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State Versus Private Ownership: The Conservative Governments and British Civil Aviation 1951–62

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 July 2014

David R. Devereux
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Extract

Studies of post-1945 Britain have often concentrated upon political and foreign policy history and are only just now beginning to address the question of the restructuring of the British economy and domestic policy. Civil aviation, a subject of considerable interest to historians of interwar Britain, has not been given a similar degree of attention in the post-1945 era. Civil aviation policy was, however, given a very high priority by both the 1945-51 Labour government and its Conservative successors. Civil aviation represented part of the effort to return Britain to a peacetime economy by transferring resources from the military into the civil aircraft industry, while at the same time holding for Britain a position of pre-eminence in the postwar expansion of civil flying. As such, aviation was a matter of great interest to reconstruction planners during World War Two, and was an important part of the Attlee government's plans for nationalization.

Civil aviation was expected to grow rapidly into a major global economic force, which accounted for the great attention paid it in the 1940s and 1950s. Its importance to Britain in the postwar era lay in the value of air connections to North America, Europe, and the Empire and Commonwealth, and also in the economic importance of Britain's aircraft industry. In a period when the United States was by far the largest producer of commercial aircraft, the task of Labour and Conservative governments was to maintain a viable British position against strong American competition. What is particularly interesting is the wide degree of consensus that existed in both parties on the role the state should play in the maintenance and enhancement of this position.

Type
Research Article
Information
Albion , Volume 27 , Issue 1 , Spring 1995 , pp. 65 - 85
Copyright
Copyright © North American Conference on British Studies 1995

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References

1 The author wishes to thank the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada and the Summer Grants Committee of St. John Fisher College for research funding for this article. PRO in subsequent notes refers to the Public Record Office, Kew, London. Crown copyright material in the PRO is reproduced by permission of the Controller of Her Majesty's Stationery Office.

2 One authority suggests that £88 million was spent by the Labour and Conservative governments on the aircraft industry between 1946 and 1958. Lyth, Peter J., “A Multiplicity of Instruments: The 1946 Decision to create a separate British European Airline and its effect on civil aircraft production,” Journal of Transport History, 3rd series, 11, 2 (September 1990): 5–15 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

3 PRO, CAB 104/232, Cmd.6561, International Air Transport, White Paper presented October 1944.

4 PRO, CAB 21/2229, Cmd. 6712, December 1945.

5 SirChester, Norman, The Nationalization of British Industry 1945–51 (London, 1975), p. 195 Google Scholar.

6 Hickie, Desmond, “The Government and Civil Aircraft Production 1942-51” (Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 1988), p. 392 Google Scholar.

7 Dobson, Alan, Peaceful Air Warfare: The United States, Britain and the Politics of International Aviation (Oxford, 1991), p. 200 Google Scholar.

8 Hayward, Keith, Government and British Aerospace: A Case Study in Post-War Technology Policy (Manchester, 1983), pp. 13–15 Google Scholar.

9 The Brabazon types were five categories of aircraft recommended by the Brabazon Committee in 1943. Type 1 was an eight engine trans-Atlantic aircraft, the ill-fated Bristol Brabazon; type 2 was an aircraft for European services, which saw service with BEA as the Vickers Viscount and Airspeed Ambassador, type 3 was a four-engine aircraft for empire routes, which was never built, but an amended design became the Bristol Britannia; type 4 was a jet-powered express aircraft that became the De Havilland Comet; type 5 was a short-haul aircraft for colonial services that became the De Havilland Dove and Miles Marathon. PRO, CAB 65/33, W.P.(43)83, 25 February 1943, for the report of the First Brabazon committee and War Cabinet deliberations.

10 For example, in the first quarter of 1948, BOAC carried only 14 passengers on its South African service, versus 485 for South African Airways flying US aircraft. PRO, CAB 21/2234, British civil aircraft situation-memorandum by Lord Privy Seal, July 1948.

11 PRO, CAB 128/13, C.M.(48), 15 July 1948.

12 PRO, PREM 8/934, Report of committee on procedure for ordering civil aircraft, July 1948. In 1949, BOAC also took over BSAA which had suffered badly from the loss of the two Tudors. This left only the two national airlines.

13 PRO, CAB 129/38, C.P.(50)16 ,27 January 1950. Progress of civil aviation under present administration; memorandum by Minister of Civil Aviation.

