1.1 Understanding Bullshit

The accusation that philosophy is bullshit is common (the phrase “philosophy is bullshit” returns more than 39,000 results on Google). Eminent scientists like Stephen Hawking, and influential science popularizers like Neil DeGrasse Tyson and Bill Nye have dismissed its value (Reference GoldhillGoldhill, 2016). Philosophers themselves are often ready to denigrate particular areas or approaches as bullshit, or something equivalent to bullshit. Dismissals of all or parts of “continental philosophy” as bullshit are not at all uncommon, though thankfully rarer now than in the past. The name-calling is by no means one-sided: Graham Harman is scarcely more charitable when he decries the “shallowness, false dichotomies, lack of imagination, robotic chains of reasoning, and the aggressive self-assurance that typifies analytic philosophers at their worst”; lest you think he reserves his scorn only for some pockets of analytic philosophy, he adds “we need to question the assumptions of this entire school” (Reference HarmanHarman, 2009: 167–168). But the accusation that a school of philosophy is bullshit is reserved for “difficult” and “obscure” work. Even if we think that the kind of philosophy characterized by numbered premises, formal proofs, and attempts at exceptionless definitions is arid and sterile, we’re unlikely to dismiss it as bullshit.

Is (some) philosophy bullshit? Reference FrankfurtHarry Frankfurt (2009) has influentially argued that bullshit consists in assertions made without regard to whether they’re true. If that’s what’s meant when some people dismiss some schools of philosophy as bullshit, it’s often question-begging: it begs the question against those schools that aim at bringing us to see the world differently, rather than at stating truths about it. It might be true that some philosophers don’t care whether what they’re saying is literally true, but it doesn’t follow – without a lot of argument – that their work deserves to be dismissed as bullshit. Just as importantly, sincerity doesn’t guarantee that an assertion isn’t bullshit. Think of the accusation “he believes his own bullshit”; if Frankfurt-style bullshit was the only kind there was, that accusation would make little sense.

Frankfurt’s account also doesn’t capture how “bullshit” is used in the empirical literature. This literature builds on Reference Pennycook, Cheyne, Barr, Koehler and FugelsangGordon Pennycook and colleagues’ (2015) path-breaking work. They define “bullshit” in terms of form and content, rather than the attitudes of those who produce it: on their account, bullshit consists in assertions that, in virtue of their syntactic structure, seem to convey meaning but (supposedly) lack genuine content. Their paradigms are the obscure sayings of the purveyors of supposed new age wisdom, like this example they draw from Deepak Chopra: “Attention and intention are the mechanics of manifestation” (Reference Pennycook, Cheyne, Barr, Koehler and FugelsangPennycook et al., 2015: 550). Their interest as psychologists is in what characteristics of hearers or readers make them receptive to these assertions; that is, what are the psychological correlates of finding bullshit profound?

Pennycook et al. take their account of bullshit to pick out assertions that also count as Frankfurt-bullshit, but they’re wrong about that. Deepak Chopra may or may not be indifferent to whether his assertions are true. His attitude is irrelevant to whether they are bullshit, on their account. Reference CohenGerry Cohen (2013) has offered an alternative account, which seems better able to capture what Pennycook et al. call “pseudo-profound bullshit.” Cohen doesn’t aim to replace Frankfurt’s notion; rather, he argues that we need more than one account to capture all the bullshit that’s out there. Cohen-style bullshit can be sincerely intended; its distinguishing mark is that it’s “unclarifiable” (Reference CohenCohen, 2013: 104).

Cohen also brings the discussion directly back to philosophy: he singles out “Francophone philosophical culture” as the “most successful producer of bullshit, both in respect of the volume of bullshit that it has produced and in respect of the warmth with which that bullshit has been received” (Reference CohenCohen, 2013: 108). Again, Cohen doesn’t dispute that those who produce the work he mentions (Deleuze, Derrida, Kristeva, and Lacan, as well as the Althusserian Marxists who are his special target) are sincere. He thinks they aim at truth, at least truth of a kind. Nevertheless, what they say is not true: it’s not even false.

Cohen’s original interest in bullshit stems from an avowedly autobiographical motivation. In his twenties, he tells us, he read a great deal of French Marxism, most of it stemming from the Althusserian school. He goes on to report that he struggled to extract meaning from these texts, and when he was able to make some sense of them attributed more significance to the claims than they really deserved, in virtue of the effort he’d expended extracting them. His dalliance with Althusserian Marxism subsequently made him intolerant of bullshit, and when he founded a Marxist discussion group he called it the Non-Bullshit Marxism Group (Reference CohenCohen, 2013: 95). We’ll return to Cohen’s confessed intolerance of bullshit; I think his preconceptions about these texts matter a great deal to his responses to them. In any case, his principal example – his “wonderful example of bullshit” – comes from a former student of Althusser’s, Étienne Balibar: “This is precisely the first meaning we can give to the idea of dialectic: a logic or form of explanation specifically adapted to the determinant intervention of class struggle in the very fabric of history” (Reference BalibarBalibar, 2014: 97). Cohen might once have assessed Balibar’s assertion as profound; he now dismisses it as bullshit. Can the psychological work shed light on why he was once impressed, and perhaps on why he is now dismissive?

Reference Pennycook, Cheyne, Barr, Koehler and FugelsangPennycook et al. (2015) asked their participants to rate the assertions they were presented with – drawn from Deepak Chopra’s tweets and from two online new age bullshit generators – for profundity, alongside motivational quotes and mundane assertions. They found that bullshit receptivity was correlated with an intuitive cognitive style and lower cognitive ability, as well as with higher rates of religious and paranormal belief. Allegedly, people are impressed by bullshit due to their failure or inability to detect the vacuity of the stimuli. I think it’s vanishingly unlikely that Cohen fits their model, in cognitive style, in ability, or in beliefs in the supernatural. Perhaps another account of bullshit receptivity might do better at explaining his dalliance with Althusserian Marxism?

The empirical literature can be mined for other explanations. Reference Pennycook, Cheyne, Barr, Koehler and FugelsangPennycook et al. (2015) probed the interaction between the (allegedly nonsensical) content of the assertions that feature as stimuli in their work and the dispositions of those who are receptive to them. Other work looks instead to the apparent source of assertions (as well as their content) to explain receptiveness. Reference SperberDan Sperber (2010) has identified the guru effect, whereby high credibility is assigned to an assertion in virtue of the fact that it is obscure and it is believed to stem from someone who is a “guru”; that is, a source of wisdom. Sperber takes the guru effect to partly explain the success of some philosophers, “especially but not uniquely in the so-called continental tradition” (Reference SperberSperber, 2010: 587); Sperber goes on to quote Sartre, Heidegger, and Derrida; perhaps Balibar could be added to Sperber’s list.

More recently, the guru effect has been joined by the Einstein effect (Reference Hoogeveen, Haaf and BulbuliaHoogeveen et al., 2022). In this study, stimuli generated by the New-Age Bullshit GeneratorFootnote ³ were attributed to either a scientist or a spiritual leader. Across more than 10,000 participants in 24 countries, assertions were judged as more credible when attributed to a scientist than to a spiritual leader; even religious participants tended to see statements attributed to a scientist as more credible than identical statements attributed to a spiritual authority. Perhaps the success of bullshit in Francophone philosophy is due to the special status of philosophers in France: because they have the status of “gurus,” their nonsense is attributed with a great deal of credibility, despite – or perhaps in virtue of – its “unclarifiability.”

The source and content effects just listed – the guru effect, the Einstein effect, the effects of bullshit on perceptions of profundity – are typically conceived as different ways in which assertions are given an underserved boost in credibility in the eyes of those who are susceptible. The credibility inflation is held to be undeserved, because – after all – the statements that are rated as credible and even profound are designed to be meaningless. The bullshit receptivity scale developed by Reference Pennycook, Cheyne, Barr, Koehler and FugelsangPennycook et al. (2015: supplementary material) uses items like the following: “We are in the midst of a high-frequency blossoming of interconnectedness that will give us access to the quantum soup itself.” The Einstein effect was measured using stimuli like: “Yes, it is possible to exterminate the things that can confront us, but not without hope on our side. Turbulence is born in the gap where transformation has been excluded. It is in evolving that we are re-energized” (Reference Hoogeveen, Haaf and BulbuliaHoogeveen et al., 2022: supplementary material). Since these are bullshit statements, the assignment of any degree of credibility and profundity to them is undeserved.

Of course, credibility boosts in virtue of these kinds of effects might often attach to genuinely meaningful statements too: they might be perceived as more profound than they deserve, given their relatively banal contents. Meaningful statements can have their credibility boosted in still other ways. Several studies have found that the use of irrelevant neuroscientific information boosts the credibility of assertions for naïve participants (Reference Weisberg, Keil, Goodstein, Rawson and GrayWeisberg et al., 2008; Reference Fernandez-Duque, Evans and HodgesFernandez-Duque, Evans, and Hodges, 2015). There’s no reason to think that these kinds of effects are limited to extraneous neuroscientific information. Scientific jargon of all sorts probably impresses many people.

Cohen may have briefly fallen victim to the guru effect or the Einstein effect: the status of the philosopher within France may have led him to take Balibar’s claims to be more significant than they deserve. In doing so, he would have fallen victim to what I’m calling an extratextual influence: his assessment of the text was influenced by awareness of facts outside the text. Alternatively, he may have been moved by intratextual factors: for example, the obscurity of the claims. Of course, these kinds of influences interact and are rarely cleanly separated. The content of a new age aphorism suggests a “spiritual leader” as its source; conversely, banal assertions from a scientist get little or no boost in credibility in virtue of their source. One way or another, Cohen was taken in by bullshit, or so he later came to think.

1.2 Deserving Bullshit

With these tools in hand, we can now put fine clothes on our resentments. We analytic philosophers, with our careful arguments and our rigor and our devotion to clarity, are outshone in the public eye by continental philosophers who disguise their essential triviality under layers of apparently significant pseudoprofundity. Their claims, when they bother to make them, are either devoid of meaning altogether, or cover essentially mundane thoughts with an unearned glamour (Reference ShackelShackel, 2005). We may not be able to partake of their aura, but at least we have the satisfaction of exposing them for what they are, and laying bare the tricks that take in the unwary.

None of this is true. Whatever the merits of continental philosophy – or particular strands within it – the empirical work on bullshit does not provide us with any grounds for dismissing or downgrading it. It might be true that the work of (some) continental philosophers receives a credibility boost in virtue of features of their content that might be paraphrased away without loss of meaning, or in virtue of the status of the intellectual, and specifically the philosopher, in France. But it’s not true that any such credibility boost is strictly extraneous or necessarily undeserved. It may be fully rational to assign a higher degree of credibility to a text (with “text,” understood broadly, to encompass anything from an assertion through to a corpus of work) in virtue of features of its content that could be paraphrased away, or of its apparent source.

