. The district court, interpreting applicable state law, held that the 2003 assignment was the result of a “mutual mistake of fact” that did not accurately reflect the intent of the parties. Accordingly, the erroneous document could be reformed and was sufficient to support standing to bring suit. The Federal Circuit affirmed. Judge Reyna dissented, reasoning that, irrespective of the district court’s later reformation of the erroneous assignment, the plaintiff’s failure to own the patent at the time her suit was filed necessarily barred her suit under Article III of the Constitution. Which of these positions do you find more persuasive? Notwithstanding the holding in favor of the plaintiff, is there a claim for legal malpractice against the law firm in question?

2.2 Assignment of Copyrights and the Work Made for Hire Doctrine

Under § 201(a) of the Copyright Act, copyright ownership “vests initially in the author or authors of the work.” A copyright owner may assign any of its exclusive rights, in full or in part, to a third party. The assignment generally must be in writing and signed by the owner of the copyright or his or her authorized agent (17 U.S.C. § 204(a)).

If a work of authorship is prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment, then the work is a “work made for hire” and the employer is considered the author and owner of the copyright (17 U.S.C. § 201(b)). In addition, if a work is not made by an employee but is “specially ordered or commissioned,” it will be considered a work made for hire if it falls into one of nine categories enumerated in § 101(2) of the Act: a contribution to a collective work, a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, a translation, a supplementary work, a compilation, an instructional text, a test, answer material for a test, or an atlas. Commissioned works that do not fall into one of these nine categories (for example, software) are not automatically considered to be works made for hire, and copyright must be assigned explicitly through a separate assignment or sale agreement.

Warren v. Fox Family Worldwide, Inc.

328 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 2003)

HAWKINS, Circuit Judge.

In this dispute between plaintiff-appellant Richard Warren (”Warren”) and defendants-appellees Fox Family Worldwide (“Fox”), MTM Productions (“MTM”), Princess Cruise Lines (“Princess”), and the Christian Broadcasting Network (“CBN”), Warren claims that defendants infringed the copyrights in musical compositions he created for use in the television series “Remington Steele.” Concluding that Warren has no standing to sue for infringement because he is neither the legal nor beneficial owner of the copyrights in question, we affirm the district court’s Rule 12 dismissal of Warren’s complaint.

Warren and Triplet Music Enterprises, Inc. (“Triplet”) entered into the first of a series of detailed written contracts with MTM concerning the composition of music for “Remington Steele.” This agreement stated that Warren, as sole shareholder and employee of Triplet, would provide services by creating music in return for compensation from MTM. Under the agreement, MTM was to make a written accounting of all sales of broadcast rights to the series and was required to pay Warren a percentage of all sales of broadcast rights to the series made to third parties not affiliated with ASCAP or BMI. These agreements were renewed and re-executed with slight modifications in 1984, 1985 and 1986.

Warren brought suit in propria persona against Fox, MTM, CBN, and Princess, alleging copyright infringement, breach of contract, accounting, conversion, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of covenants of good faith and fair dealing, and fraud.

Warren claims he created approximately 1,914 musical works used in the series pursuant to the agreements with MTM; that MTM and Fox have materially breached their obligations under the contracts by failing to account for or pay the full amount of royalties due Warren from sales to parties not affiliated with ASCAP or BMI; and that MTM and Fox infringed Warren’s copyrights in the music by continuing to broadcast and license the series after materially breaching the contracts. As to the other defendants, Warren claims that CBN and Princess infringed his copyrights by broadcasting “Remington Steele” without his authorization. Warren seeks damages, an injunction, and an order declaring him the owner of the copyrights at issue.

Defendants argu[ed] that Warren’s infringement claims should be dismissed for lack of standing because he is neither the legal nor beneficial owner of the copyrights. The district court dismissed Warren’s copyright claims without leave to amend and dismissed his state law claims without prejudice to their refiling in state court, holding that Warren lacked standing because the works were made for hire, and because a creator of works for hire cannot be a beneficial owner of a copyright in the work. Warren appeals.

The first agreement [between the parties], signed on February 25, 1982, states that MTM contracted to employ Warren “to render services to [MTM] for the television pilot photoplay now entitled ‘Remington Steele.’” It also is clear that the parties agreed that MTM would “own all right, title and interest in and to [Warren’s] services and the results and proceeds thereof, and all other rights granted to [MTM] in [the Music Employment Agreement] to the same extent as if … [MTM were] the employer of [Warren].” The Music Employment Agreement provided:

As [Warren’s] employer for hire, [MTM] shall own in perpetuity, throughout the universe, solely and exclusively, all rights of every kind and character, in the musical material and all other results and proceeds of the services rendered by [Warren] hereunder and [MTM] shall be deemed the author thereof for all purposes.

Figure 2.1 Warren claimed that he created 1,914 musical works for the popular 1980s TV series Remington Steele.

The parties later executed contracts almost identical to these first agreements in June 1984, July 1985, and November 1986. As the district court noted, these subsequent contracts are even more explicit in defining the compositions as “works for hire.” Letters that Warren signed accompanying the later Music Employment Agreements provided: “It is understood and agreed that you are supplying [your] services to us as our employee for hire … [and] [w]e shall own all right, title and interest in and to [your] services and the results and proceeds thereof, as works made for hire.”

That the agreements did not use the talismanic words “specially ordered or commissioned” matters not, for there is no requirement, either in the Act or the caselaw, that work-for-hire contracts include any specific wording. In fact, in Playboy Enterprises v. Dumas, 53 F.3d 549 (2d Cir. 1995), the Second Circuit held that legends stamped on checks were writings sufficient to evidence a work-for-hire relationship where the legend read: “By endorsement, payee: acknowledges payment in full for services rendered on a work-made-for-hire basis in connection with the Work named on the face of this check, and confirms ownership by Playboy Enterprises, Inc. of all right, title and interest (except physical possession), including all rights of copyright, in and to the Work.” Id. at 560. The agreements at issue in the instant case are more explicit than the brief statement that was before the Second Circuit.

In this case, not only did the contracts internally designate the compositions as “works made for hire,” they provided that MTM “shall be deemed the author thereof for all purposes.” This is consistent with a work-for-hire relationship under the Act, which provides that “the employer or other person for whom the work was prepared is considered the author.” 17 U.S.C. § 201(b).

Warren argues that the use of royalties as a form of compensation demonstrates that this was not a work-for-hire arrangement. While we have not addressed this specific question, the Second Circuit held in Playboy that “where the creator of a work receives royalties as payment, that method of payment generally weighs against finding a work-for-hire relationship.” 53 F.3d at 555. However, Playboy clearly held that this factor was not conclusive. In addition to noting that the presence of royalties only “generally” weighs against a work-for-hire relationship, Playboy cites Picture Music, Inc. v. Bourne, Inc., 457 F.2d 1213, 1216 (2d Cir. 1972), for the proposition that “[t]he absence of a fixed salary … is never conclusive.” 53 F.3d at 555. Further, the payment of royalties was only one form of compensation given to Warren under the contracts. Warren was also given a fixed sum “payable upon completion.” That some royalties were agreed upon in addition to this sum is not sufficient to overcome the great weight of the contractual evidence indicating a work-for-hire relationship.

Warren also argues that because he created nearly 2,000 musical works for MTM, the works were not specially ordered or commissioned. However, the number of works at issue has no bearing on the existence of a work-for-hire relationship. As the district court noted, a weekly television show would naturally require “substantial quantities of verbal, visual and musical content.”

The agreements between Warren and MTM conclusively show that the musical compositions created by Warren were created as works for hire, and Warren is therefore not the legal owner of the copyrights therein.

AFFIRMED.

Notes and Questions

1. Employee v. Contractor. In Warren v. Fox the musical compositions created by Warren fell into one of the nine categories of “specially commissioned works” that qualify as works made for hire under § 101(2) of the Copyright Act (audiovisual works), even if they were not made by employees of the commissioning party. They will thus be classified as works made for hire so long as they can be shown to have been “specially commissioned” – the focus of the debate in Warren. A slightly different question arose in Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989). In that case Reid, a sculptor, was engaged by a nonprofit organization, CCNV, to create a memorial “to dramatize the plight of the homeless.” Sculpture is not one of the nine enumerated categories of commissioned works. Thus, even if Reid’s sculpture were “specially commissioned” (as it probably was), it would not be classified as a work made for hire under § 101 unless Reid were considered to be an employee of CCNV. CCNV argued that it exercised a certain degree of control over the subject matter of the sculpture, making it appropriate to classify Reid as its employee. The Court disagreed:

Reid is a sculptor, a skilled occupation. Reid supplied his own tools. He worked in his own studio in Baltimore, making daily supervision of his activities from Washington practicably impossible. Reid was retained for less than two months, a relatively short period of time. During and after this time, CCNV had no right to assign additional projects to Reid. Apart from the deadline for completing the sculpture, Reid had absolute freedom to decide when and how long to work. CCNV paid Reid $15,000, a sum dependent on completion of a specific job, a method by which independent contractors are often compensated. Reid had total discretion in hiring and paying assistants. Creating sculptures was hardly regular business for CCNV. Indeed, CCNV is not a business at all. Finally, CCNV did not pay payroll or Social Security taxes, provide any employee benefits, or contribute to unemployment insurance or workers’ compensation funds.

Does the structure of the works made for hire doctrine under § 101(2) of the Copyright Act make sense? Why should specially commissioned works be considered works for hire only if they fall into one of the nine enumerated categories? Why is a musical composition treated so differently than a sculpture?

2. Manner of compensation. The form of compensation received by the author is mentioned in both Warren v. Fox and CCNV v. Reid. Why is this detail significant to the question of works made for hire? Are the courts’ conclusions with respect to compensation consistent between these two cases?

3. Software contractors and assignment. For a variety of professional, financial and tax-planning reasons, software developers often work as independent contractors and are not hired as employees of the companies for which they create software. And, like the sculpture in CCNV v. Reid, software is not one of the nine enumerated categories of works under § 101(2) of the Copyright Act. Thus, even if it is specially commissioned, software will not be considered a work made for hire. As a result, companies that use independent contractors to develop software must be careful to put in place copyright assignment agreements with those contractors. And because contractors often sit and work beside company employees with very little to distinguish them, neglecting to take these contractual precautions is one of the most common IP missteps made by fledgling and mature software companies alike. If you were the general counsel of a new software company, how would you deal with this issue?

4. Recordation. Section 205 of the Copyright Act provides for recordation of copyright transfers with the Copyright Office. Recordation of transfers is not required, but provides priority if the owner attempts to transfer the same copyrighted work multiple times:

§ 205(d) Priority between Conflicting Transfers.—As between two conflicting transfers, the one executed first prevails if it is recorded, in the manner required to give constructive notice … Otherwise the later transfer prevails if recorded first in such manner, and if taken in good faith, for valuable consideration or on the basis of a binding promise to pay royalties, and without notice of the earlier transfer.

As students of real property will surely observe, this provision resembles a “race-notice” recording statute under state law. As such, the second transferee of a copyright may prevail over a prior, unrecorded transferee if the second transferee records first without notice of the earlier transfer. Note also that this provision is applicable only to copyrights that are registered with the Copyright Office.

5. Statutory termination of assignments. Sections 203 and 304 of the Copyright Act provide that any transfer of a copyright can be revoked by the transferor between 35 and 40 years after the original transfer was made.Footnote 2 This remarkable and powerful right is irrevocable and cannot be contractually waived or circumvented. It was intended to enable authors who were young and unrecognized when they first granted rights to more powerful publishers to profit from the later success of their works. For example, in 1938 Jerry Siegel and Joseph Shuster, the creators of the Superman character, sold their rights to the predecessor of DC Comics for $130. Siegel and Shuster both died penniless in the 1990s, while Superman earned billions for his corporate owners.

Though Sections 203 and 304 were originally directed to artists, writers and composers, these provisions apply across the board to all copyrighted works including software and technical standards documents. The possibility that an original developer of Microsoft Windows could suddenly pull the plug on millions of existing licenses is somewhat ameliorated because the reversion does not apply to works made for hire or derivative works. Nevertheless, one must ask why these reversionary rights apply to software and technical documents at all. If such works of authorship are excluded as works made for hire under Section 101(2), why shouldn’t they also be excluded from Sections 203/304?Footnote 3 Is there any justification for allowing developers of copyrighted “technology” products to terminate assignments made decades ago?

6. Divisibility of copyright. Prior to the Copyright Act of 1976, copyright ownership was not divisible. That is, the owner of a copyright, say in a book, could not assign the exclusive right to produce a film based on that book to a third party. The right to produce a film could be licensed to a third party, but an attempted assignment of the right would potentially be invalid or treated as a license.Footnote 4 But today, under 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(2), “Any of the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright, including any subdivision of any of the rights specified by section 106, may be transferred … and owned separately.” What do you think was the rationale for this change in the law? Why would, say, a film studio prefer to “own” the right to produce a film based on a book rather than have a license to do so?

Figure 2.2 The creators of the Superman character died in near poverty while the Man of Steel went on to form a multi-billion-dollar franchise. Sections 203 and 304 of the US Copyright Act were enacted to enable authors and their heirs to terminate any copyright assignment or license between 35 and 40 years after originally made in order to permit them to share in the value of their creations.

2.3 Assignment Of Patent Rights

As with other IP rights, patents, patent applications and inventions may be assigned. Patent rights initially vest in inventors who are, by definition, individuals. Unlike copyright, there is no work made for hire doctrine under US patent law. However, if an employee is “hired to invent” – that is, to perform tasks intended to result in an invention – then the employee may have a legal duty to assign the resulting invention to his or her employer.Footnote 5

Unfortunately, the “hired to invent” doctrine is murky and inconsistently applied.Footnote 6 Thus, most employers today contractually obligate their employees to assign rights in inventions and patents to them when made within the scope of their employment and/or using the employer’s resources or facilities. This requirement exists in the private sector, at nonprofit universities and research institutions, as well as government agencies. The initial assignment from an inventor to his or her employer is often filed during prosecution of a patent on a form provided by the Patent and Trademark Office. If such an assignment is not filed, the inventor’s employer obtains no rights in an issued patent other than so-called “shop rights” that allow the employer to use the patented invention on a limited basis.Footnote 7

Beyond the initial assignment from the inventor(s), the owner of a patent may assign it to a third party as any other property right. The following case turns on whether an inventor assigned his rights to his employer at the time the invention was conceived, or when the patent was issued.

Filmtec Corporation v. Allied-Signal Inc.

939 F.2d 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1991)

PLAGER, CIRCUIT JUDGE

Allied-Signal Inc. and UOP Inc. (Allied), defendants-appellants, appeal from the preliminary injunction issued by the district court. The trial court enjoined Allied from “making, using or selling, and actively inducing others to make use or sell TFCL membrane in the United States, and from otherwise infringing claim 7 of United States Patent No. 4,277,344 [’344].” Because of serious doubts on the record before us as to who has title to the invention and the ensuing patent, we vacate the grant of the injunction and remand for further proceedings.

The application which ultimately issued as the ‘344 patent was filed by John E. Cadotte on February 22, 1979. The patent claims a reverse osmosis membrane and a method for using the membrane to reduce the concentration of solute molecules and ions in solution. Cadotte assigned his rights in the application and any subsequently issuing patent to plaintiff-appellee FilmTec. This assignment was duly recorded in the United States Patent and Trademark Office. Defendant-appellant Allied manufactured a reverse osmosis membrane and FilmTec sued Allied for infringing certain claims of the ’344 patent.

John Cadotte was one of the four founders of FilmTec. Prior to founding FilmTec, Cadotte and the other founders were employed in various responsible positions at the North Star Division of Midwest Research Institute (MRI), a not-for-profit research organization. MRI was principally engaged in contract research, much of it for the United States (Government), and much of it involving work in the field of reverse osmosis membranes.

The evidence indicates that the work at MRI in which Cadotte and the other founders were engaged was being carried out under contract (the contract) to the Government. The contract provided that MRI

agrees to grant and does hereby grant to the Government the full and entire domestic right, title and interest in [any invention, discovery, improvement or development (whether or not patentable) made in the course of or under this contract or any subcontract … thereunder].

It appears that sometime between the time FilmTec came into being in 1977 and the time Cadotte submitted his patent application in February of 1979, he made the invention that led to the ’344 patent. As we will explain, just when in that period the invention was made is critical.

Cadotte left MRI in January of 1978. Cadotte testified that he conceived his invention the month after he left MRI. Allied disputes this, and alleges that Cadotte conceived his invention and formed the reverse osmosis membrane of the ’344 patent earlier—in July of 1977 or at least by November of 1977 when he allegedly produced an improved membrane.

Allied alleges that the evidence establishes that the contract between MRI and the Government grants to the Government “all discoveries and inventions made within the scope of their [i.e., MRI’s employees] employment,” and that the invention claimed in the ’344 patent was made by Cadotte while employed by MRI. From this Allied reasons that rights in the invention must be with the Government and therefore Cadotte had no rights to assign to FilmTec. If FilmTec lacks title to the patent, FilmTec has no standing to bring an infringement action under the ’344 patent. FilmTec counters by arguing that the trial court was correct in concluding that the most the Government would have acquired was an equitable title to the ’344 patent, which title would have been made void under 35 U.S.C. § 261 by the subsequent assignment to FilmTec from Cadotte.

The parties agree that Cadotte was employed by MRI and that the contract between MRI and the Government contains a grant of rights to inventions made pursuant to the contract. However, the record does not reflect whether the employment agreement between Cadotte and MRI either granted or required Cadotte to grant to MRI the rights to inventions made by Cadotte. Allied argues that Cadotte’s inventions were assigned nevertheless to MRI. Allied points to the provision in the contract between MRI and the Government in which MRI warrants that it will obligate inventors to assign their rights to MRI.

While this is not conclusive evidence of a grant of or a requirement to grant rights by Cadotte, it raises a serious question about the nature of the title, if any, in FilmTec. FilmTec apparently did not address this issue at the trial, and there is no indication in the opinion of the district court that this gap in the chain of ownership rights was considered by the court.

Between the time of an invention and the issuance of a patent, rights in an invention may be assigned and legal title to the ensuing patent will pass to the assignee upon grant of the patent. If an assignment of rights in an invention is made prior to the existence of the invention, this may be viewed as an assignment of an expectant interest. An assignment of an expectant interest can be a valid assignment.

Figure 2.3 FilmTec reverse osmosis membrane filter.

Once the invention is made and an application for patent is filed, however, legal title to the rights accruing thereunder would be in the assignee, and the assignor-inventor would have nothing remaining to assign. In this case, if Cadotte granted MRI rights in inventions made during his employ, and if the subject matter of the ’344 patent was invented by Cadotte during his employ with MRI, then Cadotte had nothing to give to FilmTec and his purported assignment to FilmTec is a nullity. Thus, FilmTec would lack both title to the ’344 patent and standing to bring the present action.

The district court was of the view that if the Government was the assignee from Cadotte through MRI, the Government would have acquired at most an equitable title, and that legal title would remain in Cadotte. The legal title would then have passed to FilmTec by virtue of the later assignment, pursuant to Sec. 261 of the [Patent Act]. Sigma Eng’g v. Halm Instrument, 33 F.R.D. 129 (E.D.N.Y. 1963).

But Sigma, even if it were binding precedent on this court, does not stretch so far. The issue in Sigma was whether the plaintiff, assignee of the patent rights of the inventors, was the real party in interest such as to be able to maintain the instant action for patent infringement. Defendant claimed that the inventors’ employer had title to the invention by virtue of the employment contract which obligated the inventors to transfer all patent rights to inventions made while in its employ. As the court expressly noted, no such transfers were made, however, and the court considered any possible interest held by the employer in the invention to be in the nature of an equitable claim.

In our case, the contract between MRI and the Government did not merely obligate MRI to grant future rights, but expressly granted to the Government MRI’s rights in any future invention. Ordinarily, no further act would be required once an invention came into being; the transfer of title would occur by operation of law. If a similar contract provision existed between Cadotte and MRI, as MRI’s contract with the Government required, and if the invention was made before Cadotte left MRI’s employ, as the trial judge seems to suggest, Cadotte would have no rights in the invention or any ensuing patent to assign to FilmTec.

Because of the district court’s view of the title issue, no specific findings were made on either of these questions. As a result, we do not know who held legal title to the invention and to the patent application and therefore we do not know if FilmTec could make a sufficient legal showing to establish the likelihood of success necessary to support a preliminary injunction.

It is well established that when a legal title holder of a patent transfers his or her title to a third party purchaser for value without notice of an outstanding equitable claim or title, the purchaser takes the entire ownership of the patent, free of any prior equitable encumbrance. This is an application of the common law bona fide purchaser for value rule.

Figure 2.4 Schematic showing possible assignment pathways for Cadotte’s invention.

Section 261 of Title 35 goes a step further. It adopts the principle of the real property recording acts, and provides that the bona fide purchaser for value cuts off the rights of a prior assignee who has failed to record the prior assignment in the Patent and Trademark Office by the dates specified in the statute. Although the statute does not expressly so say, it is clear that the statute is intended to cut off prior legal interests, which the common law rule did not.

Both the common law rule and the statute contemplate that the subsequent purchaser be exactly that—a transferee who pays valuable consideration, and is without notice of the prior transfer. The trial judge, with reference to FilmTec’s rights as a subsequent purchaser, stated simply that “FilmTec is a subsequent purchaser from Cadotte for independent consideration. There is no evidence presented to imply that FilmTec was on notice of any previous assignment.” The court concluded that, even if the MRI contract automatically transferred title to the Government, such assignment is not enforceable at law as it was never recorded.

“the bona fide purchaser for value cuts off the rights of a prior assignee who has failed to record the prior assignment in the Patent and Trademark Office by the dates specified in the statute.”

Since this matter will be before the trial court on remand, it may be useful for us to clarify what is required before FilmTec can properly be considered a subsequent purchaser entitled to the protections of Sec. 261. In the first place, FilmTec must be in fact a purchaser for a valuable consideration. This requirement is different from the classic notion of a purchaser under a deed of grant, where the requirement of consideration was a formality, and the proverbial peppercorn would suffice to have the deed operate under the statute of uses. Here the requirement is that the subsequent purchaser, in order to cut off the rights of the prior purchaser, must be more than a donee or other gratuitous transferee. There must be in fact valuable consideration paid so that the subsequent purchaser can, as a matter of law, claim record reliance as a premise upon which the purchase was made. That, of course, is a matter of proof.

In addition, the subsequent transferee/assignee—FilmTec in our case—must be without notice of any such prior assignment. If Cadotte’s contract with MRI contained a provision assigning any inventions made during the course of employment either to MRI or directly to the Government, Cadotte would clearly be on notice of the provisions of his own contract. Since Cadotte was one of the four founders of FilmTec, and the other founders and officers were also involved at MRI, FilmTec may well be deemed to have had actual notice of an assignment. Given the key roles that Cadotte and the others played both at MRI and later at FilmTec, at a minimum FilmTec might be said to be on inquiry notice of any possible rights in MRI or the Government as a result of Cadotte’s work at MRI. Thus once again, the key to FilmTec’s ability to show a likelihood of success on the merits lies in the relationship between Cadotte and MRI.

In our view of the title issue, it cannot be said on this record that FilmTec has established a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits. It is thus unnecessary for us to consider the other issues raised on appeal concerning the propriety of the injunction. The grant of the preliminary injunction is vacated and the case remanded to the district court to reconsider the propriety of the preliminary injunction and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

VACATED AND REMANDED.

Notes and Questions

1. Recording of title. As noted in Section 2.1, Note 4, assignments of patents may be recorded at the Patent and Trademark Office. As provided in 35 U.S.C. § 261,

An interest that constitutes an assignment, grant or conveyance shall be void as against any subsequent purchaser or mortgagee for a valuable consideration, without notice, unless it is recorded in the Patent and Trademark Office within three months from its date or prior to the date of such subsequent purchase or mortgage.

This provision is a modified form of the familiar “race-notice” recording statute that applies to real estate transactions.Footnote 8 Unlike the comparable provision of the Copyright Act (17 U.S.C. § 205(d), discussed in Section 2.2), the second assignee of a patent may prevail over a prior, unrecorded assignee if the second assignee records first without notice of the earlier assignment unless the first assignee records within three months of the first assignment. An assignee of a patent thus has a three-month grace period in which to record its transfer without fear of being superseded by a second assignment. What is the reason for this three-month grace period, which exists neither in copyright nor real property law?

2. Inquiry notice. The court in FilmTec borrows the notion of “inquiry notice” from the law of real property recording. What is inquiry notice?Footnote 9 How does it differ from actual notice and constructive notice?

3. Present v. Future Grants of Patent Rights. The court in FilmTec explains that “the contract between MRI and the Government did not merely obligate MRI to grant future rights, but expressly granted to the Government MRI’s rights in any future invention. Ordinarily, no further act would be required once an invention came into being; the transfer of title would occur by operation of law.” That is, disregarding MRI’s failure to record the transfer, MRI’s present grant of rights in a future patent to the government (assuming that MRI had previously obtained the requisite rights from Cadotte) would automatically convey those rights to the government as soon as an invention was made.

A similar fact pattern arose in Stanford v. Roche, 563 U.S. 776 (2011) (reproduced, in part, in Section 14.1). In that case, a Stanford researcher who was obligated under Stanford’s policies to assign inventions to Stanford also signed an agreement assigning his future invention rights to Cetus Corp. while visiting the company to use its equipment. The Federal Circuit ruled for Cetus, reasoning that, under FilmTec, the researcher’s present assignment of future patent rights to Cetus automatically became effective when a patent application was filed, leaving nothing for him to assign to the holder of a future promise of assignment (i.e., Stanford). Stanford successfully sought certiorari on different grounds (whether the Bayh–Dole Act overrode these contractual provisions), and the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment for Cetus without reaching the assignment issue.

However, Justices Breyer and Ginsburg dissented (joined by Justice Sotomayor, who concurred in the judgment) on the ground that the Federal Circuit’s 1991 rule in FilmTec seemingly contradicted earlier precedent. Citing one 1867 treatise and a 1958 law review note, Justice Breyer proposed that before FilmTec, “a present assignment of future inventions (as in both contracts here) conveyed equitable, but not legal, title” and that this equitable interest “grants equitable enforcement to an assignment of an expectancy but demands a further act, either reduction to possession or further assignment of the right when it comes into existence.” In other words, the researcher’s present “assignment” of his future patent rights to Cetus would give Cetus an equitable claim to seek “legal title” once an invention existed or a patent application was filed. On this basis, Justice Breyer concludes,

Under this rule, both the initial Stanford and later Cetus agreements would have given rise only to equitable interests in Dr. Holodniy’s invention. And as between these two claims in equity, the facts that Stanford’s contract came first and that Stanford subsequently obtained a postinvention assignment as well should have meant that Stanford, not Cetus, would receive the rights its contract conveyed.

Despite Justice Breyer’s dissatisfaction with the holdings of FilmTec and Stanford v. Roche, their approach to future assignments still appears to be the law.Footnote 10 Which approach do you think most accurately reflects the intentions of the parties? What policy ramifications might each rule have?

4. Shall versus does. The result in Stanford v. Roche turns on the wording of two competing legal instruments – Dr. Holodniy’s assignments to Cetus and Stanford. As noted by the Federal Circuit in the decision below, Holodniy’s initial agreement with Stanford constituted a mere promise to assign his future patent rights to Stanford, whereas his agreement with Cetus acted as a present assignment of his future patent rights to Cetus, thus giving the patent rights to Cetus (583 F.3d 832, 841–842 (2009)). As explained by Justice Breyer in his dissent:Footnote 11

In the earlier agreement—that between Dr. Holodniy and Stanford University—Dr. Holodniy said, “I agree to assign … to Stanford … that right, title and interest in and to … such inventions as required by Contracts and Grants.” In the later agreement—that between Dr. Holodniy and the private research firm Cetus—Dr. Holodniy said, “I will assign and do hereby assign to Cetus, my right, title, and interest in” here relevant “ideas” and “inventions.” The Federal Circuit held that the earlier Stanford agreement’s use of the words “agree to assign,” when compared with the later Cetus agreement’s use of the words “do hereby assign,” made all the difference. It concluded that, once the invention came into existence, the latter words meant that the Cetus agreement trumped the earlier, Stanford agreement. That, in the Circuit’s view, is because the latter words operated upon the invention automatically, while the former did not.

What could Stanford have done to avoid this problem? How do you think the result of Stanford v. Roche affected the wording of university patent policies and assignment documents in general?Footnote 12 Given this holding, should an assignment agreement ever be phrased in any way other than “Assignor hereby grants to Assignee … ”? Was Dr. Holodniy himself at fault in this situation? What, if anything, should he have done differently?

5. Breadth of employee invention assignments. As noted in the introduction to this section, employers who wish to obtain assignments of the inventions created by their employees must do so pursuant to written assignment agreements. But how broad can these assignments be? In Whitewater West Indus. v. Alleshouse, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 36394 (Fed. Cir. 2020), the Federal Circuit reviewed an employee assignment agreement that contained the following provision:

a. Assignment: In consideration of compensation paid by Company, Employee agrees that all right, title and interest in all inventions, improvements, developments, trade-secret, copyrightable or patentable material that Employee conceives or hereafter may make or conceive, whether solely or jointly with others:

  • (a) with the use of Company’s time, materials, or facilities; or (b) resulting from or suggested by Employee’s work for Company; or (c) in any way connected to any subject matter within the existing or contemplated business of Company

  • shall automatically be deemed to become the property of Company as soon as made or conceived, and Employee agrees to assign to Company, its successors, assigns, or nominees, all of Employee’s rights and interests in said inventions, improvements, and developments in all countries worldwide. Employee’s obligation to assign the rights to such inventions shall survive the discontinuance or termination of this Agreement for any reason.

This provision, on its face, appears to require not only that current employees assign their inventions to the company (a typical provision in employment agreements), but also that former employees continue to make such assignments indefinitely in the future, so long as such inventions are “in any way connected to any subject matter within the existing or contemplated business of Company.” Needless to say, this provision is quite aggressive.

Richard Alleshouse, a designer of water park attractions, was hired by Wave Loch, Inc., a company operating in California, in October 2007. In September 2008, Alleshouse signed a Covenant Against Disclosure and Covenant Not to Compete containing the above assignment clause. In 2012, Alleshouse left Wave Loch to cofound a new company in the same line of business. There, he continued to develop and patent features of surfing-based water park attractions. In 2017, Wave Loch (through its successor Whitewater West) sued Alleshouse for breach of contract and correction of inventorship, seeking to acquire title to three patents on which Alleshouse was listed as a co-inventor following his departure from Wave Loch.

In evaluating Wave Loch’s claim, the Federal Circuit considered California Business and Professions Code § 16600, which states: “Except as provided in this chapter, every contract by which anyone is restrained from engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind is to that extent void.” This statutory provision has traditionally been interpreted to prohibit companies from imposing noncompetition restrictions on former employees. In this case, however, the Federal Circuit extended its reach to prohibit assignments of future IP rights not based on the company’s own IP. In assessing the over-breadth of the provision, the court noted that:

No trade-secret or other confidential information need have been used to conceive the invention or reduce it to practice for the assignment provision to apply. The obligation is unlimited in time and geography. It applies when Mr. Alleshouse’s post-employment invention is merely “suggested by” his work for Wave Loch. It applies, too, when his post-employment invention is “in any way connected to any subject matter” that was within Wave Loch’s “existing or contemplated” business when Mr. Alleshouse worked for Wave Loch.

Under these circumstances, the court invalidated the assignment provision, reasoning that it “imposes [too harsh a] penalty on post-employment professional, trade, or business prospects—a penalty that has undoubted restraining effect on those prospects and that a number of courts have long held to invalidate certain broad agreements with those effects.”

Interestingly, Wave Loch cited Stanford v. Roche in its defense, arguing that the court there interpreted § 16600 to uphold the invention assignment provision used by Cetus. The Federal Circuit rejected this argument, however, stating that in Stanford, unlike Whitewater, “there was simply no evidence of a restraining effect on [the researcher’s] ability to engage in his profession.” But as pointed out by Professor Dennis Crouch, “The weak point of the Federal Circuit’s decision [in Whitewater] is that it is seemingly contrary to its own prior express statement [in Stanford] that ‘section 16600 [applies] to employment restrictions on departing employees, not to patent assignments.’”Footnote 13

Which view do you find more persuasive? Should Alleshouse have been required to assign his post-departure patents to Wave Loch? What would the result be in a state that did not have an analog to California’s § 16600? Should this question be resolved under Federal patent law?

