Fortunately it is no longer necessary to advocate the study of Military History. In our own Army as in all armies trained on modern principles this study has its established place in the military training of the officer. Indeed, I should suppose that even in England, of those who habitually study history for professional purposes, the great majority are soldiers.

I do not propose to concern myself now with the bearing of the study of history upon those larger problems of strategy which jointly concern the statesman and the soldier. Nor am I concerned with the application of the experience of recent wars either to tactical methods, or to the organisation, armament, and administration of armies. The particular aspect of this question with which I intend to deal is the use of Military History as a means of training officers for command in war.

This use of history is not always understood, even by officers, though almost all read military history and some study it. Many have no very exact idea of the practical value to be obtained or how to obtain it. In this soldiers are not peculiar. In almost all professions there are more who seek to acquire a knowledge of facts than there are who draw deductions from that knowledge. Yet mere knowledge of facts is of itself of very little value, and probably of less value to the soldier than to others.