In 1997, several of Asia's economies collapsed and the international community was called in to help mend the ailing region. The crisis attracted a great deal of attention among both the scholarly and policy communities. At that time, it seemed that the Asian miracle had come to an abrupt end. Places such as South Korea enjoyed a prosperous run though suffered a dubious demise. Later developers in Southeast Asia and China, having just emerged from out of the starting gate, quickly stalled in their attempts to ride the wave of Asia's postwar economic dynamism. Fortunately, things would not remain dour for too long. Some countries, such as Taiwan and Japan, made it through the crisis relatively unscathed. Both China and South Korea quickly rebounded. Southeast Asian countries, such as Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand, adapted and have consequently begun new growth trajectories. In the end, it seemed that the most severe and lasting casualty of the 1997 crisis was the East Asian developmental state model itself. To be sure, the more recent literatures on East Asian political economy have taken a sharp turn, wherein terms like “booty capitalism” and “crony capitalism” have quickly come to replace more laudatory titles such as the “East Asian Miracle.”

Northeast Asia, where the interests of three major nuclear powers and the world's two largest economies mingle around the unstable pivot of the Korean Peninsula, is a region rife with political and economic uncertainties. It is arguably one of the most dangerous areas in the world, plagued by security problems of global importance, including nuclear and missile proliferation. It has, to be sure, been widely touted as a region of economic promise. Yet despite Northeast Asia's demonstrable economic success at the macro level, and a panoply of highly regarded individual economic managers at the micro level, its collective economic management has nevertheless been disappointing.

The end of the Cold War has given rise to a wide-ranging debate about the future of international relations in the Asia-Pacific. This debate has been difficult to assess in part because of the elusive quality of the outcomes being explored, such as whether the region is characterized by “stability” or “rivalry.” What exactly do we want to explain?

Thanks to supercharged economic growth, coupled with abundant physical and human capital, as well as political clout as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, China is a rising great power on the world stage. Whereas the former China under its closed, mysterious, and communist ideology was characterized as a threat to Asian and world peace during the Cold War years, today, ironically, a more open and internationally engaged China again triggers the “China threat” rhetoric. Despite China's constant assurance of peaceable foreign policy intentions and claims that it will “never seek hegemony,” skeptics rebuke these as a mere smokescreen that covers an enormous forward thrust, evidenced, for example, by the expansionist moves toward islets in the South China Sea. On the one hand, whether aggressive moves qualified China as a threat is still debated. On the other hand, whether provocative actions would escalate into large-scale militarized conflicts that jeopardize regional stability constitutes the immediate concern.

The Japanese developmental state catapulted Japan into economic prominence. However, almost just as world attention focused on Japan's distinctive model, the era of the developmental state was drawing to a close. A generation of scholars has ably documented the story of Japan's developmental state by focusing on industrial policy. They chronicled how a strong bureaucracy buffered by insulation from politicians lay at the heart of the developmental state. As Joseph Wong points out in the introductory essay to this special issue, scholars have also argued that the developmental state contained within itself the seeds of its own dismantling.1 Since the 1960s, formal powers had been stripped from the bureaucracy, leaving it increasingly dependent upon “administrative guidance” not legally enforceable.2 By the late 1980s, the very success of the developmental state had eroded the powers of the bureaucracy to set industrial policy.

What will the future of East Asia be like in the years ahead? More than a decade after the end of the Cold War, we are still confronted with the fundamental question of whether a new world order will be shaped primarily by state, regional, or global forces and actors. This great puzzle of both theoretical and real-world significance has been widely debated among scholars and policy pundits of diverse normative and theoretical orientations, only to generate many competing explanations and prognostications.

In the pantheon of new security concepts debated in East Asia in the past decade, human security is perhaps the most controversial. It is based on the idea that the individual or community must be at least one of the referent points in answering the eternal questions of security for whom, from what, and by what means.

This article examines how postindustrial pressures and political changes have shaped recent social policy reforms in Japan and South Korea. Postindustrial pressures are categorized into exogenous and endogenous factors: exogenous being economic globalization and internationalization, endogenous being changing family and gender relations and demographic shifts such as population aging and declining birthrates. I argue that we need to attend more closely to the interactions between postindustrial and political factors to explain social and welfare policies in these countries. The conventional view on East Asian welfare states no longer adequately explains recent social welfare policy changes in the region.

Concepts of regionalization and regionalism have dominated discussions of emerging global orders. With the rise of the European Union (EU), scholars have begun to look for similar multilaterally negotiated regional organizations in the Asia-Pacific region.