6. When does an assignable invention exist? Another twist relating to employee invention assignments involves the point in time when an “invention” actually comes into existence and can thus be assigned. In Bio-Rad Labs, Inc. v. ITC and 10X Genomics (Fed. Cir. 2021), two employees each agreed to assign to Bio-Rad, their employer, any IP, including ideas, discoveries and inventions, that he “conceives, develops or creates” during his employment. Both employees left Bio-Rad to form 10X Genomics, which competed with Bio-Rad. Four months later, 10X began to file patent applications on technology that the employees had worked on while at Bio-Rad. The employees claimed that, while their work at 10X was related to their work at Bio-Rad, they did not actually “conceive” the inventions leading to their patents until after they had joined 10X. The Federal Circuit, applying California employment and contract law, agreed, holding that the assignment clause in the Bio-Rad agreements related to “intellectual property” and that an unprotectable “idea,” even if later leading to a patentable invention, was not IP and could thus not be assigned. That is, the court found that the assignment duty under the agreement was “limited to subject matter that itself could be protected as intellectual property.” If this is the case, then why did the Bio-Rad agreement expressly call for the assignment of “ideas” in addition to inventions and other forms of IP?

Figure 2.5 Richard Alleshouse was the product manager for Wave Loch’s FlowRider attraction, shown here as installed on the upper deck of a Royal Caribbean cruise ship.

Professor Dennis Crouch contrasts Bio-Rad with Dana-Farber Cancer Inst., Inc. v. Ono Pharm. Co., Ltd., 964 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2020), in which unpatentable, pre-conception ideas did give rise to a claim for ownership of patentable inventions conceived later.Footnote 14 Which approach do you think most accurately reflects the intentions of the parties? How would you draft an assignment agreement to unambiguously cover pre-conception ideas, or to avoid such assignments?

7. Indivisibility of patent rights. Unlike copyrights (see Section 2.2, Note 5), the rights “within” a patent are indivisible. That is, the owner of a patent may not assign one claim of the patent to another, nor may it assign the exclusive right to make or sell one particular type of product. As set out by the Supreme Court in Waterman v. MacKenzie, 138 U.S. 252 (1891), a patent owner’s only options are to assign (1) the whole patent, (2) an undivided part or share of the whole patent, or (3) the patent rights “within and throughout a specified part of the United States” (a rarity these days). Thus, when a patent owner, under option (2), assigns “an undivided part” of a patent, the assignee receives an undivided interest in the whole, becoming a tenant in common with the original owner and any other co-owners (the rights and duties of such joint patent owners are discussed in greater detail in Section 2.5). Why do patents and copyrights differ in this regard? Should patents be “divisible” like copyrights? What advantages or disadvantages might arise from such divisibility?

8. Past infringement. The general rule in the United States is that “one seeking to recover money damages for infringement of [a] patent … must have held the legal title to the patent during the time of the infringement.” Arachnid, Inc. v. Merit Indus., Inc. 939 F.2d 1574, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1991). Thus, the assignee of a patent only obtains the right to sue for infringement that occurred while it owned the patent. As the Supreme Court held a century and a half ago, “It is a great mistake to suppose that the assignment of a patent carries with it a transfer of the right to damages for an infringement committed before such assignment.” Moore v. Marsh, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 515 (1868). This rule often acts as a trap for the unwary (see, e.g., Nano-Second Technology Co., Ltd. v. Dynaflex International, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62611 (N.D. Cal.) (language purporting to assign “the entire right, title and interest” to a patent failed to convey the right to sue for past infringement)). As a result, if the assignee wishes to sue for infringement occurring prior to the date of the assignment, the assignment must contain an express conveyance of this right. Does this rule still make sense today? Why might an assignor of a patent not wish to assign the right to sue for past infringement to a purchaser of the patent? What language would you use in an assignment clause to convey this important right to the assignee?

Problem 2.1

The Brokeback Institute (BI) is a leading medical research center. The IP assignment clause in its standard consulting agreement reads as follows:

Consultant hereby assigns to BI all of its ownership, right, title, and interest in and to all Work Product. An Invention will be considered “Work Product” if it fits any of the following three criteria: (1) it is developed using equipment, supplies, facilities, or trade secrets of BI; (2) it results from Consultant’s work for BI; or (3) it relates to BI’s business or its current or anticipated research and development.

How would you react to and/or revise this clause if you represented a consultant who was one of the following:

  1. a. A software developer being engaged by BI for a six-month, full-time engagement to update BI’s medical records software database.

  2. b. A Nobel laureate biochemist with a faculty appointment at Harvard who will be visiting BI to teach a three-week summer class to freshman pre-med students.

  3. c. A brain researcher from Oxford who has been invited to serve on the scientific advisory board of a BI grant-funded neurosurgery project, which will involve participation in one telephonic board meeting per calendar quarter.

  4. d. A pathologist who will advise BI on the design of its new pathology lab, which is expected to require fifty hours of work over the next year.

Problem 2.2

Help out Stanford University by drafting an IP assignment clause applicable to its faculty members, including those who occasionally visit other institutions and companies to use their equipment and facilities.

2.4 Trademark Assignments and Goodwill

Like copyrights and patents, trademarks may be assigned by their owners. But as IP rights, trademarks differ in important respects from copyrights and patents. Most fundamentally, as discussed in the following case, an assignment of a registered trademark is invalid unless it is accompanied by an assignment of the associated business goodwill.

Sugar Busters LLC v. Brennan

177 F.3d 258 (5th Cir. 1999)

KING, Chief Judge

Plaintiff-appellee Sugar Busters, L.L.C. (plaintiff) is a limited liability company organized by three doctors and H. Leighton Steward, who co-authored and published a book entitled “SUGAR BUSTERS! Cut Sugar to Trim Fat” in 1995. In “SUGAR BUSTERS! Cut Sugar to Trim Fat,” the authors recommend a diet plan based on the role of insulin in obesity and cardiovascular disease. The authors’ premise is that reduced consumption of insulin-producing food, such as carbohydrates and other sugars, leads to weight loss and a more healthy lifestyle. The 1995 publication of “SUGAR BUSTERS! Cut Sugar to Trim Fat” sold over 210,000 copies, and in May 1998 a second edition was released. The second edition has sold over 800,000 copies and remains a bestseller.

Brennan then co-authored “SUGAR BUST For Life!,” which was published in May 1998. “SUGAR BUST for Life” states on its cover that it is a “cookbook and companion guide by the famous family of good food,” and that Brennan was “Consultant, Editor, Publisher, [and] Sales and Marketing Director for the original, best-selling ‘Sugar Busters!™ Cut Sugar to Trim Fat.’” Approximately 110,000 copies of “SUGAR BUST for Life!” were sold between its release and September 1998.

Plaintiff filed this suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana on May 26, 1998. Plaintiff sought to enjoin [Brennan] from selling, displaying, advertising or distributing “SUGAR BUST for Life!,” to destroy all copies of the cookbook, and to recover damages and any profits derived from the cookbook.

The mark that is the subject of plaintiff’s infringement claim is a service mark that was registered in 1992 by Sugarbusters, Inc., an Indiana corporation operating a retail store named “Sugarbusters” in Indianapolis that provides products and information for diabetics. The “SUGARBUSTERS” service mark, registration number 1,684,769, is for “retail store services featuring products and supplies for diabetic people; namely, medical supplies, medical equipment, food products, informational literature and wearing apparel featuring a message regarding diabetes.” Sugarbusters, Inc. sold “any and all rights to the mark” to Thornton-Sahoo, Inc. on December 19, 1997, and Thornton-Sahoo, Inc. sold these rights to Elliott Company, Inc. (Elliott) on January 9, 1998. Plaintiff obtained the service mark from Elliott pursuant to a “servicemark purchase agreement” dated January 26, 1998. Under the terms of that agreement, plaintiff purchased “all the interests [Elliott] owns” in the mark and “the goodwill of all business connected with the use of and symbolized by” the mark.

The district court found that the mark is valid and that the transfer of the mark to plaintiff was not “in gross” because

[t]he plaintiff has used the trademark to disseminate information through its books, seminars, the Internet, and the cover of plaintiff’s recent book, which reads “Help Treat Diabetes and Other Diseases.” Moreover, the plaintiff is moving forward to market and sell its own products and services, which comport with the products and services sold by the Indiana corporation. There has been a full and complete transfer of the good will related to the mark …

A trademark is merely a symbol of goodwill and has no independent significance apart from the goodwill that it symbolizes. Therefore, a trademark cannot be sold or assigned apart from the goodwill it symbolizes. The sale or assignment of a trademark without the goodwill that the mark represents is characterized as in gross and is invalid.

The purpose of the rule prohibiting the sale or assignment of a trademark in gross is to prevent a consumer from being misled or confused as to the source and nature of the goods or services that he or she acquires. Use of the mark by the assignee in connection with a different goodwill and different product would result in a fraud on the purchasing public who reasonably assume that the mark signifies the same thing, whether used by one person or another. Therefore, if consumers are not to be misled from established associations with the mark, [it must] continue to be associated with the same or similar products after the assignment.

Plaintiff’s purported service mark in “SUGARBUSTERS” is valid only if plaintiff also acquired the goodwill that accompanies the mark; that is, “the portion of the business or service with which the mark is associated.” [Brennan] claim[s] that the transfer of the “SUGARBUSTERS” mark to plaintiff was in gross because “[n]one of the assignor’s underlying business, including its inventory, customer lists, or other assets, were transferred to [plaintiff].” [Brennan’s] view of goodwill, however, is too narrow. Plaintiff may obtain a valid trademark without purchasing any physical or tangible assets of the retail store in Indiana – the transfer of goodwill requires only that the services be sufficiently similar to prevent consumers of the service offered under the mark from being misled from established associations with the mark.

In concluding that goodwill was transferred, the district court relied … on its finding that “plaintiff is moving forward to market and sell its own products and services, which comport with the products and services sold by the Indiana corporation.” Steward testified, however, that plaintiff does not have any plans to operate a retail store, and plaintiff offered no evidence suggesting that it intends to market directly to consumers any goods it licenses to carry the “SUGAR BUSTERS!” name. Finally, we are unconvinced by plaintiff’s argument that, by stating on the cover of its diet book that it may “[h]elp treat diabetes and other diseases” and then selling some of those books on the Internet, plaintiff provides a service substantially similar to a retail store that provides diabetic supplies. We therefore must conclude that plaintiff’s purported service mark is invalid.

Notes and Questions

1. Acquiring goodwill. The Servicemark Purchase Agreement between Elliott and Sugar Busters, LLC clearly purported to transfer “the goodwill of all business connected with the use of and symbolized by” the SUGARBUSTERS mark. Given this language, why did the Fifth Circuit find that the goodwill of the business was not transferred? In view of the court’s holding, how would you advise a client if it desires to acquire a trademark but not to conduct the same business as the prior owner of the mark?

2. Consumer confusion. Generally, trademark infringement cases hinge on whether an alleged infringer is causing consumer confusion as to the source of goods or services. A similar theory applies to the Fifth Circuit’s rule on in gross trademark assignments: If the new goods sold under the mark are significantly different than the old goods sold under the mark, then consumers might be confused as to the source and nature of the goods being sold. Why is this the case? What is the harm in this confusion?

3. Effect of an in gross transfer. Professor Barton Beebe notes, in discussing the Sugar Busters case, that “In most situations … the assignee may claim exclusive rights in the mark, but the basis of and the priority date for those rights stems only from the assignee’s new use of the mark, not from any previous use by the assignor.”Footnote 15 This conclusion is sensible – without the accompanying goodwill, the acquirer gets nothing from the original mark owner, but may begin to use the mark afresh and may build up goodwill based on its own use. But does this reasoning correspond with the holding of Sugar Busters? Note the date on which the plaintiff purported to acquire the trademark from Elliott (January 26, 1998), when Brennan’s allegedly infringing book was released (May 26, 1998) and when the plaintiff brought suit against Brennan (May 26, 1998). Even if the plaintiff acquired no trademark rights at all from Elliott, wouldn’t it have acquired some enforceable rights between January and May, 1998? And what about any common law trademark rights that the plaintiff accrued from the 1995 publication of its first Sugar Busters book?

4. Toward free transfer? Professor Irene Calboli argues that the rule requiring transfer of goodwill with trademarks is an outdated trap for the unwary that should be abolished. She hypothesizes a transaction in which a new company acquires the Coca-Cola Company, observing all the proper formalities, and then decides to apply the famous Coca-Cola mark not to carbonated colas, but to salty snacks. Will consumers be confused? Possibly, but the new owner is perfectly within its rights to apply the mark to its snack products rather than colas. Would consumers be worse off if the transaction documentation had neglected to reflect a transfer of goodwill? Calboli reasons that

the rule of assignment “with goodwill” is failing to meet its purpose and … rather than focusing on a sterile and confusing requirement, the courts should focus directly on the assignee’s use of the mark. If this use is likely to deceive the public, the courts should declare the assignments at issue void. Yet, if no likelihood of confusion or deception results from the transaction, the courts should allow the assignments to stand.Footnote 16

Do you agree? Does the prohibition on in gross transfers of trademarks serve any useful purpose today?Footnote 17

5. Recordation. The recordation requirements for trademarks are similar to those for patents. As provided under 15 U.S.C. § 1060(3):

An assignment shall be void against any subsequent purchaser for valuable consideration without notice, unless the prescribed information reporting the assignment is recorded in the United States Patent and Trademark Office within 3 months after the date of the assignment or prior to the subsequent purchase.

As with patents, this provision is a modified form of “race-notice” recording statute. The second assignee of a trademark may prevail over a prior, unrecorded assignee if the second assignee records first without notice of the earlier assignment unless the first assignee records within three months of the first assignment.

6. Security interests and mortgages. The recording statute for patents 35 U.S.C. § 261 refers to “a subsequent purchaser or mortgagee” of a patent, whereas the statute for trademarks refers only to “a subsequent purchaser.” Why does the trademark statute omit mention of mortgagees? Can a trademark be mortgaged? What might prevent this from happening effectively?

7. Short-form assignments. Intellectual property rights are often conveyed as part of a larger corporate merger or acquisition transaction. In order to avoid filing the entire transaction agreement with the Patent and Trademark Office for recording purposes, the parties often execute a short-form assignment document that pertains only to the assigned patents or trademarks. This short-form document is then recorded at the Patent and Trademark Office. A sample of such a short-form assignment follows.

Short-Form Trademark Assignment (for Filing with the US Patent and Trademark Office)

This assignment is made as of the ____ day of ______________ by ASSIGNOR INC., a _______ corporation having a principal place of business at ______________, hereinafter referred to as the ASSIGNOR, to ASSIGNEE CORP., a ___________ corporation, having a principal place of business at __________________, hereinafter referred to as ASSIGNEE.

WHEREAS, ASSIGNOR is the owner of the registered trademarks and trademark applications, hereinafter collectively referred to as the TRADEMARKS, identified on Schedules “A” and “B” attached hereto, together with the good will and all rights which may have accrued in connection therewith.

WHEREAS, ASSIGNEE is desirous of acquiring the entire right, title and interest of ASSIGNOR in and to said TRADEMARKS together with said rights and the good will of the business symbolized thereby.

NOW, THEREFORE, for good and valuable consideration paid by the ASSIGNEE, receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, ASSIGNOR does hereby sell, assign, transfer and set over to ASSIGNEE, its successors and assigns, ASSIGNOR’s entire right, title and interest in and to the TRADEMARKS, together with said good will of the business symbolized thereby, said TRADEMARKS to be held and enjoyed by the ASSIGNEE, its successors and assigns as fully and entirely as the same would have been held and enjoyed by the ASSIGNOR had this assignment not been made.

ASSIGNOR covenants and agrees to execute such further and confirmatory assignments in recordable form as the ASSIGNEE may reasonably require to vest record title of said respective registrations in ASSIGNEE.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, ASSIGNOR has caused this Assignment to be executed by a duly authorized officer.

ASSIGNOR

By: _____________________ Date: ____________________

2.5 Assignment of Trade Secrets

Like other IP rights, trade secrets may be assigned by their owners. As the leading treatise on trade secret law announces in the heading of one of its chapters, “Trade Secrets Are Assignable Property.”Footnote 18 Yet the assignment of trade secrets is perhaps the least developed and understood among IP types.

Part of the complexity arises from the fact that the term “trade secret” refers to two distinct concepts: A trade secret is, on one hand, a piece of information that derives value from being kept secret. Yet the term also refers to the set of enforceable legal rights that give the “owner” of that information legal redress for its improper acquisition or usage. In some ways, this dichotomy is similar to that seen with patents and copyrights. On one hand, there is an invention, and on the other hand, a patent right that gives its owner enforceable legal rights with respect to that invention. Likewise, a work of authorship and the copyright in that work of authorship. Unfortunately, trade secrecy law is hobbled by the existence of only a single term to describe both the res that is protected, and the legal mode of its protection.

It is for this reason that the few courts that have considered issues surrounding trade secret assignment have distinguished between “ownership” of a trade secret and its “possession.” In DTM Research, L.L.C. v. AT&T Corp., 245 F.3d 327, 332 (4th Cir. 2001), the court held that “While the information forming the basis of a trade secret can be transferred, as with personal property, its continuing secrecy provides the value, and any general disclosure destroys the value. As a consequence, one ‘owns’ a trade secret when one knows of it, as long as it remains a secret.” Accordingly, the court held that a party possessing secret information is entitled to seek redress against another party that misappropriated it, even if the first party lacks “fee simple” title to that information (i.e., if the first party itself allegedly misappropriated the information from another).

Possession of a trade secret also figures prominently in cases that discuss the assignment of trade secrets. When the owner of a copyrighted work of art transfers the copyright to a buyer, the transferor loses its right to reproduce the work further. Likewise, when the owner of a trade secret transfers that secret to a buyer, the transferor loses its right to exploit that secret further. As the court explained in Memry Corp. v. Ky. Oil Tech., N.V., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94393 at *16 (N.D. Cal. 2006), “in giving up all rights to use of the secrets through assignment, the assignor is implicitly and legally bound to maintain the secrecy of the information contained in the trade secrets.”

2.6 Joint Ownership

Just like real and personal property, IP may be co-owned by multiple parties. But the laws regarding joint ownership of IP are different than those affecting real and personal property. To make matters worse, they also differ based on the kind of IP involved, and they vary from country to country. As a result, planning for joint ownership of IP can become fraught with risks and traps for the unwary. As one waggish practitioner has written, “‘Joint ownership of IP’ – no words strike more terror into the heart of an IP practitioner than the task of having to provide appropriate contractual provisions in such a situation.”Footnote 19

Joint ownership of IP rights impacts prosecution of patents and trademarks, exploitation of those rights, and licensing and enforcement of rights. These principles are discussed below in the context of patents, copyrights, trade secrets and trademarks under US law.

2.6.1 Patents

When more than one individual makes an inventive contribution to an invention, the resulting patent will be jointly owned. As explained by the Federal Circuit in Ethicon v. United States Surgical Corp., 135 F.3d 1456, 1465 (Fed. Cir. 1998), “in the context of joint inventorship, each co-inventor presumptively owns a pro rata undivided interest in the entire patent, no matter what their respective contributions.”

The rights of joint owners of patents are described in 35 U.S. Code § 262:

In the absence of any agreement to the contrary, each of the joint owners of a patent may make, use, offer to sell, or sell the patented invention within the United States, or import the patented invention into the United States, without the consent of and without accounting to the other owners.

Thus, each co-owner of a patent may independently exploit the patent without the consent of its co-owners. But unlike copyrights, joint owners of patents do not owe one another a duty of accounting or sharing of profits. Thus, the co-owner of a patented process that uses it to embark on a profitable new manufacturing venture has no obligation to share any of its earnings with the co-owners of the patent.

Any co-owner of a patent may also license it to others, again with no obligation to share royalties or other amounts received with its co-owners.Footnote 20 While a co-owner may grant an exclusive license to a third party, and that exclusivity may operate to prevent the granting co-owner from granting further licenses to others, it has no effect on the other co-owners of the patent, who may continue to exploit or grant other licenses under the patent.

Likewise, any co-owner of a patent may bring suit to enforce it against an infringer, but in order for the suit to proceed, it must join all other co-owners in the suit (see Section 11.1.5). Moreover, as illustrated in Ethicon, a retroactive license from any co-owner will serve to authorize the infringer’s conduct, thus defeating a suit brought by fewer than all co-owners.

2.6.2 Copyrights

There are some similarities between the treatment of joint owners under US copyright and patent law. Under US copyright law, each co-owner of a copyright may independently exploit the copyright without permission of the other co-owners. This exploitation includes performance, reproduction, creation of derivative works and all other exclusive rights afforded by the Copyright Act. However, unlike patents, a copyright co-owner who earns profits from the exploitation of a jointly owned work must render an accounting to his or her co-owners and share the profits with them on a pro rata basis. Thus, if three members of a band compose a song, and one of them quits to pursue a solo career, the soloist must account to the other two for any profits that he or she earns from performing the song (or a derivative of it) for the duration of the copyright.

Likewise, any co-owner of a copyright may license the copyright to others. As with patents, an exclusive license granted by a single co-owner will not be particularly valuable to the licensee, as the other co-owners are free to license the same rights to others. Such an exclusive license will thus be considered nonexclusive for purposes of standing to sue.Footnote 21 As with other exploitation, the copyright licensor must account to the other co-owners for any profits earned based on the license.

Finally, any co-owner of a copyright may sue to enforce the copyright against an infringer without the consent of the other co-owners. As with patents, a license from any co-owner will serve to authorize the infringer’s conduct. But unlike patent infringement litigation, notice to the co-owners of a copyright, and their joinder in an infringement suit, is not mandatory, but discretionary in the court (see 17 U.S.C. § 501(b), discussed in greater detail in Section 11.1.5, Note 5).

2.6.3 Trade Secrets

There is scant case law, and little reliable commentary, discussing the rights and obligations of joint owners of trade secrets to one another. Yet from the authority that exists, it appears that joint owners of trade secrets, unlike joint owners of patents and copyrights, are not free to exploit jointly owned trade secrets without the consent of their co-owners.

Thus, in Morton v. Rank Am., Inc., 812 F. Supp. 1062, 1074 (C.D. Cal. 1993), one co-owner of trade secrets relating to the operations of the Hard Rock Café chain sued another co-owner who used the information in violation of a noncompetition agreement. The court held that, under California law, being the co-owner of a trade secret does not necessarily insulate one from a claim of trade secret misappropriation. In Jardin v. DATAllegro, Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84509 *15 (S.D. Cal. 2011), another California court, citing Morton, held that a joint owner of a trade secret could be liable for disclosing the trade secret in a patent application without the permission of his co-owner.

It also appears, in at least one case, that a co-owner of a trade secret may sue a third party for misappropriation of that trade secret without the consent of the other co-owner(s). In MGP Ingredients, Inc. v. Mars, Inc., 465 F. Supp. 2d 1109 (D. Kan. 2006), MGPI and SNM jointly owned trade secrets relating to the formulation of the popular Greenies® dog chews. MGPI alleged that SNM impermissibly disclosed these trade secrets to Mars, Inc., which then began to manufacture its own dog chews using the secret formula. The court rejected Mars’ motion to dismiss MGPI’s suit for trade secret misappropriation against both SNM and Mars on the basis that SNM was a co-owner of the trade secrets.

2.6.4 Trademarks

Unlike patents, copyrights and trade secrets, the primary purpose of a trademark is to act as an indication of the source of goods or services. The ownership of a single mark by two or more entities contradicts this fundamental principle and is thus “disfavored” by the law. As the Sixth Circuit cautions in Yellowbook Inc. v. Brandeberry, 708 F.3d 837, 845 (6th Cir. 2013),

Joint ownership is disfavored in the trademark context. By their nature, trademarks derive their value from exclusively identifying a particular business. If customers are confused about which business the mark refers to, one of the users may unfairly benefit from the goodwill of the other, or the goodwill of the mark may be dissipated entirely. Beneficial joint ownership or licensing schemes may be devised, but courts are not well placed to fill in these details, and parties (and customers) are typically best served by exclusive ownership.

Nevertheless, the PTO permits joint ownership of registered marks. One scenario in which this is permitted is when the joint owners are related companies that exhibit a “unity of control” that eliminates consumer confusion because the joint owners are, for practical purposes, operating as a single unit.Footnote 22 In another scenario, two parties may be granted “concurrent” registrations for the same mark in connection with a similar product in different geographic markets.Footnote 23 In addition, the owner of a trademark registration may assign a partial interest in that registration to a third party, after which both parties will be co-owners of the registration.Footnote 24 This situation occurs, inter alia, as a result of the break-up of joint ventures and the inheritance of businesses by multiple heirs or testamentary beneficiaries.Footnote 25

When a jointly owned trademark serves as an indication of source, no individual co-owner has the right to exploit that mark separately from the collective use made by the joint owners. For example, the four original members of the musical group “The Commodores” held common law trademark rights in the group’s name. When Thomas McClary, one of the group’s members, left the group and began to perform under the names “The 2014 Commodores” and “The Commodores Featuring Thomas McClary” the other group members sued him for trademark infringement and a number of other causes. The Eleventh Circuit held in Commodores Entm’t Corp. v. McClary, 879 F.3d 1114 (11th Cir. 2018) that “The rights to use the name ‘The Commodores’ remained with the group after McClary departed, and the corollary is also true: McClary did not retain rights to use the marks individually.”

Notes and Questions

1. Vive la difference? Why is there such discord among four areas of US IP law regarding the rights of joint owners? Would there be value in harmonizing these different systems? How would you recommend that such harmonization be pursued?

2. Economic justifications. Judge Richard Posner offers a potential economic justification for the discrepancies in the treatment of jointly owned copyrights and patents.

In both domains, a joint owner is allowed to use or license the jointly owned work without the permission of the other owner or owners; this rule reduces transaction costs by eliminating bilateral monopoly. But the joint owner of a copyright who uses or licenses a copyright must account to the other owners for the profits of the use and share them with those others, while the joint owner of a patent need not. The latter rule provides greater encouragement to inventors to keep working to improve their inventions, consistent with the continuously improving quality of technology, but not of the arts.Footnote 26

What do you think of this explanation? Would requiring the co-owner of a patent to share its profits from the exploitation of the patent with its co-owners decrease innovation? Why doesn’t the accounting requirement similarly dampen creative activity?

Figure 2.6 Though he was an original member of the musical group The Commodores, Thomas McClary did not retain rights to utilize the group’s name after he left the band in 1984.

3. International inconsistency. Commentators have long observed that US law is out of step with the laws of many other countries in how it handles jointly owned IP. For example, in many countries in Europe and Asia, IP rights may not be exploited, licensed or asserted without the consent of all joint owners. Is this approach preferable? What does it mean for joint owners of IP?

In 1990, Professor Robert Merges and Lawrence Locke analyzed the laws of the United States and various other countries regarding their handling of joint patent owners. They concluded, among other things, that:

The American rule permitting co-owners to work their patent without compensating the other co-owners is preferable to the French rule requiring compensation … [T]he French rule can lead to a situation where both co-owners elect not to work the patent, in hopes of forcing the other co-owner to work it and split the profits. Since society has an obvious interest in seeing patented technology developed, the American rule is better.

The right of co-owners to license and assign their full interest, or any portion of it, should be restricted according to the rule in effect on the continent, in Great Britain and in Japan: consent of all co-owners should be required. This will prevent one co-owner from taking advantage of the others …Footnote 27

Do you concur with these recommendations? Why or why not? Should any of Merges and Locke’s recommendations be applied to forms of IP other than patents?

3 The Nature of an Intellectual Property License

Summary Contents

  1. 3.1 License versus Ownership of IP 48

  2. 3.2 Covenant Not to Sue 49

  3. 3.3 The Governing Law of IP Licenses 51

  4. 3.4 Obligation as Condition versus Covenant 60

  5. 3.5 Effect of IP Transfer on Licenses 64

What is an intellectual property (IP) license? The answer to this seemingly straightforward question is far from obvious, and it has engendered no small amount of judicial hand-wringing and scholarly debate over the years. We are all familiar, of course, with the licensing agreement. A licensing agreement is a contract, whether oral or written, whether signed with a pen, affirmed by a handshake or assented with a click. And, as such, the rules of contract law apply – rules that have been developed over centuries of common law.

But a licensing agreement, according to some, is more than an ordinary contract, just as a rental agreement for an apartment is more than a mere contract. It conveys an interest in a property right. Thus, while a rental agreement is a contract, interpreted in accordance with the laws of contract, it also conveys a leasehold interest, a property interest that has an existence that is both dependent on, but also independent of, the contract that created it. That is, there are aspects of a leasehold that need not be written into a rental agreement, but which exist nonetheless – the result of even more centuries of common law development.

Similarly, we can talk about licenses separately from licensing agreements. While these two legal creations are often inextricably linked, they have separate qualities as well. In contrast to a licensing agreement, a license is an authorization to exploit some exclusive right that the law confers on the owner of IP. For example, under the U.S. Patent Act, “whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States or imports into the United States any patented invention during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent” (35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (emphasis added)). The “authority” referenced in the Act is typically referred to as a “license” to practice the patent. A license “[i]n its simplest form … means only leave to do a thing which the licensor otherwise would have a right to prevent.”Footnote 1

The importance of treating a licensing agreement as distinct from a license is illustrated by the following example: Under a particular licensing agreement the licensor may grant a license under a copyright and under a patent. If the copyright license terminates for some reason (e.g., nonpayment of the royalty), the overall licensing agreement may continue, as may the patent license. Likewise, an agreement may terminate, yet a license granted under the agreement may be specified to continue in perpetuity after that termination.Footnote 2 The duration of a license and the licensing agreement under which it is granted need not be concurrent or identical.

But is an IP license a “property” interest, like a leasehold? The answer to that question depends on an even deeper question, which is the degree to which intellectual property itself constitutes “property.” That, too, is the subject of significant debate, and the answer may vary depending on the type of IP involved.Footnote 3

In this chapter we will explore some of the metaphysical issues surrounding the nature of an IP license – issues that sometimes have a very real effect on parties and transactions.

3.1 License Versus Ownership of IP

Perhaps the easiest way to begin to think about the nature of an IP license is to compare it to its counterpart – IP ownership (discussed in Chapter 2). Just as every lease requires a lessor, every license requires a licensor. The licensor of an IP right may be its owner, or it may simply be another licensee who is sublicensing certain of its rights (just as a lessee of real property may sublease the leased premises). But for our purposes, it is useful to compare the rights that an IP licensee has with those possessed by an IP owner – one who has come into possession of legal title to IP through creation or assignment.

Professor Ray Nimmer explained this distinction as follows:

Licenses are often contrasted with assignments of rights in information. The novice can think of an “assignment” as the equivalent of a sale of all rights in the intangible subject matter and not be far wrong. Commercial practice, however, frequently blurs the line between a license and an assignment. The fundamental difference is that, while licenses and assignments both focus on rights in, or use of, information, in an assignment the original rights owner tends to divest itself of rights in the subject matter, while in a license the transferor (“licensor”) retains more rights in the subject matter of the license. It can do this not only because the parties have agreed to a transaction that enables a split of ownership and use rights in the information, but because unlike hard goods, information can be both transferred and retained.Footnote 4

Table 3.1 offers a quick summary of the differences between the rights held by IP owners and licensees (both exclusive and nonexclusive).

Table 3.1 Rights in an item of IP (X) after a transaction between A and B

After the transaction, which party (A or B):AssignmentLicense (exclusive)License (nonexclusive)
Owns X?BAA
Has the right to exploit/use XBBB/A
Has the right to prevent others from using X (i.e., enforcement)?BB/AA
Has the right to grant further licenses to X?BB/AA
May maintain rights in X?BB/AA

Thus, as shown in Table 3.1, after A assigns IP right X to B, it is owned by B, and B has all rights to exploit, enforce, license and maintain X. Moving to the next column, if A grants B an exclusive license with respect to X, its ownership remains with A, but the right to exploit belongs to B (see Chapter 6 for a discussion of the rights and obligations of exclusive licensees). The right to enforce, further license and maintain X, however, may vary based on the terms of the exclusive licensing agreement between A and B. In some cases, B may obtain the right to enforce X (see Section 11.2), to grant sublicenses of X (see Section 6.5) and to maintain X (see Section 9.5). In contrast, under a nonexclusive license both A and B have the right to exploit X, while only A has the right to enforce, further license and maintain X.

