Post-war discussions and studies of technological transfer and economic development have demonstrated that the advantages of being backward can be elusive. With a technical lag, new technology can apparently be borrowed ‘off-the-peg’. But the new technology cannot automatically be easily assimilated into the lagging economy. Institutional structures, organisational styles, and the varying characteristics of inputs can all entail adaptations and modifications to ensure successful borrowing. Making these changes can often depend on the existence of domestic scientific and technical expertise. In this respect, the Soviet Union was in a relatively favourable position. It had inherited the beginnings of an industrial base from Tsarism. It also had a small but lively scientific and technological community to provide the foundations of a substantial R&D network. It therefore had the capacity to make the necessary modifications to imported technology.

The key area of technological failure was that, in spite of these advantages, the Soviet Union was not able to use large-scale technical borrowing to build the foundation of further widespread and domestically initiated technological change. Institutional factors, such as the organisational structures for research, development and innovation, are important in explaining this failure, but the political and social conditions of the late 1930s were such that it was not a propitious time to be attempting such a transformation.

Under Tsarism

The technological level of the pre-revolutionary economy of the Russian Empire was far below that of the industrialised nations. Agricultural techniques were backward over most of the Empire, and much of industry, including oil, coal and many branches of engineering, was at a low technological level.