Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Tables
- Figures
- Acknowledgments
- Online appendices
- 1 Leaders
- 2 Why and when do leaders fight?
- 3 International conflict and the fate of leaders
- 4 The fate of leaders and incentives to fight
- 5 Case studies: Central America 1840???1918
- 6 Conclusions
- Appendix A Data and measurement
- Bibliography
- Index
2 - Why and when do leaders fight?
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 07 September 2011
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Tables
- Figures
- Acknowledgments
- Online appendices
- 1 Leaders
- 2 Why and when do leaders fight?
- 3 International conflict and the fate of leaders
- 4 The fate of leaders and incentives to fight
- 5 Case studies: Central America 1840???1918
- 6 Conclusions
- Appendix A Data and measurement
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
The decisive means for politics is violence.…Anyone who fails to see this is, indeed, a political infant.
Max WeberIn this chapter we present a new theory which explains why and when leaders seek or avoid international conflict. In our theory, the strategic interaction that leads to or away from war is to be found at the domestic, rather than the international level. To provide the reader a roadmap of the first half of this chapter, we briefly sketch the main logic of our theory. We begin generically with a leader and an opposition locked in a competition over power and policy. An exogenous shock (temporarily) changes the domestic balance of forces in favor of the leader???s political opposition. Leaders who worry mainly about a regular, peaceful, removal from office are willing and able to make credible political concessions to the opposition because they can reasonably assume a safe retirement and even the possibility of returning to office. For such leaders, an increase in the risk of a regular removal from office makes them less likely to initiate international conflict. Those leaders who must worry about a forcible removal from office, unfortunately, cannot credibly commit to concessions. Because concessions that weaken their power increase their risk of a forcible removal from office and subsequent personal punishment, such leaders have incentives to try to take back any concessions they made once the tide swings back in their favor. In turn, the opposition has every incentive to capitalize on its (temporary) advantage and try to overthrow the leader.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Leaders and International Conflict , pp. 12 - 45Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2011