3.2 Covenant Not to Sue

Various courts and commentators have weighed in on the legal nature of an IP license. One view, exemplified by the Federal Circuit in Spindelfabrik Suessen-Schurr Stahlecker & Grill v. Schubert & Salzer Maschinenfabrik AG, 829 F.2d 1075 (Fed. Cir. 1987), is that a license is simply a covenant by the licensor not to sue the licensee for IP infringement under certain conditions:

[A] patent license agreement is in essence nothing more than a promise by the licensor not to sue the licensee. Even if couched in terms of “[l]icensee is given the right to make, use, or sell X,” the agreement cannot convey that absolute right because not even the patentee of X is given that right. His right is merely one to exclude others from making, using or selling X. Indeed, the patentee of X and his licensee, when making, using, or selling X, can be subject to suit under other patents. In any event, patent license agreements can be written to convey different scopes of promises not to sue, e.g., a promise not to sue under a specific patent or, more broadly, a promise not to sue under any patent the licensor now has or may acquire in the future.

Professor Chris Newman, however, has challenged the characterization of a license as a “covenant not to sue.” In the below excerpt, he compares licenses in the real property context to copyright licenses:

If I sell you an admission ticket to my theater, I take on a contractual duty to allow you to enter the premises at the appointed time and place (as well as possibly to provide specified entertainment of some sort). If, when you arrive, I bar your entry, I violate my contractual duty, and you have a claim for breach of contract. But suppose I do allow (i.e., take no steps to obstruct or forbid) your entry as agreed. May I nevertheless charge you with trespass on the ground that while our contract imposed a duty on me to let you come in, it could not and did not grant you any privilege to do so? The answer is no … Selling you an admission ticket would be understood by all as manifesting the intent to grant you permission to enter, and so it would effectively exercise my power as a titleholder to grant you that privilege. The privilege would thus result from the same acts that give rise to a binding contract, but it would not flow from or depend upon contract formation as a legal matter. The privilege would be valid even if some technicality of contract law (say, failure to comply with a statute of frauds) prevented the creation of binding contractual duties. Even in the face of such a failure, if you were to show up at the time designated on the ticket and enter the premises, you would not be trespassing unless and until I revoked the privilege by asking you to leave.

If, on the other hand, we were to take seriously the notion that a license consists of nothing but a contractual obligation not to sue, then my hypothetical would have real bite. Under this reasoning, even though I am bound by contract to let you enter the theater, you are still technically a trespasser when you do so – it’s just that I have a contractual duty not to bring a claim charging you as one. If this sounds absurd, the absurdity resides in the contract theory of license. After all, if you were not still a trespasser, it would be superfluous to speak of my having a contractual “duty not to sue” you – sue you for what? The notion that a license is a “contract not to sue” thus assumes the implicit (and correct) premise that contracts do not create privileges. Once a privilege has been granted on the other hand, there is no need for a contract “not to sue,” though there may be for a contract not to revoke the privilege.

Is there any practical difference between having a privilege to use my property and having a right not to be sued for doing so? Indeed there is. Suppose my contractual duty not to sue you for trespass is part of a larger agreement in which you undertake other duties to me, some of which are due to be performed soon after your bargained-for use of my property is complete. If you then refuse or fail to perform in such a way as to constitute a material breach of the agreement, the contract may be terminated, thus relieving me prospectively of my duties under it, including the duty to refrain from suing you. This means that even though your prior uses of my property took place while the license (i.e., the contract) was still in force, if they are still within the statute of limitations for trespass I am now free to sue you over them. The contract theory of license cannot explain or justify the rule that licensed actions taken while the license remains in force are forever immune from claims of infringement.

Nor is the contract theory of license reconcilable with the phenomenon, common in copyright law, of multiple co-owners, each of whom is empowered to grant nonexclusive licenses without the others’ consent.Footnote 5 Were such a license a contract, it would bind only the grantor and not other co-owners, who would remain free to sue for infringement. One might seek to explain this by theorizing that co-owners of the same work exist in some sort of privity such that a license agreement by one contractually binds the others, but clearly copyright law does not hold this to be the case. If it were, a single co-owner should be equally capable of granting an exclusive license binding on all other co-owners and rendering void any subsequent attempts of theirs to grant conflicting licenses. Instead, the law prevents the creation of conflicting exclusive licenses by holding that where there are co-owners, the power to create exclusive rights can only be wielded by all of them acting jointly.Footnote 6

Notes and Questions

1. Covenant or not? Why does the Federal Circuit in Spindelfabrik refer to a patent license as a “covenant not to sue”? Why does Newman disagree with this characterization? How does he conceptualize an IP license? Does it matter that Spindelfabrik dealt with a patent license, whereas Newman is largely discussing copyright licenses?

2. Nonproperty rights. One of the difficulties with a property-based characterization of the IP license is that it does not fully account for permissions that are granted with respect to intangibles that are not generally considered to be property – data, know-how, unpatented inventions and the like.Footnote 7 How would you reconcile Newman’s description with such licenses? Are they property interests? Or is a “covenant not to sue” a better description?

3. Future rights. Another area in which conceptualizations of IP licenses are challenged is future IP rights. Licensing agreements often purport to grant rights with respect to IP that is created in the future (see, e.g., Stanford v. Roche, discussed in Section 2.3, Note 3, and Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil, discussed in Section 24.3). Are these future grants merely contractual commitments to grant licenses in the future, or are they present grants of future interests, analogous to future interests in estates that exist with respect to real property? For example, can an easement exist across a road that has not yet been built? Or is a contract relating to such an easement merely a contractual commitment to grant an easement once, and if, the road is built?

3.3 The Governing Law of IP Licenses

Closely related to the legal nature of IP licenses is the question of which law governs such licenses. There are several possible choices:

  • the state common law of contracts

  • the state common law of property

  • the Uniform Commercial Code enacted in various states

  • federal statutory law governing certain licensed IP rights (e.g., patents, copyrights, registered trademarks and federal trade secrets)

  • state statutory law governing certain licensed IP rights (e.g., state trade secrets)

  • state common law governing certain licensed IP rights (e.g., common law trademarks and rights of publicity)

  • federal common law relating to IP licenses.

Though there is no single, clear answer to this question, a significant amount of ink has been spilled wrangling over it. It is complicated, of course, by the diversity of IP types, which have their origins in federal statutes, state statutes and state common law. Below are various perspectives on this difficult question.

3.3.1 State Common Law of Contracts

The District Court in Sun Microsystems, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 81 F. Supp. 2d 1026 (N.D. Cal. 2000) held that “[t]he rules of contract construction embodied in California law control the interpretation of the [License Agreement] to the extent that such rules are consistent with federal copyright law and policy.” This position is a common one: because a licensing agreement is a contract, and because contracts are governed by state law, then the relevant state’s common law of contracts governs the interpretation and enforcement of the licensing agreement.

Of course, any interpretation supplied by state contract law cannot be inconsistent with federal law that defines the licensed IP rights. Thus, for example, a state court could not hold that a copyright licensing agreement with a duration of fifty years is too long, given that the duration of copyright protection often exceeds that period. Likewise, a state court could not create a new standard for evaluating the scope of patent claims to determine which products are subject to a royalty obligation. But the interpretation of contractual terms, whether or not they deal with federally created IP rights, is generally performed under state contract law.

3.3.2 State Common Law of Property

A slightly different approach is taken by Judge Pauline Newman of the Federal Circuit, who suggests that it is not the state common law of contracts, but that of property that should be understood as governing IP licenses:

The jurisprudence governing property interests is generally a matter of state law. Even when the property is the creation of federal statute, private rights are usually defined by state laws of property. This has long been recognized with respect to patent ownership and transfers.Footnote 8

Professor Christina Mulligan, writing about software end user license agreements (EULAs, discussed in greater detail in Chapter 17), offers efficiency-based rationales to distinguish between a contractual and a property-based understanding of licensing agreements:

One large difference between contract and property is that the number of people involved in contractual and property relationships changes how much negotiation over rights and duties is possible. Where two individuals sit down to hammer out a unique agreement for services from scratch, the costs each of them must shoulder, in terms of time and resources, to understand their agreement will be about the same. Moreover, to the extent that their contract covers unique circumstances, both parties may have similar interests in negotiating highly specific or idiosyncratic terms that advance their preferences for how the contract will be performed. And because the contract terms primarily affect those who are party to the contract, their idiosyncrasies won’t impose information-cost burdens on others.

On the other hand, the transfer and form of property rights affects many people besides the owner of the property. As a result, property rights tend to be more standardized, because the existence of idiosyncratic property rights raises the costs of understanding their scope for third parties who must respect others’ rights.Footnote 9

3.3.3 The Uniform Commercial Code

Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code relates to sales of goods. In general, IP licenses are not sales of goods, but the extension of rights in intangibles. Thus, as a formal matter, Article 2 does not apply to IP licenses. As Professor Ray Nimmer has observed, “In most licensing agreements and court decisions on licensing law issues, Article 2 is irrelevant and never even considered.”Footnote 10

Nevertheless, the familiarity that many attorneys have with Article 2 leads almost irresistibly to comparisons and analogies between contractual terms relating to sale of goods and transactions in IP. For example, UCC definitions of “good faith,” “bona fide purchaser” and different forms of warranty routinely inform discussions of licensing agreements, both among attorneys and in judicial decisions.Footnote 11 Similar comparisons were made between sale and lease transactions, which led to the adoption in 1987 of Article 2A of the UCC pertaining to leases of personal property.

A similar effort – proposed UCC Article 2B – was initiated in 1995 with respect to license agreements. Yet, due to disagreements between consumer and software industry groups and within IP academic circles, Article 2B was never adopted.Footnote 12 Instead, it was released in 1999 as a free-standing uniform law called the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA), which was adopted in only two states, Maryland and Virginia.Footnote 13

3.3.4 Federal Common Law

First-year law students are taught that the concept of federal common law was abolished when the Supreme Court held in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) that there is no “federal general common law.” Yet pockets of federal common law survive to this day in a range of areas including admiralty, antitrust and bankruptcy law, as well as some areas of IP licensing. One area in which federal common law directly affects IP licensing agreements is the assignment of licensing agreements, which is discussed in Section 13.3.2.

Professor Shyamkrishna Balganesh points to the work of Professor Richard Epstein in describing the federal common law tradition in intellectual property:

Intellectual property law, or the law relating to the delineation and enforcement of rights and privileges in informational resources, remains a prominent example here. Patent, copyright and trademark law in the U.S. are today seen as statutory areas that Congress alone is authorized to modify. Together with the complex rules of federal preemption, they purport to dominate the landscape of American intellectual property law.

Yet, hidden away in the interstices of these statutory areas is a rather robust body of law that applies common law ideas, methods and principles to various informational resources without running afoul of preemption concerns. “Common law intellectual property,” as it is often referred to, represents a set of legal causes of action that create various rights, duties, and enforceable liabilities for otherwise non-rival and non-excludable assets. Its hallmark lies in its common law origins, having been developed and adapted by judges in individual cases through the deployment of the common law’s core concepts and principles.Footnote 14

The following case illustrates how courts wrestle with these seemingly esoteric issues in a real-world dispute.

Bassett v. Mashantucket Pequot Tribe

204 F.3d 343 (2d Cir. 2000)

LEVAL, CIRCUIT JUDGE

Background

According to the allegations of the complaint: Plaintiff Debra Bassett operates a business, Bassett Productions, that produces films and television programs. Defendant Mashantucket Pequot Tribe is a federally recognized Indian tribe with a reservation located within the geographical boundaries of the State of Connecticut. Defendant Mashantucket Pequot Museum is a Connecticut corporation located on the Pequot Reservation.

In October 1994, Bassett met with representatives of the Tribe to discuss the possibility of producing a film for the Museum about the Pequot War of 1636–38. In November, Defendant Theresa Bell, acting individually and as a representative of the Tribe, signed a “confidential disclosure agreement” in which she agreed that all information received from Bassett Productions was proprietary, and was to be returned to Bassett Productions at its request. In May 1995, Defendant Jack Campisi, communicating with Bassett on behalf of the Tribe, advised her that the Tribe intended to hire her to produce the film, contingent on the negotiation of a satisfactory contract and the Tribe’s acceptance of a script for the film.

In August 1995, Bassett Productions entered into a letter agreement with the Tribe (the “Letter Agreement”) for the development and production of a film about the 1636–38 Pequot War. The Letter Agreement identified Bassett Productions as the “Producer” and the Tribe as the “Owner,” but did not define these terms. It stipulated that Bassett Productions would “hire and supervise the development and writing of a screenplay by Keith Merrill and George Burdeau,” and that the Tribe would “compensate” Bassett Productions for development costs according to an agreed schedule. It also stipulated that “at such time” that the Tribe approved the final draft of the screenplay, Bassett Productions would have exclusive rights to produce the film for exhibition at the Pequot Museum.

Some time before October 30, 1995, Bassett had delivered to the Tribe a script that she herself had written based on a “script scenario” she had developed with assistance from her associate Allan Eckert. The script was prominently marked on its first page, “Copr. 1995 Bassett Entertainment Corporation.”

On October 30, 1995, Bassett received a notice from the Tribe terminating the Letter Agreement. The notice asserted that Bassett had not “perform[ed] the contract as the parties anticipated.” Following the termination of the Letter Agreement, the Tribe continued to pursue the development and production of a film on the 1636–38 Pequot War for exhibition at the Museum. In October 1996, filming was completed on a motion picture entitled, “The Witness.” Bassett asserts the Tribe intends to screen the film at the Museum “in the near future” as part of “an interstate-driven tourist attraction.”

In September 1996, Bassett commenced this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut. The complaint sought an injunction as well as other copyright remedies on the ground that the Tribe and the Museum used Bassett’s copyrighted script without her consent or license in order to produce their own film; it further alleged that they breached the Letter Agreement, and that they committed various state-law torts resulting in injury to Bassett … The district court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint, and Bassett appealed.

Discussion

28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) states that federal district courts “shall” have exclusive, original jurisdiction “of any civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to … copyrights.” It is well-established that not every complaint that refers to the Copyright Act “arises under” that law for purposes of Section 1338(a). See, e.g., T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823, 824 (2d Cir.1964) (Friendly, J.) (noting that this principle traces to “precedents going back for more than a century”). In particular, “the federal grant of a … copyright has not been thought to infuse with any national interest a dispute as to ownership or contractual enforcement turning on the facts or on ordinary principles of contract law.” Here, the district court, relying on our discussion in dictum in Schoenberg v. Shapolsky Publishers, Inc., 971 F.2d 926, 932–33 (2d Cir.1992), dismissed the claims based on the conclusion that Bassett’s “copyright infringement claims … do not ‘arise under’ federal copyright laws for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a), but are merely incidental to [her] state law [contract] claims.” Bassett contends that the court erred in dismissing her claims on the basis of Schoenberg. She argues that her copyright claims neither depend on nor result from claims for breach of contract. She further maintains that, because she sought a remedy expressly granted by the Copyright Act, her copyright claims do “arise under” the Act pursuant to the rule of T.B. Harms.

Figure 3.1 The Mashantucket Pequot Museum & Research Center in Ledyard, Connecticut, commissioned a film about the Pequot War of 1636–38.

Whether a complaint asserting factually related copyright and contract claims “arises under” the federal copyright laws for the purposes of Section 1338(a) “poses among the knottiest procedural problems in copyright jurisprudence.” 3 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer On Copyright § 12.01[A], at 12–4 (1999). Such claims characteristically arise where the defendant held a license to exploit the plaintiff’s copyright, but is alleged to have forfeited the license by breaching the terms of the licensing contract and thus to infringe in any further exploitation.

Prior to our landmark decision in T.B. Harms, several district courts in the Second Circuit resolved the issue of jurisdiction under Section 1338 for “hybrid” claims raising both copyright and contract issues by attempting to discern whether the copyright issues constituted the “essence” of the dispute, or whether instead the copyright issues were “incidental to” the contract dispute. That approach, however, left a class of plaintiffs who suffered copyright infringement bereft of copyright remedies. Plaintiffs whose federal lawsuits were dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the ground that their copyright claims were “incidental to” their contract claims had no way either to obtain an adjudication of infringement or to obtain relief provided by the Copyright Act, because the Act confers exclusive jurisdiction over copyright claims on federal courts.

In T.B. Harms, Judge Friendly recognized the complexity of the problem of defining when a case “arises under” the Copyright Act. In synthesizing Supreme Court cases that had considered the issue of federal jurisdiction in a variety of contexts, Judge Friendly established a test for this circuit that focused on whether and how a complaint implicates the Copyright Act.

Judge Friendly began his analysis by examining Supreme Court precedent addressing the question when a federal court properly exercises jurisdiction under Section 1338, which creates jurisdiction in the federal courts in “any civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents … [and] copyrights,” among others. He identified two lines of authority as particularly important. First, in American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916), Justice Holmes explained that a “suit arises under the law that creates the cause of action.” According to Judge Friendly, Justice Holmes’ interpretation of Section 1338 explained the exercise of federal jurisdiction “in a great many cases, notably copyright and patent infringement actions, both clearly authorized by the respective federal acts, and thus unquestionably within the scope of 28 U.S.C. § 1338.” Judge Friendly observed that “in the many infringement suits that depend only on some point of fact and require no construction of federal law, no other explanation may exist.” Second, Judge Friendly discussed Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180 (1921), in which the Supreme Court held that a claim created by state law might still “arise under” federal law “if the complaint discloses a need for determining the meaning or application of such a law.”

Synthesizing the Supreme Court authorities, Judge Friendly concluded that a suit “arises under” the Copyright Act if:

  1. (1) the complaint is for a remedy expressly granted by the Act, e.g., a suit for infringement or for the statutory royalties for record reproduction; or,

  2. (2) the complaint … asserts a claim requiring construction of the Act

Figure 3.2 Chief Judge Henry T. Friendly, the author of the opinion in T.B. Harms, served on the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit from 1959–1986.

As the suit in T.B. Harms did not fall within any of these enumerated categories, the court found that it did not “arise under” the copyright laws for purposes of Section 1338 and that jurisdiction was therefore lacking.

The T.B. Harms test differed significantly from the essence-of-the-dispute or merely-incidental test. The analysis under T.B. Harms turns on what is alleged on the face of the complaint, while the essence-of-the-dispute or merely-incidental test looks rather at what defense will be proffered. For example, if the complaint alleges copyright infringement or seeks an injunction under the Copyright Act, under T.B. Harms the federal court has jurisdiction; under the other test, in contrast, the court must ascertain whether the defendant will defend only by reference to state law matters, such as a claim of contractual entitlement, or will raise defenses based on the Copyright Act.

The T.B. Harms test avoids problems that result from the essence-of-the-dispute test. By rejecting reliance on whether the copyright claim could be characterized as “incidental” and instead focusing the inquiry under Section 1338 on whether a plaintiff’s complaint “[was] for a remedy expressly granted by the Act,” T.B. Harms ensured that plaintiffs who sought copyright remedies that depended on a prior showing of contractual entitlement would not be left without the remedies promised by the Copyright Act. T.B. Harms also obviated the need for courts to determine at the outset of litigation whether copyright claims were incidental to contract claims – a difficult determination to make even after discovery and trial, and one that cannot be made reliably on the basis of the complaint alone.

Judge Friendly’s solution to the problem posed by Section 1338 has been widely admired by the leading copyright scholars. The T.B. Harms test has been adopted by all the circuits that have considered the question whether a suit arises under the Copyright Act for purposes of Section 1338, if the disputed issues include non-copyright matters.

Nearly thirty years after the T.B. Harms decision, a panel of this court in Schoenberg undertook in dictum to state the test for determining the existence of Section 1338 jurisdiction in cases alleging violations of the Copyright Act resulting from breach of contract. The plaintiff, an author, alleged that he had licensed the defendant, a publisher, to publish plaintiff’s work. The license obligated the defendant to publish within six months of plaintiff’s delivery of the manuscript, to promote and market the work, and to license foreign language editions. According to plaintiff’s allegations, the publisher breached numerous obligations of the license. As a result of these failures, plaintiff claimed that the license was terminated and that defendant’s further publication of the work constituted an infringement. Although the appeal related to a different issue, the opinion undertook to state “the appropriate test under the T.B. Harms paradigm, for determining whether a suit ‘arises under’ the Copyright Act when it alleges infringement stemming from a breach of contract.”

The opinion acknowledged that [i]n T.B. Harms, Judge Friendly wrote that, “an action ‘arises under’ the Copyright Act if and only if the complaint is for a remedy expressly granted by the Act,” and that “[b]ecause Schoenberg is seeking damages for the alleged infringement as well as an injunction against future infringements, his complaint on its face asserts a claim ‘arising under’ the Copyright Act.” It observed, however, that notwithstanding the T.B. Harms formulation, some district courts had “looked beyond the complaint in order to determine whether the plaintiff was really concerned with the infringement of his copyright, or, alternatively, was, in fact, more interested in” free enjoyment of his property or other non-copyright issues. Other courts, it noted, had adopted the even “broader proposition that no claim arises under the Copyright Act whenever an infringement would necessarily result from the breach of a contract that licensed or assigned a copyright.”

In undertaking to reconcile the varying approaches of those district court opinions (and perhaps concluding that the authority of T.B. Harms extended only to disputes over copyright ownership and not to hybrid copyright/contract claims), Schoenberg created a new, complex three-step test; the first step of the test was precisely that which T.B. Harms had rejected – whether the claim for copyright remedies is “merely incidental” to a determination of contract rights. The opinion declared that in hybrid copyright and contract cases Section 1338 jurisdiction should be analyzed in the following manner:

A district court must first ascertain whether the plaintiff’s infringement claim is only “incidental” to the plaintiff’s claim seeking a determination of ownership or contractual rights under the copyright … If it is determined that the claim is not merely incidental, then a district court must next determine whether the complaint alleges a breach of a condition to, or a covenant of, the contract licensing or assigning the copyright … [I]f a breach of a condition is alleged, then the district court has subject matter jurisdiction … But if the complaint merely alleges a breach of a contractual covenant in the agreement that licenses or assigns the copyright, then the court must undertake a third step and analyze whether the breach is so material as to create a right of rescission in the grantor. If the breach would create a right of rescission, then the asserted claim arises under the Copyright Act.

We believe for a number of reasons that the Schoenberg test is unworkable. At the outset, it overlooks that, because the Copyright Act gives federal courts exclusive jurisdiction to enforce its provisions, a plaintiff who is denied access to a federal forum on the theory that his copyright claims are incidental to a contract dispute is thereby absolutely denied the benefit of copyright remedies. Such a denial of copyright remedies undermines the Act’s capacity to protect copyright interests. A plaintiff with meritorious copyright claims and entitlement to the special remedies provided by the Act is deprived of these remedies merely because the first hurdle of proving entitlement is a showing of a contractual right.

A second problem with the Schoenberg test is that it is vague. Schoenberg characterizes the first part of its test in two ways: whether “the ‘essence’ of the plaintiff’s claim” is in contract or copyright, or whether the “infringement claim is only ‘incidental’ to the plaintiff’s claim seeking determination of ownership or contractual rights under the copyright.” The meaning of either of these phrases is difficult to discern. At one juncture, Schoenberg suggests that the focus of inquiry should be on the plaintiff’s motivations (“whether the plaintiff was really concerned with the infringement of his copyright or, alternatively, was, in fact, more interested in whether he would be allowed to enjoy his property free from the contract claims of the defendant”). District courts applying the “only incidental” test, in turn, have construed it in various other ways.

Furthermore … the Schoenberg test requires the court to make complex factual determinations relating to the merits at the outset of the litigation – before the court has any familiarity with the case. Ascertaining what are a plaintiff’s principal motives in bringing suit, and what issues will loom largest in the case, may well require extensive hearings and fact finding. The need for such fact finding recurs at each stage of Schoenberg’s three-step formula. Thus, if a court finds that a copyright claim is not “merely incidental to” a contract claim (step one), it must still determine whether the contractual term alleged to have been breached was in the nature of a covenant or a condition (step two). And if it finds that the alleged breach was of a covenant, the court must next determine “whether the breach is so material as to create a right of rescission,” failing which the case must be dismissed (step three). This third inquiry in particular, which entails an assessment of the importance of the particular covenant, as well as the seriousness of the breach, raises questions that are not appropriately, easily or reliably answered at the start of litigation.

“When a complaint alleges a claim or seeks a remedy provided by the Copyright Act, federal jurisdiction is properly invoked.”

For the reasons discussed above, we conclude that, for claims of infringement arising from, or in the context of, an alleged contractual breach, this circuit’s standard for determining jurisdiction under Section 1338 is furnished by T.B. Harms, and not by Schoenberg. When a complaint alleges a claim or seeks a remedy provided by the Copyright Act, federal jurisdiction is properly invoked.

Applying the T.B. Harms standard to this case leads us to conclude that Bassett’s copyright claims “arise under” the Copyright Act for purposes of Section 1338. Unlike the complaint in T.B. Harms, the complaint in this case alleges that the defendants, without authority, used plaintiff’s copyrighted script to produce a new film intended and advertised for imminent exhibition. The amended complaint alleged copyright infringement and sought “a remedy expressly granted by the Act,” specifically, an injunction against further infringement of Bassett’s copyrighted script. Because the complaint alleges the defendants violated the Copyright Act and seeks the injunctive remedy provided by the Act, under the rule of T.B. Harms, the action falls within the jurisdictional grant of Section 1338. The district court’s contrary holding was in error.

Notes and Questions

1. Contract versus property. The question of whether state contract or property law governs IP licensing agreements reflects the debate discussed in Section 3.2 over the nature of IP licenses themselves. How would conceptualizing a license as a “covenant not to sue” impact governing law?

2. The legacy of UCITA. After the early 2000s, little was said about UCITA or the effort to develop a consistent national body of law for IP licenses and licensing agreements. Should legislative efforts in this area be restarted? How has the law of licensing developed without such a uniform code?

3. Arising under. How do the tests under T.B. Harms and Schoenberg fundamentally differ? How often do you think these different tests would result in different outcomes? Could the court in Bassett have reached the same result using the Schoenberg test? The effect of applying the T.B. Harms test may be to authorize federal jurisdiction in many more cases and thus remove those cases from state courts. What is the impact of such a shift?

4. Contractual override? Section 11.3 discusses contractual provisions by which parties specify the law that they wish to govern their licensing agreements. If an agreement contains such a clause, are the issues discussed in this section relevant? How do you think these legal principles interact with contractual preferences of parties? How often do you think parties select “Federal common law” to govern their licensing agreements?

3.4 Obligation as Condition Versus Covenant

When a license is granted, the licensee obtains the right to perform particular acts under specified rights held by the licensor in designated fields of use. These define the “scope” of the license (which is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 6). If the licensee performs some activity outside the scope of the license, but which still infringes the licensor’s intellectual property rights, then the licensee is an infringer. The license does not grant the licensee any rights outside the scope of the license, and the licensor is within its rights to sue the licensee for infringement of those out-of-scope IP rights.

Likewise, if the grant or continuation of a license is conditioned on the licensee’s taking certain actions, then the licensee’s failure to comply with those obligations can render the license void. For example, language such as the following could be considered a condition: “Licensor grants Licensee a non-exclusive license so long as Licensee complies with the following conditions.” Because the license is conditioned on licensee’s compliance with the stated conditions, the licensee’s failure to comply with those conditions will void the license and the licensor can proceed against it in an infringement action.

If, on the other hand, the licensee violates an ordinary covenant or obligation in a license agreement (e.g., the obligation to pay royalties), then the licensor can sue the licensee for breach of contract and seek contractual damages and other remedies. It can also seek to terminate the license agreement if the provisions of the agreement permit termination for the alleged breach (see Section 12.2, discussing breach and termination of licenses). But so long as the license remains in effect, the licensee is operating under a license and is not infringing the licensor’s IP rights. Thus, a breach of a license covenant, unlike operating outside the scope of the license grant, only gives rise to contractual remedies, but not infringement claims, so long as the license remains in effect.

One of the most important remedies available for claims of IP infringement is the injunction – a court order prohibiting conduct that constitutes infringement. Injunctive relief is relatively rare in contractual actions, in which monetary damages are the normal remedy. Thus, it is often advantageous to the licensor to argue that a particular contractual provision that the licensee has violated is a condition of the license rather than a mere contractual covenant. The following case illustrates this point.Footnote 15

MDY Industries, LLC v. Blizzard

629 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 2011)

CALLAHAN, CIRCUIT JUDGE

Blizzard Entertainment, Inc. (“Blizzard”) is the creator of World of Warcraft (“WoW”), a popular multiplayer online role-playing game in which players interact in a virtual world while advancing through the game’s 70 levels. MDY Industries, LLC and its sole member Michael Donnelly (“Donnelly”) (sometimes referred to collectively as “MDY”) developed and sold Glider, a software program that automatically plays the early levels of WoW for players.

MDY brought this action for a declaratory judgment to establish that its Glider sales do not infringe Blizzard’s copyright or other rights …

In November 2004, Blizzard created WoW, a “massively multiplayer online role-playing game” in which players interact in a virtual world. WoW has ten million subscribers, of which two and a half million are in North America.

WoW players roleplay different characters, such as humans, elves, and dwarves. A player’s central objective is to advance the character through the game’s 70 levels by participating in quests and engaging in battles with monsters. As a player advances, the character collects rewards such as in-game currency, weapons, and armor. WoW’s virtual world has its own economy, in which characters use their virtual currency to buy and sell items directly from each other, through vendors, or using auction houses.

Each WoW player must read and accept Blizzard’s End User License Agreement (“EULA”) and Terms of Use (“ToU”) on multiple occasions. Players who do not accept both the EULA and the ToU may return the game client for a refund.

Donnelly is a WoW player and software programmer. In March 2005, he developed Glider, a software “bot” (short for robot) that automates play of WoW’s early levels, for his personal use. A user need not be at the computer while Glider is running. Glider … moves the mouse around and pushes keys on the keyboard. You tell it about your character, where you want to kill things, and when you want to kill. Then it kills for you, automatically. You can do something else, like eat dinner or go to a movie, and when you return, you’ll have a lot more experience and loot.

Glider does not alter or copy WoW’s game client software, does not allow a player to avoid paying monthly subscription dues to Blizzard, and has no commercial use independent of WoW.

The parties dispute Glider’s impact on the WoW experience. Blizzard contends that Glider disrupts WoW’s environment for non-Glider players by enabling Glider users to advance quickly and unfairly through the game and to amass additional game assets. MDY contends that Glider has a minimal effect on non-Glider players, enhances the WoW experience for Glider users, and facilitates disabled players’ access to WoW by auto-playing the game for them.

In summer 2005, Donnelly began selling Glider through MDY’s website for fifteen to twenty-five dollars per license. As of September 2008, MDY had gross revenues of $3.5 million based on 120,000 Glider license sales.

Blizzard claims that from December 2004 to March 2008, it received 465,000 complaints about WoW bots, several thousand of which named Glider. Blizzard spends $940,000 annually to respond to these complaints.

As to the scope of the license [to use WoW], ToU § 4(B), “Limitations on Your Use of the Service,” provides:

You agree that you will not … (ii) create or use cheats, bots, “mods,” and/or hacks, or any other third-party software designed to modify the World of Warcraft experience; or (iii) use any third-party software that intercepts, “mines,” or otherwise collects information from or through the Program or Service.

A copyright owner who grants a nonexclusive, limited license ordinarily waives the right to sue licensees for copyright infringement, and it may sue only for breach of contract. However, if the licensee acts outside the scope of the license, the licensor may sue for copyright infringement. Enforcing a copyright license raises issues that lie at the intersection of copyright and contract law.

We refer to contractual terms that limit a license’s scope as “conditions,” the breach of which constitute copyright infringement. We refer to all other license terms as “covenants,” the breach of which is actionable only under contract law. We distinguish between conditions and covenants according to state contract law, to the extent consistent with federal copyright law and policy.

A Glider user commits copyright infringement by playing WoW while violating a ToU term that is a license condition. To establish copyright infringement, then, Blizzard must demonstrate that the violated term—ToU § 4(B)—is a condition rather than a covenant. Blizzard’s EULAs and ToUs provide that they are to be interpreted according to Delaware law. Accordingly, we first construe them under Delaware law, and then evaluate whether that construction is consistent with federal copyright law and policy.

