Phase one: selling the idea to Washington

King Fahd of Saudi Arabia was reported to have received a telephone call from King Hussain on 11 February 1985, informing him of the details of the Jordanian–PLO Accord, while he was on a state visit to Washington. It was also reported that he already had a copy of the document in his possession. This was the first direct contact between an Arab leader and the second Reagan Administration, and it took place in the wake of two developments which the Arabs regarded as hostile. First, the proposed increase in US military aid to Israel from $1.4 bn in 1985 to $1.8 bn for the following year. Second, the parallel decision to halt arms sales to the Arabs for the foreseeable future.

The latter decision, which was made public on 30 January 1985, was clearly an attempt to pre-empt the King, who had a multi-billion dollar request pending. The White House statement was toned down, however, and accompanied by an assurance that it reflected nothing significant, but rather heralded a breathing space for a reassessment of US policy. Since Prime Minister Peres had just received assurances of a huge increase in US military aid, which, it had already been made clear, would not be affected by this latest decision, the arms embargo against the Arabs, however temporary, appeared to be a deliberate snub to the very man the Reagan Administration was supposedly trying to court, if only because of his country's special relationship with the US and its huge petrodollar reserves in US banks.