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Preface

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 March 2010

Paul Weirich
Affiliation:
University of Missouri, Columbia
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Summary

Game theory is a rich field for the philosopher. It formulates principles of rational action and so makes immediate contributions to the branch of logic that studies practical reasoning. Its principles of strategic reasoning also provide the undergirding for the social contract theory and the study of social and linguistic convention. Revisions of central game-theoretic tenets reverberate throughout philosophy.

This book makes some assumptions about rationality and equilibrium in games and traces out their consequences. These are the main assumptions: (1) There are no dilemmas of rationality; an agent has a rational choice in every choice situation. (2) Every ideal game has a solution, that is, a profile of jointly rational strategies. (3) A rational choice is self-supporting. (4) An equilibrium is a profile of strategies that are jointly self-supporting. These assumptions suggest replacing Nash equilibrium, which fails to exist in some ideal games, with a new type of equilibrium called strategic equilibrium. Strategic equilibrium is introduced via a study of self-support. Taking an equilibrium to be a profile of jointly self-supporting strategies, I use a new account of self-support to obtain the new type of equilibrium. I show that a strategic equilibrium exists in every ideal normal-form game meeting certain mild restrictions and provide procedures for finding strategic equilibria in those games.

This project arose from reflections on cooperative games, where individuals may form coalitions that adopt joint strategies and otherwise act as agents. I took being an equilibrium as a necessary condition for being a solution to a cooperative game, and this led to a problem.

Type
Chapter
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Equilibrium and Rationality
Game Theory Revised by Decision Rules
, pp. ix - xii
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 1998

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  • Preface
  • Paul Weirich, University of Missouri, Columbia
  • Book: Equilibrium and Rationality
  • Online publication: 18 March 2010
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511663727.001
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  • Preface
  • Paul Weirich, University of Missouri, Columbia
  • Book: Equilibrium and Rationality
  • Online publication: 18 March 2010
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511663727.001
Available formats
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Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Preface
  • Paul Weirich, University of Missouri, Columbia
  • Book: Equilibrium and Rationality
  • Online publication: 18 March 2010
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511663727.001
Available formats
×