A covenant is a contractual promise, i.e., a manifestation of intention to act or refrain from acting in a particular way, such that the promisee is justified in understanding that the promisor has made a commitment. A condition precedent is an act or event that must occur before a duty to perform a promise arises. Conditions precedent are disfavored because they tend to work forfeitures. Wherever possible, equity construes ambiguous contract provisions as covenants rather than conditions. However, if the contract is unambiguous, the court construes it according to its terms.

Applying these principles, ToU § 4(B)(ii) and (iii)’s prohibitions against bots and unauthorized third-party software are covenants rather than copyright-enforceable conditions. Although ToU § 4 is titled, “Limitations on Your Use of the Service,” nothing in that section conditions Blizzard’s grant of a limited license on players’ compliance with ToU § 4’s restrictions.

To recover for copyright infringement based on breach of a license agreement, (1) the copying must exceed the scope of the defendant’s license and (2) the copyright owner’s complaint must be grounded in an exclusive right of copyright (e.g., unlawful reproduction or distribution). Contractual rights, however, can be much broader.

“To recover for copyright infringement based on breach of a license agreement … the copyright owner’s complaint must be grounded in an exclusive right of copyright”

[C]onsider a license in which the copyright owner grants a person the right to make one and only one copy of a book with the caveat that the licensee may not read the last ten pages. Obviously, a licensee who made a hundred copies of the book would be liable for copyright infringement because the copying would violate the Copyright Act’s prohibition on reproduction and would exceed the scope of the license. Alternatively, if the licensee made a single copy of the book, but read the last ten pages, the only cause of action would be for breach of contract, because reading a book does not violate any right protected by copyright law.

Here, ToU § 4 contains certain restrictions that are grounded in Blizzard’s exclusive rights of copyright and other restrictions that are not. For instance, ToU § 4(D) forbids creation of derivative works based on WoW without Blizzard’s consent. A player who violates this prohibition would exceed the scope of her license and violate one of Blizzard’s exclusive rights under the Copyright Act. In contrast, ToU § 4(C)(ii) prohibits a player’s disruption of another player’s game experience. A player might violate this prohibition while playing the game by harassing another player with unsolicited instant messages. Although this conduct may violate the contractual covenants with Blizzard, it would not violate any of Blizzard’s exclusive rights of copyright. The antibot provisions at issue in this case, ToU § 4(B)(ii) and (iii), are similarly covenants rather than conditions. A Glider user violates the covenants with Blizzard, but does not thereby commit copyright infringement because Glider does not infringe any of Blizzard’s exclusive rights. For instance, the use does not alter or copy WoW software.

Were we to hold otherwise, Blizzard—or any software copyright holder—could designate any disfavored conduct during software use as copyright infringement, by purporting to condition the license on the player’s abstention from the disfavored conduct. The rationale would be that because the conduct occurs while the player’s computer is copying the software code into RAM in order for it to run, the violation is copyright infringement. This would allow software copyright owners far greater rights than Congress has generally conferred on copyright owners.

We conclude that for a licensee’s violation of a contract to constitute copyright infringement, there must be a nexus between the condition and the licensor’s exclusive rights of copyright. Here, WoW players do not commit copyright infringement by using Glider in violation of the ToU. MDY is thus not liable for secondary copyright infringement, which requires the existence of direct copyright infringement.

Notes and questions

1. Grounded in exclusive rights of copyright. The Ninth Circuit in MDY holds that a license condition is created when a contractual restriction is grounded in the licensor’s exclusive rights of copyright. Other types of restrictions are simply contractual covenants. What kinds of contractual restrictions are “grounded in the exclusive rights of copyright”?

2. Beyond copyright. Should the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in MDY apply when distinguishing between license conditions and contractual covenants in licensing agreements that related to IP other than copyright? What about licenses of information not covered by any statutory form of IP, such as data and know-how? What might be an “exclusive right of patents” giving rise to a condition?

3. Drafting conditions rather than covenants. In Sun Microsystems, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 188 F.3d 1115 (9th Cir. 1999) (decided prior to MDY), the Ninth Circuit found that a provision to ensure compatibility between the licensor’s (Sun’s) and licensee’s (Microsoft’s) software was a covenant rather than a condition of the license grant. As a result, Microsoft’s failure to ensure compatibility was a breach of contract rather than infringement of Sun’s intellectual property rights. The relevant sections of the licensing agreement between Sun and Microsoft are set forth below:

  1. § 2.1(a) Sun grants to Licensee a perpetual non-exclusive development license under the Intellectual Property Rights of Sun to make, access, use, copy, distribute, view, display, modify, adapt, and create Derivative Works of the Technology and resulting Products.

  2. § 2.6(a)(vi) Licensee agrees that any new version of a Product that Licensee makes commercially available to the public after the most recent Compatibility Date shall only include the corresponding Compatible Implementation.

Do you think it would have been possible for Sun to draft §2.6(a)(vi) as a condition of the license grant? Could the two provisions have been combined so as to ensure that continued compatibility was a clear condition of the license grant? Why might Microsoft object to this provision as a condition, but consent to it as a covenant?

4. Breach over infringement? If a licensee uses licensed IP beyond the scope of the license, can the licensor bring a breach of contract claim in addition to, or in lieu of, an IP infringement claim? The answer may depend on the language of the license grant clause. If the grant simply allows the licensee to use the licensed IP for Purpose A, and the licensee in addition uses the IP for Purpose B, it is not clear that the licensee has breached the contractual provisions authorizing it to use the IP for Purpose A. On the other hand, if the license grant states that the licensee may use the licensed IP for the sole and exclusive purpose of pursuing Purpose A, then its use of the IP in pursuit of Purpose B might violate the terms of the agreement. Consider Eli Lilly & Co. v. Emisphere Techs., Inc., 408 F. Supp. 2d 668, 685 (S.D. Ind. 2006), in which the court reasoned as follows:

Emisphere granted Lilly an exclusive license to use Emisphere information for the “Field,” which was defined as oral delivery of PTH. Section 2.1 concludes: “Lilly shall not have any rights to use the Emisphere Technology … other than insofar as they relate directly to the Field and are expressly granted herein.” By its plain terms, this provision bars Lilly from using Emisphere Technology … outside the agreed field of PTH research.

Do you agree with the court? Does the language “Lilly shall not have any right to use the [Technology] other than insofar as they relate directly to the Field” create a contractual prohibition that Lilly breached by using the Technology outside the Field? Or does “shall not have any right” define the scope of the license, meaning that Lilly’s operation outside of the Field constitutes an infringement of Emisphere’s IP? And if, as the court holds, Lilly breached the licensing agreement, could Emisphere both terminate the contract and sue for contractual damages, as well as bring suit for IP infringement?

3.5 Effect of IP Transfer on Licenses

If an IP license is akin to a property interest, like a lease or a servitude upon land, then what happens to that license when the original licensor assigns the licensed IP to someone else? Does the license “run with the IP,” as a real property servitude often (but not always) “runs with the land”? Or is the licensee out of luck (i.e., an infringer) when its licensor divests itself of the IP rights underlying the license?

The Copyright Act expressly addresses this issue in 17 U.S.C. § 205(e), which provides that:

A nonexclusive license, whether recorded or not, prevails over a conflicting transfer of copyright ownership if the license is evidenced by a written instrument signed by the owner of the rights licensed or such owner’s duly authorized agent, and if

  1. (1) the license was taken before execution of the transfer; or

  2. (2) the license was taken in good faith before recordation of the transfer and without notice of it.

Thus, a nonexclusive copyright license will survive a transfer of the underlying copyright if the license was granted before the transfer. It will also survive if the license was granted after the licensor transferred the copyright but before the transfer was recorded with the Copyright Office, so long as the licensee acted in good faith and did not have notice of the transfer.Footnote 16 Interestingly, § 205(e) does not apply to exclusive copyright licenses, presumably on the theory that exclusive licenses should be recorded if the licensee wishes to guard against the loss of its rights as a result of future transfers.Footnote 17

Unlike the Copyright Act, the Patent Act does not explicitly address the issue of a transfer of underlying rights. Nevertheless, it has been long-established in the case law that “the purchaser of a patent takes subject to outstanding licenses”Footnote 18 and “a [patent] license is good against the world, whether it is recorded or not. A purchaser of a patent takes it subject to all outstanding licenses.”Footnote 19

But what about the multitude of other contractual obligations contained in a licensing agreement? Licensor obligations relating to service, maintenance, technical assistance, indemnification and confidentiality are not likely to constitute part of the core licensed property interest that travels with the patent, so what happens to them when the licensor transfers the underlying IP to a new owner without assigning the entire agreement? In Datatreasury Corp. v. Wells Fargo & Co., 522 F.3d 1368, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2008), the Federal Circuit considered whether a contractual requirement to arbitrate disputes followed patents to their new owner. The court held that it did not, reasoning that

the legal encumbrances deemed to “run with the patent” in these cases involved the right to use the patented product, not a duty to arbitrate. The cases do not support a conclusion that procedural terms of a licensing agreement unrelated to the actual use of the patent (e.g. an arbitration clause) are binding on a subsequent owner of the patent.

So what becomes of these non-transferred contractual obligations? One theory is that the original licensor and patent owner remains obligated to perform these contractual obligations so long as they have not been assigned to (and assumed by) someone else. Thus, if the original licensor does not assign a licensing agreement to the acquirer of the underlying IP, the original licensor is still required to perform these obligations. But this requirement may offer only cold comfort to the licensee, as the original licensor may have few remaining resources with which to perform those obligations, and without the underlying IP may be unable to perform some of those obligations. Section 13.3.5 discusses contractual provisions that help to ensure that these contractual licensor obligations are transferred to the new owner of the underlying IP.Footnote 20

Notes and Questions

1. Other forms of IP. The principles discussed in this section are seldom raised in the context of trademark or trade secret licenses. Why? If a suitable case arose, do you think that a trademark or trade secret license should “run with the right”? What would be the practical effect of such a rule?

2. Running of the FRAND commitment. Chapter 20.6 discusses the effect of a transfer of a patent on the original owner’s obligation to license that patent to others on “fair, reasonable and nondiscriminatory” (FRAND) terms. As mentioned in Note 3 of that section, courts have generally not been amenable to treating such FRAND commitments as property-like encumbrances on patents. How does this reluctance square with the reasoning of courts in this section? Do FRAND commitments more resemble licenses, which do run with the rights, or arbitration commitments, which do not?

3. What contractual provisions might parties wish to add to their agreements to ensure that obligations follow a transfer of IP? (Hint: It’s impossible to bind an unknown future buyer of an IP right, but not the future seller of that right.)

4 Implied Licenses and Unwritten Transactions

Summary Contents

  1. 4.1 Statutes of Frauds 67

  2. 4.2 Pitches and Idea Submissions 68

  3. 4.3 Implied Licenses and Commissioned Works 81

  4. 4.4 Implied Licenses in Law 89

We generally think of license agreements as written documents signed (or clicked) by the parties. However, there are numerous situations in which a license or other rights may be implied through the conduct of the parties, a course of dealing or industry custom. Yet the law of implied licenses, and implied contracts more generally, is somewhat incoherent. As one leading treatise observes:

[In] many modern implied license cases, courts attempt to describe the doctrine in terms of categories or types of implied licenses. In our view, most of these efforts are incomplete or worse; they create overlapping categories to the point that the categories confuse, rather than aid in analysis … The fact that the doctrine involves overlapping, difficult to describe concepts, however, does not mean that implied license cases are random; it means, rather, that so many different concepts are brought into this concept that understanding it as a single theme is difficult.Footnote 1

Implied license theories crop up in other chapters of this book, including those relating to scope of the license (Section 6.1), first sale and exhaustion (Chapter 23), and the licensing of technical standards (Chapter 20). The common theme among the cases dealing with implied licenses, if any exists, is that implied licenses may be recognized by a court in order to achieve some just end when express contractual terms are not up to the job. In this chapter we will consider a few special scenarios in which implied licenses and other rights may arise, bearing in mind that the potential to argue for the existence of an implied license is limited only by the ingenuity of the lawyers involved.

4.1 Statutes of Frauds

Implied licenses are, by their very nature, unwritten. Statutes of frauds are legal requirements that, to be enforceable, particular types of transactions must be in writing, typically accompanied by authorized signatures and, sometimes, other formalities. On one hand, a rule requiring written documentation serves important functions of preventing fraud, giving effective notice, signaling the legal significance of a promise, and providing a record of the terms of the agreement. On the other hand, a writing requirement enables bad actors to avoid unwritten promises, increases transaction costs and introduces the likelihood that otherwise legitimate agreements will be invalidated on purely technical (and increasingly archaic) grounds.

As discussed in Chapter 2, federal copyright, patent and trademark law all contain rules that relate to the transfer and assignment of these rights. But is a license an “assignment” for the purposes of the statute of frauds? There is little statutory guidance regarding this question, but the answer is likely no. The Copyright Act, however, expressly includes “exclusive licenses” among the types of transactions requiring a written instrument. Does this mean that nonexclusive licenses need not be written? In many cases this is probably the rule (see I.A.E. v. Shaver, infra, Section 4.3).

State law statutes of frauds vary, but none specifically refers to licenses or transfers of intellectual property. This being said, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 110(e) notes that “a contract that is not to be performed within one year from the making thereof” is subject to the statute of frauds. The one-year requirement, to the extent recognized by a court, could seriously impact many licensing transactions. For example, in Commonwealth Film Processing, Inc. v. Courtaulds United States, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 1157 (W.D. Va. 1989), the executives of two companies engaged in patent litigation met at an airport to discuss the settlement of their claims through a licensing arrangement. At that meeting, “certain basic understandings were reached on issues relevant to a possible license agreement” between the parties.

In holding that the oral settlement and license agreement were unenforceable under the one-year rule, the court reasoned that

It is clear from the allegations in Commonwealth’s complaint that the license agreement they contend was reached cannot be fully performed within one year. In paragraph 11a of the complaint, Commonwealth alleges that the license agreement would be “continuous.” Paragraph 11b states that the alleged agreement contained a provision for royalty payments which were to continue for five years. Consequently, the license agreement which is alleged by Commonwealth falls squarely within the statute of frauds and is unenforceable unless saved by a recognized exception to the statute.

At least one state supreme court has criticized the one-year rule. In C.R. Klewin, Inc. v. Flagship Properties, Inc., 600 A.2d 772 (Conn. 1991), the court reasons that the rule no longer supports the policies that gave rise to the statute of frauds and observes that the “only remaining effect” of the one-year rule “is arbitrarily to forestall adjudication of possible meritorious claims.” The Klewin court thus adopts what is now the majority rule: an unwritten contract is not void under the one-year rule unless it cannot be performed within the one-year period under any circumstances. The fact that a contract is not likely to be performed within one year is not enough to void such an unwritten contract.

4.2 Pitches and Idea Submissions

In many industries, the owner of an IP right may approach a potential licensee to “pitch” a new idea, whether a business plan, a screenplay, a concept for a new reality TV show or, as in the Nadel case below, the idea for a new toy. In most cases, no documents have changed hands, let alone been executed. Yet in some cases, the submitter of an idea may be able to claim that use of that idea by a recipient gives rise to an implicit obligation to be compensated. The implied license doctrine in the context of idea submissions is discussed in the cases that follow.

Nadel v. Play-By-Play Toys & Novelties, Inc.

208 F.3d 368 (2d Cir. 1999)

SOTOMAYOR, CIRCUIT JUDGE

Craig P. Nadel (Nadel) brought this action against Play-By-Play Toys & Novelties, Inc. (Play-By-Play) for breach of contract, quasi contract, and unfair competition …

Background

Nadel is a toy idea man. Toy companies regularly do business with independent inventors such as Nadel in order to develop and market new toy concepts as quickly as possible. To facilitate the exchange of ideas, the standard custom and practice in the toy industry calls for companies to treat the submission of an idea as confidential. If the company subsequently uses the disclosed idea, industry custom provides that the company shall compensate the inventor, unless, of course, the disclosed idea was already known to the company.

In 1996, Nadel developed the toy concept at issue in this case. He transplanted the “eccentric mechanism” found in several hanging Halloween toys then on the market [and] placed the mechanism inside of a plush toy monkey skin to develop the prototype for a new table-top monkey toy. This plush toy figure sat upright, emitted sound, and spun when placed on a flat surface.

In October 1996, Nadel met with Neil Wasserman, an executive at Play-By-Play who was responsible for the development of its plush toy line. According to Nadel, he showed his prototype monkey toy to Wasserman, who expressed interest in adapting the concept to a non-moving, plush Tazmanian Devil toy that Play-By-Play was already producing under license from Warner Bros. Nadel contends that, consistent with industry custom, any ideas that he disclosed to Wasserman during their October 1996 meeting were subject to an agreement by Play-By-Play to keep such ideas confidential and to compensate Nadel in the event of their use.

Nadel claims that he sent his prototype monkey toy to Wasserman as a sample and awaited the “Taz skin” and voice tape, which Wasserman allegedly said he would send, so that Nadel could make a sample spinning/laughing Tazmanian Devil toy for Play-By-Play. Wasserman never provided Nadel with the Taz skin and voice tape, however, and denies ever having received the prototype monkey toy from Nadel.

Notwithstanding Wasserman’s denial, his secretary, Melissa Rodriguez, testified that Nadel’s prototype monkey toy remained in Wasserman’s office for several months. According to Ms. Rodriguez, the monkey toy was usually kept in a glass cabinet behind Wasserman’s desk, but she remembered that on one occasion she had seen it on a table in Wasserman’s office. Despite Nadel’s multiple requests, Wasserman did not return Nadel’s prototype monkey toy until February 1997, after Play-by-Play introduced its “Tornado Taz” product at the New York Toy Fair.

The parties do not dispute that “Tornado Taz” has the same general characteristics as Nadel’s prototype monkey [toy]. Nadel claims that, in violation of their alleged agreement, Play-By-Play used his idea without paying him compensation. Play-By-Play contends, however, that it independently developed the Tornado Taz product concept and that Nadel is therefore not entitled to any compensation. Specifically, Play-By-Play maintains that, as early as June or July of 1996, two of its officers – Wasserman and Slattery – met in Hong Kong and began discussing ways to create a spinning or vibrating Tazmanian Devil, including the possible use of an eccentric mechanism. Furthermore, Play-By-Play claims that in late September or early October 1996, it commissioned an outside manufacturing agent – Barter Trading of Hong Kong – to begin developing Tornado Taz.

Play-By-Play also argues that, even if it did use Nadel’s idea to develop Tornado Taz, Nadel is not entitled to compensation because Nadel’s concept was unoriginal and non-novel to the toy industry in October 1996.

Discussion
Nadel’s Claims

On January 21, 1999, the district court granted Play-By-Play’s motion for summary judgment dismissing Nadel’s claims for breach of contract, quasi contract, and unfair competition. Interpreting New York law, the district court stated that “a party is not entitled to recover for theft of an idea unless the idea is novel or original.” Applying that principle to Nadel’s claims, the district court concluded that, even if the spinning toy concept were novel to Play-By-Play at the time Nadel made the disclosure to Wasserman in October 1996, Nadel’s claims must nonetheless fail for lack of novelty or originality because “numerous toys containing the characteristics of [Nadel’s] monkey were in existence prior to October 1996.”

Submission-of-Idea Cases under New York Law

Our analysis begins with the New York Court of Appeals’ most recent discussion of the law governing idea submission cases, Apfel v. Prudential-Bache Securities, Inc., 616 N.E.2d 1095 (1993). In Apfel, the Court of Appeals discussed the type of novelty an idea must have in order to sustain a contract-based or property-based claim for its uncompensated use. Specifically, Apfel clarified an important distinction between the requirement of “novelty to the buyer” for contract claims, on the one hand, and “originality” (or novelty generally) for misappropriation claims, on the other hand.

Under the facts of Apfel, the plaintiff disclosed his idea to the defendant pursuant to a confidentiality agreement and, subsequent to disclosure, entered into another agreement wherein the defendant agreed to pay a stipulated price for the idea’s use. The defendant used the idea but refused to pay plaintiff pursuant to the post-disclosure agreement on the asserted ground that “no contract existed between the parties because the sale agreement lacked consideration.” The defendant argued that an idea could not constitute legally sufficient consideration unless it was original or novel generally and that, because plaintiff’s idea was not original or novel generally (it had been in the public domain at the time of the post-disclosure agreement), the idea provided insufficient consideration to support the parties’ post-disclosure contract.

Figure 4.1 Tornado Taz.

In rejecting defendant’s argument, the Court of Appeals held that there was sufficient consideration to support plaintiff’s contract claim because the idea at issue had value to the defendant at the time the parties concluded their post-disclosure agreement. The Apfel court noted that “traditional principles of contract law” provide that parties “are free to make their bargain, even if the consideration exchanged is grossly unequal or of dubious value,” and that, so long as the “defendant received something of value” under the contract, the contract would not be void for lack of consideration.

The Apfel court explicitly rejected defendant’s contention that the court should carve out “an exception to traditional principles of contract law” for submission-of-idea cases by requiring that an idea must also be original or novel generally in order to constitute valid consideration. In essence, the defendant sought to impose a requirement that an idea be novel in absolute terms, as opposed to only the defendant buyer, in order to constitute valid consideration for the bargain. In rejecting this argument, the Apfel court clarified the standards for both contract-based and property-based claims in submission-of-idea cases. That analysis guides our decision here.

The Apfel court first noted that “novelty as an element of an idea seller’s claim” is a distinct element of proof with respect to both (1) “a claim based on a property theory” and (2) “a claim based on a contract theory.” The court then proceeded to discuss how the leading submission-of-idea case – Downey v. General Foods Corp., 286 N.E.2d 257 (1972) – treated novelty with respect to property-based and contract-based claims. First, the Apfel court explained that the plaintiff’s property-based claims for misappropriation were dismissed in Downey because “the elements of novelty and originality [were] absent,” i.e., the ideas were so common as to be unoriginal and known generally. Second, the Apfel court explained that the plaintiff’s contract claims in Downey had been dismissed on the separate ground that the “defendant possessed plaintiff’s ideas prior to plaintiff’s disclosure [and thus], the ideas could have no value to defendant and could not supply consideration for any agreement between the parties.”

By distinguishing between the two types of claims addressed in Downey and the different bases for rejecting each claim, the New York Court of Appeals clarified that the novelty requirement in submission-of-idea cases is different for misappropriation of property and breach of contract claims …

Thus, the Apfel court refused to read Downey and “similar decisions” as requiring originality or novelty generally in all cases involving disclosure of ideas. Rather, the Apfel court clarified that the longstanding requirement that an idea have originality or general novelty in order to support a misappropriation claim does not apply to contract claims. For contract-based claims in submission-of-idea cases, a showing of novelty to the buyer will supply sufficient consideration to support a contract.

Moreover, Apfel made clear that the “novelty to the buyer” standard is not limited to cases involving an express post-disclosure contract for payment based on an idea’s use. The Apfel court explicitly discussed the pre-disclosure contract scenario present in the instant case, where “the buyer and seller contract for disclosure of the idea with payment based on use, but no separate postdisclosure contract for the use of the idea has been made.” In such a scenario, a seller might, as Nadel did here, bring an action against a buyer who allegedly used his ideas without payment, claiming both misappropriation of property and breach of an express or implied-in-fact contract. The Apfel court recognized that these cases present courts with the difficult problem of determining “whether the idea the buyer was using was, in fact, the seller’s.” Specifically, the court noted that, with respect to a misappropriation of property claim, it is difficult to “prove that the buyer obtained the idea from [the seller] and nowhere else.” With respect to a breach of contract claim, the court noted that it would be inequitable to enforce a contract if “it turns out upon disclosure that the buyer already possessed the idea.” The court then concluded that, with respect to these cases, “[a] showing of novelty, at least novelty as to the buyer” should address these problems.

We note, moreover, that the “novelty to the buyer” standard comports with traditional principles of contract law. While an idea may be unoriginal or non-novel in a general sense, it may have substantial value to a particular buyer who is unaware of it and therefore willing to enter into contract to acquire and exploit it. In fact, the notion that an unoriginal idea may still be novel (and valuable) to a particular buyer is not itself a novel proposition … In contrast to contract-based claims, a misappropriation claim can only arise from the taking of an idea that is original or novel in absolute terms, because the law of property does not protect against the misappropriation or theft of that which is free and available to all …

Finally, although the legal requirements for contract-based claims and property-based claims are well-defined, we note that the determination of novelty in a given case is not always clear. The determination of whether an idea is original or novel depends upon several factors, including, inter alia, the idea’s specificity or generality (is it a generic concept or one of specific application?), its commonality (how many people know of this idea?), its uniqueness (how different is this idea from generally known ideas?), and its commercial availability (how widespread is the idea’s use in the industry?).

Moreover, in assessing the interrelationship between originality and novelty to the buyer, we note that in some cases an idea may be so unoriginal or lacking in novelty that its obviousness bespeaks widespread and public knowledge of the idea, and such knowledge is therefore imputed to the buyer. In such cases, a court may conclude, as a matter of law, that the idea lacks both the originality necessary to support a misappropriation claim and the novelty to the buyer necessary to support a contract claim.

In sum, we find that New York law in submission-of-idea cases is governed by the following principles: Contract-based claims require only a showing that the disclosed idea was novel to the buyer in order to find consideration. Such claims involve a fact-specific inquiry that focuses on the perspective of the particular buyer. By contrast, misappropriation claims require that the idea at issue be original and novel in absolute terms. This is so because unoriginal, known ideas have no value as property and the law does not protect against the use of that which is free and available to all. Finally, an idea may be so unoriginal or lacking in novelty generally that, as a matter of law, the buyer is deemed to have knowledge of the idea. In such cases, neither a property-based nor a contract-based claim for uncompensated use of the idea may lie.

In light of New York’s law governing submission-of-idea cases, we next consider whether Nadel’s toy idea was original or novel in absolute terms so as to support his misappropriation claim and whether his idea was novel as to Play-By-Play so as to support his contract claims.

Nadel’s Misappropriation Claim

[In] this case, the district court did not decide whether Nadel’s idea – a plush toy that sits upright, emits sounds, and spins on a flat surface by means of an internal eccentric motor – was inherently lacking in originality. We therefore remand this issue to the district court to determine whether Nadel’s idea exhibited “genuine novelty or invention” or whether it was “a merely clever or useful adaptation of existing knowledge.”

Moreover, insofar as the district court found that Nadel’s idea lacked originality and novelty generally because similar toys were commercially available prior to October 1996, we believe that there remains a genuine issue of material fact on this point. While the record contains testimony of Play-By-Play’s toy expert – Bert Reiner – in support of the finding that Nadel’s product concept was already used in more than a dozen different plush toys prior to October 1996, the district court cited the “Giggle Bunny” toy as the only such example. Nadel disputes Reiner’s contention and claims, furthermore, that the district court erroneously relied on an undated video depiction of the Giggle Bunny toy to conclude that upright, sound-emitting, spinning plush toys were commercially available prior to October 1996.

With respect to the Giggle Bunny evidence, we agree with Nadel that the Giggle Bunny model depicted in the undated video exhibit is physically different from the earlier Giggle Bunny model known to be commercially available in 1994. Drawing all factual inferences in Nadel’s favor, we cannot conclude as a matter of law that the upright, sound-emitting, spinning plush Giggle Bunny shown in the video exhibit was commercially available prior to October 1996, and we certainly cannot conclude based on this one exhibit that similar toys were in the public domain at that time.

Moreover, although we find highly probative Mr. Reiner’s testimony that numerous toys with the same general characteristics of Nadel’s toy idea were commercially available prior to October 1996, his testimony and related evidence are too ambiguous and incomplete to support a finding of unoriginality as a matter of law. Mr. Reiner’s testimony fails to specify precisely which (if any) of the enumerated plush toys were designed to (1) sit upright, (2) on a flat surface, (3) emit sounds, and (4) spin or rotate (rather than simply vibrate like “Tickle Me Elmo,” for example). Without this information, a reasonable finder of fact could discount Mr. Reiner’s testimony as vague and inconclusive.

On remand, the district court is free to consider whether further discovery is warranted to determine whether Nadel’s product concept was inherently original or whether it was novel to the industry prior to October 1996. A finding of unoriginality or lack of general novelty would, of course, preclude Nadel from bringing a misappropriation claim against Play-By-Play. Moreover, in evaluating the originality or general novelty of Nadel’s idea in connection with his misappropriation claim, the district may consider whether the idea is so unoriginal that Play-By-Play should, as a matter of law, be deemed to have already possessed the idea, and dismiss Nadel’s contract claims on that ground.

Nadel’s Contract Claims

Mindful that, under New York law, a finding of novelty as to Play-By-Play will provide sufficient consideration to support Nadel’s contract claims. [Reading the] record in a light most favorable to Nadel, we conclude that there exists a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Nadel’s idea was, at the time he disclosed it to Wasserman in early October 1996, novel to Play-By-Play. Notably, the timing of Play-By-Play’s development and release of Tornado Taz in relation to Nadel’s October 1996 disclosure is, taken alone, highly probative. Moreover, although custom in the toy industry provides that a company shall promptly return all samples if it already possesses (or does not want to use) a disclosed idea, Play-By-Play in this case failed to return Nadel’s prototype monkey toy for several months, despite Nadel’s multiple requests for its return. According to Wasserman’s secretary, Melissa Rodriguez, Nadel’s sample was not returned until after the unveiling of “Tornado Taz” at the New York Toy Fair in February 1997. Ms. Rodriguez testified that from October 1996 through February 1997, Nadel’s sample was usually kept in a glass cabinet behind Wasserman’s desk, and on one occasion, she remembered seeing it on a table in Wasserman’s office. These facts give rise to the reasonable inference that Play-By-Play may have used Nadel’s prototype as a model for the development of Tornado Taz.

None of the evidence adduced by Play-By-Play compels a finding to the contrary on summary judgment. With regard to the discussions that Play-By-Play purportedly had in June or July of 1996 about possible ways to create a vibrating or spinning Tazmanian Devil toy, those conversations only lasted, according to Mr. Slattery, “a matter of five minutes.” Play-By-Play may have “discussed the concept,” as Mr. Slattery testified, but the record provides no evidence suggesting that, in June or July of 1996, Play-By-Play understood exactly how it could apply eccentric motor technology to make its Tazmanian Devil toy spin rather than, say, vibrate like Tickle Me Elmo. Similarly, although Play-By-Play asserts that it commissioned an outside manufacturing agent – Barter Trading of Hong Kong – to begin developing Tornado Taz in late September or early October of 1996, Play-By-Play admits that it can only “guess” the exact date. Play-By-Play cannot confirm that its commission of Barter Trading pre-dated Nadel’s alleged disclosure to Wasserman on or about October 9, 1996. Nor has Play-By-Play produced any documents, technical or otherwise, relating to its purported business venture with Barter Trading or its independent development of a spinning Tornado Taz prior to October 1996. Based on this evidence, a jury could reasonably infer that Play-By-Play actually contacted Barter Trading, if at all, after learning of Nadel’s product concept, and that Play-By-Play’s development of Tornado Taz is attributable to Nadel’s disclosure.

We therefore conclude that there exists a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Nadel’s idea was, at the time he disclosed it to Wasserman in early October 1996, novel to Play-By-Play. As to whether the other elements necessary to find a valid express or implied-in-fact contract are present here, e.g., mutual assent, legal capacity, legal subject matter, we leave that determination to the district court to address, if necessary, on remand.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm that part of the district court’s judgment dismissing Play-By-Play’s counterclaims. We vacate that part of the district court’s judgment granting Play-By-Play’s motion for summary judgment and dismissing Nadel’s complaint and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Wrench LLC v. Taco Bell Corp.

256 F.3d 446 (6th Cir. 2001)

GRAHAM, DISTRICT JUDGE

This case raises a question of first impression in this circuit regarding the extent to which the Copyright Act preempts state law claims based on breach of an implied-in-fact contract. Plaintiffs-Appellants Wrench LLC, Joseph Shields, and Thomas Rinks brought this diversity action against Defendant-Appellee Taco Bell Corporation (“Taco Bell”), claiming breach of implied contract and various torts related to Taco Bell’s alleged use of appellants’ ideas.