This is clearest with regard to the Einstein effect. It should be entirely obvious that we do and should assign higher credibility to assertions by scientists speaking in their domain of expertise, in virtue of the fact that they issue from scientists. We’re rarely in a position to verify scientific claims for ourselves; instead, we accept the claims of specialists speaking within the domain of their expertise because we take them to be much better positioned to make such claims than we are. It’s worth emphasizing how routine this kind of deference is, especially in light of the politicization of science that was a central feature of the COVID-19 pandemic (and which led many people to doubt the epistemic credentials of epidemiologists). We may not automatically accept the diagnoses of medical professionals, but we almost always assign high credibility to them, in virtue of the fact that they have a medical degree. If the stakes are high enough, or if we have some reason to doubt the professional, we might seek a second opinion. But we (most of us, at any rate) don’t look beyond the domain of medical expertise: we turn to another medical professional, in recognition of their domain-specific credibility.

The phenomenon is by no means restricted to medical professionals. We assign especially high credibility to scientists speaking in the domain of their expertise (at least in areas that have not been politicized) when we take them to report the consensus in their field. When a journalist interviews an astronomer about what they hope we’ll learn from the James Webb telescope, say, we rarely question or doubt the claims they make, so long as they confine themselves to their area of expertise. This is all completely rational. It is rational to assign higher credibility to experts; expertise just does confer epistemic credibility. Experts’ assertions carry extra weight in virtue of the fact that they have more background knowledge and a much greater ability to assess claims within the domains of their expertise than laypeople.

If there’s irrationality in the Einstein effect, it must be in virtue of the fact that the effect attaches to literally meaningless statements. It’s one thing to attach high credibility to a doctor’s diagnosis, or to the assertion from an astronomer that the Big Bang occurred 13.8 billion years ago, and quite another to assign high credibility to “Wholeness quiets infinite phenomena.” In the first two cases, we assign a high credibility to an assertion we can parse for meaning; in the second, we assign high credibility to something that is entirely baffling. Surely that’s irrational?

Again, I think this is a mistake. The assignment of credibility to an assertion shouldn’t depend on our ability to understand it; not when it’s a claim about a domain requiring special expertise. Consider two claims that are, for me, impenetrable but to which I assign high credibility:

• E = mc²

• Quantum particles can be in a superposition of states that collapse into a single state on observation.

I assign these propositions a high degree of credibility because physicists take them to be credible, and they are propositions with regard to which physicists have epistemic privilege. Fundamental physics is, notoriously, a domain in which ordinary intuition is unreliable and any degree of understanding depends on painfully acquired esoteric knowledge. Given my lack of training in the domain, I should expect to find claims within it impenetrable. That shouldn’t be a barrier to finding them credible. They’re credible to me because experts assert them, not because I can assess them for myself, or even understand them.

You may well understand the propositions just mentioned better than I do. Still, you certainly accept some propositions you can’t really clarify (whether you’re aware that you can’t clarify them or not; see Reference Keil, Wilson, Keil and WilsonKeil and Wilson [2000]; Reference Rozenblit and KeilRozenblit and Keil [2002] on the illusion of explanatory depth). Perhaps these propositions fall within the domain of physics or mathematics: perhaps (like me) you can’t really clarify the claim that the universe consists of ten (or eleven) dimensions – again, a claim I assign some credence to. Perhaps they’re propositions about biology: many more people accept the theory of evolution than are able to explain it, and even those with some undergraduate education in it are often seriously confused about it (Reference ShtulmanShtulman, 2006). We see the same phenomenon in the domain of religion. Think of notoriously opaque claims like “God is three in one.” It’s rational for (some) religious believers to accept claims like this (where this entails seeing them as credible and important), deferring to theologians and priests for their precise content.

The religious believer is rational in accepting such claims (given their background beliefs) for the same sort of reason I take myself to be rational in accepting the scientific claims I mentioned. We take these statements to be credible despite our inability to clarify them because we take them to concern issues that fall within a domain in which it takes genuine and deep expertise to have knowledge (or justified belief), and because we take these claims to be endorsed by those who possess the relevant expertise. Clarifiability doesn’t enter into it: I have just as much – and just the same – reason to endorse the claims I can’t clarify within such domains as those (if any) I can clarify. I do so on the basis of expert testimony, and my capacity to grasp the claims is irrelevant. Similarly, there’s no particular reason to think that those who rate Deepak Chopra’s tweets as credible and important are behaving irrationally in doing so, given their background beliefs.

The notion of rationality I’m invoking here is obviously subjectivist. To be rational, in the sense I have in mind, is a matter of updating one’s attitudes on the evidence. It is not a matter of getting things right (though of course it’s nonaccidentally connected to getting things right). Given bad evidence or bad background beliefs, someone may rationally update in a way that takes them further from the truth. Most readers will think that anyone who assigns high credibility to new age aphorisms has bad background beliefs. I agree; nevertheless given those beliefs, there’s no reason to think they’re updating badly. Those people who are subject to the Einstein effect may be subject to no rational defect at all: neither in endorsing the supposedly scientific claims nor in taking scientists to be domain experts.

Let’s return to philosophy. Suppose (for the moment) that Balibar or Deleuze or Derrida (or Hegel or Wittgenstein or McDowell) deal in assertions that are “unclarifiable” for many (or even all) of their readers. Given the right set of background beliefs, it would nevertheless be rational to assign them a high degree of credibility and importance. Given the status of the philosopher in France, it is rational for the nonexpert to assign high credibility to such assertions when they are plausibly taken as falling within the domain of the speaker’s expertise. There’s nothing irrational about any of that.

1.3 Bullshit, Expert Level

This defense of French bullshit only takes us so far, however. I’ve argued that it’s rational for nonexperts to assign high credibility to assertions they can’t clarify, when they take those assertions to be endorsed by relevant experts. It follows that it might be rational for the average nonexpert to assign high credibility to the assertions of a philosopher. But it’s one thing to show that it would be rational for the nonexpert to assign high credibility to an unclarifiable assertion and quite another to show that it would be rational for a professional philosopher to do the same. The philosopher is in the position of the physicist who reads a statement like “Turbulence is born in the gap where transformation has been excluded,” attributed to another physicist. Unlike the layperson, they have the tools to assess it, and can appropriately call bullshit. Similarly, that it’s rational for the nonexpert to assign high credibility to (say) Balibar’s claims even though they’re unclarifiable for them doesn’t show that Gerry Cohen was making a mistake in calling bullshit.

Let’s set Cohen himself aside for the moment. Before we discuss his justification for calling bullshit on Balibar, let’s focus on more typical cases in which philosophers denigrate the work of other philosophers in these kinds of terms. Typically, these cases involve philosophers in one tradition denouncing work in another: say, the signatories of the infamous letter calling on the University of Cambridge not to award an honorary degree to Derrida (Reference SmithSmith, 1992). It is unlikely that Armstrong, Quine, or Ruth Barcan Marcus had much familiarity with Derrida’s work. Their assessment of his work might have been based on casual acquaintance with it: reading excerpts or maybe an essay. Perhaps some of the signatories thought that intellectual responsibility required them to dip into Derrida in this kind of way before signing the letter. Perhaps some of them went deeper, reading several essays, a whole book, or even several books. Of course, there comes a point at which one has engaged sufficiently deeply with a philosopher to be in a good epistemic position to assess their work (one signatory of the letter, Kevin Mulligan, may have been in such a position). But it takes serious and sustained engagement to be in that position with regard to a philosopher working in a different tradition; more serious and sustained engagement than is commonly thought.

Science is highly specialized, and the expert chemist (say) may be at a loss when it comes to the claims of a physicist. With regard to claims like that, the chemist may be just as much a layperson as I am. They might assign high credibility to such claims for the same reasons I do. Philosophy is not (a) science, of course. But it is very diverse. Even within traditions, broadly conceived, there’s a great deal of diversity: I struggle to understand work in much of the philosophy of science, for example. Across traditions there is a great deal more diversity, in subject matter, approach, and even stakes. I think it’s plausible to maintain that those signatories to the Derrida letter who lacked serious acquaintance with his work were laypeople in Derrida’s field. They simply lacked the expertise to make a serious attempt at clarifying his statements or otherwise assessing them.Footnote ⁴

Genuine engagement with Derrida’s work – say reading several of his books and even some commentary – is likely insufficient to acquire the expertise required to assess it, even for someone who is already an expert in a different philosophical tradition. At least on views I find plausible, genuine and deep immersion in a philosophical tradition is required. Philosophical traditions might constitute what Reference MacIntyreAlasdair MacIntyre (1990) calls rival versions of inquiry, with incommensurable standards. Alternatively, and more weakly, they may not be incommensurable but they might have very different goals. If either of these views is true, Derrida’s work might be bad philosophy when it is assessed against the aims of paradigm analytic philosophy but good philosophy when assessed against some other standard. Perhaps his claims about language don’t illuminate its structure very well at all but succeed in bringing us to see the world anew, for example.

That’s not to say that someone trained in a different tradition can’t acquire the expertise justifiably to call bullshit on Derrida or some other philosopher. My training, up to and including PhD, was in continental philosophy, but I take myself to have acquired the expertise to assess some stretches of analytic philosophy (only some stretches: no one, or almost no one, is in a position to assess all of it, given how diverse and specialized it is). It is possible to acquire the expertise to make such assessments (note the opportunity-costs trap that looms here: it sometimes takes effort and work to discover whether it’s worthwhile to make the effort to understand a thinker). There’s also a much easier route to acquiring a justified belief that something is bullshit: testimony from someone who is genuinely expert in the relevant tradition. The degree to which a belief acquired on the basis of such testimony is justified depends, inter alia, on the degree to which it reflects a consensus of those with expertise. It’s not hard to find examples of people with impeccable credentials within the French poststructuralist tradition who dismiss Derrida’s value (Foucault famously dismissed Derrida’s “petty pedagogy” [Reference Haddad, Custer, Deutscher and HaddadHaddad, 2016]). If Foucault’s testimony is heavily contested within his own tradition, though, we acquire the right to think nothing more definitive than it is reasonable to believe that Derrida is bullshit on its basis.

