Morale and the Materialschlacht – 1918

After fifty-two months of fighting, blockade, near total mobilisation and 2 million deaths, the German army finally capitulated on 11 November 1918. Outgunned and outnumbered by its enemies, whose forces were rapidly increasing due to the massive influx of fresh American troops into France, the army stood little chance of significantly delaying, let alone permanently halting, the retreat towards its own borders. Stretched to the limit of its powers of endurance during the course of its own offensives earlier in the year, in the summer of 1918 it broke. Although some troops continued to fight bravely, the willingness and ability of most to resist the Allied offensive disappeared. While, in the estimation of no less a distinguished soldier than Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, the German army possessed enough material resources to prolong the war into 1919, its men lacked both the inclination and energy to do so. Matters of morale, which had been decisive in determining the conflict's longevity, were also pivotal in bringing about its termination. As Ludendorff himself acknowledged two and a half weeks before the armistice, at the end of the war it was not primarily the number (die Zahl) but rather the spirit of the troops (Geist der Truppe) which was decisive.