The combination of relative power resources and the fact of inter-state conflict over core values influenced the outcome of Eric Johnston's efforts in the Jordan basin. No doubt, cognitive dynamics would continue to guide the foreign policy behavior of the riparian states, and the objective environment, or more specifically, the distribution of power, would establish outcomes.

In this chapter, we discuss the Jordan waters crisis of 1964 and the deterioration of relations in the central Middle East that led up to the outbreak of the third Arab—Israel war. Our primary concern is to highlight the complexity of inter-state relations in the region, and the perceptions and security concerns that emanated from them. The aim is to understand the way in which cognitive variables influenced the decision-making and regional behavior of the Arab states and Israel. First, we outline the developments that provoked the Jordan waters crisis and other critical events of the period. Then, we analyze the foreign policy behavior of the states in question, in terms of their different perceptions of themselves and the environment. Finally, we evaluate the cognitive dynamics in relation to outcomes in the Middle East in 1964 and 1967.

Before proceeding, two points of clarification must be made.