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Corporate Political Strategies

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 January 2009

Graham K. Wilson
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Extract

With one partial exception, political scientists have carried out little empirical research on corporate political activity. That one exception is political action committees, PACs. Perhaps because of the ready availability of apparently reliable data on corporate political contributions, most empirical studies of business political activity have concentrated on PACs. The study of PACs is not, however, synonymous with the study of corporate political behaviour. Indeed, not all corporations have PACs; Sabato estimated that almost half the largest manufacturing corporations did not. At least one politically active corporation, Du Pont, refused for many years to establish a PAC.

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Notes and Comments
Information
British Journal of Political Science , Volume 20 , Issue 2 , April 1990 , pp. 281 - 288
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1990

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References

1 For excellent research on PACs see Sabato, Larry, PAC Power: Inside the World of Political Action Committees (New York: W. W. Norton, 1984)Google Scholar; Masters, Marick F. and Keim, Gerald D., ‘Determinants of PAC Participation Among Large Corporations’, Journal of Politics, 47 (1985), 1158–73CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Andres, Gary, ‘Business Involvement in Campaign Finance: Factors Influencing the Decision to Form a PAC’, PS (Spring 1985), 213–20.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

2 Sabato, , PAC Power Inside: the World of Political Action Committees, p. 164.Google Scholar

3 This is one of the important general conclusions of Sabato's book.

4 Olson, Mancur, The Logic of Collective Action, Public Goods and the Theories of Groups (New York: Schocken Books, 1968)Google Scholar: Wilson, James Q., Political Organizations (New York: Basic Books, 1974)Google Scholar: Moe, Terry, The Organization of Interests (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980).Google Scholar

5 Wilson, Graham K., ‘Why Is There No Corporatism In the United States?’ in Lehmbruch, Gerhard and Schmitter, Philippe, eds, Patterns of Corporatist Policymaking (London and Beverley Hills: Sage, 1982), pp. 219–36Google Scholar; Salisbury, Robert, ‘Why No Corporatism in America?’ in Schmitter, Philippe and Lehmbruch, Gerhard, eds, Trends Toward Corporatist Intermediation (London and Beverly Hills: Sage, 1979), pp. 213–30.Google Scholar

6 Grant, Wyn, ‘The Organization of Capitalists in Britain's “Company State”: A Comparative Perspective’, paper presented to the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC, 09 1988.Google Scholar

7 Wilson, Graham K., Interest Groups in the United States (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1981)Google Scholar, esp. chap. 4; Vogel, David, ‘The Power of Business in America: A Re-Appraisal’, British Journal of Political Science, 13 (1983), 19–45.CrossRefGoogle Scholar See also Edsall, Thomas, The New Politics of Inequality (New York: W. W. Norton, 1984)Google Scholar and Berry, Jeffrey, The Interest Group Society (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown, 1984)Google Scholar for similar interpretations.

8 Truman, David, The Governmental Process (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1951).Google Scholar

9 Lowi, Theodore, The End of Liberalism (New York: W. W. Norton, 1979).Google Scholar

10 Vogel, David, Fluctuating Fortunes (New York: Basic Books, 1989).Google Scholar