INTRODUCTION

The term ‘illiberal constitutionalism’ describes the Hungarian and Polish governmental systems since 2010 and 2015, respectively. In these states, every element of liberal constitutionalism, such as the rule of law, democracy and human rights, is observable; none is missing, but no element prevails in its entirety. Hungary and Poland have been slowly sliding from their previous status as constitutional democracies toward authoritarianism. In this chapter, we argue that up until the COVID-19 crisis, no reform, steps, actions, decisions or attitudes had come together to make Hungary and Poland authoritarian regimes within the EU. Nonetheless, there is no doubt that the weak but tacitly existing constitutional constraint on public power has been gradually reducing even during the COVID-19 emergency, but, at this moment, it cannot be said that it has reached a turning point.

Against this background, we claim, first, that the historical trajectories, value orientation and emotional profiles of both countries have facilitated the creation and consolidation of illiberal constitutionalism. Its elements – illiberal legality, illiberal democracy (Section 3) and the reduced protection of human rights (Section 4) – are intrinsically connected, but even if we consider them together, we could conclude that up until spring 2020 they had not constituted an authoritarian regime. That is our second claim. Our third claim is that the COVID-19 crisis could be seen as the factor that has accelerated the process of reaching an authoritarian turn – a final assessment, however, can only be made after the pandemic ultimately, both de facto and de jure, is over (Section 5). Exploring these areas demands the examination of what ‘illiberal democracy’ means in an illiberal constitutional setting; how, or to what extent, the attitude toward human rights has changed; and how all of this has been affected by the COVID-19 crisis.

ILLIBERAL VALUES AND COLLECTIVE NARCISSISM

Hungarian and Polish populist leaders, starting from 2010, have, with increased intensity, exploited the emotional needs of their compatriots and used different techniques to gain political support for remodelling constitutional settings. This support seems to be stable because it originates from a historically shaped value orientation, which is connected to the group identification so widely shared by Hungarians and Poles.