Background

Appellants Thomas Rinks and Joseph Shields are creators of the “Psycho Chihuahua” cartoon character which they promote, market, and license through their wholly-owned Michigan limited liability company, Wrench LLC. The parties have described Psycho Chihuahua as a clever, feisty dog with an attitude; a self-confident, edgy, cool dog who knows what he wants and will not back down.

In June 1996, Shields and Rinks attended a licensing trade show in New York City, where they were approached by two Taco Bell employees, Rudy Pollak, a vice president, and Ed Alfaro, a creative services manager. Pollak and Alfaro expressed interest in the Psycho Chihuahua character, which they thought would appeal to Taco Bell’s core consumers, males aged eighteen to twenty-four. Pollak and Alfaro obtained some Psycho Chihuahua materials to take with them back to Taco Bell’s headquarters in California.

Upon returning to California, Alfaro began promoting the Psycho Chihuahua idea within Taco Bell. [After] several meetings with non-marketing executives, Alfaro showed the Psycho Chihuahua materials to Vada Hill, Taco Bell’s vice president of brand management, as well as to Taco Bell’s then-outside advertising agency, Bozell Worldwide. Alfaro also tested the Psycho Chihuahua marketing concept with focus groups to gauge consumer reaction to the designs submitted by Rinks and Shields.

During this time period, Rinks told Alfaro that instead of using the cartoon version of Psycho Chihuahua in its television advertisements, Taco Bell should use a live dog, manipulated by computer graphic imaging, with the personality of Psycho Chihuahua and a love for Taco Bell food. Rinks and Alfaro also discussed what it was going to cost for Taco Bell to use appellants’ character, and although no specific numbers were mentioned, Alfaro understood that if Taco Bell used the Psycho Chihuahua concept, it would have to pay appellants.

In September 1996, Rinks and Shields hired Strategy Licensing (“Strategy”), a licensing agent, to represent Wrench in its dealings with Taco Bell. [On] November 18, 1996, Strategy representatives forwarded a licensing proposal to Alfaro. [Taco Bell] did not accept this proposal, although it did not explicitly reject it or indicate that it was ceasing further discussions with Wrench.

On December 5, 1996, Alfaro met with Hill, who had been promoted to the position of chief marketing officer, and others, to present various licensing ideas, including Psycho Chihuahua. On February 6, 1997, Alfaro again met with appellants and representatives of Strategy to review and finalize a formal presentation featuring Psycho Chihuahua that was to be given to Taco Bell’s marketing department in early March 1997. At this meeting, appellants exhibited examples of possible Psycho Chihuahua promotional materials and also orally presented specific ideas for television commercials featuring a live dog manipulated by computer graphics imaging. These ideas included a commercial in which a male dog passed up a female dog in order to get to Taco Bell food.

Alfaro was unable to arrange a meeting with the marketing department during March 1997 to present the Psycho Chihuahua materials. On April 4, 1997, however, Strategy made a formal presentation to Alfaro and his group using samples of uniform designs, T-shirts, food wrappers, posters, and cup designs based on the ideas discussed during the February 6, 1997, meeting. Alfaro and his group were impressed with Strategy’s presentation.

On March 18, 1997, Taco Bell hired a new advertising agency, TBWA Chiat/Day (“Chiat/Day”). Taco Bell advised Chiat/Day that it wanted a campaign ready to launch by July 1997 that would reconnect Taco Bell with its core group of consumers. Chuck Bennett and Clay Williams were designated as the creative directors of Taco Bell’s account.

On June 2, 1997, Bennett and Williams proposed a commercial to Taco Bell in which a male Chihuahua would pass up a female Chihuahua to get to a person seated on a bench eating Taco Bell food. Bennett and Williams say that they conceived of the idea for this commercial one day as they were eating Mexican food at a sidewalk cafe and saw a Chihuahua trotting down the street, with no master or human intervention, “on a mission.” Bennett and Williams contend that this image caused them jointly to conceive of the idea of using a Chihuahua as a way of personifying the intense desire for Taco Bell food. Williams subsequently wrote an advertisement script using a Chihuahua, which Taco Bell decided to produce as a television commercial.

When, in June 1997, Alfaro learned that Chiat/Day was planning to use a Chihuahua in a commercial, he contacted Hill again about the possibility of using Psycho Chihuahua. Hill passed Alfaro on to Chris Miller, a Taco Bell advertising manager and the liaison between Taco Bell’s marketing department and Chiat/Day. On June 27, 1997, Alfaro gave Psycho Chihuahua materials to Miller along with a note suggesting that Taco Bell consider using Psycho Chihuahua as an icon and as a character in its advertising. Miller sent these materials to Chiat/Day, which received them sometime between June 28 and July 26.

Taco Bell aired its first Chihuahua commercial in the northeastern United States in July 1997, and received a very positive consumer reaction [and] launched a nationwide advertising campaign featuring Chihuahua commercials in late December 1997.

Appellants brought suit in January 1998, alleging breach of implied-in-fact contract as well as various tort and statutory claims under Michigan and California law. Appellee filed a motion to dismiss, which the district court granted in part and denied in part …

Discussion

Appellants assert that the district court erred in determining that novelty was required to sustain their contract claim. The district court found that Michigan law required appellants to prove the originality or novelty of their ideas in order to maintain their claims, concluding that appellants’ ideas were not novel because they “merely combined themes and executions that had been used many times in a variety of commercials for different products.” The district court thus granted summary judgment in favor of appellee on this alternative basis. We conclude that the district court erred in finding that Michigan law requires novelty in a contract-based claim.

Figure 4.2 “Psycho Chihuahua” and the Taco Bell chihuahua

The district court seems to have assumed, without further discussion, that if the novelty requirement applied to appellants’ conversion and misappropriation claims, it would also apply to appellants’ implied-in-fact contract claim.

Conversion is based on property law principles. Courts have usually refused to protect ideas on a property theory, but when they have, it has generally been subject to the requirements of novelty and concreteness … Most courts apply a different rule to contract claims, modifying the requirement of novelty in some circumstances and dispensing with it altogether in others. The reason for the distinction is this: property rights are rights against the world and courts are generally unwilling to accord that kind of protection to ideas; contract rights on the other hand are limited to the contracting parties and it should be for them to decide if an idea is sufficiently valuable to be purchased.

Nevertheless, many courts do require novelty in an action based upon an implied contract theory on the ground that there can be no consideration for an implied promise to pay if the idea does not constitute “property.”

Sarver v. Detroit Edison Co., 51 N.W.2d 759 (Mich. App. 1997) tells us where Michigan likely stands on this issue. In Sarver, plaintiff brought an action against her employer seeking damages for conversion and breach of contract based on the allegation that defendant appropriated an idea which she submitted through an employee suggestion program. The court rejected plaintiff’s conversion cause of action finding that plaintiff’s idea “was neither novel nor unique” and “did not constitute property subject to a conversion cause of action.” The Sarver court went on to hold, however, that plaintiff had stated a breach of contract claim, stating “to the extent that plaintiff seeks compensation for formulating, drafting, and submitting her idea pursuant to defendant’s employee suggestion program, rather than for the idea itself, she has stated a breach of contract claim.” The Sarver court did not impose a requirement of novelty on plaintiff’s contract claim.

[The] Sarver court quoted with approval the decision of the Supreme Court of Alaska in Reeves v. Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. In Reeves, plaintiff had proposed the idea of creating a visitor center at a location where visitors could view the Alaska oil pipeline. He brought an action alleging tort and contract claims against the pipeline servicing company, which subsequently established such a visitor center. The Supreme Court of Alaska held that the element of novelty was not required for plaintiff’s implied contract claim:

Relying largely on cases from New York, Alyeska argues that novelty and originality should be required in an implied-in-fact claim. Reeves responds that we should follow California’s example and not require novelty as an essential element of this sort of claim. Idea-based claims arise most frequently in the entertainment centers of New York and California, but New York requires novelty, whereas California does not. We prefer the California approach. An idea may be valuable to the recipient merely because of its timing or the manner in which it is presented … Implied in fact contracts are closely related to express contracts. Each requires the parties to form an intent to enter into a contract. It is ordinarily not the court’s role to evaluate the adequacy of the consideration agreed upon by the parties. The bargain should be left in the hands of the parties. If parties voluntarily choose to bargain for an individual’s services in disclosing or developing a non-novel or unoriginal idea, they have the power to do so.

Reeves, 926 P.2d at 1130, 1141–1142. Since the Michigan court in Sarver quoted Reeves on the requirement of novelty in an action based on conversion and went on to hold that the plaintiff’s contract claim survived notwithstanding lack of novelty, we conclude that Michigan follows Reeves and the California cases which dispense with the requirement of novelty in actions based on implied-in-fact contracts …

While we conclude that Michigan would not impose a requirement of novelty in an action based upon a contract implied in fact, it does not appear that the result of this case would change even if Michigan were to follow the New York view, which requires only novelty to the defendant. Here, Taco Bell does not claim that it was aware of appellants’ ideas prior to disclosure. Accordingly, we find that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to the appellee on the ground that appellants failed to show that their ideas were novel or original.

The judgment of the district court is REVERSED.

Notes and Questions

1. Ideas versus trade secrets. What is the difference between an “idea,” such as the ideas shared in Nadel and Wrench, and a trade secret? Would you consider the ideas in these cases to constitute trade secrets? Would it have made a difference if the purveyor of the idea asked the recipient to sign a nondisclosure agreement? What if the recipient refused to sign? Should an idea’s status as a trade secret affect a court’s recognition of an implied license?

2. Industry practice. The Nadel court refers to trade practices in the toy industry. Why are those practices relevant? Would a court reach the same result in a different industry, say motion pictures or aerospace engineering?

3. Idea disclaimers. Some companies want to ensure that they are not obliged to individuals who pitch ideas to them. Consider the following disclaimer posted on the IBM website:

IBM does not want to receive confidential or proprietary information from you through our Web site. Please note that any information or material sent to IBM will be deemed NOT to be confidential. By sending IBM any information or material, you grant IBM an unrestricted, irrevocable license to use, reproduce, display, perform, modify, transmit and distribute those materials or information, and you also agree that IBM is free to use any ideas, concepts, know-how or techniques that you send us for any purpose.Footnote 2

Why doesn’t IBM want your ideas? Would a disclaimer like IBM’s be appropriate in the motion picture industry? Would it be enforceable? Would the enforceability of such a disclaimer work differently depending on whether an idea submitter argued in contract versus property?

Another company, satellite provider EchoStar, explains the following in its idea submission policy:

EchoStar views patent protection as important for our own inventions and ideas as well as those you are offering to us. As a matter of policy, we normally receive unsolicited ideas from the general public only after the idea submitters have first taken steps to obtain patent protection for such ideas. We expect idea submitters to seek and rely wholly upon their patent rights, as defined by the claims of an issued patent, just as our company is required to do in order to protect its own rights.Footnote 3

How does EchoStar’s policy differ from IBM’s? Why do you think EchoStar adopted this approach? Which of these two policies, if either, would you advise a client to adopt?

4. Novelty. The court in Wrench holds that under Michigan law, following the California rule, novelty is not required to prevail on a breach of contract claim. For a property-based misappropriation claim, however, novelty would still be required. Is the idea of a clever, feisty chihuahua pitching Tex-Mex food novel enough to prevail on a misappropriation claim?

5. Rights against the world. The Wrench court notes that “property rights are rights against the world” (so-called erga omnes rights) whereas contract rights only affect the parties bound by the contract. Why does this distinction matter in deciding whether a novelty standard should apply?

6. State versus federal law. Does state or federal law govern the creation and interpretation of implied licenses pertaining to IP rights created under federal statute? In Foad Consulting Group, Inc. v. Musil Govan Azzalino, 270 F.3d 821 (9th Cir. 2001), a copyright case, the Ninth Circuit noted that:

while federal law answers the threshold question of whether an implied, nonexclusive copyright license can be granted (it can), state law determines the contract question: whether a copyright holder has, in fact, granted such a license. As a general matter, we rely on state law to fill in the gaps Congress leaves in federal statutes. Thus, where the Copyright Act does not address an issue, we turn to state law … so long as state law does not otherwise conflict with the Copyright Act. There is no reason we should treat implied copyright licenses any differently.

Not every circuit has addressed this issue. Do you think the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in Foad should be followed elsewhere?

7. Parol evidence and implied licenses. Foad dealt with the application of California’s parol evidence rule to an implied copyright license. The parol evidence rule permits a court to consider evidence extrinsic to the four corners of a contract when the contract is ambiguous. But what is parol evidence when an implied (unwritten) contract is under consideration? Or, put another way, what is not parol when the contract itself is unwritten? The Ninth Circuit in Foad stated that “application of California’s parol evidence rule in interpreting a contract that a party purports to have granted an implied copyright license does not conflict with the Act or its underlying policies.” What does the court mean?

8. Idea registration. In Hollywood, aspiring screenwriters, directors and idea brokers regularly pitch ideas to movie studios and television networks. Generally, no contract is signed before or during a pitch, which can just as easily be made in a taxicab, a restaurant or even the proverbial elevator in a studio executive’s office.Footnote 4 So how do pitchers prevent their ideas from being stolen by their (sometimes less than ethical) recipients? One solution is idea registration. The Writers Guild of America, West (WGAW) Registry allows individuals, for a small fee, to upload and register their scripts, treatments,Footnote 5 lyrics, short stories, poems, commercials, drawings and written ideas. Such registration offers no explicit legal protection, as might a copyright registration, but it does provide some benefits to the registrant. As explained by WGAW:

The registration process places preventative measures against plagiarism or unauthorized use of an author’s material. While someone else may have the same storyline or idea in his or her material, your evidence lies in your presentation of your work. Registering your work does not disallow others from having a similar storyline or theme. Rather, registering your work would potentially discourage others from using your work without your permission.

Though the Registry cannot prevent plagiarism, it can produce the registered material as well as confirm the date of registration. Registering your work creates legal evidence for the material that establishes a date for the material’s existence. The WGAW Registry, as a neutral third party, can testify for that evidence.Footnote 6

Of course, the Library of Congress also permits the registration of most of these materials for a similarly low fee, and a copyright registration does afford the registrant some legal rights. Why might someone choose WGAW registration over copyright registration?

10. “Handshake culture” under threat? California law requires lawyers’ contingency fee agreements to be in writing. In 2018, actor Johnny Depp sued his longtime attorney to recover an estimated $30 million in fees that Depp had paid the attorney since 1999. The reason? The agreement – which entitled the attorney to the customary 5 percent share of Depp’s earnings – was never put in writing. A Los Angeles trial judge agreed with Depp and ruled that the agreement between Depp and his attorney was not valid. The ruling was met with alarm by many in Hollywood, who bemoaned the death of the industry’s “handshake culture.”Footnote 7 Do you agree with the result of Depp’s action? Is “handshake culture” at risk? Is it worth saving? Why or why not?

Problem 4.1

Julia, who recently received her PhD in satellite engineering, has an idea for a method of increasing the bandwidth of satellite transmissions. Julia is currently looking for a job, and has not filed a patent application for her invention (nor has she developed it enough to satisfy the formal requirements to obtain a patent). In a job interview with Conic Dynamics Corp. (CDC), Julia describes her idea to Paul, one of CDC’s senior engineers. She tells him that she would be happy to work with him on improving her method if she is hired. Four weeks later, CDC informs Julia that she was not selected for the job. What legal recourse, if any, does Julia have in each of the following cases:

  1. a. Julia hears nothing further from CDC, but a year after her interview an article describing her method is published in a technical journal. Paul is one of the article’s co-authors.

  2. b. Two years after Julia’s interview, a friend informs her that he came across a patent application filed by CDC that claimed an invention remarkably similar to Julia’s method.

  3. c. Given the facts in (a) and (b), assume that a week after Julia’s interview she received a letter from CDC stating that “CDC’s official policy, as described on its website, is that all ideas submitted to it automatically become CDC’s property and CDC will accept no obligations with respect to any submissions made to it unless the submission was requested in writing by a CDC representative.”

  4. d. Would the result in (a) or (b) change if CDC began a research project based on the same idea one year before Julia’s interview?

  5. e. Would the result in (a) or (b) change if Julia had given Paul a detailed set of diagrams and a written description of her method during the interview?

4.3 Implied Licenses and Commissioned Works

The cases in Section 4.2 address a situation in which an idea was submitted to a recipient and was used by the recipient in its business (the spinning toy idea in Nadel and the chihuahua restaurant promotion idea in Wrench). In both cases, the principal question was whether the originator of the idea had either a claim (property or contractual) to compensation for the use of the disclosed idea. In this section we turn to the question of what implied right the recipient of an intellectual asset (in these cases, copyrighted material, but also potentially ideas, patented inventions, etc.) may have to use the asset after it is delivered, even if the recipient has not fully complied with its obligation to pay the originator.

I.A.E., Inc. v. Shaver

74 F.3d 768 (7th Cir. 1996)

RIPPLE, CIRCUIT JUDGE

Architect Paul D. Shaver appeals the district court’s summary judgment ruling that there was no infringement of Mr. Shaver’s copyrighted schematic design drawings. The court concluded that Mr. Shaver had granted an implied nonexclusive license to utilize his drawings in the completion of Gary Regional Airport’s air cargo building. For the reasons that follow, we [affirm].

Background

In July 1992, two construction companies formed a joint venture. I.A.E., Inc. and its president Ramamurty Talluri joined with BEMI Construction and its president William Brewer to become the I.A.E./BEMI Joint Venture (“Joint Venture”). On December 21, 1992, the Joint Venture entered into a contract with the Gary Regional Airport Authority (“Airport”) to design and to construct an air cargo/hangar building. Under the contract, Joint Venture was to provide all of the civil, structural, mechanical and electrical engineering services and architectural design services needed to construct the air cargo building.

In furtherance of that goal, Joint Venture subcontracted with Paul D. Shaver, an architect with extensive experience in designing airport facilities, to prepare the schematic design drawings for the airport building. The parties agree that there are four phases to the architectural design of a building: schematic design, preliminary design, final design and construction supervision. The schematic design documents are the product of the first phase of designing a building. They outline the scope of the project and are the basis of the owner’s approval for the building design. Schematic design documents are often used as a reference base for further design development.

Mr. Shaver’s letter of January 14, 1993, to Mr. Talluri, which constitutes the written contract between the architect and Joint Venture, contained Mr. Shaver’s agreement to prepare the schematic design drawings for the Airport building: “With the assistance of your office and the [Airport] staff, agreed design parameters can be established initially to permit the Project to proceed in a normal development manner.” The contract price for his services was $10,000 plus reimbursable expenses, less deductions for the participation of I.A.E.’s staff. The contract specifically set forth the services Mr. Shaver intended to perform:

To prepare, with the assistance of your office and BEMI, Inc., staff, standard Design Documents … which would describe the agreed scope of the Project, we estimate a 4–5 week period of time including two or three scheduled approval meetings with your office and [Airport] Authority personnel. These documents would consist of the following which are customarily prepared to describe the scope of the Project and also for general reference: Drawings, 5, Title Sheet, Site Plan, Floor Plans, Elevations and Building Sections Preliminary Construction Cost Estimate.

[W]e are prepared to complete the required Schematic Design Document preparation for $10,000 subject to adjustment with deductions resulting from participation of staff from your office and your Architectural associate …

Please advise us if you need any additional data concerning our understanding of the scope of work.

Mr. Shaver believed that, once a design had been approved, he would execute further written contracts for the remaining phases of the architectural work.

After Mr. Shaver attended several meetings with the Airport, he prepared his schematic design drawings of the proposed Airport building. He then delivered copies of his schematic drawings to the Airport, Joint Venture, and other parties involved in the Project. These drawings were submitted with a notice of copyright. The copyrights of those drawings, both as technical drawings and as architectural works, were effective June 2, 1993. Their validity has not been challenged. Mr. Shaver and Mr. Talluri later presented to the Airport the completed schematic designs. On February 22, 1993, the Airport approved one of them. Mr. Shaver was paid $5,000 of his fee on that date.

On March 1, 1993, Joint Venture retained H. Seay Cantrell & Associates (“Cantrell”) to perform the remaining architectural work for the air cargo building. When Mr. Shaver realized that he and his firm were no longer involved in the Project, he took two actions. On March 3, 1993, Mr. Shaver wrote to the Airport’s Executive Director, Levelle Gatewood, acknowledging that he and his staff were, “under the circumstances, no longer in a position to participate or contribute to the development of the east Air Cargo Building Project.” The letter, with enclosed copies of Mr. Shaver’s schematic design drawings, also stated:

We trust that our ideas and knowledge exhibited in our work will assist the Airport in realizing a credible and flexible use Cargo/Hangar facility.

Mr. Shaver’s second act, one week later, was to seek collection of the amount that Joint Venture still owed him for the services he had rendered and to notify Joint Venture that he intended to enforce his copyrights if necessary. Mr. Shaver, by his attorney, claimed that he was owed an additional $5,000 fee, plus his out-of-pocket expenses ($887.29), plus (a new claim) a $7,000 payment for the purported “assignment” of his copyright on the schematic design documents. The attorney’s letter of March 10, 1993 offered Mr. Talluri a settlement of Mr. Shaver’s claim against Joint Venture for $12,887.29. Mr. Talluri agreed to pay the contract costs, $5,887.29, as final payment. According to Mr. Talluri, Mr. Shaver “had never previously raised the issue of copyright, copyright infringement or his alleged entitlement to moneys, in addition to the contract amount, for ‘assignment’ of his copyright on the schematic design drawings.”

Once it was clear that Mr. Shaver and Joint Venture would not reach an accord concerning any amount still owing to Mr. Shaver under the contract, on August 5, 1993, I.A.E. and Mr. Talluri filed this action. They sought a declaratory judgment that they did not infringe any copyrights owned by Mr. Shaver and that they had a right to use Mr. Shaver’s drawings; they also sought damages. Mr. Shaver counterclaimed against I.A.E. and Mr. Talluri, seeking damages for copyright infringement and breach of contract. He also filed third-party complaints against Cantrell, BEMI and its president Mr. Brewer, and the Airport, alleging that all the named defendants had infringed his copyrights in the schematic design documents or that they had conspired to do so by copying and using elements of his design in the final bid documents for the Airport Project. Joint Venture and the Airport responded that they had used Mr. Shaver’s drawings only as Mr. Shaver had intended their use, to build the Airport’s air cargo building. All parties then filed cross-motions for summary judgment.

The district court granted summary judgment on the ground that there was no copyright infringement.

Proof of copyright infringement requires two showings: first, that the claimant has a validly owned copyright, and second, that the “constituent elements of the work that are original” were copied. The first element is not in contention; there is no challenge to the validity of Mr. Shaver’s copyrights. It is the second prong of infringement that is at issue; Mr. Shaver asserted that his work was copied. The district court determined, however, that the use of his works was permissible because Mr. Shaver had granted an implied nonexclusive license.

Figure 4.3 I.A.E. v. Shaver involved an architect’s plans for an air cargo building at Gary Regional Airport (now Gary/Chicago International Airport (GYY)).

A copyright owner may transfer to another person any of the exclusive rights the owner has in the copyright; however, such a transfer must be made in writing. 17 U.S.C. § 204(a). [The] “transfer of copyright ownership” is defined, in the Copyright Act, as an exclusive license or some other instrument of conveyance. The definition expressly excludes a nonexclusive license. Therefore, even though section 204(a) of the Copyright Act invalidates any transfer of copyright ownership that is not in writing, section 101 explicitly removes a nonexclusive license from the section 204(a) writing requirement. We turn, therefore, to the differences between exclusive and nonexclusive licenses.

In an exclusive license, the copyright holder permits the licensee to use the protected material for a specific use and further promises that the same permission will not be given to others. The licensee violates the copyright by exceeding the scope of this license. The writing requirement serves the goal of predictability and certainty of copyright ownership.

By contrast, in the case of an implied nonexclusive license, the licensor-creator of the work, by granting an implied nonexclusive license, does not transfer ownership of the copyright to the licensee. The copyright owner simply permits the use of a copyrighted work in a particular manner. In contrast to an exclusive license, a “nonexclusive license may be granted orally, or may even be implied from conduct.” … In fact, consent given in the form of mere permission or lack of objection is also equivalent to a nonexclusive license and is not required to be in writing. Although a person holding a nonexclusive license has no standing to sue for copyright infringement, the existence of a license, exclusive or nonexclusive, creates an affirmative defense to a claim of copyright infringement. The concept of an implied nonexclusive license has been recognized [by] the courts, including this one, which universally have recognized that a nonexclusive license may be implied from conduct. Indeed, implied licenses are like implied contracts, which are well recognized in the field of architecture. As the district court noted, the Ninth Circuit, in [Effects Associates, Inc. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555 (9th Cir. 1990)], held that an implied nonexclusive license has been granted when (1) a person (the licensee) requests the creation of a work, (2) the creator (the licensor) makes that particular work and delivers it to the licensee who requested it, and (3) the licensor intends that the licensee-requestor copy and distribute his work.

In light of these principles, we now turn to the record before us. In our analysis, we find helpful, as did the district court, the opinion of our colleagues in the Ninth Circuit in Effects. In the case before us, [Shaver] maintains that his expectation was that he would be the architect who would be preparing the final drawings, presumably from his own preliminary drawings, to be used for the construction. We therefore must determine whether the record will support a determination that such an interpretation had any objective foundation.

Effects suggests several objective factors to guide the judicial inquiry as to whether an implied license exists: the language of the copyright registration certificate, the letter agreement, and deposition testimony; and the delivery of the copyrighted material without warning that its further use would constitute copyright infringement. When we apply these factors to the circumstances before us, we must conclude that there is no genuine issue of triable fact and that the district court concluded correctly as a matter of law that Mr. Shaver granted an implied nonexclusive license to Joint Venture.

Figure 4.4 Effects Associates involved the development of a gruesome special effect for the horror film The Stuff.

We note first that Mr. Shaver’s certificates of registration, entitling the drawings “East Air Cargo Building, Gary Regional Airport, Indiana: Not Yet Constructed,” state that copyrighted designs are to be used for the “Airport Facility.” We now turn to the language of the contract itself. The contract in this case was a letter written by Mr. Shaver. This letter, apparently in confirmation of an earlier telephone conversation, demonstrates that the relationship of independent contractor for the purpose of creating the preliminary drawings for the Airport Project existed between Mr. Shaver and Joint Venture. It defines his role in the Airport Project and, specifically, his “understanding of the scope of work”: preparation of the preliminary schematic design drawings … Mr. Shaver stated that his drawings are the type “customarily prepared to describe the scope of the project and also for general reference.” Mr. Shaver also quoted the consideration for his work, $10,000. Mr. Shaver’s statement that “agreed design parameters can be established initially to permit the Project to proceed in a normal development manner,” certainly suggests that he considered his contribution to be in furtherance of the entire Project. In short, his letter was clear, to-the-point, and unambiguous. No other work is listed; no expectation of a further role in the Project is mentioned in the contract. Therefore, although Mr. Shaver tells us that he anticipated he would be the architect to take the Project to completion, nothing in his contract gives the slightest indication of that belief. Although Indiana law allows contractual terms to be implied from the intent and action of the parties, the “intent relevant in contract matters is not the parties’ subjective intent but their outward manifestation of it.” Here the contract is clear.

The plain language of the contract is supported by common sense. As we have already pointed out, Mr. Shaver created a work – preliminary architectural drawings – and handed them over to the Joint Venture for use on the Airport Project. For that work the architect received $10,000 compensation. As the Ninth Circuit concluded in Effects:

To hold that Effects did not at the same time convey a license to use the footage in “The Stuff” would mean that plaintiff’s contribution to the film was “of minimal value,” a conclusion that can’t be squared with the fact that Cohen paid Effects almost $56,000 for this footage. Accordingly, we conclude that Effects impliedly granted nonexclusive licenses.

908 F.2d 555, 558. This understanding is reflected throughout the parties’ depositions and affidavits. Joint Venture clearly expected to use Mr. Shaver’s drawings for the Project. Mr. Talluri expected that Mr. Shaver’s schematic design drawings were to be used in the Airport Project for which they were intended and stated that the drawings were used only in that manner, despite the fact that Mr. Shaver was not the continuing architect.

Not only the language of the copyright registration certificates, the letter contract, and the depositions and common sense support the conclusion of the district court that the defendants had an implied nonexclusive license to use Mr. Shaver’s drawings in the Airport Project; Mr. Shaver’s actions and subsequent writing also unequivocally support that conclusion. Mr. Shaver delivered his copyrighted designs without any warning that their further use would constitute copyright infringement. In his March 3, 1993 letter, Mr. Shaver acknowledged that he was no longer a contributor to the Project’s development, but that he expected “that our ideas and knowledge exhibited in our work will assist the Airport in realizing a credible and flexible use Cargo/Hangar facility.” This statement, accompanied by the delivery of copies of his drawings, certainly constitutes a release of those documents to the Airport for its Project and clearly validates a determination that all the objective factors support the existence of an implied license to use Mr. Shaver’s drawings in the construction of the air cargo building.

On this record, we cannot conclude that Mr. Shaver has raised a genuine issue of material fact on the issue of the parties’ intent. His contention that he never intended to grant a license for the use of his drawings past the drafting stage unless he was the continuing architect is simply not supported by the record.

Mr. Shaver also makes several alternative arguments that accept the existence of a nonexclusive implied license, but suggest that, under the circumstances established by the record, it cannot be enforced. We believe that these arguments cannot be maintained in light of our analysis, but we shall address them briefly for the sake of completeness.

Mr. Shaver submits that, even if there was an implied license for the use of his drawings, the Airport, Cantrell and Joint Venture exceeded the scope of that license by allowing another architect, Cantrell, to use the designs. He relies on Oddo v. Ries, 743 F.2d 630 (9th Cir.1984). Oddo held that Ries, a publisher, had an implied nonexclusive license to use Oddo’s articles to create a particular book. However, Ries exceeded the scope of that implied license when it hired another writer and created a different work, one which included much new material written by the second writer as well as large portions of Oddo’s manuscript. By publishing the other writer’s book, which was distinct from the plaintiff’s manuscript originally licensed for use, the defendant exceeded the scope of the partnership’s implied license. In our case, however, the record contains written authorization for the use of Mr. Shaver’s copyrighted drawings to “describe the agreed scope of the Project” for Joint Venture and the Airport. The use of his drawings was therefore within the scope of that agreement. Mr. Shaver’s assertion that he did not grant the right to further use of his drawings unless he was the architect continuing the Project is simply not supported by the contract. Mr. Shaver’s reliance on Oddo is therefore of no benefit to him.

Mr. Shaver also asserts that, because only half of the contract sum was paid, the implied license “did not spring into existence.” In Effects, the Ninth Circuit rejected a virtually identical argument that there could be no implied license until the full payment of the contract price was made. That court recognized that the appellant was treating the complete payment of the contractual consideration as a condition precedent to the use of the copyrighted material. After noting that “conditions precedent are disfavored and will not be read into a contract unless required by plain, unambiguous language,” it found nothing in the agreement between the parties indicating such an agreement. Similarly, in the case before us, nothing in the contract or in Mr. Shaver’s later letter indicates that full payment was a condition precedent to the use of his drawings. In fact, he first distributed his drawings before any payment was made, and next handed them over to the Airport, with no mention of payment, after half the dollar amount of the contract had been tendered. Clearly at that point a license to use the drawings had impliedly been granted. Mr. Shaver did not state that failure to pay would be viewed as copyright infringement until the March 10, 1993 letter from his attorney.

Conclusion

Mr. Shaver created an implied nonexclusive license to use his schematic design drawings in the Airport Project. Accordingly, there was no infringement of Mr. Shaver’s copyrighted works. We conclude that, because there are no genuine issues of material fact before us, we must affirm the judgment of the district court.

Notes and questions

1. Contract versus property. In both Shaver and Effects, the customer of a commissioned work failed to pay the full amount due for the work, yet was found to have an implied license to use the work in the manner intended by the creator. Why wouldn’t the customer’s license be conditioned on making the full payment? Should it be? The court in Shaver wrote that “conditions precedent are disfavored and will not be read into a contract unless required by plain, unambiguous language.” Can an implied license have “plain, unambiguous language”? For a further discussion of license conditions versus contractual covenants, see Section 3.4.