1.4 Clarifying the Unclarifiable

I’ve argued that most of us aren’t justified in calling bullshit on the work of other philosophers, because we’re rarely in a good epistemic position to make the call. But Cohen, surely, was in a good position to assess Balibar. He read, he tells us “a great deal” of Althusserian Marxism in his twenties (Reference CohenCohen, 2013: 94), which surely positioned him to assess it. Further, it seems there are no grounds for worrying that he assessed it against an inappropriate standard: the aims of Althusserian Marxism are surely at least roughly the same aims as other work in the Marxist tradition. Cohen, at least, seems to have the right to call bullshit.Footnote ⁵ In principle, that’s right: Cohen does have the right to call bullshit on Balibar. But even Cohen is on shaky ground here (for reasons that will be important when we – finally! – return to the discussion of peer review).

Recall Cohen’s basis for calling bullshit: that Balibar’s work is “unclarifiable.” In defending this criterion of bullshit, Cohen is in good company (if not in Frankfurt’s company); that’s more or less how the empirical literature operationalizes “bullshit.” Reference Sterling, Jost and PennycookSterling, Jost, and Pennycook (2016), for example, characterize bullshit as “essentially meaningless.” These assertions defeat all attempts, even the attempts of those with domain-relevant expertise, to clarify them. But is Balibar’s work really unclarifiable?

Actually, I don’t have much trouble clarifying the stimuli used in the experiments on bullshit, nor the extrusions of the new age sages. Take the paradigm of bullshit Reference Pennycook, Cheyne, Barr, Koehler and FugelsangPennycook et al. (2015: 549) cite as a central example: “Hidden meaning transforms unparalleled abstract beauty.” That’s not very hard to assign a content to. Meanings plainly can be hidden (perhaps this very aphorism is an example of such hidden meanings, though I don’t think it’s very well hidden in this case). Such meanings could have a transformative effect on beauty, I suppose; that is, perhaps our perception of such beauty is quite different before and after grasping the hidden meaning. “Abstract beauty” might refer to the beauty of art that is not representational. It doesn’t take a lot of work to assign a meaning to the assertion; it’s sufficiently easy, I think, for it to be reasonable to believe that most people parse it as meaningful even on casual reading. I won’t attempt it now, but I don’t think it’s all that difficult to assign a meaning to the Deepak Chopra tweet that Pennycook et al. cite as a paradigm of bullshit: “Attention and intention are the mechanics of manifestation.”Footnote ⁶

We need to look harder if we are to find examples of genuinely unclarifiable or “literally meaningless” statements to serve as stimuli for experiments. Perhaps we’ll find them in the work of French philosophers, as Cohen thinks. Recall the “wonderful example” of bullshit he cites from Étienne Balibar: “This is precisely the first meaning we can give to the idea of dialectic: a logic or form of explanation specifically adapted to the determinant intervention of class struggle in the very fabric of history” (Reference BalibarBalibar, 2014: 97). But is it really unclarifiable? Cohen’s original discussion of bullshit came in response to Frankfurt and was published along with the latter’s reply. Frankfurt offers what seems to me a straightforward and defensible interpretation of Balibar’s assertion: “The most distinctive point of dialectical explanations is precisely that they are supposed to be particularly helpful in illuminating how class struggle has determined the course of history” (Reference Frankfurt, Buss and OvertonFrankfurt, 2002: 342).

Why does Frankfurt, who I suspect has no great background in Marxism (let alone in the Althusserians) succeed in clarifying Balibar when Cohen does not? I think the difference lies in the degree of intellectual charity with which Cohen (and those who dismiss new age aphorisms as meaningless) approach the assertions they dismiss. Given even a minimally charitable attitude to these statements, we can easily make sense of at least most of them.

I’ve argued that one (defensible) reason for attributing a significant degree of credibility and importance to an assertion we can’t clarify is because we take it to be an assertion by an expert, speaking within the domain of their expertise. I now want to add that whether we succeed in clarifying an assertion is also sensitive to how much prior credibility we assign to it and its source. Because they’re attributed to a new age sage (or because features of their content suggest such an attribution), those with a low opinion of such people read them through an uncharitable interpretive frame and find little meaning in them. Similarly, I bet that Cohen rejects Balibar as meaningless because he’s disillusioned with Althusserian Marxism. He has things backward: he thinks he rejects Balibar because he’s meaningless; rather, he finds Balibar meaningless because he now has such a low opinion of his work.

Of course, none of this would arise were Deepak Chopra’s tweets or Balibar’s assertions models of pellucid clarity. It takes work to paraphrase their claims; that’s why intellectual charity can make such a difference to whether we find them meaningful. Assertions vary in their clarity, and it’s plausible to think that new age sages (and perhaps even some philosophers) exploit polysemy to avoid commitment to testable predictions. But, as Cohen himself recognizes, polysemy can be a virtue in a text: it can “stimulate thought” (Reference Cohen, Buss and OvertonCohen, 2002: 334), and a number of philosophers have shared the early Wittgenstein’s belief that though all attempts to articulate genuinely profound truths must “run against the boundaries of language,” attempts at such articulation in poetic form deserve our deep respect (Reference WittgensteinWittgenstein, 1965). There are legitimate arguments concerning when lack of clarity is a flaw in a particular text. But neither Balibar nor the new age sages are genuinely unclarifiable; not to a minimally charitable reader.Footnote ⁷ If Cohen finds Balibar unclarifiable, it’s likely because he can no longer read Balibar’s work with sufficient charity to assign determinate content to it.

2.1 Reading the Journals

Let’s apply these insights to contemporary journals, via a case study of sorts. Jason Stanley is a major contemporary philosopher. Much of the recent attention to his work has focused on his books on propaganda (Reference StanleyStanley, 2015) and fascism (Reference StanleyStanley, 2018), but he was a central figure in philosophy well before he began to publish on these kinds of issues. In particular, his monograph on epistemology (Reference StanleyStanley, 2005) has been very influential. Writing on Facebook, Stanley noted an oddity about the reception of that book. It was, at the time of writing, the fifth most cited work since 2000 in the four most prestigious journals in philosophy: Philosophical Review, Mind, Noûs, and the Journal of Philosophy. But the book itself had developed out of a paper rejected by three of these four journals. “All of those journals have accepted papers discussing, in many cases very centrally, a work those very journals have deemed unpublishable” (Stanley, quoted in Reference Dutilh NovaesDutilh Novaes, 2013).

Catarina Dutilh Novaes, whose work on the role of trust in argumentation I’ve drawn on here, takes this tale to suggest that peer review doesn’t do a good job of tracking quality (see also Reference Arvan, Bright and HeesenArvan, Bright, and Heesen [2022]). While no system is immune to error, at least one of these journals should have identified Stanley’s work as demanding publication – shouldn’t they? I’m unconvinced that this case – or indeed, multiple such cases – provides much evidence in favor of the view that peer review is broken. Even setting aside obvious concerns (perhaps journal feedback, and the passing of time, allowed Stanley to improve the work), there are good reasons to think more highly of Stanley’s work after it was published than of the same work when it was submitted to journals. Reading it now, we have intratextual and (especially) extratextual evidence of its quality that was unavailable to reviewers (much of it unavailable in principle, and therefore unavailable to assessors in any replacement for peer review). This evidence makes a justifiable difference to how we assess the quality of the work. Some of it provides guidance with regard to the value the text possessed all along. More radically, some of it may help to constitute that value.

2.2 Back to the Case Study

Knowledge and Practical Interests (Reference StanleyStanley, 2005) is a book, not a journal article. But it’s a book from Oxford University Press (OUP), widely regarded as the most prestigious publisher in academic philosophy (Reference LeiterLeiter, 2013). Indeed, it’s a book from the Clarendon Press of OUP; the “Clarendon Press” imprint was, at the time when Stanley’s book was published, given to titles the press regarded as “of particular academic importance” (Oxford University Press, 2009). It is, moreover, a book by Jason Stanley, a major figure in contemporary philosophy (even if Stanley’s reputation rests, in important part, on Knowledge and Practical Interests, that reputation can appropriately affect our perception of the book). Finally, it’s a book that has received a great deal of discussion. It’s been cited more than 1,600 times and papers that discuss it in depth have been published in major journals.Footnote ¹⁰ All of this constitutes strong higher-order evidence in favor of its value (and might even help to constitute its merits) – evidence that was not available to reviewers and editors when Stanley’s paper was submitted to the journals.

Confession time: I haven’t read Knowledge and Practical Interests. But I’m very confident that it’s an excellent book. Publication by OUP would be enough for me to think it’s worthwhile. I have sufficient faith in the press, its commissioning editors, and its reviewers to be confident that the books the press publishes are usually significant contributions to philosophy. The fact that it’s by Jason Stanley is further evidence that convinces me of its quality. As a matter of fact, I have read some of Stanley’s work carefully (see Reference LevyLevy 2017 for discussion of his work on knowledge how), but I would be confident in its quality even if I had never read him. Too many of my peers (and, in this domain, epistemic superiors) think highly of him for me to doubt his quality. His professorship at Yale is also higher-order evidence of his quality, largely because occupying a position like that is third-order evidence: it’s evidence that his peers think highly of him because such a reputation is needed to be appointed to such a position. It’s also evidence he has an excellent publication record, and that’s further evidence of his quality.

All this evidence – evidence about the book and its influence, and about Stanley – convinces me that Knowledge and Practical Interests is excellent.Footnote ¹¹ None of it, or almost none of it, was available to the reviewers of the paper that became the book (most of it couldn’t be available to them, since it didn’t yet exist, of course). They had much less to go on. So the puzzle Stanley points to – why would a book merit serious discussion in the pages of leading journals, when the paper which formed its core didn’t merit publication in these journals? – really isn’t so mysterious. A central part of the answer is that reviewers for the journals didn’t then have the evidence that now supports an especially high appraisal of the work.

Let’s spend a little more time on this claim, because the position I’m arguing for is counterintuitive. Of course, most people accept that the kind of factors I’ve pointed to – the prestige of the author, of their academic appointment, their citations, and so on – influence reviewers and editors. There’s little controversy about that. But the consensus view is that this represents an obstacle to epistemically fair assessment of work; indeed, an epistemic injustice. It’s prestige bias: the same bias that leads hiring committees to prefer candidates from “better” schools to equally (or even better) qualified candidates from schools that are less well thought of (Reference De CruzDe Cruz, 2018). Mentioning the prestige of Stanley and his book may explain why his work is now widely discussed when it was once rejected, but it doesn’t go any way toward justifying it.

