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2 Jonas Robitscher, The Powers of Psychiatry 99 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1980).Google Scholar

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27 E.g., Willard Gaylin et al., Doing Good: The Limits of Benevolence (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978); Willard Gaylin, Caring (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 976).Google Scholar

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29 Id. at 11.Google Scholar

30 Id.Google Scholar

31 id.Google Scholar