2. Scope of implied license. In Johnson v. Jones, 46 USPQ2d 1482 (6th Cir. 1998), the Sixth Circuit held that Johnson, an architect, did not grant an implied license for his client to alter and use his drawings. Johnson had submitted a draft contract containing the following language to his prospective client, Jones:

The drawings, specifications and other documents furnished by the Design/Builder are instruments of service and shall not become the property of the Owner whether or not the project for which they are made is commenced. Drawings, specifications and other documents shall not be used by the Owner on other projects, additions to this project, or … for completion of this Project by others, except by written agreement relating to use, liability and compensation.

Although Johnson began work, Jones did not sign the contract. Later, Johnson was terminated and Jones retained a different architect to complete the project. The new architect (Tosch) claimed that he had an implied license to use the drawings produced by Johnson, citing the Effects case. The court explained that:

In Effects, defendant, a movie-maker, asked plaintiff, a special effects company, to create footage to enhance action sequences in a film defendant was making. Unhappy with the footage provided by plaintiff, defendant paid only half of the expected amount. Subsequently, defendant incorporated plaintiff’s footage into the film and released the film to another company for distribution. The Effects court held that plaintiff had granted defendant an implied non-exclusive license to incorporate the footage into the film and then distribute the film.

The circumstances in Effects differ materially from those in the present case. Almost every objective fact in the present case points away from the existence of an implied license. Johnson submitted two AIA contracts, both of which contained express provisions that he would retain ownership of his drawings, and that those drawings would not be used for completion of the Jones house by others, except by written agreement with appropriate compensation. These contractual provisions, although never signed by Jones, speak to Johnson’s intent; they demonstrate that Johnson created the drawings with the understanding that he would be the architect in charge of the project. They further demonstrate that Johnson would not have allowed Tosch to finish the project using his drawings without a written agreement, and additional compensation.

How would you distinguish Johnson and Shaver, if at all? Which case do you feel better reflects the intentions of the parties?

3. Implied rights to sublicense. An interesting twist on the implied license doctrine has arisen in the context of tattoos. Tattoos are generally understood to comprise artistic works in which the tattoo artist obtains copyright. However, courts have also held that the individual on whom the tattoo is placed has an implied license to reproduce the tattoo, for example, in photographic images of himself or herself. The issue has become commercially significant when tattoos are visible on the bodies of celebrities such as sports figures. In Solid Oak Sketches, LLC v. 2K Games, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 3d 333 (S.D.N.Y. 2020), the court found that NBA players LeBron James, Eric Bledsoe and Kenyon Martin had implied licenses to display and reproduce their tattoos (all created by the same artist) “as part of their likenesses,” and that they were authorized to grant the NBA the right to license their likenesses, including the tattoos, to the producer of NBA-based video games.

Problem 4.2

Arti, a freelance graphic designer, is hired by a publisher to create the artwork for an undergraduate economics textbook. Arti produces the artwork and is paid $2,500, per their agreement, which is silent regarding copyright. Two years later, the publisher releases a second edition of the book. Because Arti is now working as a full-time employee of a rival publishing house, the publisher hires Bob to make slight revisions to the original artwork for the second edition. Two years after that, the book is ready for its third edition, and the publisher decides to modify the artwork further using its own in-house designer. Arti comes across a copy of the third edition online and realizes that the artwork has been altered without her consent. What legal remedies, if any, does Arti have against the publisher (assuming that she owns the copyright in the original artwork)?

Figure 4.5 NBA star LeBron James is reported to have twenty-four tattoos, many of which were created by LA-based artist gangatattoo.

4.4 Implied Licenses in Law

McCoy v. Mitsuboshi Cutlery, Inc.

67 F.3d 917 (Fed. Cir. 1995)

RADER, CIRCUIT JUDGE

Duncan McCoy, Alex Dorsett, and Alex-Duncan Shrimp Chef, Inc. (McCoy) sued Mitsuboshi Cutlery, Inc. (Mitsuboshi) and Admiral Craft Equipment Corp. (Admiral Craft) for infringing McCoy’s intellectual property rights and committing business torts. McCoy’s sales organization had hired Mitsuboshi to make and supply shrimp knives covered by McCoy’s patent and trademarks. When Mitsuboshi produced the knives, McCoy refused to pay for them. Mitsuboshi resold the knives to Admiral Craft. McCoy sought damages from Mitsuboshi and Admiral Craft for selling the knives to third parties. Admiral Craft settled with McCoy before trial.

Background

McCoy owns U.S. Patent No. 4,759,126 on a shrimp knife that peels, deveins, and butterflies in one motion. McCoy arranged for Mitsuboshi, a Japanese knife manufacturer, to produce shrimp knives embodying the patented invention. At McCoy’s request, Mitsuboshi stamped the knives with McCoy’s registered U.S. Trademarks Nos. 1,687,589 and 1,702,878. From 1988 to 1990, Mitsuboshi manufactured and sold large quantities of these knives to McCoy.

In 1991, McCoy’s separate marketing organization, A.T.D. Marketing, Inc. (ATD), ordered 150,000 of the knives from Mitsuboshi. Mitsuboshi produced the knives. When Mitsuboshi timely offered the knives, ATD refused to accept or pay for them. ATD’s refusal left Mitsuboshi holding the 150,000 knives in its warehouse in Japan. The record contains no suggestion that the knives were defective.

McCoy acknowledged its responsibility for ATD’s refusal to pay. McCoy, however, accepted and paid for only about 20,000 of the 150,000 knives ordered. McCoy refused to pay for the other 130,000 knives. On the basis of these facts, the jury found that McCoy breached its contract with Mitsuboshi. McCoy did not appeal this jury verdict.

Following McCoy’s partial payment, Mitsuboshi continued to negotiate for payment and delivery of the remaining 130,000 knives. McCoy, however, remained silent, unable to pay for them. In the face of this silence, Mitsuboshi repeatedly notified McCoy of its intent to resell the knives to mitigate damages. At length, Mitsuboshi sold 6,456 of the knives to Admiral Craft, a mail-order wholesaler of restaurant supplies. Admiral Craft sold 958 of the knives in the United States to restaurants and supply houses in 1993 through its mail catalog.

McCoy sued Mitsuboshi and Admiral Craft for patent and trademark infringement, unfair competition in violation of both federal and Texas law, and several Texas state law torts. Admiral Craft settled, but Mitsuboshi persevered, counterclaiming for breach of contract. At the close of evidence, Mitsuboshi moved for judgment as a matter of law that it was entitled to resell the knives. The trial court denied Mitsuboshi’s motion. The jury found against Mitsuboshi on the infringement, unfair competition, and tortious interference counts, and for Mitsuboshi on the breach of contract count. Mitsuboshi then renewed its motion for judgment as a matter of law. The trial court again denied the motion. Mitsuboshi appeals.

Discussion

The jury found, and McCoy does not contest, that McCoy breached its contract with Mitsuboshi. This appeal thus raises the purely legal question of the effect of McCoy’s breach on his intellectual property rights in the knives. This court confronts this question for the first time.

A patent confers on its holder the right to exclude others from making, using, or selling what is described in its claims. This court has recognized that these intellectual property rights, like any other property rights, are subject to the contractual obligations of their owner and the applicable law:

Th[e] right to exclude may be waived in whole or in part. The conditions of such waiver are subject to patent, contract, antitrust, and any other applicable law, as well as equitable considerations such as are reflected in the law of patent misuse. As in other areas of commerce, private parties may contract as they choose, provided that no law is violated thereby.

Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 703 (Fed.Cir.1992). Thus, a patent or trademark owner may contract to confer a license on another party. In most instances under contract law, a patent or trademark owner intentionally creates an express license. A licensee, of course, has an affirmative defense to a claim of patent infringement.

In some circumstances, however, the entire course of conduct between a patent or trademark owner and an accused infringer may create an implied license. The Supreme Court stated:

Any language used by the owner of the patent or any conduct on his part exhibited to another from which that other may properly infer that the owner consents to his use of the patent in making or using it, or selling it, upon which the other acts, constitutes a license and a defense to an action …

De Forest Radio Tel. Co. v. United States, 273 U.S. 236, 241 (1927). When warranted by such a course of conduct, the law implies a license.

Figure 4.6 The patented shrimp knife and deveiner at issue in McCoy.

Whether express or implied, a license is a contract “governed by ordinary principles of state contract law.” Moreover the law may imply licenses “to make effective the contracts of the patentee.” An implied license, however, must not exceed the limits necessary to make the contract effective.

To enforce the contracts of the patentee, the law may imply a license where a patent holder sells or authorizes the sale of a patented product – a voluntary sale. Thus, “an authorized sale of a patented product places that product beyond the reach of the patent.” Under this implied license, a patent holder receives a reward for inventive work in the first sale of the patented product. As the Supreme Court stated:

Patentees … are entitled to but one royalty for the patented machine, and consequently when a patentee has himself constructed the machine and sold it, or authorized another to construct and sell it, or to construct and use and operate it, and the consideration has been paid to him for the right, he has then to that extent parted with his monopoly, and ceased to have any interest whatever in the machine so sold or so authorized to be constructed and operated.

Bloomer v. Millinger, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 340, 350 (1863).

In some cases, the law implies a license where a patent holder does not authorize the sale of a patented product – an involuntary sale. See, e.g., Wilder v. Kent, 15 F. 217, 219 (C.C.W.D.Pa.1883). For example, in Wilder, the patent holder sued an individual for infringement who purchased a machine at a sheriff’s sale. The court dismissed the complaint finding the purchaser had acquired the right to use the patented machine through the purchase at the sheriff’s sale. The court reasoned: “To deny to the sheriff’s vendee the right to use such machine would in effect prevent its sale upon an execution at law … and practically withdraw it from the reach of the owner’s execution creditors.” While appreciating the unique nature of patent rights, the court noted that “a patented machine is susceptible of manual seizure, and the unrestricted sale thereof does not involve the transfer of any interest in the patent.”

Justice Story [in Sawin v. Guild, 21 F.Cas. 554, 554–55 (C.C.D.Mass.1813)] reasoned that statutes must be construed where possible to avoid introducing “public mischiefs, or manifest incongruities.” Justice Story felt a great public mischief would result if courts construed the patent laws to permit an action against a sheriff for selling a patented product at a sheriff’s sale.

More recently, in an opinion authored by Judge Friendly, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit expressly recognized and extended this implied license doctrine to the sale of products by an aggrieved seller to remedy a buyer’s breach. Platt & Munk Co. v. Republic Graphics, Inc., 315 F.2d 847 (2d Cir.1963). Platt & Munk owned copyrights on educational toys and contracted with Republic to supply them. After Republic began delivery, Platt & Munk alleged various defects and refused to pay for the balance of the toys. Republic then informed Platt & Munk of its intent to resell the toys to recover its production costs. Platt & Munk responded by seeking an injunction prohibiting Republic from reselling the toys without Platt & Munk’s consent. The trial court granted a preliminary injunction without addressing whether the toys were actually defective or whether Platt & Munk had the right to refuse payment. Republic filed an interlocutory appeal.

The Second Circuit remanded to the trial court to determine whether Platt & Munk justifiably refused to pay for the toys. If not, it instructed the trial court to lift the injunction. In other words, if Platt & Munk breached the contract, Republic had a right to resell the toys notwithstanding any copyright protection. The Second Circuit based its holding on New York contract law, which provided a seller of goods the right to mitigate damages for contract breaches. Where Platt & Munk breached, the Second Circuit found that Platt & Munk’s copyrights had no effect on Republic’s state law right to resell:

We see no reason why the copyrighted character of the goods should preclude [resale] when – and the qualification is vital – the person for whom the goods were being made unjustifiably refuses to pay the price.

Platt, 315 F.2d at 855.

This ruling extended the implied license doctrine beyond sales under judicial decree to sales under self-help provisions in commercial law. Together, [these cases] demonstrate that the law may create an implied license to enforce the contract obligations of the patent holder and recognize legal rights of aggrieved parties … Absent an implied license in either case, patent holders could frustrate otherwise available commercial remedies.

Here, McCoy and Mitsuboshi had a long-standing business relationship whereby Mitsuboshi manufactured McCoy’s patented knives. In 1991, McCoy placed a purchase order for 150,000 knives with Mitsuboshi. Mitsuboshi, in turn, accepted the order and performed its obligations under that agreement. When it tendered the knives to McCoy, McCoy breached the contract by failing to pay. At that point, rather than immediately act, Mitsuboshi continued to negotiate with McCoy in an effort to secure payment and deliver the knives. After repeated failed attempts, Mitsuboshi sold some of the knives to an American company.

The applicable state contract law in this case is Texas’s version of the Uniform Commercial Code. Because this case involves the sale of goods, the Texas UCC entitles the seller to resell the goods upon the buyer’s wrongful refusal to pay. Consequently, under Texas contract law, when McCoy breached the contract, Mitsuboshi had a right to resell the knives to recoup its losses without McCoy’s consent.

As in Platt, an implied license properly enforces McCoy’s contractual promise to pay for the knives, reflects Mitsuboshi’s commercial efforts to resolve the matter, and recognizes Mitsuboshi’s rights to mitigate under the Texas UCC. This court, like our sister circuit in Platt, sees no reason why the owner of intellectual property rights deserves to evade application of the ordinary contract remedy of resale for an unjustified refusal to pay.

This implied license does not offend the protection afforded patent and trademark rights by federal law. Instead, licenses, like other federal property and contract rights, conform to the applicable state laws. As this court observed in Power Lift, the Supreme Court has held that federal patent law does not preempt enforcement of contracts under state law. By the same reasoning, federal trademark law does not preempt contract enforcement either. Intellectual property owners “may contract as they choose,” but their intellectual property rights do not entitle them to escape the consequences of dishonoring state contractual obligations.

Notes and Questions

1. Public mischiefs and manifest incongruities. Judge Rader’s reasons for recognizing an implied license in Mitsuboshi are somewhat unclear. He first references Bloomer v. Millinger and Wilder v. Kent, two obscure nineteenth-century cases that relate to the creation of an implied license accompanying sale of patented products, a doctrine that today has largely been subsumed by the doctrine of patent exhaustion (see Chapter 23). He next cites the even older case of Sawin v. Guild, in which Justice Story justified the recognition of an implied license so as to avoid “public mischiefs” and “manifest incongruities,” a sort of public interest analysis that never gained significant purchase in patent law.Footnote 8 Finally, Judge Rader leaps forward by more than a century to Platt & Munk, in which the Second Circuit held that New York contract law concerning the mitigation of damages preempted any right that the holder of a copyright might have to prevent the resale of copyrighted toys. Which of these prior cases is most relevant to the facts in Mitsuboshi? Why do you think that Judge Rader felt the need to ground his decision in nineteenth-century decisions such as Bloomer, Wilder and Sawin?

2. Implied in fact or implied in law? There are two general species of implied license: those that are implied in fact and those that are implied in law. As explained by Professor Annemarie Bridy,

The existence of a license … implied in fact … is inferred from objective indicia that the work’s creator assented to and intended the defendant’s use of the work. In order to prove an implied-in-fact license, the defendant must make a showing of permissive intent on the rights holder’s part.Footnote 9

A license implied in law, on the other hand, arises solely through operation of law, without reference to the contracting intentions of the parties:

To prove the existence of an implied-in-law contract (or quasi-contract), there is no need for the proponent to prove that her counterparty had contractual intent. Rather, the court imposes a contractual duty on the counterparty in order to prevent injustice to the proponent. The theory is equitable and nonpromissory, resting on the principle that one party should not be unjustly enriched at the expense of another.Footnote 10

Applying this classification scheme, how would you characterize the implied licenses in Nadel, Wrench, Shaver and Mitsuboshi?

3. Later-issued patents. In TransCore, LP v. Elec. Transaction Consultants Corp., 563 F.3d 1271 (Fed. Cir. 2009), TransCore, the holder of patents covering the E-ZPass automatic toll-collection device, settled patent litigation with Mark IV Industries, a competing manufacturer. Under the settlement agreement, TransCore granted Mark IV a license under three issued patents. Several years later, Mark IV brought suit against ETC, an installer of toll-collection devices sold by Mark IV, under a number of patents, including a newly issued patent (the ’946 patent, a “continuation” of one of the licensed patents) that covered the subject matter of the patents licensed to Mark IV. Because the ’946 patent had not issued at the time of TransCore’s settlement with Mark IV, it was not included in the settlement agreement. Mark IV argued, however, that it had an implied license under the ’946 patent. The Federal Circuit agreed, noting that the ’946 patent “was broader than, and necessary to practice, at least the ’082 patent that was included in the TransCore–Mark IV settlement agreement.”

[T]he district court properly concluded that in order for Mark IV to obtain the benefit of its bargain with TransCore, it must be permitted to practice the ’946 patent to the same extent it may practice the ’183, ’275 and ’082 patents. TransCore is, therefore, legally estopped from asserting the ’946 patent against Mark IV in derogation of the authorizations granted to Mark IV under the ’183, ’275 and ’082 patents. And Mark IV is, in turn, an implied licensee of the ’946 patent.

Why does the court find such an implied license? What injustice would be done if no implied license were recognized?

4. No implied rights clauses? What if the parties to a licensing agreement, such as the ones in Mitsuboshi or TransCore, agreed to a contractual clause excluding any implied licenses? Can a court still recognize an implied license? The answer seems to be yes. In TransCore, the TransCore–Mark IV settlement agreement contained the following language: “No express or implied license or future release whatsoever is granted to MARK IV or to any third party,” 563 F.3d at 1272. In addition, the parties made sure, they thought, that the license granted under the three specified patents would not be expanded to include future patents, agreeing, “This Covenant Not To Sue shall not apply to any other patents issued as of the effective date of this Agreement or to be issued in the future.” So how did the court find an implied license that applied to a patent “issued in the future”? It reasoned that not recognizing an implied license to the ’946 patent would “permit TransCore to derogate from the rights it has expressly granted” – in effect selling a right, then taking back part of what it has sold.

The Federal Circuit cabined the reasoning of TransCore in Endo Pharms., Inc. v. Actavis, Inc., 746 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2014), another case involving a license and a later-issued patent. As in TransCore, the license agreement in Actavis contained a “No Implied Rights” clause. But this time the Federal Circuit gave more weight to the clause, as well as the fact that the newly issued patent in Endo was not a continuation of one of the licensed patents, as it was in TransCore. It held that “The lack of a continuation relationship between any of the asserted and licensed patents and explicit disclaimer of any other licenses not within the literal terms of the contract are dispositive,” 746 F.3d at 1378. What do you make of this distinction? Does it matter that the court in TransCore made little of the fact that the ’946 patent arose from a continuation application? Should this really be the dispositive factor in implied license cases?

5. Scope of implied license. Once an implied license is recognized, what is its scope? The court in TransCore held that “Mark IV’s rights under its implied license to the ’946 patent are necessarily coextensive with the rights it received in the TransCore–Mark IV license agreement,” 563 F.3d at 1279–80. Why is this scope appropriate? What happens to the implied license when the originally licensed patents expire?

Figure 4.7 The dispute in TransCore v. Elec. Transaction Consultants involved patents covering E-ZPass electronic tollbooth devices.

In the copyright cases discussed in Section 4.3, Note 2, the result is less clear. Which approach is the better one? Should the basis on which an implied license is found affect the scope of the implied license?

6. An implied license in oneself? In recent years, celebrities, including Gigi Hadid and Khloe Kardashian, have been sued for copyright infringement when they have publicly posted photographs of themselves taken by paparazzi. In these suits, the paparazzi claim that the celebrities are infringing their (the paparazzi) copyrights in the photographs, as the copyright in a photograph is held by the photographer, even if it was taken without the permission of the celebrity. Professor Annemarie Bridy has argued that celebrities like Hadid should have a license implied in law to post photographs of themselves on social media:

Paparazzi photography is the product of a culture that worships and commoditizes glamour and celebrity. It is, at its base, a form of celebrity exploitation. The value of a paparazzi photo derives less from the photographer’s creative choices, which copyright is designed to protect, than from the celebrity of its subject, which is not copyright’s concern. In paparazzi photos, the photographer’s creative rights and the subject’s publicity rights are entangled. Equity suggests that the primary source of a paparazzi photo’s value, its famous subject, should be entitled to share in that value to some extent.

Hadid’s contributions to the photo’s aesthetic and commercial value seem on par with – if they don’t actually exceed – the photographer’s own contributions in this particular case. Yet the photographer sought to extract damages from Hadid for her limited use of the photo on her own Instagram account. To deny Hadid a limited implied license to use the photo at issue in the suit would arguably be unjust, considering both the significance of her contribution to its value and the fundamentally exploitive nature of paparazzi photography.Footnote 11

Do you agree with Professor Bridy’s theory? How are unauthorized celebrity photographs similar to McCoy’s shrimp peelers?

5 Confidentiality and Pre-license Negotiations

Summary Contents

  1. 5.1 Initial Overtures and Declaratory Judgments 97

  2. 5.2 Confidentiality and Nondisclosure Agreements 107

  3. 5.3 Preliminary Documents 116

Before a commercial agreement of any significance is entered, the parties generally engage in discussions and negotiations. Depending on the size and complexity of the transaction, negotiations can sometimes take weeks, months or even years to complete. Often, the parties will exchange one or more pre-transaction documents that set the stage for the negotiations and a framework for the final, or “definitive” agreement(s). This chapter considers several of the most common forms of such preliminary documents: (1) invitations to license, (2) confidentiality and nondisclosure agreements and (3) term sheets, letters of intent and memoranda of understanding.

5.1 Initial Overtures and Declaratory Judgments

Often, licensing and other transactions are effected between parties that know one another through their respective employees or consultants or their reputations in the market. In these cases, the discussions leading to a transaction can be initiated through a simple phone call, email message or meeting. But in other cases, the parties may not have a pre-existing relationship and will need to query potential business partners “cold.” For example, a neophyte author will generally send out dozens or hundreds of query letters to publishers and literary agents before finding one who is interested in her great American novel. This process for authors, journalists, toy designers, visual artists, film makers, freelance photographers and other holders of copyrights can be time consuming and frustrating, but generally not fraught with legal issues.

The situation is somewhat different, however, when patents are involved. As discussed in Chapter 1, an individual who invents a new type of widget may not have the resources, expertise or business network to embark on full-scale production and marketing of the device. Likewise, the widget may simply be one component of a more complex product such as a smartphone, automobile or geosynchronous satellite that is manufactured by other, much larger, companies. In all of these cases, the inventor may need to approach different market players about potential licensing arrangements.

But how will a large company react to a licensing overture by an inventor who holds a patent that is potentially relevant to some aspect of its business? In the best case, the company will invite the inventor to discuss the proposal, which may eventually lead to an agreement. Less good, but far more common, the large company may ignore the inventor’s unsolicited proposal. But most risky for the inventor, the company, once it is alerted to the existence of his patent, might view it as a potential threat. If that is the case, the company could seek to challenge the patent preemptively by bringing a declaratory judgment action against the inventor seeking to invalidate the patent.Footnote 1

Declaratory Judgment Act (28 U.S.C. § 2201)

In a case of actual controversy … any court of the United States … may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such a declaration.

Thus, when there is an “actual controversy,” a party may avail itself of the Act by seeking a declaration of its rights in federal court. For example, if the holder of an intellectual property right threatens to sue a party for infringement of that right, the threatened party may seek a declaration either that it does not infringe or that the asserted right is invalid or unenforceable.

In MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007), the Supreme Court established the current standard for assessing the existence of an “actual controversy” in IP cases:

Whether the facts alleged, under all circumstances, show that there is a substantial controversy between parties having adverse legal interests of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.Footnote 2

The Federal Circuit’s most extensive analysis of declaratory judgment jurisdiction in patent licensing cases can be found in SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., decided two months after the Supreme Court’s decision in MedImmune.

Sandisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc.

480 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007)

LINN, CIRCUIT JUDGE

SanDisk Corporation (“SanDisk”) appeals from a decision of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California granting STMicroelectronics’ (“ST’s”) motion to dismiss SanDisk’s … claims relating to declaratory judgment of noninfringement and invalidity for failure to present an actual controversy. Because the district court erred in dismissing the declaratory judgment claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, we vacate the judgment and remand the case to the district court.

Background

SanDisk is in the flash memory storage market and owns several patents related to flash memory storage products. ST, traditionally in the market of semiconductor integrated circuits, more recently entered the flash memory market and has a sizeable portfolio of patents related to flash memory storage products. On April 16, 2004, ST’s vice president of intellectual property and licensing, Lisa Jorgenson (“Jorgenson”), sent a letter to SanDisk’s chief executive officer requesting a meeting to discuss a cross-license agreement. The letter listed eight patents owned by ST that Jorgenson believed “may be of interest” to SanDisk. On April 28, 2004, SanDisk responded that it would need time to review the listed patents and would be in touch in several weeks to discuss the possibility of meeting in June.

On July 12, 2004, having heard nothing further from SanDisk, Jorgenson sent a letter to SanDisk reiterating her request to meet in July to discuss a cross-license agreement and listing four additional ST patents that “may also be of interest” to SanDisk. On July 21, 2004, SanDisk’s chief intellectual property counsel and senior director, E. Earle Thompson (“Thompson”), responded to ST’s letter by informing Jorgenson of his “understanding that both sides wish to continue … friendly discussions” such as those between the business representatives in May and June. The discussions of May and June that Thompson referred to were discussions among managers and vice presidents of SanDisk and ST at business meetings held on May 18, 2004, and June 9, 2004, to explore the possibility of ST’s selling flash memory products to SanDisk. The business meetings were unrelated to any patents.

On August 5, 2004, when the business representatives next met, SanDisk presented an analysis of three of its patents and orally offered ST a license. ST declined to present an analysis of any of its patents, stating instead that any patent and licensing issues should be discussed in a separate meeting with Jorgenson. Later that same day, Thompson wrote a letter to Jorgenson objecting to separating business and intellectual property issues and stating that “[i]t has been SanDisk’s hope and desire to enter into a mutually beneficial discussion without the rattling of sabers.” On August 11, 2004, Jorgenson replied, stating that it was her understanding that the parties were going to have a licensing/intellectual property meeting later that month “to discuss the possibility for a patent cross-license.” She said that SanDisk should come to that meeting prepared to present an analysis of the three SanDisk patents it identified during the August 5th business meeting, as well as “any infringement analyses of an ST device or need for ST to have a license to these patents.” She also said that ST would be prepared at that meeting to discuss the twelve patents identified in her prior letters. In closing, Jorgenson said that ST was “look[ing] forward to open and frank discussions with SanDisk concerning fair and reasonable terms for a broad cross-license agreement.”

On August 27, 2004, the licensing meeting was held. Jorgenson, two ST licensing attorneys, and three technical experts retained by ST to perform the infringement analyses of SanDisk’s products, attended on behalf of ST. Thompson and an engineer attended on behalf of SanDisk. At the meeting, Jorgenson requested that the parties’ discussions be treated as “settlement discussions” under Federal Rule of Evidence 408. ST then presented a slide show which compared statistics regarding SanDisk’s and ST’s patent portfolios, revenue, and research and development expenses, and listed SanDisk’s various “unlicensed activities.” This slide show was followed by a four- to five-hour presentation by ST’s technical experts, during which they identified and discussed the specific claims of each patent and alleged that they were infringed by SanDisk. According to Thompson, the presentation by ST’s technical experts included “mapp[ing] the elements of each of the allegedly infringed claims to the aspects of the accused SanDisk products alleged to practice the elements.” Thompson declares that “the experts liberally referred to SanDisk’s (alleged) infringement of [ST’s] products.” SanDisk’s engineer then made a presentation, describing several of SanDisk’s patents and analyzing how a semiconductor chip product sold by ST infringes.

At the end of the meeting, Jorgenson handed Thompson a packet of materials containing, for each of ST’s fourteen patents under discussion, a copy of the patent, reverse engineering reports for certain of SanDisk’s products, and diagrams showing how elements of ST’s patent claims cover SanDisk’s products. According to SanDisk, Jorgenson indicated (in words to this effect):

I know that this is material that would allow SanDisk to DJ [ST] on. We have had some internal discussions on whether I should be giving you a copy of these materials in light of that fact. But I have decided that I will go ahead and give you these materials.

Jorgenson further told Thompson that “ST has absolutely no plan whatsoever to sue SanDisk.” Thompson responded to Jorgenson that “SanDisk is not going to sue you on Monday” and that another meeting might be appropriate.

On September 1, 2004, Jorgenson wrote to Thompson, enclosing copies of ST’s general slide presentation from the August meeting and also enclosing a hard copy booklet containing each of the engineering reports “for each claim on all products where ST demonstrated coverage by the 14 ST patents to-date [sic].” Jorgenson requested that SanDisk provide ST with a copy of SanDisk’s presentation and information about the three SanDisk patents presented. On September 8, 2004, Thompson replied by e-mail, confirming receipt of the package from ST, attaching a copy of SanDisk’s presentation, indicating it was his “personal feeling … that we have got to trust one another during these negotiations,” and seeking a non-disclosure agreement. Thompson also wrote “I still owe you the rates quoted.”

On October 15, 2004, after several further e-mails and phone calls between the business representatives trying to establish another meeting, SanDisk filed the instant lawsuit. SanDisk alleged infringement of one of its patents and sought a declaratory judgment of noninfringement and invalidity of the fourteen ST patents that had been discussed during the cross-licensing negotiations. On December 3, 2004, ST filed a motion to dismiss SanDisk’s declaratory judgment claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, maintaining that there was no actual controversy at the time SanDisk filed its complaint.

Figure 5.1 Figure from US Patent No. 5,073,816, “Packaging semiconductor chips,” which ST claimed that SanDisk infringed.

The district court granted ST’s motion to dismiss, holding that no actual controversy existed for purposes of the Declaratory Judgment Act because SanDisk did not have an objectively reasonable apprehension of suit, even though it may have subjectively believed that ST would bring an infringement suit. The district court reasoned that “SanDisk has presented no evidence that ST threatened it with litigation at any time during the parties’ negotiations, nor has SanDisk shown other conduct by ST rising to a level sufficient to indicate an intent on the part of ST to initiate an infringement action.” The district court found that the studied and determined infringement analyses that ST presented to SanDisk did not constitute the requisite “express charges [of infringement] carrying with them the threat of enforcement.” The district court also found that the totality of the circumstances did not evince an actual controversy because ST told SanDisk that it did not intend to sue SanDisk for infringement. In a footnote, the court indicated that, as an alternative basis for its ruling, even if it did have jurisdiction, it would exercise its discretion and decline to hear the case.

SanDisk appealed the dismissal to this court.

Discussion

SanDisk argues that the district court erred as a matter of law by requiring an express accusation of patent infringement coupled with an explicit threat of judicial enforcement to support declaratory judgment jurisdiction, and that, under the correct legal standard articulated by this court in Arrowhead, the facts of this case illustrate that SanDisk’s apprehension of an infringement suit was objectively reasonable. SanDisk asserts that the infringement analysis presented by ST and its experts at the August 27, 2004 licensing meeting constituted an allegation of infringement and that the totality of the circumstances shows that ST’s conduct gave rise to an actual case or controversy. SanDisk further points out that negotiations regarding licensing had ceased by the time SanDisk filed its claims for declaratory judgment.

ST counters that the district court applied the correct legal standard and argues that SanDisk ignores the line of cases that have followed and interpreted [Arrowhead Indus. Water, Inc. v. Ecolochem, Inc., 846 F.2d 731 (Fed. Cir. 1988)]. ST asserts that the cases following Arrowhead reveal that the bare mention of infringement, particularly during license negotiations, is not sufficient to meet the standard set forth in Arrowhead. ST asserts that its conduct at the August 27, 2004 licensing meeting was to strengthen its position during licensing negotiations and that, under the totality of the circumstances, SanDisk has not shown that ST’s conduct gave rise to declaratory judgment jurisdiction …

Case or Controversy

The first question we address is whether the facts alleged in this case show that there is a case or controversy within the meaning of the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a).

The Declaratory Judgment Act provides, in relevant part, that

[i]n a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction … any court of the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought.

The “actual controversy” requirement of the Declaratory Judgment Act is rooted in Article III of the Constitution, which provides for federal jurisdiction over only “cases and controversies.” Thus, our jurisdiction extends only to matters that are Article III cases or controversies.

The Supreme Court, in the context of a patent license dispute, recently examined Article III’s case or controversy requirement as it relates to the Declaratory Judgment Act. See MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007). In MedImmune, the Supreme Court considered “whether Article III’s limitation of federal courts’ jurisdiction to ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies,’ reflected in the ‘actual controversy’ requirement of the Declaratory Judgment Act requires a patent licensee to terminate or be in breach of its license agreement before it can seek a declaratory judgment that the underlying patent is invalid, unenforceable, or not infringed.”