I’m suggesting, in contrast, that prestige is often genuine evidence: that is, it provides considerations that justify changing beliefs. It’s evidence on both a subjectivist and a more objective account of evidence. On a subjectivist account, a fact or proposition is evidence for you if it’s (really) the case that you ought to adjust your beliefs upon learning it, given your prior beliefs.Footnote ¹² Of course, this subjectivist account of evidence accommodates pernicious biases: for someone with prejudiced beliefs, a person’s gender could be evidence of inferiority, for example. On a subjectivist account, evidence need not be objectively good evidence. Prestige is clearly often genuine evidence in this sense: it’s uncontroversial that people do take the prestige of an author or a book to be a reason to think well of it, compared to how they would assess the same arguments presented in the absence of this higher-order evidence. So, too, is the prestige of the institution from which someone graduated genuine evidence for the assessor, if this person believes that institutional reputation is a reliable predictor of candidate quality.Footnote ¹³

It is (subjectively) rational for agents to update their beliefs on their evidence (Reference LevyLevy, 2021). Agents who update like this are functioning well, in one important respect: their internal systems are working as designed. The person for whom p is evidence, given their background beliefs, might have bad background beliefs but updating on p is rational for them. In addition, though, markers of prestige may often be objectively good evidence: genuine indicators of quality. Exactly when prestige is genuinely good evidence is of course an empirical question: it must be the case that the markers of prestige correlate sufficiently reliably with the properties they’re taken to be evidence for. Although there’s no doubt that it influences us when it shouldn’t, prestige often does correlate with these kinds of properties.

Outside philosophy, employers often prefer graduates from “good” schools to those from less prestigious institutions. I think we’re right to be troubled by this, but not because this preference isn’t rational. Talent may be evenly distributed at birth (or perhaps there’s no reasonable way of cashing out talk of talent and potential at birth), but it’s not the case that as adults, people are still equally able. What’s really troubling isn’t that jobs go to the privileged regardless of their ability (though that does happen) but that ability itself is unfairly distributed. Birth plays a big role in who becomes talented. Encouragement, exposure to a variety of stimuli, reward for achievement, and so on; these things make an enormous difference to people’s capacities. We should expect those who graduate from Harvard to be more articulate and confident and in many domains (including those that employers, rightly or wrongly, value) more able than those who went to less prestigious schools. Even if a Harvard education is no better than that available elsewhere, Harvard students should be expected to be better than most: Harvard is able to choose from those who’ve stood out, and those from privileged backgrounds are more likely to stand out.Footnote ¹⁴

The degree to which prestige correlates with quality is surely lower than it ought to be: many things that are not valuable influence the attribution of prestige. Indeed, prestige has plausibly come to be weaponized in philosophy. For example, the prestige ranking of subfields was established by people who lacked genuine acquaintance with the areas of philosophy they dismiss (or even testimony from those with such acquaintance); unsurprisingly, it’s a very unreliable cue to quality. This unjustified prestige hierarchy contributes to the dismissal of wide swathes of philosophy as bullshit. This hierarchy interacts with other illegitimate markers of prestige, such as accent or even simply what Reference BourdieuBourdieu (1998) called “cultural capital,” such as an easy familiarity with wine and books (think of the examples that populate many philosophical papers and how they convey social status). It may often or even always be unjust to treat prestige as evidence, because prestige reflects undeserved background conditions. In these cases, it is also unjustified. It compounds disadvantage and leaves those who want to pursue other questions and other approaches facing a demand to legitimate themselves as worthwhile (Reference DotsonDotson, 2013).

We can make prestige more reliable and fight its weaponization by recognizing that prestige is most reliable when it is local (because expertise is local). For a variety of reasons (from pernicious influences, like the effects of insider networks, through to gaps in the expertise of editors and the lower rates at which women submit to more prestigious journals [Reference Krishnamurthy, Liao, Deveaux and DaleckiKrishnamurthy et al., 2017; Reference Wilhelm, Conklin and HassounWilhelm, Conklin, and Hassoun, 2018]), the best work in many fields does not tend to appear in the most prestigious journals. Publication in the most prestigious journals should itself be seen as evidence of local excellence: excellence in the domains they focus on. Local cues to prestige must align with local criteria for excellence: As Reference DotsonDotson (2013: 18) urges, the inappropriate demand for legitimation should be met not only with a proliferation of different kinds of philosophy, but equally a proliferation of “canonical works and criteria that will be used as justifying norms.” Such a proliferation will entail a proliferation of (local) extratextual cues to quality and a more appropriate alignment of prestige with excellence.

It’s also true that even within domains in which they’re relevant, cues to prestige may be used inappropriately. In many cases, such cues should be screened off by better information. That someone went to Harvard is an indicator of their ability, but a later record of failure suggests that the indicator is an unreliable one. In hiring in philosophy, later achievement routinely screens off earlier evidence. That someone has a PhD from Cornell is evidence of quality, but later publications should screen it off, because it provides stronger evidence for the same qualities. Other things being equal, we should prefer the better published Shelbyville College graduate over the worse published Cornell PhD. In fact, given the advantages that accrued to the latter, and the obstacles faced by the former, it’s arguably rational to prefer an equally well-published Shelbyville grad to the Cornell PhD: their record is evidence they’re better than their competitor, since they had to overcome more obstacles and make their own way without the guidance of a well-placed network. Similar considerations apply to admission to grad school: letters from prestigious individuals (say) constitute genuine evidence, but also reflect advantages (networking opportunities, for example) that others may not have had, and responses should be adjusted in that light.

Either way, a record of excellent publications is genuine evidence of excellence. To be sure, it’s not evidence of excellence alone: it also reflects unmerited advantage. If you have an excellent record of publication, that’s probably (in important part) because your job is less demanding than many. You don’t have a 5/5 teaching load, you’re not a freeway flier, patching together a living across multiple campuses; your home life is supportive rather than draining; you have access to resources and time to reflect. These are close to necessary conditions of excellence in publication (I’m aware of exceptions, but they’re rare – and all the more impressive for overcoming these obstacles). Excellence has undeserved background and causal conditions; that doesn’t entail it’s not excellence. If you’re selecting between candidates one of whom has manifested such excellence and one who has not, you’d be taking a gamble to prefer the second: perhaps they’re capable of work every bit as good or better, but in many circumstances you’re not entitled to believe that’s likely. Higher-order evidence is often objectively good evidence, and in some contexts markers of prestige fit this model.

Assessing the actual evidential weight of (say) a PhD from a prestigious school versus a PhD from a less prestigious one is obviously a difficult exercise; one made all the more difficult by the fact that evidential weight is context-dependent and comparative: it is always evidence, but its strength depends on what other facts obtain. Fortunately, making these judgments are not required for my project. I need only to show that prestigious publication and pedigree is evidence. It’s evidence we ought to take into account in assessing the quality of philosophical work.

Although excellence is found well beyond the most prestigious journals, and though publication in prestigious journals reflects many factors, some pernicious, publication in these journals is genuine evidence of excellence. Equally, publication by a prestigious press is genuine evidence of excellence. It’s the latter evidence which explains the different epistemic positions of contemporary readers of Knowledge and Practical Interests and the reviewers who rejected Stanley’s paper. Those reviewers took the paper seriously, as they were rationally bound to, on the basis of the strength of the arguments it presented them with (of course this sort of first-order evidence strongly constrains rational response). They saw it as serious and worthwhile philosophy – the original paper received no fewer than three revise and resubmits from Philosophical Review, which all by itself is higher-order evidence of its quality. But differences in intellectual charity may justifiably make the difference between seeing a paper as one among many high-quality submissions to the journal and one that is really compelling.

The reviewers, or the editors, saw it as excellent, but as not quite excellent, or not quite exciting, enough. Were they making a mistake? Was Stanley’s work so excellent that it demanded acceptance (where a text demands acceptance when it is an objective mistake to prefer to publish other excellent work rather than it)? Perhaps it was, but if it was, it was very much the exception among the work that is submitted, and even among that actually published. While lots of work in philosophy is merely good, there’s more excellent work than there are slots in the high-profile journals. Little of that excellent work stands out as genuinely demanding acceptance.

Much (most?) of the work submitted to philosophy journals is worthwhile: it is competently written and argued, and makes a genuine contribution to the philosophical literature. But editors and reviewers are looking for more. The current system is designed to have fewer slots than good papers: it’s supposed to act as a filter through which only significantly-better-than-merely-good papers pass.Footnote ¹⁵ The criteria for competence are probably easier to apply than the criteria for excellence. To judge whether a paper is competent, I need to assess whether the arguments are cogent, whether it is written comprehensibly, whether it cites a sufficiently broad range of relevant literature, whether it interprets the work of others defensibly, and whether the point it is making is at least minimally novel or underappreciated. No doubt there’s room for reasonable disagreement on these questions, but there’s much less room for such disagreement on them than on whether the paper is significantly better than competent. The current invitation to review for Mind asks reviewers to note that the editors “are looking for papers of significant interest that are not merely small contributions to an existing discussion.” We have no algorithm for assessing when a paper passes that bar, and none for trading off the various other criteria that papers are rightly judged against. Suppose we’re satisfied the paper is of ‘significant interest’: how do we weigh that against the perceived holes in the argument? There are many papers that are, in one way or another, excellent and there’s plenty of room for reasonable disagreement about which of them deserve publication.Footnote ¹⁶

I don’t know whether Stanley’s paper demanded publication. But I’m confident that most of the papers published in excellent journals are not better than many that didn’t make it. Rather, the authors were luckier: reviewers just happened to think better of their paper than another, due to idiosyncratic (but defensible) preferences and no doubt often due to sheer chance (the paper looked good in contrast to the last one the reviewer read; they happened to be in the right mood; they happened to be thinking about that issue just yesterday). There are (by design) fewer slots in journals than there are excellent papers, and it is partly a matter of luck which of these excellent papers makes it through. I’m confident that none of my papers demanded publication: had the editors decided to reject those they accepted, they wouldn’t have been making any kind of rational error (conversely, some they rejected could have been accepted without anyone having a right to complain).

