The Russian invasion of Ukraine has brought on unspeakable suffering. It has already injured and killed scores of people. It has displaced millions who now face an uncertain future. It raises the specter of all-out cyber war that threatens to draw other countries into the conflict. It is raging not only on the ground in Ukraine, but also on internet platforms where disinformation has spread. It tests the resilience of international partnerships and alliances. Beyond these immediate implications, the Russian attack on Ukraine also violates the prohibition on aggressive use of force, a foundational principle of the post-World War II international order. Facing these alarming prospects, many are pessimistic about what the war in Ukraine may portend for the future of international law and international relations. Surprisingly, however, some of the bleakest predictions have not yet been realized. Quite the contrary. We argue that there is a lot to be optimistic about when it comes to the role of international law, partnerships and norms in this conflict.

In 1970, Thomas Franck asked a rhetorical question of enduring significance: Who Killed Article 2(4)? The reference is to the provision of the United Nations Charter that requires all member states to refrain “from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.” Vladimir Putin's gambit in Ukraine, conducted with the rhetorical purpose of eliminating the country as an independent state, is the latest in a series of events that periodically cause analysts to bemoan the end of the post-World War II international order. Will this time be different? Will it mark a definitive change in international law? This short essay will argue that, bloody as the Ukraine conflict has been, the immediate response has been to reinforce rather than reject traditional norms about sovereignty and territorial integrity. At the same time, the invasion and other states’ reaction to it illustrate both the character of, and limits to, authoritarian use of international law.

Russia's invasion of Ukraine has triggered an unprecedented wave of sanctions targeting every facet of the Russian economy. In the early months of the conflict, the sheer scope, speed, and coordination of this response to Russia's aggression instills hope that economic pressure may yet play a decisive role in this conflict. But the massive scale of the effort is also cause for concern. In particular, it highlights the relative lack of legal constraints governing economic warfare, even in the face of potentially grave harms to third parties and the global economy. While these concerns have provoked no shortage of proposals for reform, the fragmented institutional landscape and a lack of political will are likely to frustrate any attempts at far-reaching transformation.

Russia's invasion of Ukraine has exposed the capriciousness of state and corporate power over human rights online. Events since the invasion have demonstrated the coercive power of the state over online expression, privacy, and public protest. Russia's longtime “war against reality” has deepened in its repression and is dependent on the raw power of criminal law enforcement, surveillance by security forces, censorship by its media regulator, and legal and extralegal demands against internet platforms. Without drawing an equivalence, the European Union has imposed a comprehensive ban on Russian state-controlled media outlets, encouraged in part by the Ukrainian government, whose moral authority under the circumstances has been particularly strong. Notwithstanding state power over them, technology companies continue to be capable of causing or mitigating, if not preventing, human rights harms. Foreign companies and local partners have heroically maintained internet access in Ukraine and resisted Russian censorship and propaganda, the latter resulting in the blocking of key internet platforms by Russia. It is the latest chapter in the struggle among governments, companies, and individuals to control online space. But it is also an opportunity for reflection, for while the Kremlin has flouted its international obligations, governments and companies committed to human rights law cannot so behave. They should exercise their power over public space according to transparent rule of law standards of non-discrimination, legality, necessity, and legitimacy. A headlong rush to Russia-specific rules and enforcement, unmoored from public articulation of human rights standards, risks corroding the global normative framework for fundamental rights online.

Russia's invasion of Ukraine has put to the test theories about how cyberattacks fit into conventional war. Contrary to many expectations, cyber operations appear to have played only a limited role in the initial stages of the invasion, prompting competing theories and rampant speculation about why. Although written while the conflict continues, this essay considers how either of two broad explanations for the limited role of cyberattacks to date—that Russia's attempted cyberattacks were thwarted or that Russia chose not to deploy them widely—challenges conventional wisdom about cybersecurity. The essay concludes by suggesting that one lesson international lawyers should draw from the current conflict is the urgent need to clarify and enforce international rules not just for the rare high-end destructive or widely disruptive cyber operations, but also for lower-level operations that have proven more consistently problematic, both in Ukraine and elsewhere. Clarifying such rules could help to manage escalation risk now and in the future, even if such rules—like the most venerable international law prohibitions that Russia's invasion has violated—do not necessarily restrain behavior directly.

The situation of Ukrainians fleeing the Russian invasion exemplifies, as the organizers of this symposium note, both a shock to the international order and a powerful international response. Europeans, and Global North states more broadly, have welcomed Ukrainians with a generosity that sits in stark contrast to their treatment of the vast majority of contemporary refugees. This exceptional response demonstrates a key gap in the legal architecture, namely the absence of an international agreement on shared responsibility for hosting refugees. It also highlights a substantive shortcoming in international refugee law: its failure to protect most people fleeing armed conflict. In contrast, regional law from Africa and Latin America has for some time extended refugee protection to individuals escaping generalized violence. Beyond the substantive law, in many cases, regional protection is a preferable option for individuals fleeing violent conflict. In addition to these structural and substantive concerns, the exceptionally rapid and generous response to the Ukrainians demonstrates the deep politicization of international refugee policy and highlights the invidious role of race in the international legal order.

Russia's invasion of Ukraine violated the prohibition of force contained in the United Nations Charter and the peremptory norm of general international law prohibiting aggression. The invasion was not an exercise of individual or collective self-defense, or a humanitarian intervention, as Russia variously claimed. The United Nations General Assembly rejected all such claims when 141 member states voted to deplore “in the strongest terms the aggression by the Russian Federation against Ukraine in violation of Article 2 (4) of the Charter” as well as “the involvement of Belarus in this unlawful use of force against Ukraine.” This essay traces the legal implications of Russia's act of aggression, and its violations of international humanitarian law, through international criminal law, international human rights law, and the law of state responsibility. It argues that Russia violates the human rights of every person it kills, and that states are permitted and may be required to provide military assistance to Ukraine and impose economic sanctions on Russia. As Ukraine fights for its survival as an independent state, international law remains both a moral guide and a strategic asset.