In December of 2003 the Medicare Modernization Act (MMA) added section 223 to the Internal Revenue Code, creating a federal tax subsidy for money contributed to (and earnings accumulated on) health savings accounts, or HSAs. Though public attention was largely focused at that time on the provisions of the MMA creating the new Medicare prescription drug benefit, the MMA was also a major victory for advocates of “consumer-driven health care” who believe that HSAs have the potential to control the cost and improve the quality of health care in the United States, and perhaps even to increase health care access.

Consumer-driven health care advocates believe that the key reason health care costs are out of control in the United States is that most Americans are too generously insured. They believe the solution is to increase consumer sensitivity to cost and effectiveness by making people spend their own money for health care.

Scholars of differing political affiliation and the President's Council on Bioethics have called for regulation of assisted reproductive technology (ART) that would emulate many aspects of the regulatory system of the United Kingdom, in particular that of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority. Specifically, scholars and the Council have argued that research in the U.S. involving gametes and human embryos lacks consistent oversight. While the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) produces an annual ART success rate report, submission of data is guaranteed only by the promise that non-responders will be noted as such in the appendix of CDC's report, and most ART clinics publish success rates on the Internet in a much more recognized forum: website advertising. Moreover, U.S. law does not require licensing or accreditation of infertility programs and few regulations govern embryo research. While the large majority of clinics report their success rate data, and many follow practice standards and apply for accreditation from private agencies, these practices are strictly voluntary. Clinics failing to report their success rates face no legal consequence.

We don't care enough about prisoners’ welfare. We should care deeply because, as two prominent commentators on the history of prisons have said, “Prisoners are ourselves writ large or small. And, as such, they should not be subjected to suffering exceeding fair expiation for the crimes for which they have been convicted.” Well over two million persons are imprisoned in America today. We imprison a higher percentage of our population than any other country. Those we imprison are disproportionately poor, of color, uneducated, and sick. They have chronic conditions, mental illnesses, sexually transmitted diseases and other infectious diseases. They usually receive inadequate health care—and sometimes shockingly poor care.6 It has always been so. Prison reformers have argued for decent prison care based on humanitarian principles since the founding of the Republic, and, notwithstanding some notable achievements, have failed to achieve decent conditions. In the last fifty years, reformers shifted to individual rights arguments based on prisoners’ constitutional rights.

Consider a mother of two who works full-time as a secretary in order to provide for her family. For several months in early 2000, she had excruciating lower back painthe consequences, she believed, of playing high-school and college fieldhockey. At work, she was unable to stand up from her chair without tremendous pain; at home, she was unable to sleep soundly. After visiting several physicians and undergoing a battery of diagnostic tests, the need for surgery became apparent. She consulted an orthopedic surgeon and was impressed with his qualifications. After informing her employer and seeking the advice of her family and friends, she consented to surgery. What the mother of two did not know, however, was that she had entrusted her life and livelihood to a surgeon who, in the ten years preceding her surgery, had settled twelve medical malpractice claims for an average of just under $300,000 per claim.

Calvin Coolidge had a successful run in politics for over twenty years before ultimately becoming president of the United States in 1923. Throughout Coolidge's first term as president, he worked long, hard hours, was active in Congress, and maintained a strong relationship with the media. This changed, however, during the second term of his presidency. Less than a month after his second-term election, Coolidge's son died of blood poisoning. This traumatic event caused the President to enter into a deep depression. In his autobiography, Coolidge admitted that when his son died, the power and glory of the presidency went with him. His grief, which has since been coined pathological grief, had an effect on the President's mind, body and spirit. President Coolidge lost interest in his job and began sleeping fourteen hours a day, ultimately earning a reputation as one of the most ineffectual presidents ever to hold office. His depression rendered him incapable of making decisions, and as a result most of his duties were delegated to members of his Cabinet. Though the White House knew for four years that Coolidge's depression rendered him incompetent, he remained in office until the end of his second term.