Being accepted by Mind (say) is evidence of excellence, but also partially a matter of luck. It is therefore partially a matter of luck which papers come to accrete the extratextual higher-order evidence that attests to their excellence: citations, responses, and so on. The fact that a paper is subsequently discussed is not evidence that it demanded acceptance, nor is it evidence that rejection by another journal was a mistake. Even when the evidence that subsequently accrues is rightly taken as indicating merits that make the paper genuinely outstanding and not merely excellent, it would be a mistake to convict the reviewers of error on the basis of this evidence: after all, it wasn’t available to them, and they can’t be faulted for failing to take it into account. Perhaps the paper I am reviewing right now for The Journal of Good Ideas will – or would – prove especially fruitful for subsequent debates, but that this is so is most clearly shown by its actually proving fruitful. Subsequent history both attests to the genuine qualities of the paper, and reflects luck in its uptake. It’s near impossible to disentangle the relative contribution of luck and quality in its subsequent history: we can only say of Stanley’s submission that it (like many other rejected and accepted papers, no doubt) was good enough to be fruitful in the way it has been.Footnote ¹⁷

A big part of the reason why Cohen found Balibar’s work to be bullshit is that he approached it with little intellectual charity. Much the same can be said for (many of) those who dismiss Derrida’s work as bullshit: at the very least, were they more charitable they would find something of interest in his work or concede that it might be worthwhile for other people engaged in other kinds of projects. But the attitude we take to a text can make much smaller differences: as well as making the difference between bullshit and the clarifiable, it can make the difference between the good and the excellent. It can also make the difference between “reject” and “revise and resubmit”: the difference in verdict can reflect how much trust in the author the reviewer was disposed to feel. Intellectual charity can be cashed out as a kind of trust: a trust that the work is coherent, consistent, and significant. It’s because (for some more or less idiosyncratic reason) they invested more trust in my paper that reviewers recommended it be accepted, rather than some other, equally deserving, paper.

Intellectual charity is, plausibly enough, an epistemic virtue, so perhaps we might reasonably demand that reviewers for journals approach every paper charitably. Many of those who dismiss Derrida as a charlatan may in fact be violating an intellectual obligation. But the suggestion that we owe every paper intellectual charity leaves it open how much charity we should extend. We shouldn’t read every submission with the trust in the author we extend to a dead great: we shouldn’t assume that apparent inconsistencies and flaws always reflect our limitations and not those of the text. Charity is indefinitely gradable, and there’s such a thing as being too charitable. Some texts really are inconsistent; some arguments really are badly flawed, and some papers should be rejected. We can only judge, as best we can, how much charity to extend.

Our assessment of work in philosophy, and no doubt in other disciplines too, is sensitive to the degree of intellectual charity we extend, but there’s no algorithm for settling how much is sufficient and how much is excessive. How much intellectual charity we extend is settled by all sorts of things, including how well-written the article is, our personal preferences in philosophy, and even our passing moods. Is it unjust that your paper was rejected when another was accepted? Arguably it is: your paper may have been every bit as deserving. We need to recognize that philosophy – like every other academic discipline – doesn’t hand out goods to all and only the deserving. When it works well (and frequently it doesn’t) it selects more or less randomly from among the many who are good enough. Those who are rewarded are always lucky, and the unrewarded are very often unlucky. We should work to eliminate the many bad kinds of pernicious bias that persist in philosophy, and also the cult of genius that confuses luck with merit. We should also work to explore alternative ways of recognizing quality: perhaps there are fairer methods. I’m skeptical, though, that we can eliminate the effects of intellectual charity on who is rewarded and who is not.

3.1 Hoaxing the Journals

Hoax papers came to widespread attention with the famous Sokal hoax. In 1996, Alan Sokal, a New York University physicist, submitted a hoax paper to the journal Social Text (Reference SokalSokal, 1996b). The article cited a range of feminist and postmodern thinkers as well as physicists, and argued that in the light of contemporary physics the idea of an external reality independent of human beings can no longer be supported. Sokal went on to argue that physics provides tools for an emancipatory political project. Social Text accepted the paper (allegedly, they asked for changes that Sokal refused to make; in any event, they didn’t require the changes). After publication, Sokal revealed that the article was a hoax and the paper was “liberally salted with nonsense” (Reference SokalSokal, 1996a).

Sokal provided a template that several others have since copied. The most notable hoax since Sokal – and the one that hits closest to home, since it targeted philosophy, as well as cultural studies – was the “grievance studies” hoax (Reference Pluckrose, Lindsay and BoghossianPluckrose, Lindsay, and Boghossian, 2018). “Grievance studies” is the name the hoaxers give to fields, like feminism and fat studies, that are as much motivated by perceived injustices as engaged in description. Like Sokal, the hoaxers wrote papers that played to editors’ and reviewers’ political leanings, but had a content that was allegedly nonsensical or incredible. One paper, for example, was a feminist rewrite of a chapter of Mein Kampf; another argued that men could reduce their transphobia by anally penetrating themselves. Despite the allegedly ludicrous or offensive contents of their papers, they succeeded in having seven accepted before exposure by the press brought the experiment to a halt.

There’s no doubt that the grievance studies hoax succeeded, at least by one measure. It succeeded in reinforcing the view that the fields targeted have low intellectual standards and that in them, ideology trumps sense. It also succeeded in catapulting the authors, especially James Lindsay, to lucrative notoriety. Similarly, the Sokal hoax helped shape the opinion of the educated public, and gained Alan Sokal a degree of fame, and book contracts, he couldn’t have otherwise expected. But did these hoaxes succeed in their professed aims of demonstrating that the fields targeted actually have unacceptably low standards?

While this question is a side issue, it’s worth addressing it briefly – in part because we can shed light on it using tools we’ve developed in the previous sections. I’m not especially impressed by either hoax. Social Text, to which Sokal submitted “Transgressing the Boundaries,” was not peer reviewed at the time. No doubt the editors of the journal found it hard to follow the paper’s details, but the major ideas were clear enough: that mathematics is pervaded by ideological assumptions, that postmodern theory helps to dispel these assumptions, that contemporary mathematics provides tools that destabilize fixed meanings. The author was apparently extremely well placed to make these claims: on the one hand, he was a professor of physics at New York University; on the other, he peppered the paper with allusions and citations to influential postmodern thinkers. It’s not mysterious why the editors of Social Text accepted the paper. It doesn’t strike me as groundbreaking – the claims made, for instance the claim that Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle undermines the idea of an observer independent reality and therefore reveals physical reality to be a social construction, were commonplaces in some circles – but here they were being made by a bona fide professor of physics. As I argued in the last section, how charitably we read something, and the significance we attribute to its claims, are heavily influenced by the higher-order evidence that knowledge of the author provides us with. I think there’s a strong case for thinking that the editors of Social Text responded appropriately to the evidence they had.

Social Text wasn’t peer reviewed and the editors were swayed by knowledge of the author’s expertise in making their decision, without the (possibly) countervailing opinions of reviewers to restrain them. But the journals Pluckrose, Lindsay, and Boghossian targeted were peer reviewed. Moreover, the authors didn’t try to leverage the higher-order evidence provided by a prestigious appointment in a high-status field to influence editors: they submitted the papers under fictitious names, and provided “ordinary” academic affiliations. Did they succeed in casting doubt on the epistemic credentials of the fields they targeted where Sokal failed? Again, I’m skeptical.

Most of Pluckrose, Lindsay, and Boghossian’s submissions (including all their initial submissions) were unsuccessful. They had more luck when they (a) submitted to lower-tier journals and (b) revised their papers extensively in the light of feedback, including feedback from journals that rejected them, or (c) fabricated data (Reference LagerspetzLagerspetz 2021). To my eye, the accepted papers were not obviously unworthy of acceptance at the journals they deceived. Arguably, they were genuine contributions to the fields they took aim at, either in virtue of their ideas or in virtue of the data they reported. It’s noteworthy that Pluckrose, Lindsay, and Boghossian misrepresent their papers in many of their public statements (though, to be fair, they also made all papers and the records of their submissions publicly available). For example, while one paper is truly claimed to paraphrase a chapter of Mein Kampf, the paper follows the structure, rather than the content, of the chapter. So what?

If these reflections are right, then neither the Sokal hoax nor the grievance studies affair involved papers that were bullshit. Sokal claims his paper was “liberally salted with nonsense” and Reference Pluckrose, Lindsay and BoghossianPluckrose, Lindsay, and Boghossian (2018) aimed to produce “some little bit of lunacy or depravity,” but the papers clearly have a content and might even make claims worth taking seriously. We needn’t worry that reading with a sufficient degree of intellectual charity to avoid attributing bullshit will lead to false positives in cases like this. Still, these papers suggest we ought to be readier than we usually are to dismiss work as fundamentally unserious. Given the stakes, we might think, we should be on the lookout for trolls, if not for bullshit. I’m going to suggest that these hoaxes don’t give us a reason to be less trusting of the papers we review. We should assume that authors intend their claims to be taken seriously, as contributions to knowledge (I’ll have more to say about the attitudes authors should take to their assertions in the next section). Reviewers and editors taken in by these hoaxes shouldn’t feel guilty: falling for them isn’t strong grounds for concluding that they haven’t fulfilled their epistemic duties.Footnote ¹⁸ Trust is essential for the functioning of peer review – and, more generally, for the growth of knowledge – and becoming less trusting threatens our capacity to acquire and transmit knowledge.

3.2 The Epistemic Value of Trust

Setting aside our knowledge of our immediate surroundings and what we can recall about them, testimony is almost certainly the most significant route to knowledge for creatures like us. Think, for example, about how many of the facts around which people build their very identities are known to them via testimony. He is a proud American, but the fact that he lives in a nation called the United States is not something he could observe. She identifies as a Democrat, but she’s aware of the existence of parties and congress only thanks to the media. They are fanatical about Real Madrid, though they’ve never been to the Bernabéu. The history of our country, the identity of the prime minister, the existence of political parties – for most of us, these are things we know only via testimony.

Testimony is vital in academic work, too. In science, most research is produced by labs, not individuals, and it’s common for individual members of a research group to be unable to reproduce or sometimes even to fully understand the work produced by others. One person may have expertise in high-energy physics and make a contribution that another – say, a chemist or a medical researcher – doesn’t fully understand. They must trust that the work has been done properly and that the results are reported accurately. The physicist, meanwhile, may be in precisely the same position with regard to the work of his colleagues: unable fully to understand it and taking it on trust. The researchers may not have ever met one another; not even virtually (unless making contributions to a Google document open to everyone in the group counts as “meeting”). Papers may now sometimes have literally thousands of authors, and the average number of contributors is increasing (Reference MallapatyMallapaty, 2018).

Even within a field, trust is essential. I might be able to check your work, but it would be time-consuming and onerous for me to do so: our productivity depends on trusting one another, so that we can spend our time more efficiently and far more effectively. Trust is also required across research groups. Researchers build upon one another’s findings, which they may not be able to replicate (and which they usually won’t try to, for lack of time). Of course, researchers sometimes do set out to replicate work, especially now, in the wake of an increasing awareness that many famous studies were false positives or were p-hacked (that is, manipulated, whether nefariously or not, to produce significance). Moreover, researchers now have available statistical tools that enable them to detect fraud or error, as well as a sense of which studies are suspect (Reference Camerer, Dreber and HolzmeisterCamerer et al., 2018): it’s not as though results need be taken on pure faith. But even applications of these tools attest to the centrality of testimony to science. When a well-known paradigm fails a high-powered, well-conducted replication, most reputable scientists abandon it. They don’t “do their own research.” They don’t replicate the replication. They take it largely on trust that the study was conducted as reported and that it had the results reported. Similarly, they may apply statistical tools (e.g., for estimating the degree to which effect sizes are exaggerated by publication bias) which they did not and could not develop for themselves.

