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Chapter I - The Concept of Human Rights

from A - The Normative Framework

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 September 2018

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Summary

Quite oft en little attention is given to the exact meaning of the concept of “human rights”. Nowadays, considerable efforts are undertaken to expand the list of human rights with one or another novelty. A preliminary question should be raised as to the conditions that should be fulfilled by a given interest to transform it into a human right. What quality requirements should be satisfied to qualify as human right? As its denomination itself indicates, one may assume that human rights are rights everyone is entitled to, purely and only because he or she is a human being.

Inflation, a negative phenomenon in economics, is unfortunately also not unknown in relation to legal concepts. A few examples illustrate how difficult it may be to stick to a pure terminology. Not all ill-treatment is inhuman treatment and certainly not torture. Not every alien staying illegally in a country is an asylum seeker and certainly not every asylum seeker is a refugee. Not every massacre is genocide. And not every right is a human right. Sometimes it is assumed that every legitimate aspiration is a human right. If the concept of human rights has any meaning, it should only apply to “rights”. What is not a right is a fortiori not a human right. According to the classical definition of Rudolf von Jhering, a right is a “legally protected interest”. Consequently, it must be an interest recognised, protected or guaranteed by the national legislation, by the Constitution or by international treaties. This is a formal requirement. But there are also substantive requirements.

A legitimate aspiration, however important or desirable, is not necessarily a right. Here too, some examples may clarify this. Nothing is more looked after than the “pursuit of happiness”. Every human being attaches high importance to loving and being loved. But, however much we may regret it, there is, at least in the legal meaning of the concept of “right”, no “right to happiness” and no “right to be loved”, no more so than a “right to fair weather”. Of course, anybody may claim the contrary but this is without legal consequences whatsoever.

Type
Chapter
Information
International Human Rights Protection
Balanced, Critical, Realistic
, pp. 7 - 18
Publisher: Intersentia
Print publication year: 2016

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