9 Gerretson malees the following pertinent points (Vol. II, pp. 329, 330; Vol. III, pp. 11–14): Marcus Samuel, head of the British Shell interests and a power in British politics, urged upon the government the importance of fuel oil (which was the main product of Shell's fields in Borneo). At the same time, however, there was reluctance on the part of the British government to become deeply involved in support of a business enterprise. The Royal Dutch-Shell was decidedly opposed to political pressuring, and Deterding was sensitive to excessive British influence. The British fleet, moreover, did not convert to fuel oil until 1917. From these various factors cited by Gerretson, the tentative conclusion may be drawn that prior to World War I the role of the British government in Royal Dutch affairs was minimal. However, historians generally agree, and the author's own research confirms, that there was certainly official British interest in overseas oil reserves prior to World War I. Both Sir John Fisher and Sir Winston Churchill, as First Sea Lords of the Admiralty, vigorously urged the acquisition of an adequate source of petroleum supply for the British navy prior to World War I. The British government's purchase of a large share of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company in 1913 is an example. The absence of conclusive documentation precludes any final judgment of this question at this time.