Arguably, trust plays a smaller role in philosophy than in the sciences, or in history (where researchers may take on trust reports of what was found in the archives). We usually don’t report results that are difficult to replicate (“Kripke Resigns As Report Alleges He Faked Results of Thought Experiments” [Fauxphilnews, 2012]) is funny because thought experiments can’t be faked like that). In the next section, I discuss how philosophy makes claims that must, nevertheless, be taken on trust. For the moment, though, I want to emphasize that even setting aside the more obvious cases (x-phi data; quotation of inaccessible or translated work; descriptions of the findings of scientists in naturalistic philosophy), trust always plays some role.

Consider a thought experiment, like those that Kripke didn’t fake. When a philosopher publishes a paper built around such a thought experiment, we can and do “conduct” it for ourselves. Do I have the intuition that the agent doesn’t know that’s a barn? But my response might be influenced by the context in which I encounter the thought experiment. The fact that it appears in Journal of Really Important Philosophy provides me with evidence that might sway me: evidence that the reviewers for JRIP, and likely its editors too, had the intuition reported. Of course, I also have evidence that the author had the intuition reported. These facts might actually help to shape my intuitions. Admittedly, the generation of intuitions is ill-understood, and some (or all) of them might be produced by cognitively impenetrable mechanisms. In that case, knowledge that A. F. Philosopher has the intuition that the agent doesn’t know won’t – directly – alter my intuitions. Still, that knowledge will affect how I respond to the case. Perhaps my intuitions aren’t clear (mine often aren’t). Knowing that Philosopher and the reviewers for the JRIP had the intuition might settle how seriously I take the case, despite having no clear intuition of my own. Even here, in the very heart of analytic methodology, trusting what others report makes a difference to how we respond.

Of course, we also rely on testimony (and therefore trust) with regard to the findings of subdisciplines outside our own, including findings that might constrain our interpretation of work within our own field. Just as a psychologist might prefer one theory over another because it appears to postulate mechanisms that are credibly ascribed to evolutionary history (despite having no expertise with regard to evolution), so a philosopher might reject a view because it appears to entail substance dualism (despite having little knowledge of debates over the credibility of dualism). The claim that substance dualism is incredible constrains their work, and this is a claim they accept on the basis of testimony.

Trust is also central to peer review. Reviewers trust the authors to report their findings, and even their intuitions, honestly. The editors trust the reviewers to read fairly and review thoughtfully. Readers trust the process has been followed, and followed competently. The need for trust pervades the entire edifice of the socially distributed enterprise that is academic research and publishing. That’s part of the reason why hoaxes are so fascinating, and so challenging. That’s also the reason why anything that threatens the extent to which we can trust one another threatens our capacity to produce truth and understanding. Hoaxes risk undermining the epistemic trust we have in one another (Reference BuckwalterBuckwalter, 2023). Since they are damaging, and might be prevented by an increase in vigilance when we review, there’s a prima facie case for reviewers becoming more suspicious.

3.3 The Fragility of Trust

Trusting someone or something consists in more than simply relying on them. We can rely on someone we don’t trust. I may not set an alarm because I know I can rely on my neighbor to wake me at 6 a.m. by playing loud music. I may regard that same neighbor as too untrustworthy to nominate for the delivery of parcels when I’m out. We may rely on the untrustworthy when they have regular habits, depending on their predictability. We may also rely on tools we don’t trust, when we don’t have anything better to hand (Reference Dormandy and DormandyDormandy, 2020).

Standard accounts of trust hold that reliance is necessary but not sufficient for trust. Accounts of what must be added to reliance for an attitude to qualify as trust vary and I won’t try to adjudicate between them. It’s worth mentioning a reliable indicator by which we can distinguish mere reliance from trust: the presence of reactive attitudes (Reference HoltonHolton, 1994). I won’t feel betrayed if my noisy neighbor fails to wake me at 6 a.m., contrary to their usual habits. A feeling of betrayal is an indicator I trusted, rather than merely relied upon someone.

Because trust consists in reliance plus something extra, and when we trust someone we are open to being betrayed, trust exposes us to harm. Reliance already exposes us to harm: when we rely on something, we figure it into our plans (Reference HoltonHolton, 1994), so let downs mean our interests are set back. But when we trust, we’re harmed more deeply than we would have been had we merely relied upon someone: we’re hurt as well as harmed. Since trust exposes us to the risk of harm, we should not trust too lightly. Since epistemic trust risks not merely our individual interests but the integrity of the academic enterprise, we’d be rational to take precautions, to weed out the untrustworthy, and to be vigilant for signs of the untrustworthy.

But while betrayals of trust set back our interests and may harm the epistemic community, vigilance, too, can damage trust. The old Russian proverb “trust, but verify” does not give us advice we can follow: attempts at verification severely damage trust on the part of the trustee, and reveals its absence on the part of the truster. As Reference BaierAnnette Baier (1986) influentially argued, trust is “a fragile plant” and inspection of its roots tends to kill it. If I trust you, I won’t attempt to check up on you. If Bern rings Lena’s friends to verify her story that she was visiting them last night, he reveals he doesn’t trust her (in that domain, at least), and Lena might feel betrayed. She will almost certainly be upset. It is not merely overt actions that damage trust; so too do epistemic precautions. Trust does not seek evidence (Reference JonesJones, 1996; Reference HieronymiHieronymi, 2008; Reference Keren and DormandyKeren, 2020), nor does it tolerate deliberation on the evidence we have available. If betrayals of trust risk harming it, so do precautions against such betrayals.

It is, however, a familiar fact that where there is trust, there will be untrustworthy people trying to take advantage of it. And of course, the academic environment is full of people trying to take advantage of our trust: not just hoaxers, but also (and more seriously) predatory journals and conferences that will provide us with a (worthless) platform for a fee. There’s a great deal wrong with the journal system as it stands. It exploits the labor of the vulnerable, it privatizes research that was often funded by public money, it’s slow and often unreliable. Yet it continues to generate knowledge and understanding. That’s excellent evidence that the untrustworthy have not (yet) succeeded in undermining the trust we need for the academic enterprise to keep functioning.

How have we managed to keep betrayals of trust to a sufficiently low level for the enterprise to survive, given that precautions are as, or more, damaging of trust as actual betrayal? Following Reference Fricker, Chakrabarti and MatilalElizabeth Fricker (1994), I think at least part of the solution lies in distinguishing between implicit and explicit epistemic vigilance. While explicit vigilance – roughly, precautions we’re aware of taking or deliberation we’re aware of engaging in – damages trust, implicit vigilance is compatible with its preservation. There’s a great deal of evidence that we are epistemically vigilant (Reference Mascaro and SperberMascaro and Sperber, 2009; Reference Sperber, Clément and HeintzSperber et al., 2010; Reference HarrisHarris, 2012): both children and adults weigh testimony by references to its plausibility and to its source. We give more weight to testimony that stems from those who seem benevolent toward us, to testimony that reflects a consensus view, and to testimony from those with a track record of reliability. Such weighting of testimony is automatic and subpersonal, and engaging in it is compatible with the preservation of trust.

If we’re to increase our epistemic vigilance to weed out hoaxers, we might do so by taking explicit precautions. Or we might do so by increasing our implicit vigilance. I’ll explore both avenues. I’ve already suggested that an increase in explicit vigilance risks damaging trust. I will add to that case. I’ll also argue that though implicit vigilance is compatible with trust, increases in implicit vigilance risk spilling over into (damaging) explicit vigilance.

3.4 Trusting Less

Trust comes in degrees. Annuka trusts both her partner and her workmates, but she doesn’t extend the same degree of trust to both. She trusts her partner to further and protect her most important interests, even when they conflict with some of his. She trusts her workmates in most contexts, but doesn’t expect them to further her interests at the expense of their own. Annuka’s workmates know full well that she trusts them less than she trusts her partner. They expect nothing different, and the fact that she bestows less trust on them than on him doesn’t damage their relationship or decrease the trust each side has for the other.

Because trust comes in degrees without ceasing to be trust, it is in principle possible to come to trust less without becoming distrusting. That being the case, we need not conclude from the fact that verification damages trust that we have no hope of becoming a little less trusting in academic contexts. We might recalibrate our explicit trust and yet preserve our epistemic commons.

Annuka’s lesser trust of her workmates than her partner manifests (or consists) in two things. She trusts them in fewer spheres, and in those spheres in which she trusts them, she expects them to pay smaller costs to protect her interests. Her trust of her partner is open-ended: she expects him to take her interests into account in every context in which they’re at stake. And she expects him to give her interests a significant weight across every context. Similarly, becoming less trusting in the academic sphere is likely to consist either in trusting one another in fewer spheres, or in expecting others to weigh their own interests more heavily than they currently do when they clash with our interests.

We’ve narrowed the spheres in which we trust one another in peer review in one way. In the wake of the replication crisis, the research community became aware of the extent of what have come to be called QRPs (questionable research practices), which fall short of fraud but which illegitimately inflate effect sizes.Footnote ¹⁹ A significant reduction in QRPs can be achieved by requiring preregistration of hypotheses and open data practices: these practices make it plain whether researchers have illegitimately manipulated their results. While there is still a great deal of resistance, some prominent journals have enthusiastically embraced the open science movement, requiring or strongly encouraging preregistration and the availability of all data. Some journals will even commit to publishing “registered reports” on the basis of a research plan rather than a written paper (this practice results in the drafting of the skeleton of a paper that leaves conclusions open: “our analyses [confirm/failed to confirm] the hypothesis that …”). As a consequence, reviewers now expect authors to provide links to the preregistration and data, in the absence of which they’re less willing to assume that everything was above board.

Open science practices are not designed to prevent hoaxes, but they do make them more difficult, at least when papers report data. They’re not much help to most philosophers, though, or to those working in most of the rest of the humanities. There’s no equivalent of manipulating data in most of our work, and no reason why we shouldn’t (say) change our hypotheses midstream. There are few ways in which we could effectively narrow the spheres in which we trust one another. We might require that author identity be verified. That would make certain kinds of hoaxes more difficult (for example, if hoaxers use marginalized identities to give their work a credibility boost), but the effects would be small. If we’re to decrease trust, we’ll have to do it by reducing its degree, not its range.

