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Rationality as the end of thought

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 October 2022

Nick Chater*
Affiliation:
Behavioural Science Group, Warwick Business School, University of Warwick, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK nick.chater@wbs.ac.uk

Abstract

Bermúdez convincingly argues that framing effects are ubiquitous and that this is not a sign of human irrationality, but an unavoidable feature of any intelligent system. The commentary adds that framing effects arise even in formal domains, such as chess and mathematics, which appear paradigms of rational thought. Indeed, finding and attempting to resolve clashes between different frames is a major impetus for deliberative cognition.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press

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References

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