The Supreme Court began its analysis

with the recognition that, where threatened action by government is concerned, [the Court] do[es] not require a plaintiff to expose himself to liability before bringing suit to challenge the basis for the threat—for example, the constitutionality of a law threatened to be enforced. The plaintiff’s own action (or inaction) in failing to violate the law eliminates the imminent threat of prosecution, but nonetheless does not eliminate Article III jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court quoted its earlier decision in Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941), where the Court stated that “the question in each case is whether the facts alleged, under all the circumstances, show that there is a substantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.” The Supreme Court emphasized that Article III requires that the dispute at issue be “‘definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests’; and that it be ‘real and substantial’ and ‘admi[t] of specific relief through a decree of a conclusive character, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.’” Id. The Supreme Court stated that, when faced with a genuine threat of enforcement that the government will penalize a certain private action, Article III “d[oes] not require, as a prerequisite to testing the validity of the law in a suit for injunction, that the plaintiff bet the farm, so to speak, by taking the violative action.” As the Supreme Court noted, “the declaratory judgment procedure is an alternative to pursuit of the arguably illegal activity.” The Supreme Court clarified that, although a declaratory judgment plaintiff may eliminate an “imminent threat of harm by simply not doing what he claimed the right to do[,] … [t]hat did not preclude subject-matter jurisdiction [where] the threat-eliminating behavior was effectively coerced.” Id. “The dilemma posed by that coercion—putting the challenger to the choice between abandoning his rights or risking prosecution—is a dilemma that it was the very purpose of the Declaratory Judgment Act to ameliorate.”

The Supreme Court then applied these principles to the facts of the case and remarked that “the requirements of [a] case or controversy are met where payment of a claim is demanded as of right and where payment is made, but where the involuntary or coercive nature of the exaction preserves the right to recover the sums paid or to challenge the legality of the claim.” Id. The Supreme Court held that “[t]he rule that a plaintiff must destroy a large building, bet the farm, or (as here) risk treble damages and the loss of 80 percent of its business, before seeking a declaration of its actively contested legal rights finds no support in Article III.”

With regard to patent disputes, prior to MedImmune, this court articulated a two-part test that first considers whether conduct by the patentee creates a reasonable apprehension on the part of the declaratory judgment plaintiff that it will face an infringement suit, and second examines whether conduct by the declaratory judgment plaintiff amounts to infringing activity or demonstrates concrete steps taken with the intent to conduct such activity. See Arrowhead, 846 F.2d at 736.

The Supreme Court’s opinion in MedImmune represents a rejection of our reasonable apprehension of suit test. The Court first noted that “the continuation of royalty payments makes what would otherwise be an imminent threat at least remote, if not nonexistent … Petitioner’s own acts, in other words, eliminate the imminent threat of harm.” The Court nonetheless concluded that declaratory judgment jurisdiction existed relying in particular on its earlier decision in Altvater v. Freeman, 319 U.S. 359 (1943). There, the patentee brought suit to enjoin patent infringement, and the accused infringer filed declaratory judgment counterclaims of invalidity. The district court found that there was no infringement and that the patent was invalid. The appellate court affirmed the finding of noninfringement but vacated the finding of invalidity as moot. The Supreme Court held that the declaratory judgment counterclaims were not mooted by the finding of noninfringement. In finding declaratory judgment jurisdiction in MedImmune, the Court specifically addressed and rejected our reasonable apprehension test:

[e]ven if Altvater could be distinguished as an “injunction” case, it would still contradict the Federal Circuit’s “reasonable apprehension of suit” test. A licensee who pays royalties under compulsion of an injunction has no more apprehension of imminent harm than a licensee who pays royalties for fear of treble damages and an injunction fatal to his business. The reasonable-apprehension-of-suit test also conflicts with our decisions in Maryland Casualty, where jurisdiction obtained even though the collision-victim defendant could not have sued the declaratory-judgment plaintiff-insurer without first obtaining a judgment against the insured; and Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 239 (1937), where jurisdiction obtained even though the very reason the insurer sought declaratory relief was that the insured had given no indication that he would file suit. It is also in tension with Cardinal Chemical Co. v. Morton Int’l, Inc., 508 U.S. 83, 98 (1993), which held that appellate affirmance of a judgment of noninfringement, eliminating any apprehension of suit, does not moot a declaratory judgment counterclaim of patent invalidity.

MedImmune, 127 S. Ct. at 774 n.11.

The Supreme Court in MedImmune addressed declaratory judgment jurisdiction in the context of a signed license. In the context of conduct prior to the existence of a license, declaratory judgment jurisdiction generally will not arise merely on the basis that a party learns of the existence of a patent owned by another or even perceives such a patent to pose a risk of infringement, without some affirmative act by the patentee. But Article III jurisdiction may be met where the patentee takes a position that puts the declaratory judgment plaintiff in the position of either pursuing arguably illegal behavior or abandoning that which he claims a right to do. We need not define the outer boundaries of declaratory judgment jurisdiction, which will depend on the application of the principles of declaratory judgment jurisdiction to the facts and circumstances of each case. We hold only that where a patentee asserts rights under a patent based on certain identified ongoing or planned activity of another party, and where that party contends that it has the right to engage in the accused activity without license, an Article III case or controversy will arise and the party need not risk a suit for infringement by engaging in the identified activity before seeking a declaration of its legal rights.

Under the facts alleged in this case, SanDisk has established an Article III case or controversy that gives rise to declaratory judgment jurisdiction. ST sought a right to a royalty under its patents based on specific, identified activity by SanDisk. For example, at the August 27, 2004 licensing meeting, ST presented, as part of the “license negotiations,” a thorough infringement analysis presented by seasoned litigation experts, detailing that one or more claims of its patents read on one or more of SanDisk’s identified products. At that meeting, ST presented SanDisk with a detailed presentation which identified, on an element-by-element basis, the manner in which ST believed each of SanDisk’s products infringed the specific claims of each of ST’s patents. During discussions, the experts liberally referred to SanDisk’s present, ongoing infringement of ST’s patents and the need for SanDisk to license those patents. ST also gave SanDisk a packet of materials, over 300 pages in length, containing, for each of ST’s fourteen patents under discussion, a copy of the patent, reverse engineering reports for certain of SanDisk’s products, and diagrams showing a detailed infringement analysis of SanDisk’s products. ST communicated to SanDisk that it had made a studied and determined infringement determination and asserted the right to a royalty based on this determination. SanDisk, on the other hand, maintained that it could proceed in its conduct without the payment of royalties to ST. These facts evince that the conditions of creating a substantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal interest, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment were fulfilled. SanDisk need not “bet the farm,” so to speak, and risk a suit for infringement by cutting off licensing discussions and continuing in the identified activity before seeking a declaration of its legal rights.

Promise Not to Sue

We next address whether Jorgenson’s direct and unequivocal statement that “ST has absolutely no plan whatsoever to sue SanDisk” eliminates any actual controversy and renders SanDisk’s declaratory judgment claims moot.

We decline to hold that Jorgenson’s statement that ST would not sue SanDisk eliminates the justiciable controversy created by ST’s actions, because ST has engaged in a course of conduct that shows a preparedness and willingness to enforce its patent rights despite Jorgenson’s statement. Having approached SanDisk, having made a studied and considered determination of infringement by SanDisk, having communicated that determination to SanDisk, and then saying that it does not intend to sue, ST is engaging in the kinds of “extra-judicial patent enforcement with scare-the-customer-and-run tactics” that the Declaratory Judgment Act was intended to obviate. ST’s statement that it does not intend to sue does not moot the actual controversy created by its acts.

Conclusion

For the above reasons, we conclude that the dismissal was improperly granted. The dismissal is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Figure 5.2 The dispute in MedImmune v. Genentech involved a Genentech patent claiming antibody technology. Because MedImmune’s allegedly infringing drug Synagis generated 80 percent of its revenue, MedImmune accepted a license from Genentech and paid royalties “under protest,” then sought to invalidate the patent.

Notes and Questions

1. Declaratory judgment actions. Why would a potential licensee bring a declaratory judgment action seeking to invalidate a patent offered to it for license? If the potential licensee does not wish to enter into a license, why not simply wait until the patent holder sues for infringement, and then raise any available defenses of invalidity?

2. FRE 408 settlement negotiations. Federal Rule of Evidence 408 states that:

Evidence of the following is not admissible – on behalf of any party – either to prove or disprove the validity or amount of a disputed claim or to impeach by a prior inconsistent statement or a contradiction:

  1. (1) furnishing, promising, or offering – or accepting, promising to accept, or offering to accept – a valuable consideration in compromising or attempting to compromise the claim; and

  2. (2) conduct or a statement made during compromise negotiations about the claim – except when offered in a criminal case and when the negotiations related to a claim by a public office in the exercise of its regulatory, investigative, or enforcement authority.

In SanDisk, the parties seemingly agreed to conduct their August 27 meeting under FRE 408. What is the significance of this decision? Why should it be relevant to declaratory judgment jurisdiction?

3. No reasonable apprehension of suit. In MedImmune, the Supreme Court explicitly rejected the Federal Circuit’s “reasonable apprehension of suit” test for declaratory judgment jurisdiction. How do you think SanDisk’s action would have fared under that test? Is ST’s representation that it had no intention to sue still relevant under MedImmune?

4. MedImmune’s impact. In his concurring opinion in SanDisk, Judge Bryson predicted that the Supreme Court’s decision in MedImmune, which the Federal Circuit was bound to follow, would cause “a sweeping change in our law regarding declaratory judgment jurisdiction.” Why? Do you think that such a sweeping change was justified? Would Judge Bryson, as the majority suggests, require SanDisk to “bet the farm” before bringing a declaratory judgment action? What impact is MedImmune likely to have on licensing negotiations?

5. Patent applications. In addition to issued patents, licenses are often granted with respect to patent applications (see Section 6.1). How might the presence of patent applications in a portfolio offered for license affect the declaratory judgment analysis under MedImmune and SanDisk? What other risks might exist for a potential licensor in offering patent applications for license?

6. Invitations to license. Following the decisions in MedImmune and SanDisk, patent holders must thread a particularly thin needle when approaching potential licensees. If they are too aggressive in arguing that the potential licensee is infringing, they may trigger a declaratory judgment action by the potential licensee in the court of its choice. If, on the other hand, they are too vague regarding the scope of their patents and the potential infringement, they may not persuade potential licensees that a license is necessary. Compare the two models of licensing “inquiry letters” below and consider what approach you might advise a client to use in crafting a licensing invitation that is not likely to lead the potential licensee to bring a declaratory judgment action.

Letter A is a traditional pre-MedImmune licensing invitation. But is the patentee better off with the informal and nonspecific approach in Letter B?

License Inquiry Letter A: Direct Approach

To: Company CEO

From: General Counsel, Patentee

You are hereby notified that Company’s XYZ product infringes U.S. Patent No. x,xxx,xxx owned by Patentee. Unless you return a signed copy of the attached license agreement to Patentee within 10 days of this letter, Patentee will initiate litigation against Company in the Eastern District of Texas.

License Inquiry Letter B: Indirect Approach

Hey Joe [CEO of Company Y] –

I heard the XYZ product got great press at ComDex! ☺

Let’s grab sushi next time you’re in Cupertino. My treat – we can catch up and maybe do some biz. I have a great idea for how our companies might be able to cooperate on a terrific new idea.

Ciao!

Jim

7. Demand letter statutes. More than thirty states have enacted statutes intended to curb abusive litigation by patent “trolls” by imposing fines for sending misleading or abusive letters that allege infringement and demand payment from recipients. In May 2021, the attorney general of Washington enforced such a law against a company that allegedly sent identical demand letters to 1,200 small businesses in forty-eight states over an eighteen-month period, all demanding $65,000 to license a patent covering financial transaction processing.Footnote 3 Do such laws make legitimate licensing overtures even more risky? How can patent owners address these risks?

8. Demand letters and personal jurisdiction. Does sending a patent demand letter to a potential licensee give the federal or state courts in the recipient’s state personal jurisdiction over the sender? This controversial issue is addressed in Section 22.3, Note 4.

Problem 5.1

You represent I.C.E., the holder of a portfolio of US patents covering machines used in the packaging of ice cream for consumer resale. Draft a proposed licensing inquiry letter to the CEO of MechanIce, a long-time competitor in the manufacture of ice cream packaging machines.

Now assume that MechanIce refuses to respond, and you wish to bring it to the negotiating table by making its customers aware of your patents. Draft a licensing inquiry letter that can be sent to more than 3,000 supermarkets and grocery store chains in the United States that sell ice cream packaged using MechanIce machines (assume that the packaging itself is covered by the claims of one of your patents). How advisable is it to send this letter? What risks are involved?

5.2 Confidentiality and Nondisclosure Agreements

During the proposal and negotiation of a licensing or other business transaction, it is often the case that one or both parties will be required to disclose information to the other that is not generally known to the public. Depending on the type of transaction that is contemplated, this information could include technical product details, input costs, names of existing and potential customers, details of unpublished patent applications, and much more.

In the United States, trade secrets are protected under both federal and state law. The Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA), which has been adopted in most states, defines a trade secret as:

information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique or process, that:

  1. 1. Derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure, and

  2. 2. Is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstance to maintain its secrecy.Footnote 4

Thus, much of the information that the parties are likely to disclose to one another would fall under this definition. But part 2 of the definition requires the party claiming a piece of information as a trade secret to take reasonable efforts to “maintain its secrecy.” An unrestricted disclosure of even the most valuable information will result in the loss of its status as a trade secret, and the receiving party will be under no obligation to limit its use or disclosure of that information.

For this reason, it is often critical that parties enter into a written nondisclosure agreement (NDA) (also known as a confidentiality agreement) before any confidential information is disclosed. One of the most common agreements that a junior attorney will be given to draft and negotiate is an NDA. Below is a relatively customary form of NDA that is used in transactions like these.

Example: Mutual Nondisclosure Agreement

Agreement dated ____________ (the “Effective Date”), between ________________, and ______________________ (each a “Party” and together the “Parties”).

  1. 1. Background. The Parties intend to engage in discussions and negotiations concerning a possible business relationship. In the course of such discussions and negotiations, [and in the course of any such business relationship], it is anticipated that each party will disclose or deliver to the other party and to the other party’s directors, officers, employees, agents or advisors (including attorneys, accountants, consultants, bankers, financial advisors and members of advisory boards) (collectively, “Representatives”) certain of its trade secrets or confidential or proprietary information for the purposes of enabling the other party to evaluate the feasibility of such business relationship [and to perform its obligations and exercise its rights under any such business relationship] (the “Purpose”) [1]. As used in this Agreement, the party disclosing Confidential Information (as defined below) is referred to as the “Disclosing Party”; the party receiving such Confidential Information is referred to as the “Recipient.”

  2. 2. Confidential information. [2] As used in this Agreement, the term “Confidential Information” means all information that is disclosed by the Disclosing Party or its Representatives to the Recipient [and which is designated as such in writing, whether by letter or by the use of an appropriate proprietary stamp or legend], [or] [which by its nature is of a type which is considered to be confidential and/or proprietary]. In addition, the term “Confidential Information” shall be deemed to include: (a) any notes, analyses, compilations, studies, interpretations, memoranda or other documents prepared by the Recipient or its Representatives which contain, reflect or are based upon, in whole or in part, any Confidential Information; and (b) the existence or status of, and any information concerning, the discussions between the parties concerning the Purpose.

  3. 3. Duration. This Agreement shall apply to all Confidential Information disclosed between the parties hereto from the Effective Date until [the first anniversary of the Effective Date] [3]. The obligations imposed by this Agreement shall continue with respect to a particular item of Confidential Information until the [fifth anniversary] of the disclosure of such Confidential Information to Recipient pursuant to this Agreement; provided, however, that the confidentiality obligations imposed by this Agreement with respect to [_________] included in the Confidential Information shall continue [in perpetuity/for a period of [__] years/for the duration of applicable trade secret protection under the law].

  4. 4. Use and disclosure. [4] The Recipient shall use the Confidential Information of the Disclosing Party only for the Purposes. The Recipient shall hold the Confidential Information in confidence with at least the same degree of care as it uses to keep its own proprietary information confidential, which shall in no event be less than reasonable care, and shall not intentionally disclose or publicly release any Confidential Information of the Disclosing Party.

  5. 5. Limitations. The obligations of the Recipient specified in section 4 shall not apply, and the Recipient shall have no further obligations, with respect to any Confidential Information to the extent that the Recipient can prove that such Confidential Information: (a) is generally known to the public at the time of disclosure or becomes generally known without the Recipient violating this Agreement; (b) is in the Recipient’s possession at the time of disclosure; (c) becomes known to the Recipient through disclosure by sources other than the Disclosing Party without such sources violating any confidentiality obligations to the Disclosing Party; or (d) is independently developed by the Recipient without access or reference to the Disclosing Party’s Confidential Information [5]. Moreover, this Agreement shall not prohibit the Recipient from disclosing Confidential Information of the Disclosing Party to the extent required in order for the Recipient to comply with applicable laws, regulations, court orders and stock exchange rules, provided that the Recipient provides prior written notice of such required disclosure to the Disclosing Party, takes reasonable and lawful precautions to avoid and/or minimize the extent of such disclosure and cooperates with the Disclosing Party to obtain confidential treatment for such Confidential Information from the relevant authority.

  6. 6. Ownership. The Recipient agrees that it shall not receive any right, title or interest in, or any license or right to use, the Disclosing Party’s Confidential Information or any patent, copyright, trade secret, trademark or other intellectual property rights therein, by implication or otherwise. Each of the parties hereto represents, warrants and covenants that the trade secrets which it discloses to the other party pursuant to this Agreement have not been stolen, appropriated, obtained or converted without authorization. [A prohibition on reverse engineering is sometimes included here, as well. [8]]

  7. 7. Return of Confidential Information. The Recipient shall, upon the written request of the Disclosing Party, return to the Disclosing Party, or destroy, all Confidential Information received by the Recipient from the Disclosing Party and all copies and reproductions thereof, including any notes, reports or other documents prepared by the Recipient which contain Confidential Information of the Disclosing Party [provided, however, that the Recipient shall not be required to locate or delete copies of Confidential Information that are stored on its internal or external computer backup media as part of its standard system backup and disaster recovery processes, so long as such Confidential Information is accessible only to the relevant computer operations personnel]. Notwithstanding the return or destruction of the Confidential Information, the Recipient will continue to be bound by its obligations of confidentiality and other obligations hereunder.

  8. [8. OPTIONAL: Residuals. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Agreement, either party shall be free to use any information disclosed hereunder to the extent that it is retained in the unaided memory of its employees.] [9]

  9. 9. Representatives. Recipient shall be permitted to disclose Confidential Information received from the Disclosing Party to those of its Representatives who have a need to know such Confidential Information for the Purposes, provided that such Representatives are legally bound to maintain the confidentiality of such Proprietary Information at least to the degree that Recipient is so bound hereunder. Any breach of any obligation of confidentiality by a Representative shall constitute a breach by Recipient hereunder, and Recipient shall be jointly and severally liable with all such Representatives for such breaches. Recipient shall maintain a written log of Representatives to whom the Confidential Information is disclosed and shall share such log with the Disclosing Party upon its request. [6]

  10. 10. Injunctive relief. The provisions of this Agreement are necessary for the protection of the business and goodwill of the parties and are considered by the parties to be reasonable for such purpose. The Recipient agrees that any breach of this Agreement [will/may] [7] cause the Disclosing Party substantial and irreparable injury which cannot be remedied by monetary damages alone, and, therefore, in addition to other remedies which may be available, the Disclosing Party shall have the right to [seek] [7] specific performance and other injunctive and equitable relief to prevent any such breach or its continuation without the necessity of posting a bond.

Drafting Notes

  1. [1] Purpose – Each NDA should define the purpose for which information is exchanged. Sometimes the purpose is narrowly limited to a specific potential transaction (often an acquisition), and sometimes it broadly covers any business transaction between the parties.

  2. [2] Confidential Information – some NDAs use the term “Proprietary Information” instead of “Confidential Information.” The intent is largely the same, though “Proprietary” connotes ownership as opposed to simple confidentiality (e.g., a party may hold third-party information that it does not “own,” but which it is obligated to keep confidential).

  3. [3] Time of disclosure – in some cases, the parties may have exchanged information before the NDA is signed, in which case retroactive effect should be considered.

  4. [4] Use and nondisclosure – section 4 contains the two principal obligations that should be included in every NDA: the recipient’s obligation not to use the disclosing party’s confidential information for any purpose other than the purpose, and not to disclose or release that confidential information to others. Many NDAs inadvertently omit one of these key obligations – don’t let this happen to you!

  5. [5] Independent development – this exception generally becomes relevant in two contexts: (1) When the recipient is a large enterprise with multiple independent groups conducting research and development on potentially related topics, often in different geographical locations; if confidential information is disclosed to a group in the Austin, Texas office, but similar information is created by the recipient’s Moscow office, the information should not be protected. (2) If the recipient knows that its developers are “contaminated” with confidential information, it can form a new development group with individuals who are assured to have no access to the confidential information and ask them to develop similar information independently. This is called a “clean room” approach, and has been upheld by the courts if conducted carefully. See NEC Corp. v. Intel Corp., 1989 WL 67434 (N.D. Cal.).Footnote 5

  6. [6] Recipient personnel – in some cases, the disclosing party may wish to limit the recipient’s personnel that are authorized to access and use its confidential information. Such limitations can be structured to list the names and/or titles of such personnel, or the groups or departments in which they are based (e.g., “Confidential Information shall be made accessible only to attorneys who are members of Recipient’s Office of General Counsel”). Alternately, certain groups can be expressly excluded from access to confidential information (e.g., “No Confidential Information shall be provided or made accessible to the members of Recipient’s Mark V development team”).

  7. [7] Injunctive relief – this clause is intended to enable the disclosing party to obtain an injunction to prevent disclosure (or further disclosure) of its confidential information without proving every element typically required to obtain injunctive relief. As such, the recipient sacrifices significant legal protections by agreeing to this language in its “strong” form. The [alternative] language represents a recipient’s standard push-back against this clause.

  8. [8] No reverse engineering – if confidential information includes proprietary materials, chemical compounds, circuitry, software or other items from which other trade secrets may be derived, the disclosing party should consider the inclusion of a “no reverse engineering” clause, discussed in detail in Section 18.2.5.

  9. [9] Residuals – section 8 is a “residuals” clause, which permits the recipient to continue to use any confidential information retained in the “unaided memory” of its personnel. Such a clause is almost always controversial, and its use and acceptance are generally industry-dependent. IBM is reputed to have “invented” this clause to enable its engineers to think freely, even after they had been exposed to competitors’ confidential information. While a residuals clause does not permit the recipient to use any written, electronic or other artificial means to preserve confidential information that it is no longer permitted to use, it is certainly possible that some individuals may have exceptional (or even photographic) memories, which could enable them to use the disclosing party’s confidential information long after a proposed transaction has failed to materialize.

Notes and Questions

1. Purpose. One of the most heavily litigated issues arising under an NDA is whether the recipient used confidential information for some purpose beyond the stated “purpose” of the disclosure. For example, in Le Tote Inc. v. Urban Outfitters Inc., (E.D. Pa. 2021), Le Tote described its mail-order fashion rental business model to Urban Outfitters under an NDA for the purpose of enabling Urban Outfitters to evaluate a potential acquisition of Le Tote. Urban Outfitters did not acquire Le Tote, but did start its own mail-order fashion rental business. Le Tote alleged that it did so using Le Tote’s confidential information. If you had represented Urban Outfitters, what language might you have drafted to protect your client from such allegations? For a sense of just how large the stakes can be in such matters, see Martin Marietta Materials, Inc. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 56 A.3d 1072 (Del. Ch. 2012), aff ’d, 68 A.3d 1208 (Del. 2012) (injunction of a $5.5 billion hostile takeover on the basis of the interpretation of the word “between” in a confidentiality agreement).

2. NDA versus definitive agreement. In section 1 of the sample NDA, what is the purpose of the language in the definition of “Purposes” that reads “and to perform its obligations and exercise its rights under any such business relationship that is formalized between the parties”? Is it advisable to allow a pre-agreement NDA to continue to cover information disclosed after a definitive license or other agreement is signed? Another approach is to limit the NDA to pre-agreement discussions, and then to include a comprehensive confidentiality clause in the “definitive” agreement between the parties. Or the parties may draft the confidentiality clause in the definitive agreement broadly enough to encompass information disclosed under the NDA and then supersede and cancel the NDA in the definitive agreement. What are the advantages and drawbacks of each of these approaches?

3. Marking. In section 2, the [bracketed] language shows that the central definition of “Confidential Information” can be cast in two ways: either as all information that the disclosing party marks as confidential (e.g., with a “CONFIDENTIAL” legend) or as all information that the disclosing party discloses to the recipient. What is the significance of including a marking obligation on the disclosing party? Which form of this definition would you choose if you were representing the disclosing party? The recipient?

4. Confidential information versus trade secrets. Why do NDAs go to such lengths to define confidential information, rather than simply relying on existing statutory and common law definitions of trade secrets? Are there significant differences between proprietary/confidential information and trade secrets? Why require any terms in an NDA beyond a simple acknowledgment that certain information is a trade secret?

5. Timing and duration. Section 3 of the NDA addresses timing and duration issues. The first sentence limits the obligations under the NDA to information disclosed prior to a particular cutoff date. Why would such a cutoff be advisable? If a cutoff is used, the parties must be careful to remember that the NDA is no longer in place after that date, as information disclosed afterwards will not be covered. An alternative is to eliminate the cutoff entirely. Under what circumstances would this approach be advisable?

The next sentence describes how long the obligations under the NDA last with respect to information disclosed under it. Sometimes this duration has two tiers, a shorter term for most information (e.g., a five-year term) and a perpetual or longer term for highly sensitive or valuable information (e.g., the formula for Coca-Cola, key computer source code, etc.). Why should obligations of confidentiality ever expire? What other kinds of information might merit perpetual protection?

Note the final drafting “option” in this sentence. It provides that all confidential information that constitutes a “trade secret” will remain protected for the duration of its trade secret status. Does this provision introduce some circularity to the duration of protection for this information?

6. Residuals. As noted in Drafting Note [9], residuals clauses are almost always controversial. If you represented the disclosing party in a transaction, how would you respond to the recipient’s request for a residuals clause in an NDA? When might such a clause be reasonable? Could a residuals clause be interpreted as granting the recipient an implied license under the disclosing party’s patents? How might this implication be avoided? How would a residuals clause have helped Urban Outfitters in the case discussed in Note 1?

7. Exceptions. Section 5 of the NDA provides several exceptions to the recipient’s obligations of confidentiality. Which of these, if any, would you wish to eliminate or modify if you represented the disclosing party? How? The Celeritas case discussed below addresses one of the most common of these exceptions, that concerning information that is in the public domain. What is the purpose of the exception at the end of this section pertaining to the disclosing party’s compliance with law and regulations? Why isn’t this exception included with the other exceptions listed in Section 5?

Figure 5.3 The formula for Coca-Cola, which is allegedly stored in this imposing vault in Atlanta, has been a trade secret since 1886.

Celeritas Technologies, Ltd. v. Rockwell International Corp.

150 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1998)

LOURIE, CIRCUIT JUDGE

Rockwell International Corporation appeals from the decision of the United States District Court for the Central District of California denying Rockwell’s motions for judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial following a jury verdict that Rockwell willfully infringed Celeritas Technologies, Ltd.’s patent, misappropriated its trade secrets, and breached a non-disclosure agreement relating to the protected subject matter. [We affirm.]

On July 28, 1993, Michael Dolan filed a patent application for an apparatus for increasing the rate of data transmission over analog cellular telephone networks [using “de-emphasis” technology]. The resulting patent, U.S. Patent 5,386,590, assigned to Celeritas, was issued on January 31, 1995.

[In] September 1993, Dolan and other officials of Celeritas met with representatives from Rockwell to demonstrate their proprietary de-emphasis technology. Rockwell is the leading manufacturer of modem “chip sets” which contain the core functions of commercial modems, including the modulation function where de-emphasis is performed. The parties entered into a non-disclosure agreement (NDA), which covered the subject matter of the meeting and provided in pertinent part that Rockwell “shall not disclose or use any Proprietary Information (or any derivative thereof) except for the purpose of evaluating the prospective business arrangements between Celeritas and Rockwell.”

The agreement provided that proprietary information “shall not include information which … was in the public domain on the date hereof or comes into the public domain other than through the fault or negligence of [Rockwell].” [In] March 1994, AT&T Paradyne began to sell a modem that incorporated de-emphasis technology. In that same month, Rockwell informed Celeritas that it would not license the use of Celeritas’s proprietary technology, and concurrently began a development project to incorporate de-emphasis technology into its modem chip sets. Significantly, Rockwell did not independently develop its own de-emphasis technology, but instead assigned the same engineers who had learned of Celeritas’s technology under the NDA to work on the de-emphasis development project. In January 1995, Rockwell began shipping its first prototype chip sets that contained de-emphasis technology. By the time of trial in 1997, Rockwell’s sales were surpassing its projections.

On September 22, 1995, Celeritas sued Rockwell, alleging breach of contract, misappropriation of trade secrets, and patent infringement. The jury returned a verdict for Celeritas on each of the three theories, awarding Celeritas $57,658,000 each on the patent infringement and breach of contract claims, and $26,850,000 each in compensatory and exemplary damages on the trade secret misappropriation claim. [Rockwell] moved for JMOL on liability and for a new trial on damages.

Rockwell first argues that the district court erred by denying its motion for JMOL on the breach of contract claim. Citing the prior art submitted to the United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) by Celeritas, Rockwell argues that the evidence at trial clearly demonstrates that the de-emphasis technology disclosed to Rockwell was already in the public domain. Even if the technology were proprietary at the time of disclosure, Rockwell argues, the technology had entered the public domain before Rockwell used it, concededly no later than March 1994. Specifically, Rockwell asserts that AT&T Paradyne had already placed the technology in the public domain through the sale of a modem incorporating de-emphasis technology (“the modem”). Rockwell asserts that the technology was “readily ascertainable” because any competent engineer could have reverse engineered the modem. Rockwell further argues that any confidentiality obligation under the NDA regarding de-emphasis technology was extinguished once the ’590 patent issued in January 1995.

Figure 5.4 A Rockwell 33.6 K analog modem, c.1990s.

Celeritas responds that substantial evidence supports the jury’s verdict that Rockwell used its proprietary information. Celeritas argues that in order for a trade secret to enter the public domain in California, it must actually have been ascertained by proper means, and not merely have been ascertainable. Celeritas maintains that, in any event, the only evidence at trial supports the jury’s implicit finding that the information was not readily ascertainable from inspection of the modem. Celeritas also argues that the issuance of its patent in 1995 is immaterial because Rockwell had already breached the agreement by using its proprietary information in 1994.

We agree with Celeritas that substantial evidence supports the jury’s conclusion that Rockwell breached the NDA. The jury implicitly found that the information given to Rockwell by Celeritas was proprietary. Unrebutted testimony established that Celeritas disclosed to Rockwell implementation details and techniques that went beyond the information disclosed in the patent. Thus, even if every detail disclosed in the patent were in the prior art, a fact never alleged by Rockwell, that fact would not undermine the jury’s conclusion that Celeritas revealed proprietary information to Rockwell which it then used in developing its modem chip sets. Accordingly, Rockwell’s reliance on the prosecution history of the ’590 patent and the prior art submitted to the PTO is misplaced.

The jury also implicitly found that the technology had not been placed in the public domain by the sale of the modem. California law appears somewhat unsettled regarding whether a trade secret enters the public domain when it is “readily ascertainable” or whether it must also be “actually ascertained” by the public. Because the judgment is supportable under either standard, we need not attempt to resolve this issue of state law. Suffice it to say that substantial evidence supports a finding that the technology implementing the de-emphasis function in the modem was not “readily ascertainable.” In fact, Dolan’s testimony, the only evidence cited by Rockwell, belies its contentions. [Dolan] stated that (1) a spectrum analyzer would be needed to discover the de-emphasis technology, (2) most engineers that he talked to did not have spectrum analyzers, and (3) only if an engineer had a spectrum analyzer and knew what to look for could the engineer discover that the modem had de-emphasis technology. His express caveat that the use of de-emphasis could have been discovered if it was being affirmatively pursued is not an admission that the technology would be “readily ascertainable.” Because substantial evidence supports the conclusion that the information disclosed to Rockwell had not entered the public domain before its unauthorized use by Rockwell, the court did not err in denying Rockwell’s motion for JMOL regarding its breach of the NDA.