Since the problem we’re aiming to prevent is not fraud, but hoaxing, we might increase our vigilance for signs of its occurrence. The problem we face if we attempt to do so is that suspicion tends to snowball. In the last section, we saw how significant a difference our interpretive frame can make to how we assess a text. It’s for this reason that suspicion tends to snowball: because when we’re on the lookout for evidence of trolling, we won’t have any difficulty in locating it.

If a hoax is to succeed, it obviously can’t be too obvious. The signs we’ll need to look out for must be relatively subtle. Vigilance is going to require a careful examination of the papers we review. The problem we face is that the evidence is always equivocal, and what we make of it is shaped significantly by our interpretive frame. Set yourself to discover evidence of trolling and it’s all too easy to see it. The problem will be most acute in the domains in which hoaxes are most likely: arguments for counterintuitive or politically contentious conclusions.Footnote ²⁰ Do the authors seriously maintain that we’re living in a simulation, or that we ought to abolish the nation-state? Perhaps espousal of these views is a sign of trolling; perhaps we should increase our vigilance further? We may easily trigger a vicious cycle of suspicion, identification of potential problems, and increasing suspicion. The evidence we rely on is always equivocal – “typically the evidence we find under-determines judgments of trustworthiness or lack of trustworthiness” (Reference O’Neill and SimonO’Neill, 2020: 19) – and casting a suspicious eye over it almost guarantees we’ll find signs of untrustworthiness.

When we become alert to the possibility of trolling, cued by a counterintuitive conclusion or simply because we’re disposed to suspect it everywhere, every stylistic choice, every footnote, every argument might seem to indicate trouble. Is the complexity of phrasing a parody of academic verbosity? Or, on the contrary, is the simplicity deceptive? Why is the author citing them? What might that indicate? Suspicion is corrosive, because almost all behavior, and all writing, provides evidence that can seem to justify it given the right interpretive frame, and given a distrustful frame every piece of evidence decreases trust further. We’re not, in fact, at all reliable at detecting deception in interpersonal contexts (see Reference Shieber, Fricker, Graham, Henderson and PedersenShieber 2020 for a review): I suspect the same applies to the detection of hoaxes.

While trust certainly comes in degrees, explicit attempts to recalibrate it without abandoning it risk spiraling out of control. The damage such recalibration risks is almost certainly much greater, and more probable, than the risk from hoaxes. So long as hoaxes remain at a tolerably low level, it’s better to remain trusting.

But alterations in implicit trust need not be subject to such snowballing. Implicit epistemic vigilance integrates a range of cues for reliability into a single score, by reference to which the credibility of testimony is weighted. It doesn’t appear to be iterative in the way that explicit vigilance often is: that is, recalibration doesn’t trigger a vicious cycle of seeming to detect evidence that supports it, thereby causing a further recalibration. We may more safely recalibrate our implicit than our explicit vigilance. Of course, we can’t just decide to do so. But it is possible to recalibrate (some) implicit mechanisms. They’re trainable: expose them to a diet of fraud and dishonesty and they’re likely to become more sensitive.

Recalibrating implicit mechanisms so that they’re more sensitive to evidence of hoaxing would avoid damaging trust in the way that a recalibration of explicit mechanisms risks doing: that is, the mere fact that an agent’s mechanisms had thus been recalibrated wouldn’t be corrosive of trust all by itself. But the effects of such a recalibration would nevertheless be negative. There are two possible outcomes of such mechanisms being triggered: either they continue to work implicitly, changing the weight we give to the claims we’re assessing, or they work to trigger explicit vigilance.

If implicit mechanisms respond to cues that they parse as suspicious by alerting explicit mechanisms, they simply provide an alternative route to the same problems as a more direct recalibration of our explicit vigilance. We’d risk setting off on the corrosive cycle of suspicion, apparent confirmation, and increased suspicion.Footnote ²¹ But if implicit mechanisms simply work by reducing the weight we place on claims made, we risk raising the threshold for finding papers compelling enough to warrant publishing, with little gain in the detection of hoaxes. More sensitive implicit vigilance mechanisms would likely result in finding more arguments weak, more assumptions less reasonable, and so on. We’d reject hoax papers more often than we otherwise might, but only because we’d reject more often than we currently do (assuming, that is, that countervailing pressure from the journals and their need for content doesn’t push us back to where we began). The problem is worse if the cues we respond to are the ones most likely to trigger explicit vigilance: counterintuitiveness and being politically contentious. We’d risk exacerbating epistemic injustice, assuming that these are claims that already struggle to get a fair hearing.

If hoaxes become frequent enough – or if journal submissions come to be saturated with deliberate bullshit through some other kind of route – we’d expect implicit and explicit mechanisms of epistemic vigilance to recalibrate in response. The results are likely to be very damaging for the conduct of research. Trust is fragile, and so are the institutions that depend on it. Assuming that these institutions are worth preserving, it might indeed be rational to take steps to protect them. Such steps are likely to be more effective, and so cause less damage, when they’re institutional rather than individual.Footnote ²² We should not respond by becoming more vigilant; more willing to suspect bullshit in the work we review or handle as editors. Such suspicion is as or more likely to be trust-destroying as the problems it’s supposed to protect us against.

4.1 With or without Belief?

While there is a fairly extensive literature on whether philosophers should or do believe the distinctively philosophical propositions they assert, until recently none of that literature focused specifically on publication. As Reference PlakiasAlexandra Plakias (2019) notes, however, the norms that govern publication might be different from the norms that govern discussion in the classroom or the seminar room. For one thing, in the face-to-face context there may be more opportunity to work through qualifications and caveats; for another, the stakes are very different (given the role that publication plays in getting and keeping jobs in philosophy). Whatever the appropriate norms in philosophical discussion, Plakias argues, we may permissibly publish without belief.

Reference PlakiasPlakias (2019: 638–639) describes three (realistic) cases in which philosophers might publish without belief.

Plakias expects us to share her intuition that all three cases are permissible.Footnote ²³ She also provides several arguments why that intuition is the right one. She argues that making belief a requirement on publication would skew the field against conciliationists (that is, those who hold that we ought to reduce our confidence that p in the face of peer disagreement): since conciliationism often (or always) entails that we should not believe our controversial philosophical views, accepting the norm that we ought to publish only when we’re believers ensures that conciliationists would get few opportunities to publish. More generally, it would ensure that philosophers with lower standards for belief tend to be overrepresented in the literature, which would be bad on epistemic consequentialist grounds. In very recent work, she adds that it would also skew the field against agents who lack confidence in themselves, which (as she suggests) is unjust, given that a lack of self-confidence reflects a history of marginalization (Reference PlakiasPlakias, 2023).

Plakias argues that there is in fact no norm of philosophical publication; there’s no attitude that philosophers are obliged to adopt toward the claims they make in their papers. What matters is the argument, not the author’s attitude toward it. “The writer’s own belief is beside the point” (Reference PlakiasPlakias, 2019: 644). The argument must stand or fall on its own. What matters is that the claim is reasonable to believe, and that is secured by the provision of a sufficiently good argument, not by the author’s attitude to it. A philosopher permissibly publishes a distinctively philosophical claim if that claim is reasonable to believe, whether or not they believe it or is even entitled to believe it.

Reference FleisherFleisher (2020) endorses Plakias’ contention that the argument ought largely to stand on its own (he suggests that norms governing ARCs are extrinsic: norms that are shaped by the promotion of healthy inquiry). He notes, however, that we need not provide an argument for our ERCs. Philosophers publish this kind of claim “with the aim of having their audience believe it on trust” (Reference FleisherFleisher, 2020: 241). As we noted in the last section, testimony, more or less on its own, warrants acceptance of some of the claims made in philosophical articles. Reference FleisherFleisher (2020: 243) suggests that ERCs are “claims that aim or function to increase the common stock of evidence available to enquirers”; with regard to them, the norm of publication is justifiable belief. For example, it’s impermissible for an author to assert in print that they have gathered empirical data unless they justifiably believe they have.

Fleisher is right in thinking that different norms govern ERCs and ARCs. Before turning to my own views, however, let me note that Fleisher’s justified belief norm for ERCs is too demanding. Consider a version of Malicious Deceiver in which the hoaxer claims to have gathered empirical data that is patently absurd (suppose they report that 92 percent of registered Democrats switched their political allegiance to Donald Trump when primed with a picture of a kitten). Were a journal to publish a paper built around these results, the hoaxer would have succeeded in exposing its lax editorial standards. Closer to (philosophical) home, someone might presuppose what they call “the theory of motivation developed by David Hume” in mounting an argument, while believing that the common attribution of such a theory to Hume is mistaken. Such an assertion is permissible, if it is true that (a) such a theory is commonly attributed to Hume (such that by identifying it with his views, one picks out a well understood view), and (b) it is the theory itself, and not the attribution to Hume, that does philosophical work.

Further, making justified belief the norm of publication for ERCs would skew the field against those with high standards for belief (just as making belief the norm of publication for distinctively philosophical claims would skew the field against conciliationists). Consider Keita, a researcher who conducts an experimental study using participants sourced through Amazon Turk. Keita has scrupulously examined the literature on the reliability and replicability of data gathered on the platform and has carefully framed her research questions and participant exclusion criteria to eliminate problems. Nevertheless, she worries about the possibility of bots and random response, and can’t quite bring herself to believe her own data is accurate. Rather, she regards it as meeting the standards accepted in her field for reliability and sees those standards as defensible. Keita publishes permissibly, despite failing to believe the ERCs she makes.

4.2 A Plea for Charity

Fleisher agrees that the norms of publication that govern the cases Plakias presents are very undemanding. Since they centrally involve the assertion of ARCs, they stand or fall on their own merits, and philosophers’ attitudes matter only to the extent ERCs are at issue. However, features of the very cases Plakias uses to motivate her argument suggest that the attitude philosophers take to their ARCs matters more than either she or Fleisher thinks. Reference PlakiasPlakias (2019: 641) herself notes that in a realistic version of Repentant (non)Realist, Sanjay would probably keep his genuine attitude to himself, since “he might reasonably expect that such a caveat would negatively affect his chances of publication.” Similarly, she notes, Rachel the doubtful graduate does well to keep quiet about her worries about the research she relies on. But if there is no requirement that we believe our philosophical views, why should confession negatively affect our papers’ chances? If nothing matters but the argument, such confessions should be neither here nor there.

Hoaxes like Malicious Deceiver owe much of their success in delegitimizing journals to the attitudes of their authors. It’s because the paper was intended as a joke that the journal is supposed to look ridiculous, not merely because the paper was bad. Author attitude does make a difference here. The point generalizes: arguments don’t stand on their own, independent of their authors’ attitudes.

