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Railway Politics And The Open Door In China, 1916-1917

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 April 2017

Paul Hibbert Clyde*
Affiliation:
University of Kentucky

Extract

The policies of the so-called great Powers toward China in the twentieth century have frequently given rise to serious diplomatic disputes. Fortunately, in many cases, these differences have tended to clarify conflicting interpretations of policy, and by so doing have led to a better understanding of principles on which more complete agreement might be achieved. Conspicuous among such cases is the policy usually referred to as the Open Door. From 1899 until 1922 the Open Door in China was a subject of almost constant international friction, due, in part, to a lack of common agreement as to the precise commitments to which the Powers were pledged. Specific cases of disagreement led finally to a better appreciation of the principles involved, and in 1922 the Open Door policy was given its first treaty definition. The following pages are an attempt to analyze a series of events in 1916-17 which demonstrated the wide gulf between American and European interpretations of the Open Door, and the imperative need of a new definition of the policy. The essential background of the discussion may be stated briefly.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of International Law 1931

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References

1 United States Foreign Relations,1899, pp. 128-143.

2 See the memorandum of Roekhill, W. W.to Hay, John, Aug. 28, 1899 (Hay papers),printed in A. L. P. Dennis, Adventures in American Diplomacy (New York, 1928), pp.208 208.Google Scholar

3 United States Foreign Relations, 1900, p. 299.

4 Ibid., 1899, p. 142.

5 British and Foreign State Papers (1900-01), Vol. XCIV, p. 897.

6 Thayer, W. R. , Life and Letters of John Hay, Vol. II, p. 248; British Documents on the Origins of the War, I, p. 331, and Vol. II, pp. 1 1. For a fuller discussion of the relationship of the agreement to the Hay open door, see Yamato Ichihashi, The Washington Conference and After, p. 186.Google Scholar

7 United States Foreign Relations,1902, pp. 275-275.

8 Ibid., 1908, pp. 510-512.

9 United States Foreign Relations,1916, pp. 181181.

10 Ibid., p. 190.

11 Ibid. The American “ rights” to which Minister Reinsch referred rested upon a preliminary agreement of Oct. 6, 1909, between the American Banking Group and the Manchurian authorities, regarding the construction of a railway from Chinchow to Aigun.It was never finally ratified. Russia was instrumental in blocking the construction of this road, and had suggested that China might give the American Group a concession for a railroad from Kalgan to Urga.

12 Ibid., p. 191.

13 Ibid., p. 191.

14 United States Foreign Relations,1916, p. 193. It will be recalled that the Chinese claimed that the Chino-Japanese treaties and notes of 1915 were invalid because they were not submitted to Parliament.

15 Ibid., p. 194.

16 Ibid., p. 198.

17 See MacMurray, Vol. I, p. 204 (The Scott-Mouraviev notes)

18 See Dennis, A. L. P. , Adventures in American Diplomacy, p. 353.Google Scholar

19 United States Foreign Relations,1916, p. 205.

20 The proposed Japanese lines rested upon the Chino-Japanese railway agreement of Oct.5, 1913 (MacMurray, Vol. II, p. 1054); the proposed Russian line was said to rest on an agreement between China and the Russo-Asiatic Bank, of Mar. 27, 1916.

21 United States Foreign Relations,1917, p. 171.

22 Ibid

23 Ibid., p. 187.

24 Ibid., 1915, pp. 105-111.

25 United States Foreign Relations,1917, pp. 183-184.

26 Ibid., p. 184.

27 Ibid., p. 185.

28 United States Foreign Relations,1917, pp. 187-188.

29 Ibid., p. 188.

30 “Hereafter, if there be any railroad to be built or mine to be operated in Kwangsi and if recourse must then be had to foreign capital, we are fully disposed to borrow first from French capital.”

31 United States Foreign Relations.1917, pp. 189-190.

32 Ibid., p. 190.

33 United States Foreign Relations,1917, pp. 191-194.

34 This memorandum was in protest against certain monopolistic privileges which it was claimed had been granted by the Russian Government to the Russo-Chinese Bank.

35 United States Foreign Relations, 1917, pp. 195-196. Downing Street had refuse diplomatic support to the British construction firm of Pauling and Co., in 1907 when it sought to build the Hsinmintun-Fakumen Railway in the Japanese sphere. Similar examples might be cited.

36 United States Foreign Relations,1917, p. 196.

37 Ibid., p. 197.

38 United States Foreign Relations,1917, p. 198.

39 United States Foreign Relations,1917, p. 198.

40 Treat, P. J., The Far East (1928), p. 444.Google Scholar

41 The Consortium, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Division of International Law (Washington, 1921), pp. 31-34.>

42 Conference on the Limitation of Armament, Washington (1922), pp. 1624-25.