Hostname: page-component-76fb5796d-vvkck Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-04-26T10:46:22.009Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

National Oil Corp. v. Libyan Sun Oil Co.

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 February 2017

Joseph D. Pizzurro*
Affiliation:
Of the New York Bar

Extract

Petitioner, the Libyan National Oil Corp. (NOC), filed the petition to confirm an arbitral award rendered in Paris against Libyan Sun Oil Co. (LSOC), a Delaware corporation. The petition was based on the UN Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (Convention). LSOC opposed the petition on the grounds that NOC was not entitled to access to U.S. courts because of the state of relations between the United States and Libya and that the Libyan Sanctions Regulations prevented NOC from maintaining its claim in the absence of a license from the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control. In addition, LSOC argued that confirmation of the award should be denied under various provisions of the Convention, including the “public policy” defense embodied in Article V(2)(b). The district court (per Latchum, J.) held that NOC had standing to bring the petitión and that the defenses set forth in the Convention were inapplicable. The award was thus confirmed.

Type
International Decisions
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of International Law 1991

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 June 10, 1958, 21 UST 2517, TIAS No. 6997, 330 UNTS 38 (codified at 9 U.S.C. §§201–208 (1988)).

2 51 Fed. Reg. 2462 (1986); 31 C.F.R. §§550.101–.901 (1990).

3 46 Fed. Reg. 60,712 (1981).

4 376 U.S. 398 (1964).

5 NOC sought and obtained such a license in response to LSOC’s original assertion that the failure to do so barred NOC from pursuing its claim.

6 The regulation in question provides, in pertinent part, as follows: “Unless licensed or authorized pursuant to this part, any attachment, judgment, decree, lien, execution, garnishment or other judicial process is null and void with respect to any property in which on or since 4:10 p.m. e.s.t., January 8, 1986, there existed an interest of the Government of Libya.” 31 C.F.R. §550.210(e) (1990).

7 See, e.g., Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Fernandez, 741 F.2d 355 (11th Cir. 1984); Itek Corp. v. First Nat’l Bank of Boston, 704 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1983); Vishipco Line v. Chase Manhattan Bank, No. 77 Civ. 1251 (RLC) (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 1978); National Aeromotive v. Government & State of Iran, 499 F.Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1980).

8 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1706 (West Supp. 1989). Under the IEEPA, the President is vested with broad authority with respect to the control and disposition of foreign assets in the United States upon the declaration of a national emergency. Pursuant to this authority, President Reagan issued two executive orders imposing economic sanctions on Libya and authorizing and directing the Secretary of the Treasury to promulgate the Libyan Sanctions Regulations. See Exec. Order No. 12,543, 51 Fed. Reg. 875 (1986); Exec. Order No. 12,544, id. at 1235.

9 453 U.S. 654 (1981).

10 733 F.Supp. 800, 817 (quoting Mutual Fire, Marine & Inland Ins. Co. v. Norad Reinsurance Co., 868 F.2d 52, 56 (3d Cir. 1989)).

11 508 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1974).

12 Id. at 974.

13 733 F.Supp. at 820.