On the surface, the Great Development of the West (GDW, Xibu Dakaifa) campaign seems like a classic maneuver by a developmental state to bolster the growth of an underdeveloped region. Even in 2002, GDP per capita in western China, which includes the provinces of Xinjiang, Tibet, Ningxia, Gansu, Shaanxi, Sichuan, Chongqing, Qinghai, Yunnan, and Guizhou, remained at U.S.$666, or just more than half of the national average (see Table 1). The poorest province in China, Guizhou, had a GDP per capita of only U.S.$375, roughly equivalent to Haiti's GDP per capita in 1999. The effort to develop western China, according to the official rhetoric, was aimed at shifting western China's developmental trajectory closer to that of the rest of China, thus decreasing regional inequality and bolstering overall growth.

Despite its embedded ambiguity, conventional wisdom tends to prevail over time. This may be because old adages recurrently embrace some ingredients of truth. As James A. Mathisen highlights, conventional wisdom plays a significant role in constituting knowledge as a starting point. For many people, numerous adages (the rich get richer while the poor get poorer; birds of a feather flock together) are most commonly perceived as true. More interestingly, the accuracy of the two folk wisdoms appears to be more salient in culture-producing industries, including the motion picture industry. Concomitantly, the two adages have long been connected to diverse societal phenomena and sociological knowledge.

Why do some economies grow for several years and then stall? One obvious answer is that these economies have “overheated.” Another is that foreign demand for their products has dried up. This article explores a longer-term explanation—namely, that the institutions favorable for one stage of economic growth are less suitable for a subsequent stage. This idea of “growing into trouble” is consistent with Dani Rodrik's argument that the institutions required to stimulate growth may not be sufficient to sustain growth. We push this idea further by exploring the different requirements of structural change versus upgrading. Structural change connotes an economy's diversification through new investments, often producing real income growth. But economies can diversify without being more efficient, or their initial competitiveness can be based largely on transient factor endowment advantages. Upgrading refers to the competitiveness of these diverse activities achieved through locally based productivity improvements.

Malaysia has long been viewed as a model of a “moderate” Islamic polity. Muslims and non-Muslims have enjoyed the same civil and political rights, and Islamic parties have competed alongside secular ones in periodic elections, in spite of the distinctly Islamic timbre of Malaysia's state and society. Growing domestic political volatility, however, has led many to question the viability of political moderation. Mounting Islamism among the public, reflected both in the rise of Islamic nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and in the greater priority placed on public displays and enforcement of piety, has spurred and been reinforced by increasingly Islamist political parties. Discussions of political change have come to revolve largely around the place of Islam in party platforms and state institutions. The relative position of Muslim and non-Muslim citizens in the polity has altered with the incremental Islamization of state and society, and observing religious rituals has become a matter as much of state law as of personal choice for Muslims. Internationally, too, Malaysia has come to emphasize more its ties with non-Western and especially Muslim-majority states. Islam has thus become increasingly central to Malaysian politics—even though only slightly more than half the population (all ethnic Malays, and a small proportion of Indians, Chinese, and others) is Muslim.

Long after the start of the reform period, and well after the proven success of the private sector, the fate of the state-owned sector in China continued to disturb the sleep of many policymakers in the Chinese central government.

The literature on East Asia's political economies identifies cohesive state bureaucracy and its effective intervention in the market as the key factors that have enabled the East Asian economic miracle and that differentiate the success of East Asian newly industrializing countries (NICs) from the failure of other developing countries. However, the sharply diverging growth trajectories of the Taiwanese semiconductor and wireless communications industries show that cohesive state bureaucracy and its effective intervention are not the generic trait of the Taiwanese developmental state, repeatedly found across industries and through time. On the contrary, the scope, depth, and coherence of state intervention are a variable rather than a constant. The semiconductor industry had an activist state promoting its growth from its very inception, whereas the wireless communications industry has failed to acquire consistent state support. Explaining the variation of state intervention requires not only an analysis of the state apparatus but also a study of its institutional links to the industry. This article develops an institutional explanation of the Taiwanese state's differing roles in promoting the semiconductor and wireless communications industries, but it differentiates itself from the existing literature of the developmental state and network theories by privileging the role of overseas technologists in influencing the scope, depth, and coherence of state intervention in two industries.

South Korea is currently undergoing a process of industrial restructuring. As competitors in the Asian region have begun to catch up—in terms of technological know-how, investment mobilization, price competition, and human capital development—advanced Asian economies such as South Korea's have had to shift their industrial focus away from conventional manufacturing sectors toward postindustrial sectors including biotechnology, nanotechnology, and advanced information and communications technologies. As such, the ongoing processes of postindustrial restructuring in South Korea have involved a transition from the industrial learning paradigm to a new knowledge creation paradigm where technology innovation, rather than technology borrowing, is key. This article examines this transformative process in the area of biotechnology and bioindustry development. It specifically looks at how the South Korean developmental state has begun to reinvent itself in order to meet the challenges of innovation-driven industrialization.