14 Quoted in Gunn, John, Challenging Horizons: QANTAS 1939–54 (St. Lucia, Queensland, 1987), p. 18 Google Scholar.

15 SirThomas, Miles, Out on a Wing: An Autobiography (London, 1964), p. 277 Google Scholar.

16 BOAC, Annual Report 1951-52, British Airways Archives, Heathrow. BOAC had 72 aircraft in early 1952; 22 Argonauts (Canadian-built DC-4s with Rolls-Royce engines) on Middle and Far Eastern and South American routes; 10 Boeing Stratocruisers on the North American and Caribbean routes; 10 Lockheed Constellations on the Australian services; 20 Handley Page Hermes (an interim type) on Africa routes, and 10 Avro Yorks on freight routes. The airline also reported a 30% increase in traffic, allowing a break-even load factor reduction to 65% from 75%.

17 PRO, T225/215, H.A.(52)37, 26 February 1952.

18 PRO, T224/301, Paper on government statements on civil aviation policy, April 1959; also CAB 128/25, C.C.(52)56th conclusions, 27 May 1952.

19 PRO, T225/434, Report of Working Party January 1954.

20 PRO, CAB 134/1226, E.P.(55)12th meeting, 7 December 1955. Harold Watkinson, the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation, noted in July 1955 that the independents were being squeezed out of the best routes. PRO, AIR 19/20 Civil Aviation Policy-memorandum by the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation, 20 July 1955.

21 PRO, CAB 134/1204, Cabinet committee on civil aviation policy, 28 March 1956.

22 PRO, CAB 134/1204, C.A.P.(56)3, 23 July 1956.

23 PRO, CAB 134/1204, C.A.P.(57)1, 3 January 1957.

24 PRO, CAB 134/1445, C.A.(57) 2nd meeting, 5 June 1957.

25 Dobson, , Peaceful Air Warfare, p. 212 Google Scholar.

26 PRO, CAB 134/844, E.A.(52)69, Economic Policy Committee-Expansion of aircraft exports, 23 May 1952; E.A.(52)23rd meeting, 30 July 1952.

27 The Brabazon remains the largest aircraft ever built in Britain, yet had a passenger capacity of only 60.

28 PRO, CAB 128/24, CC(52)30th conclusions, 13 March 1952.

29 PRO, T225/992.

30 One U.S. magazine commented: “Whether we like it or not, the British are giving the US a drubbing in jet transport” ( Dempster, Derek, The Tale of the Comet [New York, 1958], p. 20)Google Scholar.

31 Hayward, , Government and British Aerospace, p. 19 Google Scholar.

32 PRO, AIR 2/10320, Memorandum on BOAC plans, 13 October 1952.

33 PRO, AVIA 54/856, 30 December 1952.

34 BOAC, Annual Report 1953-54, British Airways Archives, Heathrow.

35 PRO, T225/985, Memorandum on the Comet by Sir Herbert Brittain, 12 October 1954.

36 PRO, T225/286.

37 BOAC, Annual Report 1953-54.

38 Reginald Maudling, the Minister of Supply, commented on the Britannia's engine problems, “particularly when it developed a nasty habit of letting its engines go out one by one in certain tropical weather conditions” ( Maudling, , Memoirs [London, 1978], p. 62)Google Scholar.

39 PRO, T225/286, Meeting between Ministry of Civil Aviation and BOAC, 9 November 1954.

40 PRO, T225/994, Memorandum from BOAC, 15 February 1955.

41 PRO, CAB 128/28, C.C.(55)25th conclusions, 16 March 1955.

42 PRO, T225/987, Letter and Memo from Boyd-Carpenter and Dehavilland, March 1955.

43 Hayward, , Government and British Aerospace, p. 21 Google Scholar.

44 PRO, T225/988, 6 September 1956.

45 PRO, Suppl 6/26, Letter to Minister of Supply from Chairman, BOAC, 26 July 1956.

46 Winston Bray, History of BOAC, unpublished company history, British Airways Archives, Heathrow, p. 222.

47 PRO, T225/989, Memo on Comet IV, 13 June 1957.

48 PRO, PREM 11/2242, 4 October 1958.

49 Sir Miles Thomas, chairman at the time, said in his memoirs that the V1000, intended originally as a military transport version of the Valiant bomber, was not wanted by the RAF; therefore a civil-only version would be much more expensive than the American Boeing 707, which had a successful military counterpart produced in large numbers. BOAC was nevertheless criticized for not supporting British industry ( Thomas, , Out on a Wing, p. 328 Google Scholar).

