It is indeed a pleasure to be standing here today addressing you as your president. When Bill Park called me to ask whether I would run for president of the Southern Agricultural Economics Association (SAEA), I said yes. He said, “don't you want a day or two to think about it?” I said, “Bill, I have been in this profession for 27 years; I do not want to wait another 27 years for the opportunity. You can do the math.”

Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations (CAFOs) are point sources of pollution and require Clean Water Act permits. The 2003 regulations allow Large CAFOs to propose alternative performance standards (APS) that offer equivalent or better environmental performance than the baseline technology. Principal obstacles to APS success include the complexities of demonstrating superior performance, cost uncertainties for obtaining approval, CAFO risks of participation, inter- and intra-organizational barriers of permitting agencies, and potential lawsuits brought by environmental groups. Despite obstacles, APS offers potential for technology innovations and reduced environmental compliance costs.

Because of excessive water impairment, federal and state agencies have enacted regulations to reduce water pollution from animal feeding operations. Many of the regulations are based on numbers of animals rather than the potential of an operator to impair water quality. To enhance efficiency, critical production indicators and location screening factors might be used to exempt operations that are not significantly impairing water quality. In this manner, regulations could avoid imposing unnecessary costs on the regulated public and more effectively target monitoring and enforcement resources of the regulatory agency.

We propose a market-based approach to reducing the environmental risk posed by concentrated animal feeding operations (CAFOs). The dual problems of hidden information and hidden action faced by policymakers are considered alongside the competing incentives faced by the CAFO manager in a multiple principal-agent setting. A new approach that uses insurance-like contracts is introduced by use of the specific example of a swine operation with a lagoon-based manure management system. Index-based contingent claims contracts in tandem with third-party auditing and waste hauling options are introduced as a complement to regulatory frameworks designed to reduce negative externalities from production.

This paper discusses the three invited papers presented in the session titled “New Regulations Require New Solutions: Federal Provisions Governing Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations” (i.e., CAFOs). These papers provide an excellent review of current state and federal laws and an excellent summary of what has been and is currently being done with respect to CAFO regulation. The papers present three different policy approaches: i) alternative performance standards, ii) location-specific regulation, and iii) insurance-based underwriting of CAFO discharges. Each approach has its drawbacks; however, blending these suggested policies into current regulation would result in efficiency gains.

Declining fishery stocks, increasing fishing effort, and adverse market conditions have produced difficult financial situations for fishermen worldwide. Several high-valued fisheries are considered to be overcapitalized. The purchase and permanent retirement of fishing vessels and/or permits under a buyback program is one approach for reducing fishing capacity. Evidence from previous programs, however, suggests that buybacks are not a panacea for solving overcapacity problems. Whether such programs can help rebuild stocks and improve the financial condition of fleets in any specific fishery depends on a multitude of factors. We consider the potential of a buyback program for the U.S. Atlantic shark fishery.

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Fisheries has conducted several buyback programs to reduce harvesting capacity in fisheries. These programs have attempted to maximize capacity reduction given a fixed budget. However, restructuring issues have not been considered. We explore the possibility of satisfying three different buyback objectives. We examine the black sea bass trap fishery and determine the number of vessels given different allowable catch levels and objectives of maximizing technical efficiency, capacity utilization, and vessels in the fishery. We find considerable variation in the number of vessels allowed to remain in the fishery given the different objectives.

Both of the papers presented in this session deal with various aspects of buyback programs for fisheries. Each paper highlights the need to rationalize capacity output in fisheries in which property rights are poorly specified. However, neither paper places buyback programs into a consistent framework in which the distinction between capacity reduction and capacity utilization is clearly recognized. This distinction is important in order to elicit the most appropriate policy response (particularly with respect to buybacks) to degraded fishery resources.

We demonstrate the use of the small-sample econometrics principles and strategies to come up with reliable yield and acreage models for policy analyses. We focus on demonstrating the importance of proper representation of systematic and random components of the model for improving forecasting precision along with more reliable confidence intervals for the forecasts. A probability distribution function modeling approach, which has been shown to provide more reliable confidence intervals for the dependent variable forecasts than the standard models that assume error term normality, is used to estimate cotton supply response in the Southeastern United States.