Philosophy papers aim to establish claims through sufficiently compelling arguments; since we provide such arguments for our ARCs, our attitudes toward them matter very much less than our attitudes toward claims we warrant by testimony alone. But as we saw in previous sections, all kinds of factors, about context and content, make a justifiable difference to argument strength. Implicated author attitude is one of these factors: how compelling we find the argument is and should to some degree be affected by how seriously it is advanced as a candidate for truth.

When we advance an ARC, we don’t vouch for its truth or even its plausibility. Rather, we vouch, roughly, this is worth your time. Time and attention are limited resources, and we justifiably ask readers to expend these resources on following and assessing our arguments when we implicate that we’re prepared to stand by them, in some sense. By asserting ARCs, we implicate that the argument we offer is a serious contribution to philosophical conversation; we implicate, that is, that we take a certain attitude to it. We do not need to believe the claims we defend, nor even implicate that we believe them. But in offering a paper for publication, we certify that we regard them as reasonably seen as following from reasonably, or actually, accepted premises, and – therefore – that our ARCs constitute a serious contribution to philosophical debate.

It’s noteworthy that this standard doesn’t specify the strength of the attitude we must take to our claims. We might permissibly believe them (conciliationist considerations aside), or find them compelling, or we might adopt some weaker attitude. Indeed, philosophers are sometimes open in saying that they don’t believe the upshot of their own argument: for instance, Reference LycanLycan (2009) devotes a paper to defending substance dualism from the objections leveled against it, while confessing he is utterly unconvinced by dualism. When philosophers do this, they explicitly ask us seriously to consider an argument for a conclusion that they’re unwilling to vouch for themselves. Nevertheless, they represent themselves as taking the argument to be reasonably believed, or reasonably held to follow from premises that are reasonably, or widely, believed.Footnote ²⁴ Sanjay and Rachel might permissibly have advanced their arguments in this spirit. Rachel might have said that if a certain set of research findings are true (about which she has doubts) then a popular position faces hitherto unrecognized problems; Sanjay might have noted that he aims to show that popular objections to it fail, not that nonnaturalism is true. They might have done these things, but they didn’t because they know that their chances of publication would have been reduced had they been more open about their doubts. Why is that the case, given that their arguments would have been just as strong, and they would have satisfied the norms on philosophical publication?

Expressions of attitude strength make a difference to our paper’s chances of success for familiar reasons: because they figure among the extra-argumentative features of content and context that modulate the degree of intellectual charity with which readers (including reviewers) approach papers. Confess yourself unconvinced by your own argument and readers will justifiably expend less effort in processing it (other things being equal). Even presenting a claim as reasonably accepted conditional on some other claim being true will result in a less charitable reading, especially if one confesses oneself agnostic about the other claim.

Because we may reasonably ask our readers to extend varying degrees of charity to our arguments, there is no single norm for philosophical publication. Rather, there’s a range, and representing oneself as holding that distinctively philosophical claims are reasonably held to follow from widely or reasonably held premises represents the minimum threshold for publication in normal cases. In certifying that we take this attitude to our claims (which we do by offering it for publication), we vouch that it is worth the reader’s time. But time (and effort and attention – which are some of the constituents of intellectual charity) are open-ended. Publication implicates this is worth your time; other things being equal, publications that assert I take this to be true implicate that the argument is worth more sustained thought.

It’s not a mere brute fact that that the expression of attitudes makes a difference to intellectual charity: it’s a rational response. Other things being equal, we should think that an argument its own author takes to be unpersuasive is worth less effort than a more successful argument: given the (defeasible) link between being persuasive and actually persuading the attentive reader, the author’s being persuaded by an argument signals their perception of its persuasive power and thereby that it is worth investing time in it. For the same reason, asserting that an argument is successful also calls on the reader to approach it with more intellectual charity. Interesting philosophical arguments (outside logic) do not follow indubitably from undeniable premises. Most do not deductively establish their conclusions; rather they make them more or less plausible. We should expect our readers to take them more seriously, put more effort into them, and regard them as more credible candidates for truth when we assert or imply that we believe them (imagine a paper in which the intuition that p plays a pivotal role, but the author reports not sharing that intuition).

When we can do so in good conscience, we therefore assert or imply that we believe our philosophical claims. If we have high standards for belief, accept a demanding conciliationism, or if we simply aren’t sure whether our credence in a view qualifies as belief, we may assert or imply something weaker (but still stronger than merely “this is worth your time” if we don’t stray too far from our genuine attitude). Between outright belief and the weakest condition on permissible publication (being believed to be reasonable to believe or reasonably held to follow from reasonably or widely held premises), there is an indefinitely large range, and our implicated attitude may permissibly fall anywhere in that range (except when special features of the ARCs dictate that some stretches of the range are off-limits: because they would generate Moore paradoxicality, perhaps, or would be self-undermining). There is no one norm governing publication of distinctively philosophical claims; rather, there is a range with a lower bound. The stronger the commitment to our ARCs we implicate, the greater the degree of intellectual charity we ask our readers to extend toward them; since in doing so, we offer evidence for our claims, readers will tend to modulate their charity accordingly.

It’s worth noting that this proposal avoids the worry about belief that arises from conciliationist intuitions. It might be true that we are not rationally permitted to believe our ARCs in the face of peer disagreement, but since peer disagreements over whether arguments are worth taking seriously as contributions to philosophical debate are much rarer than peer disagreement over their conclusions, we are usually rationally permitted to believe that our argument is worth readers’ time, regardless of the truth of conciliationism. However, the proposal still faces a serious worry: the worry Reference PlakiasPlakias (2023) emphasizes in her very recent contribution to the debate. Confidence is neither equally nor fairly distributed, and any norm on permissible publication risks heightening the unfairness. It places those who are less confident at a disadvantage, and that often compounds unfairness.Footnote ²⁵

The attitude we implicate toward our own ARCs makes a justifiable difference to the degree of intellectual charity with which they’re read because in implicating that attitude we provide genuine (higher-order) evidence for them. In this light, the question “may we permissibly put forward claims as serious contributions to philosophical discussion when we don’t in fact believe they count as such contributions?” is equivalent to “may we permissibly misrepresent our evidence?” Putting it in these terms heightens the problem just mentioned, suggesting we face a trade-off between purely epistemic values and fairness.

While I think that we do face such a trade-off (I’ll have more say about such trade-offs in the concluding section), I don’t think we face a stark choice between narrowly epistemic goods and fairness. We are not epistemically obligated to represent our commitments with absolute fidelity; rather, we are obligated to avoid too flagrant a misrepresentation of our attitude. We’re obligated to avoid implicating that readers should invest much more time and attention in our arguments than we think they deserve. We have leeway to put the best face we can on our claims. As we’ve seen, such leeway is commonly exploited, and its exploitation is accepted. Sanjay implicates a stronger commitment to nonnaturalism than he actually possesses and Rachel allows the reader to think she has a reasonably high credence in the empirical evidence she cites; neither faces censure if they subsequently admit the spin they’ve engaged in. But too flagrant a misrepresentation of authorial attitude and the reader would feel betrayed upon learning of it, because they’ve been asked to invest time and effort into assessing an argument under false pretenses.Footnote ²⁶ Authors like Rachel and Sanjay are almost always careful to hedge, implicating a higher degree of commitment than they actually feel but avoiding asserting outright belief.

We are rationally permitted to put a positive spin on our attitudes toward our claims, so long as we do not so flagrantly misrepresent them as to ask readers to invest a degree of time, effort, and attention that is heavily disproportionate to the degree the author believes is warranted. Just as Sanjay may permissibly imply a degree of commitment to nonnaturalism he doesn’t genuinely feel, and Rachel may downplay her skepticism about the experimental data she cites, so the underconfident author may permissibly imply a higher credence in the success, and the worth, of their argument than they genuinely possess. They do not betray readers’ trust so long as the disproportion between the amount of intellectual charity they call for and their genuine attitudes is not excessive. Were Rachel to be really confident that the data was junk, she’d be obliged to present her argument more cautiously. Equally, the underconfident author violates readers’ and reviewers’ trust by submitting a paper they genuinely believe to be worthless. Impostor syndrome is a real and widespread phenomenon, and it’s not at all unusual for people to suspect or fear that their work is not worth reading. Fortunately, these attitudes allow leeway for positive spin, consistent with submission to journals.Footnote ²⁷

I’ve suggested that the norm of publication, and even submission for publication, is commitment. But aren’t hoaxers like Malicious Deceiver counterexamples? While I’ve suggested that the Sokal hoax and the grievance studies hoax were of dubious permissibility, I’ve also allowed that hoaxes can be permissible. Consider the sting operation aimed at predatory journals, revealing their willingness to publish garbage for a fee (Reference BohannonBohannon, 2013). Hoaxers don’t assert claims they regard as reasonably believed. They may sometimes assert claims they take as reasonably held to follow from widely accepted premises (perhaps they aim to show how ridiculous these premises are) but that would capture only a minority of permissible hoaxes. Hoaxers might instead think that the fields they aim to expose draw bizarre conclusions from reasonable premises. Nor need hoaxers believe that the claims they assert are worth readers’ time and effort.

I think these cases inform us about the scope of the norms for permissible publication, rather than their content. Whatever the norms of assertion are for claims made in ordinary interactions, we need not abide by them when we don’t owe our interlocutor sincerity, let alone truth, and important goals can be achieved by insincere or unjustifiable assertion. The murderer at the door is not owed truth. Similarly, predatory journals, and those that publish pseudoscience, aren’t owed the truth and we might better advance our epistemic goals by lying to them. Malicious Deceiver provides insight into when the norms of assertion are and are not in place, not what these norms are.Footnote ²⁸

In closing this section, let me note how this account diverges in its basis from those put forward by Plakias, Fleisher, and also Reference BarnettBarnett (2019). All three justify their accounts on the basis of consequentialist considerations: they advocate norms of sincerity that will best advance philosophical inquiry. I suspect that the stronger norm of assertion I’ve urged here is also justifiable on this kind of basis. Calibrating our investment of time and effort by reference to such cues (while remaining somewhat sensitive to evidence that they’re insincere) leads to a better community-wide division of labor. However, that’s not the basis from which these norms draw their normative force. Author attitude is evidence, and the relevant norms are epistemic: we’re misrepresenting our evidence when we pretend to a degree of confidence that is far greater than our actual attitude. Unless we’re in a situation in which there is no justified expectation of honesty, we are required to present our evidence honestly. Philosophy can be proud: to the litany of QRPs we’re familiar with from the experimental sciences (HARKing – hypothesizing after the results are known, p-hacking, data dredging, and the rest) we can add one of our own: misrepresenting the evidence by failing to report that we ourselves don’t take our ARCs to be worth readers’ time.