50 Maudling, , Memoirs, p. 62ffGoogle Scholar.

51 Whitney Straight, who replaced Sir Miles Thomas as Chairman of BOAC, wrote to Sir James Helmore at the Ministry of Supply in March 1956 that all major airlines were ordering American 707s and DC-8s and the BOAC could not compete with the turboprop Britannia. He recommended the purchase of the 707, a request approved by the government in October 1956, but Helmore nevertheless scrawled “what ought we to do about this insolent letter?” (PRO, AVIA 63/1 Letter from Straight to Helmore, 8 March 1956). Still, Harold Watkinson, minister of transport and civil aviation, later noted: “It was only natural that, after the problems with the Comet, then with the Britannia, there should be a strong ‘Buy American’ school within the Corporation” ( Watkinson, Viscount, Blueprint for Survival [London, 1976], p. 44 Google Scholar). Thomas resigned as chairman of BOAC in 1956 after a row with Watkinson over the airline's freedom as a nationalized company.

52 Hayward, , Government and British Aerospace, p. 27 Google Scholar. The chairman of BEA, Lord Douglas, visited U.S. aircraft factories on a tour in October 1956, and believed them to have the world market sown up: “UK failure to build this type does not mean that we have merely withdrawn from building a limited class of aircraft for the North Atlantic. It means that Britain will fall out of the front line long-haul business altogether.” He suggested that Britain should build a short-haul jet instead (PRO, AVIA 63/14, Summary of report on Lord Douglas's visit to the U.S., October 1956).

53 The committee's other members were the chancellor of the exchequer, the minister of labour; secretary of state for air; president of the Board of Trade; minister of transport and civil aviation; and the minister of supply (PRO, AVIA 63/27).

54 PRO, CAB 134/1446, C.A.(59)lst meeting, 2 February 1959.

55 Hayward, Keith, The British Aircraft Industry (Manchester, 1989), p. 74 Google Scholar.

56 PRO, PREM 11/2597, Memo to the prime minister by Lord Mills, 1 September 1959.

57 PRO, CAB 134/1447, C.A.(0)(59)6, 26 August 1959.

58 PRO, T 225/1071, A.I. (W.P.)34, 25 March 1958, Aircraft Industry Working Party (Padmore committee) draft report.

59 Hayward, , British Aircraft Industry, pp. 64–66 Google Scholar.

60 Ibid,, p. 69.

61 Ibid., p. 71.

62 PRO, T 225/1071, A.I.(WP)34 25 March 1959.

63 PRO, CAB 134/1446, C.A.(59) 12th meeting, 8 September 1959.

64 PRO, CAB 134/1446, C.A.(59)12th meeting, 8 September 1959. @FN

65 Hayward, , British Aircraft Industry, p. 75 Google Scholar.

66 Hayward, , Government and British Aerospace, p. 40 Google Scholar.

67 PRO, T 225/304, Gen.701/1st meeting, 21 December 1959.

68 Hayward, , Government and British Aerospace, p. 42 Google Scholar. Hawker Siddeley received £5.1 million to develop its Trident IE short-range jet; BAC received £9.7 million for the 111 and £9.4 million to improve the VC-10. Only the twin-jet BAC 111 sold widely internationally; both the Trident and VC-10, although technically excellent, were designed very closely to BEA and BOAC specifications, respectively, and thus had few sales apart from the two national corporations.

69 Hayward, , British Aircraft Industry, p. 81 Google Scholar.

70 Bray, , History of BOAC, p. 224 Google Scholar.

71 Vickers also suffered a loss of £10 million on its Vanguard design, a turboprop aircraft privately developed for BEA but which also did not sell well overseas (PRO, CAB 134/1446, C.A.(59)30 ad hoc meeting, 9 July 1959).

72 PRO, CAB 134/1446, C.A.(0)(59)6, 26 August 1959 Report of Interdepartmental Study Group on Aircraft Prospects.

73 Hayward, , Government and British Aerospace, p. 47 Google Scholar.

74 Ibid., p. 48.