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Tables

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 December 2023

Edited by
Noam Lupu  and
Jonas Pontusson
Noam Lupu
Affiliation:
Vanderbilt University, Tennessee
Jonas Pontusson
Affiliation:
Université de Genève

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Type
Chapter
Information
Unequal Democracies
Public Policy, Responsiveness, and Redistribution in an Era of Rising Economic Inequality
 , pp. xiii - xiv
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2023
Creative Commons
Creative Common License - CCCreative Common License - BYCreative Common License - NC
This content is Open Access and distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence CC-BY-NC 4.0 https://creativecommons.org/cclicenses/

Tables

  1. 1.1Inequality and redistribution among working-age households, 1995–2007

  2. 1.2Top-10-percent income shares and redistribution, 1995–2007

  3. 1.3Inequality and redistribution among working-age households, 2007–2018

  4. 1.4Top-10-percent income shares and redistribution, 2007–2019

  5. 2.1Survey items by country

  6. 2.2Average values of independent and dependent variables by country

  7. 2.3Average marginal effects of support for policy change when preferences diverge by at least 10 percentage points (two-year windows)

  8. 2.4Average marginal effects of preference gaps on policy adoption, controlling for P50 support (two-year windows)

  9. 2.5Linear probability models interacting the P90–P10 preference gap with Left government (two-year windows)

  10. 2.6Linear probability models interacting the P90–P50 preference gap with Left government (two-year windows)

  11. 2.7Average marginal effects of preference gaps on policy adoption, controlling for P50 support, economic, and welfare issues only (two-year windows)

  12. 3.1Determinants of net transfers to M as a percentage of H’s net income

  13. 3.2Determinants of net transfers to L and H as a percentage of own net income

  14. 5.1Representation of PBEIs in the US knowledge economy

  15. 6.1Parameter values

  16. 6.2Group strength, electoral selection, lobbying, and legislative responsiveness

  17. 6.3Mediation analysis

  18. 6.4Estimates of group strength on roll-call votes for some key bills with high support among low-income constituents

  19. 7.1Discontinuities in political and socioeconomic covariates

  20. 7.2Effect of mayors with university degrees on performance outcomes

  21. 7.3Effect of mayors with university degrees on fiscal outcomes

  22. 7.4Effect of mayors with university degrees on key revenue categories and tax rates

  23. 7.5Effect of governments’ education on key areas

  24. 7.6Effect of mayors with university degrees on lagged fiscal outcomes

  25. 7.7Heterogeneous effects of governments’ education: left- and right-wing parties

  26. 9.1Oaxaca–Blinder decomposition of the voting gap between high income/highly educated and low income/low educated

  27. 10.1Attitude structure in Great Britain: confirmatory factor analysis

  28. 10.2Reciprocity beliefs: factor loadings

  29. 10.3Opposition to redistribution is not predicted by reciprocity beliefs

  30. 10.4Proportionality beliefs and “redistribution from”: factor loadings

  31. 11.1Mechanisms of class-biased economic news

  32. 12.1Characteristics of broadcast communities

  33. 13.1Strength of expected class bias in representation of social policy preferences, depending on challenger parties

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  • Tables
  • Edited by Noam Lupu, Vanderbilt University, Tennessee, Jonas Pontusson, Université de Genève
  • Book: Unequal Democracies
  • Online publication: 07 December 2023
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  • Tables
  • Edited by Noam Lupu, Vanderbilt University, Tennessee, Jonas Pontusson, Université de Genève
  • Book: Unequal Democracies
  • Online publication: 07 December 2023
Available formats
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Save book to Google Drive

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  • Tables
  • Edited by Noam Lupu, Vanderbilt University, Tennessee, Jonas Pontusson, Université de Genève
  • Book: Unequal Democracies
  • Online publication: 07 December 2023
Available formats
×