Notes and Questions

1. Public domain information. In Celeritas, the NDA did not apply to “information which [was] in the public domain on the date hereof or comes into the public domain other than through the fault or negligence of [Rockwell].” Why is such information excluded? Given the result in Celeritas, how might you adjust this language for future transactions?

2. Patent applications. Beginning in 2000, US patent applications have been published by the Patent and Trademark Office eighteen months after filing, unless the applicant chooses to waive foreign filing rights (35 U.S.C. § 122). The patent application in the Celeritas case, which was filed prior to 2000, was not subject to this requirement. What effect is the publication of patent applications likely to have on the information that they contain? How might this affect the recipient’s obligations under a typical NDA?

3. Issued patent. Rockwell also argued that the issuance of Celeritas’ patent in 1995 eliminated any obligation of confidentiality that Rockwell may have had. Is this correct? Why doesn’t the court discuss this argument? What would the result have been if Rockwell had waited to begin development of its de-emphasis modem technology until Celeritas’ patent had issued (disregarding the potential need for a patent license)?

4. Contract versus trade secret. Are there any advantages in bringing an action for contractual breach of an NDA as opposed to an action for misappropriation of trade secrets under either state law and/or the federal DTSA? When might you bring both a contractual and a trade secret misappropriation action?

Problem 5.2

Referring to the sample mutual NDA above, what are the top ten terms that you would seek to negotiate if you represented the party most likely to be the disclosing party? The recipient? What if you are not sure, at the outset, which party will be likely to disclose more proprietary information during discussions? Draft a mutual NDA that would be both reasonable but favorable to each of these negotiation positions.

5.3 Preliminary Documents

In addition to confidentiality agreements, parties negotiating licensing and other transactions often exchange, and sometimes sign, preliminary documents that summarize the terms of an anticipated transaction, as well as the premises under which negotiations are anticipated to occur. These preliminary documents are variously called term sheets, letters of intent, heads of agreement, memoranda of understanding, and a host of similar designations. In almost all cases, with a few notable exceptions, they are intended to be nonbinding.

In a recent article, Professor Cathy Hwang points out the high stakes that can ride on such preliminary documents and explores why they are used:

In 2015, the Delaware Supreme Court awarded $113 million in expectation damages when a sophisticated party did not honor the terms of an unsigned, two-page preliminary agreement marked “non-binding.” Over a ten-year battle, the Delaware courts’ four decisions in SIGA Technologies Inc. v. PharmAthene Inc. stirred up a storm of interest from deal lawyers. They also brought to light a long-standing and puzzling practice in dealmaking: the use of non-binding agreements. Why do parties use non-binding agreements to memorialize high-stakes deals, especially when they have the option to use formal, binding contracts?

This inquiry reveals that parties primarily use non-binding agreements to add formality to an otherwise murky pre-contractual deal process. Preliminary agreements mark the moment when deal parties have resolved most deal uncertainty and are likely to do a deal together, whether or not they sign a preliminary agreement. Instead of causing parties to behave well, preliminary agreements merely mark the moment when parties were already primed to behave well, with or without an agreement.Footnote 6

Cynthia Cannady discourages the use of such preliminary documents whenever possible:

Letters of intent and Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) are quasi-agreements and are a risky practice with few benefits. Unlike interim agreements, they are often phrased in such a way that it is unclear if they record a binding agreement. The parties may create a similarly confusing document by signing term sheets or other documents that do not express agreements on material terms. These types of documents are often entered into because the parties have not reached agreement on material terms that have proven intractable in negotiation, however, the parties still wish to proceed with a development project or a public announcement.

For example, the parties may enter into a letter of intent to avoid the risks of negotiation failure on the question of which party will own foreground IP in a development agreement, and the additional time pressure that delay places on the engineering teams when they begin work. Expressions like “good faith” and “best efforts” are often used in such agreements to describe the efforts of the parties to agree and/or produce a deliverable. However, after six months of joint engineering work, with no agreement on IP ownership, the parties are still likely to find it hard to agree. They may also rest on the comfort of a signed MOU and devote themselves to the engineering tasks at hand.Footnote 7

Notes and Questions

1. Value of preliminary documents. As the above excerpts from Hwang and Cannady demonstrate, there is some disagreement regarding the value, or even advisability, of preliminary documents. Which of these viewpoints do you find more persuasive? How would you advise a client who came to you with a request to prepare a nonbinding letter of intent for a transaction?

2. Texaco v. Pennzoil. One of the most notorious pre-transaction documents in history involved three oil industry giants. In early January 1984, Pennzoil negotiated and signed a “Memorandum of Agreement” with certain large shareholders of Getty Oil whereby Pennzoil would acquire the outstanding shares of Getty at a price of $110 per share. The Memorandum of Agreement was subject to approval of Getty’s Board of Directors, which rejected the offer as too low. Following further negotiations, the Board counter-proposed a price $5 above Pennzoil’s original offer. Pennzoil accepted the counteroffer and both parties issued press releases announcing the deal. The next day, however, Texaco offered $125 per share to acquire all outstanding shares of Getty. Getty’s Board voted to withdraw its previous counterproposal to Pennzoil and to accept Texaco’s higher offer instead. Getty and Texaco signed a definitive merger agreement two days later. Pennzoil then sued Texaco for tortious interference and was awarded $7.53 billion in compensatory and $3 billion in punitive damages by a jury in Houston, Texas – the largest civil verdict in history. Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 729 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. App. 1987).

3. Nonbinding language. In the wake of Texaco v. Pennzoil, lawyers became keenly aware of the need to be very clear when they did not intend preliminary documents to be binding. Robert Lloyd, reflecting on the judgment in that case, recommends language along the following lines:

Although the parties may exchange proposals (written or oral), term sheets, draft agreements or other materials, neither party will have any obligations or liability to the other party unless and until both parties’ authorized representatives sign definitive written agreements. Exchanged terms are non-binding to the extent they are not included in such definitive written agreements. Either party can end these discussions at any time, for any reason (or for no reason at all), and without liability to the other party. Each party remains free to negotiate and to enter into contracts with others.Footnote 8

Do you think this language is necessary to demonstrate that no contract is being formed by preliminary documents? What about merely including the word “nonbinding” in the document header?

Figure 5.5 The record-breaking verdict in Texaco v. Pennzoil reinvigorated the popular notion that a handshake is a binding commitment.

4. Binding terms – confidentiality, exclusivity, break-up fees. Though most provisions of preliminary documents are nonbinding, a few provisions sometimes do bind the parties. First, and most commonly, confidentiality terms are often included in preliminary documents and are generally drafted to be binding on the parties. Beyond these are two less conventional forms of binding terms: exclusivity and so-called break-up fees. Exclusivity provisions require that the parties negotiate exclusively with each other for a specified period, which could be days, weeks or months. Break-up fee (also referred to as “bust-up” or “walk-away”) provisions require that one party pay the other a specified amount if the parties fail to reach a binding agreement within a certain period of time. Why would parties agree to exclusivity and break-up fees before they have executed a definitive agreement?

5. The term sheet. Some forms of preliminary documentation look very much like contracts and are signed by the parties (as they were in Texaco v. Pennzoil). However, in many cases these documents are not signed, further bolstering arguments as to their nonbinding nature. The simplest form of preliminary documentation is probably the term sheet: a list of key terms that the parties anticipate including in a definitive agreement, assuming that they can get the details ironed out. Well-drafted term sheets may also include pointers to important but unresolved issues that need to be ironed out in the definitive agreement. Do you see value in such a nonbinding document?

Nonbinding Term Sheet: Subject to Negotiation and Definitive Agreement

Licensor

ElectroBev Co., a Delaware corporation

Licensee

Sunbelt, SA de CV, a Mexican corporation

Licensed Rights

Proprietary formula for ElectroBev soft drinks

ElectroBev word and design marks in the Territory (Licensed Marks)

Licensed Products

Canned and bottled ElectroBev soft drinks for sale in consumer retail stores, convenience stores, restaurants, kiosks and vending machines. Excludes fountain drinks.

Territory

South and Central America (including Caribbean)

Rights Granted

Manufacture, promote and sell Licensed Products in the Territory under the Licensed Marks

Exclusivity

Exclusive (other than Electro’s Brazilian subsidiary – which will retain rights in a manner to be agreed)

Up-Front Fee

$100,000

Royalty

5% of Net Sales up to $10,000,000

3% above $10,000,000

Term

5 years, with 1-year automatic renewals

Target execution date

Jan. 30, 2020

6. Term sheet terms. How do you decide which terms to reflect in a term sheet? How might such terms differ from those in the above sample trademark license term sheet if the transaction involved (a) a feature-length film to be based on a popular foreign-language book; (b) a new lightweight silicone-based coating with high heat resistance; (c) a chemical compound with medicinal properties that has recently been extracted from a rare tropical insect; and (d) the lyrics to twenty Broadway musicals composed by a recently deceased songwriter?

7. Interim agreements. Lying somewhere between nonbinding preliminary documents and definitive transaction agreements are short-term “interim” agreements that parties sometimes enter while they are considering whether a longer-term arrangement is advisable. Cannady explains the rationale for such agreements in the technology sector:

Evaluation is part of the negotiation process. An evaluation agreement permits the parties to work together for a period of time and exchange information, and develop new information and ideas for the purpose of testing collaboration opportunities. It is like an NDA but permits a closer cooperation between the parties and may also specify which information will be exchanged.

A prototype agreement goes further than evaluation and commits the parties to make one or more prototypes by a certain date. The agreement’s material terms relate to the allocation of costs and duties, payment of expenses, and IP ownership and rights. Prototype agreements are mini-development agreements, but with a reduced [statement of work] and a shortened time frame.

Interim agreements are used to permit the parties to work together for a period of time pending negotiation of the agreement. These agreements clarify which party will bear what costs, IP ownership and rights, and other critical issues. They provide that the agreement will terminate by a certain date, usually a matter of a month or two. These agreements are risky because they tend to “let the horse out of the barn”; the parties rely on them as if they had successfully negotiated the full agreement. Just like development agreements, interim agreements require resolution of IP ownership and other difficult issues, but within a short time frame. In some cases, they are useful in helping parties find an interim solution pending negotiation.Footnote 9

Do you agree with Cannady’s assessment of the risks and benefits of interim agreements? How would you protect your client’s interests if they wished to enter into such an agreement?

8. Beta testing agreements. One type of interim agreement that is sometimes used in the software industry is called a “beta testing” or “early release” agreement. This is essentially a license agreement that permits the use of a pre-release version of a software program. Because the software is not ready for commercial release, it is usually provided “as is” without warranties of any kind and at no or low cost to the user. In addition, the vendor often requires the user to report all bugs and errors in the software and to provide feedback on its features and functionality, which the vendor is then permitted to build into subsequent versions of the software (i.e., through a form of “grantback” license – see Section 9.1.2). What do you think happens under a typical beta agreement if a user conceives a patentable improvement to the software that she has been licensed to use? What risks might the assignment of improvements to the vendor pose for a beta user?

Problem 5.3

Your client, Cook E. Mawnster, has developed an innovative and delicious new recipe for chocolate-chip cookies. Until now she has been baking cookies and selling them at local bake sales and farmers’ markets with resounding success. Now, she would like to enter into an agreement with a commercial baked goods company to produce and sell her cookies on a national basis. Draft the pre-transaction documents that you would recommend she use when approaching these companies.

Footnotes

1 The Business of Licensing

1 Licensing Int’l, 6th Annual Global Licensing Survey (discussed in Chapter 15).

2 IFPI, IFPI issues annual Global Music Report, May 4, 2020, www.ifpi.org/ifpi-issues-annual-global-music-report (visited August. 22, 2020).

3 Brookings Inst., Trends in the information technology sector, March 29, 2019, www.brookings.edu/research/trends-in-the-information-technology-sector (visited August 22, 2020).

4 Sometimes, of course, an IP owner may wish to use its IP to exclude others from the market and to dominate the market with its own products or services. Cynthia Cannady refers to this as the “fortress” IP strategy. See Cynthia Cannady, Technology Licensing and Development Agreements 4648 (Oxford Univ. Press, 2013).

5 For a more detailed analysis of the economic factors motivating IP licensing see, e.g., Jonathan Barnett, Why Is Everyone Afraid of IP Licensing? 30 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 123 (2017) and Cannady, supra Footnote note 4, at 45–72.

6 University and government licensing are discussed in Chapter 14.

7 And even if the IP owner has the theoretical capability to address all of the different markets that can be addressed by an IP right, it is likely that licensing rights to others in some of those markets will result in the more rapid deployment of new products and services (i.e., retaining all rights in the original IP owner could create bottlenecks in the development of new products and services). See Jorge L. Contreras & Jacob S. Sherkow, CRISPR, Surrogate Licensing, and Scientific Discovery, 355 Science 698 (2017).

8 Many IP rights – particularly patents and trademarks – are strictly national in scope, and some IP rights such as the right of publicity exist in some countries but not in others. The issue of obtaining international IP protection is a complex one and the subject of many other books. We will assume, for our purposes, that such rights are available to IP owners in jurisdictions of interest.

9 Cannady, supra Footnote note 4, at 51–52. Despite its unpleasant connotations, the term “cannibalization” is used widely in the industry.

10 See Barnett, supra Footnote note 5, at 133–34 (discussing efficient disaggregation of production functions in the semiconductor chip industry).

11 Barnett, supra Footnote note 5, at 130.

12 There are, of course, many examples of components that are only available from a single source, particularly those that are covered by IP of their own.

13 Professor Barnett offers examples from the motion picture and biopharmaceutical industries to illustrate this point (Figure 1.2). Barnett, supra Footnote note 5, at 136–37.

14 Barnett, supra Footnote note 5, at 140, Fig. 5 [reprinted with permission].

15 Interestingly, in 2018 Microsoft joined the Open Innovation Network and thereby agreed not to assert its patents against users of Linux and Android operating systems. See Chapter 19 for a discussion of the business motivations behind this and similar pledges.

16 Adam Houldsworth, Five Key Insights into 2020’s Drug Royalty Transactions, Intell. Asset Mgt., December 16, 2020.

17 Ryan Davis, Rare Listerine Royalty Auction Tied to 1881 Contract Flub, Law360, July 21, 2020.

18 See Emma Channing, Bowie: Rock God or Tax Genius?, February 7, 2016, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2729014.

19 Thomas Seal, Neil Young Sells 50% Stake in 1,180-Song Catalog to Hipgnosis, Bloomberg Law, January 6, 2021.

20 While these entities have attracted the most attention in relation to patents, assertion entities exist in the copyright world as well. See Matthew Sag, Copyright Trolling, An Empirical Study, 100 Iowa L. Rev. 1105 (2014) and Shyamkrishna Balganesh & Jonah B. Gelbach, Debunking the Myth of the Copyright Troll Apocalypse, 101 Iowa L. Rev. Online 43 (2016).

21 This important case is discussed and excerpted in Section 26.2.

22 Discussed in Section 4.2.

23 For additional examples from the computer and biotechnology industries, see Cannady, supra Footnote note 4, at 52–54.

24 See Yochai Benkler, The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets and Freedom 46 (Yale Univ. Press, 2006); Jorge L. Contreras, Patent Pledges, 47 Ariz. St. L.J. 543, 586 (2015).

2 Ownership and Assignment of Intellectual Property

1 See Enovsys LLC v. Nextel Commc’ns Inc., 614 F.3d 1333, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2010).

2 See also Section 12.4, Note 4, discussing these statutory provisions as mechanisms for terminating copyright licenses.

3 See Timothy K. Armstrong, Shrinking the Commons: Termination of Copyright Licenses and Transfers for the Benefit of the Public, 47 Harv. J. Legis. 359, 405–09 (2010) (discussing implications for software) and Jorge L. Contreras & Andrew Hernacki, Copyright Termination and Technical Standards, 43 U. Baltimore L. Rev. 221 (2014) (discussing implications for technical standards).

4 See Jonathan M. Barnett, Why Is Everyone Afraid of IP Licensing? 30 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 123, 126 (2017).

5 See Standard Parts Co. v. Peck, 264 U.S. 52 (1924) (employee hired to invent a specific improvement owed a duty to assign patent rights to the employer even though the employment contract did not specifically mention patent rights).

6 See 8 Chisum on Patents § 22.03[2] (“The line between these ‘hired-to-invent’ and ‘general employment’ categories is a fine one, and it often must be drawn on the basis of sharply conflicting testimony … [Standard Parts Co. v. Peck] has served as a precedent for a multitude of decisions by lower federal courts, both finding (1) an employment to invent and (2) the absence of such employment.”)

7 As explained by Professor Chisum, “The classic ‘shop right’ doctrine provides that an employee who uses his employer’s resources to conceive an invention or to reduce it to practice must afford to his employer a nonexclusive, royalty-free, nontransferable license to make use of the invention, even though the employee subsequently obtains a patent thereon. The shop right is not an ownership interest in the patent. Rather it constitutes a defense to a charge of patent infringement by the employee or his/her assignee.” 8 Chisum on Patents § 22.03[3].

8 See, e.g., Jesse Dukeminier et al., Property 716 (8th ed., Wolters Kluwer Law & Business, 2014).

9 For a discussion and lively critique of this doctrine, see Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 Stan. L. Rev. 577 (1988).

10 Professor Sean O’Connor analyzes the FilmTec rule and Justice Breyer’s critique in Sean O’Connor, The Aftermath of Stanford v. Roche: Which Law of Assignments Governs?, 24 Intell. Prop. J. 29 (2011). Professor Dennis Crouch considers these issues in the context of patent prior art in Dennis Crouch, Not-Yet Filed Invention Rights, Patently-O, December 2, 2020, https://patentlyo.com/patent/2020/12/filed-invention-rights.html.

11 For a discussion of the substance of Justice Breyer’s dissent in Stanford v. Roche, see Section 2.3, Note 3.

12 See Parker Tresemer, Best Practices for Drafting University Technology Assignment Agreements after FilmTec, Stanford v. Roche, and Patent Reform, 2012 U. Ill. J.L. Tech. & Pol’y 347 (2012) (offering concrete proposals for the improvement of university assignment documents), Sean M. O’Connor, The Real Issue Behind Stanford v. Roche: Faulty Conceptions of University Assignment Policies Stemming from the 1947 Biddle Report, 19 Mich. Telecomm. & Tech. L. Rev. 379, 421 (2013) (noting that “it is not clear that universities will be able or willing to impose new present assignment agreements upon their faculty without some form of consideration or shared governance consultation”). Notwithstanding the notoriety of Stanford v. Roche, not all universities appear to have gotten the message. For example, in Omni Medsci, Inc. v. Apple Inc., 7 F.4th 1148 (Fed. Cir. 2021), the Federal Circuit held that a University of Michigan bylaw providing that intellectual property in a faculty member’s inventions “shall be the property of the University” did not automatically assign the inventor’s rights in the invention to the university. It explains that “On its face, [the clause] does not unambiguously constitute either a present automatic assignment or a promise to assign in the future. It does not say, for example, that the inventor ‘will assign’ the patent rights—language that this court has previously held to constitute an agreement to assign rather than a present assignment. Nor does it say that the inventor ‘agrees to grant and does hereby grant’ title to the patent—language that this court has previously held to constitute a present automatic assignment of a future interest. We conclude that [the clause] is most naturally read as a statement of intended disposition and a promise of a potential future assignment, not as a present automatic transfer.”

13 Dennis Crouch, Overbroad Assignment Agreement: Invalid under California Law, Patently-O, November 19, 2020, https://patentlyo.com/patent/2020/11/overbroad-assignment-california.html.

14 See Dennis Crouch, Pre-Invention Innovations Not Captured by Employment Agreement Duty to Assign, Patently-O, April 29, 2021, https://patentlyo.com/patent/2021/04/invention-innovations-employment.html.

15 Barton Beebe, Trademark Law: An Open Source Casebook, version 4.0 at Part III, 127 (2017).

16 Irene Calboli, Trademark Assignment “With Goodwill”: A Concept Whose Time Has Gone, 57 Fla. L. Rev. 771, 776 (2005).

17 Note that the requirement that a trademark license be accompanied by a transfer of goodwill was rejected in Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart’s Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1959), discussed in Section 13.1.

18 Milgrim on Trade Secrets, § 2.02.

19 Neil Wilkof, Joint Ownership of a Trade Mark: The Tribulations of Termination, IPKat, November 26, 2010, https://ipkitten.blogspot.com/2010/11/joint-ownership-of-trade-mark.html.

20 See Schering Corp. v. Roussel-UCLAF SA, 104 F.3d 341, 344 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“Each co-owner’s ownership rights carry with them the right to license others, a right that also does not require the consent of any other co-owner”).

21 See Sybersound Records, Inc. v. UAV Corp., 517 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 2008).

22 See Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure (TMEP), 1201.07(b)(ii).

23 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (“Concurrent registrations may also be issued by the Director when a court of competent jurisdiction has finally determined that more than one person is entitled to use the same or similar marks in commerce. In issuing concurrent registrations, the Director shall prescribe conditions and limitations as to the mode or place of use of the mark or the goods on or in connection with which such mark is registered to the respective persons”).

24 Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure (TMEP), 501.06.

25 See, e.g., Iskenderian v. Iskenderian, 144 Cal. App. 4th 1162 (Cal. App. 2006) (trademark in family restaurant was validly transferred by late parent to three children).

26 Richard A. Posner, Intellectual Property: The Law and Economics Approach, 19 J. Econ. Persp. 57, 70 (2005).

27 Robert P. Merges & Lawrence A. Locke, Co-ownership of Patents: A Comparative and Economic View, 72 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc’y 586 (1990).

3 The Nature of an Intellectual Property License

1 Western Elec. Co., Inc. v. Pacent Reproducer Corp., 42 F.2d 116, 118 (2d Cir. 1930).

2 Issues concerning the term and duration of licenses and licensing agreements are discussed in detail in Chapter 12.

3 For a window into the extensive academic debate on this topic, see Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Intellectual Property as Property, in Research Handbook on the Economics of Intellectual Property, Vol. I (Peter S. Menell and Ben Depoorter, eds., Edward Elgar, 2019).

4 Raymond T. Nimmer, Licensing of Intellectual Property and Other Information Assets 34 (Carolina Academic Press, 2nd ed., 2007).

5 For a discussion of the rights and duties of co-owners of intellectual property, see Section 2.5.

6 Christopher M. Newman, A License Is Not a “Contract Not To Sue”: Disentangling Property and Contract in the Law of Copyright Licenses, 98 Iowa L. Rev. 1101, 1130–31 (2013).

7 Professor Ray Nimmer made much of this point in advocating for the adoption of specific state legislation to govern IP licensing transactions. See Section 3.3.4 and Raymond T. Nimmer, Licensing in the Contemporary Information Economy, 8 Wash. U. J. L. & Pol’y 99 (2002).

8 Ethicon, Inc. v. United States Surgical Corp., 135 F.3d 1456, 1471 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (Newman, dissenting) (citations omitted).

9 Christina M. Mulligan, Licenses and the Property/Contract Interface, 93 Indiana L.J. 1073, 1083 (2018).

10 Raymond T. Nimmer and Jeff C. Dodd, Modern Licensing Law, Vol. 1, 96 (Thomson Reuters, 2016–17).

11 See, e.g., Rhone-Poulenc Agro, S.A. v. Dekalb Genetics Corporation, 284 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2002), discussed in Section 6.4.

12 For the flavor of this debate, compare Mark A. Lemley, The Law and Policy of Intellectual Property Licensing, 87 Cal. L. Rev. 111 (1999) with Nimmer, supra Footnote note 6.

13 The checkered history of UCC Article 2B and UCITA is summarized in Pratik A. Shah, The Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act, 15 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 85 (2000).

14 Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Genius of Common Law Intellectual Property, 48 J.L. Stud. (2019).

15 The important distinction between conditions and covenants in licensing agreements also figures prominently in Jacobson v. Katzer, reproduced in Section 19.2.5 (discussing whether requirements in an open source software licensing agreement are covenants or conditions).

16 This “good faith” requirement is analogous to the standard of “inquiry notice” in real property transactions. See Vapac Music Publ’g, Inc. v. Tuff ‘N’ Rumble Mgmt., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10027 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).

17 See Sections 2.22.4 for a discussion of the recording requirements for assignments of patent, copyright and trademark rights.

18 Sanofi, S.A. v. Med-Tech Veterinarian Prods., 565 F. Supp. 931, 939 (D.N.J. 1983) (citing Chambers v. Smith, 5 F. Cas. 426, 427 (C.C. Pa. 1844)).

19 Sanofi, 565 F. Supp. at 940 (quoting 4 Walker on Patents § 401 (2d ed.)).

20 This issue is somewhat different than that of post-sale restraints (such as single-use requirements) that patent licensors seek to impose on purchasers of patented goods. These restraints, which some commentators have also analogized to real property covenants running with the land (see Herbert Hovenkamp, Post-Sale Restraints and Competitive Harm: The First Sale Doctrine in Perspective, 66 N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. 487, 542 (2011)), are of questionable enforceability following the Supreme Court’s 2017 decision in Impression Products v. Lexmark, discussed in Section 23.5.

4 Implied Licenses and Unwritten Transactions

1 Raymond T. Nimmer & Jeff Dodd, Modern Licensing Law § 10.02 (Thomson Reuters, 2016–17).

2 IBM, Terms of Use, August 15, 2015, www.ibm.com/legal (visited August 17, 2020).

3 Echostar, Unsolicited Ideas Policy Statement and Agreement.

4 Take the example of Robert Kosberg, known as Hollywood’s “Mr. Pitch.” Each year, Kosberg pitches twenty to fifty ideas for new films to major motion picture studios, of which he sells about eight. He sold New Line Cinema an idea for a horror film about a rampaging dog that he described as “Jaws on Paws.” The film became Man’s Best Friend. In one case, a grandmother from Ozark, Arizona, sent Kosberg a 3" × 5" card suggesting a story about a man who lives in the Statue of Liberty. He fleshed out the story and sold it to Polygram as “Keeper of the Flame.” Kosberg paid the originator of the idea about $100,000. See Anna Muoio, Meet Hollywood’s Mr. Pitch, Fast Company, October 1999, p.124.

5 A “treatment” is a short (usually 1–3 pages) summary of the major characters and plot elements of a story intended for film or television.

6 www.wgawregistry.org/regfaqs.html#quest2 (accessed August 21, 2018).

7 See, e.g., Sara Randazzo, Ruling in Johnny Depp Lawsuit Threatens Hollywood Lawyers’ Handshake Culture, Wall St. J., August 29, 2018.

8 Justice Story is famous for introducing moralistic elements into his patent law decisions, most notably the “moral utility” doctrine. See Bedford v. Hunt, 3 F. Cas. 37, 37 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (Story, J.) (the utility requirement of patent law “simply requires, that [an invention] shall be capable of use, and that the use is such as sound morals and policy do not discountenance or prohibit”).

9 Annemarie Bridy, A Novel Theory of Implied Copyright License in Paparazzi Pics, Law360, August 6, 2010.

5 Confidentiality and Pre-license Negotiations

1 Patents may be invalidated on a variety of grounds, including anticipation, obviousness, non-enablement, unclean hands and others. A patent that has been invalidated can no longer be enforced by its owner.

2 Discussed in greater detail in Section 22.3.

3 State of Wash. v. Landmark Technology A LLC, No. 21-2-06348-5 (King Co. Sup. Ct., filed May 13, 2021).

4 UTSA § 1(3). In 2016, Congress enacted the Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA) (18 U.S.C. § 1836), which provides a federal cause of action for trade secret misappropriation. The DTSA definition of trade secrets does not differ significantly from that of the UTSA.

5 Note that independent development is not a defense to patent infringement, which is a strict liability tort that requires neither intent nor knowledge, though it may rebut a claim for enhanced damages for “willful” infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 284.

6 Cathy Hwang, Deal Momentum, 65 UCLA L. Rev. 376, 378–79 (2018). The term sheet in PharmAthene was not a standalone document, but set forth terms over which other (binding) agreement required the parties to negotiate in good faith.

7 Cynthia Cannady, The Three No’s: Letters of Intent, Memoranda of Understanding, and Standstill Agreements, in Technology Licensing and Development Agreements 469–70 (Oxford Univ. Press, 2013).

8 Robert M. Lloyd, Pennzoil v. Texaco, Twenty Years After: Lessons for Business Lawyers, 6 Transactions: Tenn. J. Bus. L. 321, 352 (2005).

9 Cynthia Cannady, Technology Licensing and Development Agreements 470 (Oxford Univ. Press, 2013).

Figure 0

Figure 1.1 Auto makers like Ferrari do not manufacture the merchandise that bears their famous logos. This merchandise exists thanks to licensing.

Figure 1

Figure 1.2 Jonathan Barnett illustrates how licensing enables motion picture firms to divide distribution rights among multiple entities, each with a specific role in the supply chain.14

Figure 2

Figure 1.3 The debate over “patent trolls” has been raging for over a decade.

Figure 3

Figure 1.4 Large information technology companies like IBM and Google embraced the open source Linux operating system to support the sale of associated hardware, services and advertising.

Figure 4

Figure 2.1 Warren claimed that he created 1,914 musical works for the popular 1980s TV series Remington Steele.

Figure 5

Figure 2.2 The creators of the Superman character died in near poverty while the Man of Steel went on to form a multi-billion-dollar franchise. Sections 203 and 304 of the US Copyright Act were enacted to enable authors and their heirs to terminate any copyright assignment or license between 35 and 40 years after originally made in order to permit them to share in the value of their creations.

Figure 6

Figure 2.3 FilmTec reverse osmosis membrane filter.

Figure 7

Figure 2.4 Schematic showing possible assignment pathways for Cadotte’s invention.

Figure 8

Figure 2.5 Richard Alleshouse was the product manager for Wave Loch’s FlowRider attraction, shown here as installed on the upper deck of a Royal Caribbean cruise ship.

Figure 9

Figure 2.6 Though he was an original member of the musical group The Commodores, Thomas McClary did not retain rights to utilize the group’s name after he left the band in 1984.

Figure 10

Table 3.1 Rights in an item of IP (X) after a transaction between A and B

Figure 11

Figure 3.1 The Mashantucket Pequot Museum & Research Center in Ledyard, Connecticut, commissioned a film about the Pequot War of 1636–38.

Figure 12

Figure 3.2 Chief Judge Henry T. Friendly, the author of the opinion in T.B. Harms, served on the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit from 1959–1986.

Figure 13

Figure 4.1 Tornado Taz.

Figure 14

Figure 4.2 “Psycho Chihuahua” and the Taco Bell chihuahua

Figure 15

Figure 4.3 I.A.E. v. Shaver involved an architect’s plans for an air cargo building at Gary Regional Airport (now Gary/Chicago International Airport (GYY)).

Figure 16

Figure 4.4 Effects Associates involved the development of a gruesome special effect for the horror film The Stuff.

Figure 17

Figure 4.5 NBA star LeBron James is reported to have twenty-four tattoos, many of which were created by LA-based artist gangatattoo.

Figure 18

Figure 4.6 The patented shrimp knife and deveiner at issue in McCoy.

Figure 19

Figure 4.7 The dispute in TransCore v. Elec. Transaction Consultants involved patents covering E-ZPass electronic tollbooth devices.

Figure 20

Figure 5.1 Figure from US Patent No. 5,073,816, “Packaging semiconductor chips,” which ST claimed that SanDisk infringed.

Figure 21

Figure 5.2 The dispute in MedImmune v. Genentech involved a Genentech patent claiming antibody technology. Because MedImmune’s allegedly infringing drug Synagis generated 80 percent of its revenue, MedImmune accepted a license from Genentech and paid royalties “under protest,” then sought to invalidate the patent.

Figure 22

Figure 5.3 The formula for Coca-Cola, which is allegedly stored in this imposing vault in Atlanta, has been a trade secret since 1886.

Figure 23

Figure 5.4 A Rockwell 33.6 K analog modem, c.1990s.

Figure 24

Figure 5.5 The record-breaking verdict in Texaco v. Pennzoil reinvigorated the popular notion that a handshake is a binding commitment.

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