The opportunities and challenges of incorporating accurate policy representations into institutional partial equilibrium commodity models were investigated. Six issues are raised: commodity space definition, vertical linkages, assessing market power, the changing nature of government support, trade policy, and data requirements. The importance of product attributes and different approaches to modeling product differentiation are considered. A case study of food safety is used to bring together the major issues. Although institutional commodity models still have a role to play, we advocate the use of smaller idiosyncratic models to address many of the relevant policy questions in a rapidly changing sector.

Major issues and challenges encountered in modeling and analyzing agricultural and trade policy reforms are reviewed. We focus on modeling approach and pay special attention to the type and scope of models, calibration of a realistic baseline scenario, representation of the reform agreement, use of extramodel information, choice of metrics to measure reform impacts, and emerging issues in policy modeling. Existing solutions and unresolved issues are examined. We stress the complementarity of various modeling approaches in assessing policy reforms and the importance of helping users understand the limitations of the chosen approach.

The organizers of this session asked me to do two things: to place policy modeling into the context of both general congressional policymaking and that of the 2002 Farm Bill and to comment on the three papers of the session.

Commodity models provide results that are useful for congressional decision making. Expected impacts of proposed policies on supply, demand, prices, and income are of interest to members of Congress. But decisions by policymakers depend on a variety of factors beyond model results, including professional backgrounds and perspectives, personal experiences, familiarity with proposed and alternative policies, views of key constituents, and ideologies. Many policy changes are incremental. So while model results are important to the policymaking process, they rarely are the key determinant as to why one proposed policy trumps another.

Over $1.7 billion has been spent on the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) since 1985. The purpose of this study is to show that these expenditures have aided the environment. Rather than quantify changes in environmental variables, a spatial econometric model is used to test if CRP enrollments are greater in counties with poorer environmental quality. In seven of nine regions, CRP enrollments are higher in counties with an environmental concern. This positive finding justifies past expenditures by the CRP and supports continued funding as an environmental program. The CRP is targeting current environmental concerns that will lead to future improvement.

Changes to commodity programs in the 2002 Farm Bill increased the value of crop base acreages on which decoupled payments are received. The bill also expanded the availability of key conservation programs. This paper compares the value of payments from commodity programs (along with continued crop production) to the easement payment (and recreational lease revenue) available under the Wetland Reserve Program. A net present value model using risk-adjusted returns is employed in the analysis for Mississippi delta cropland containing rice, cotton, and soybean base. Sensitivity analysis is conducted on some of the key variables affecting the decision.

Conservation reserve program (CRP) payments amount to several billion dollars annually. Payments are allocated to both remove land from production and to help farmers pay for conservation improvements. However, research examining whether farmers increase their utility with CRPs is limited. This paper uses simulation analysis and certainty equivalents to compare farming income to payments under the CRP. Farming income is a combination of crop production and government payments as specified in the 2002 Farm Bill. This analysis focuses on farms in three different counties in Kentucky. Results indicate that CRPs are good choices for many farmers.

The 2002 Farm Bill creates several opportunities for landowners to adopt management practices that protect and improve soil and water quality. Landowners considering enrollment in conservation programs must compare the monetary and nonmonetary costs and benefits from removing land from production agriculture. The overall purpose of this invited paper session was to improve the understanding of the factors affecting a landowner's decision to enroll in conservation programs. Papers addressed the environmental benefits of conservation programs and compared the returns to enrolling in conservation programs to the returns from production agriculture.

This research identifies and quantifies the determinants of first-year academic performance in the College of Agriculture at Kansas State University, 1990–1999. Forty-eight percent of the variation in first-semester college grades was explained by high school grades, standardized test scores, socioeconomic variables, high school characteristics, credit hours completed, and major field of study. Approximately 62% of the variation in second-semester grades was explained. First-semester college grades explained 43% of second-semester grades. Several statistically significant relationships are detected, and the implications for students, advisors, and administrators are discussed.

This article analyzes anomalous patterns of agent, adjuster, and producer claim outcomes and determines the most likely pattern of collusion that is suggestive of fraud, waste, and abuse in the federal crop insurance program. Log–linear analysis of Poisson-distributed counts of anomalous entities is used to examine potential patterns of collusion. The most likely pattern of collusion present in the crop insurance program is where agents, adjusters, and producers nonrecursively interact with each other to coordinate their behavior. However, if a priori an intermediary is known to initiate and coordinate the collusion, a pattern where the producer acts as the intermediary is the most likely pattern of collusion evidenced in the data. These results have important implications for insurance program design and compliance.